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ABSTRACT
This thesis offers an expository study and an examination
of Hsun-tze's main thought, and an investigation of his position in
Chinese history.
His theory that Man's Nature is Evil has been a focus of
dispute; nevertheless, the unfavourable charges against him are often
too brief to explain its theoretical difficulties. His theories of
knowledge and of politics have recently attracted considerable attent¬
ion. However, scholarly attentions have been selective: it is not
possible to properly understand the main aspects of Hsun-tze's thought
without attempting a comprehensive study of his essential system of
thought. His theories of knowledge and of politics are only of
secondary concern in his philosophical system. His theory of the
Mind, however, is the very essence of his thought. This theory has
been scarcely studied, and the interrelations of his main theories
have also been neglected.
The First Part of this thesis attempts to investigate
his theories of human nature, of knowledge, of Tao or the Ultimate
Principle, and of politics and to show how they are linked. These
studies make up a systematic account of his theory of the Mind.
The Second Part examines the theoretical difficulties of his theories,
points out their structural deficiencies and evaluates their philo¬
sophical contribution. The Epilogue aims at revealing the spirit of
his thought, in order to investigate his significance in Chinese
philosophy and culture. Some arguments in favour of Hsun-tze
against his critics are presented here, though such a defence is
not the main purpose of this thesis. That purpose is, primarily
and ultimately, an attempt to establish an appraisal of Hsun-tze's
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A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STUDIES OF HSUN-TZE1
In China,the studies of Hsun-tze have been significant
in the following stages:
(1) From Hsun-tze's time to the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. -
220 A.D.), scholars mentioned or discussed Mencius (372-289 B.C.)
and Hsun-tze as related Confucianists. The Han historian Ssu-ma
Ch'ien, for example, wrote 'The Collective Biographies of Mencius
2
and Hsun-tze' in his work THE RECORD OF HISTORY , which was written
not much more than a hundred years after Hsun-tze's death. It is
obvious that Ssu-ma Ch'ien considered Mencius and Hsun-tze to be the
two most important Confucian thinkers after Confucius.
(2) Han Yu, an important literary writer in the T'ang Dynasty
(618-907 A.D.) was the first to impugn the value of Hsun-tze's philo¬
sophy. He considered that Hsun-tze did not understand the meaning
3 , .
of Tao . However, his criticism was too brief to be important as a
study of Hsun-tze's thought, for he did not present any further argu-
4
ment for his opposition. Although another T'ang scholar, Yang Liang ,
1. In cases where no ambiguity is involved, I have omitted accents
over vowels, e.g. Hsun-tze.
2- ^3 Ssu-ma Ch'ien. s $»J >(jj. SHIH CHI
Meng-Hsun Lieh-Chuan.
-fft oo^ T_ SS3. ifSp! fti- Han Yu (768-824). In his essay Yuan-Tao
P'ien, he wrote ' Yao passed it (i.e. Tao) to ^ Shun;. Shun to j^9 Yu;
Yu to T'ang; T' ang to JE. King Wen, King Wu and 7*
Duke Chou; King Wen, King Wu and Duke Chou to Confucius and Confucius
to Mencius. After Mencius' death, no one succeeded to the tradition.
Hsun (-tze) and 1%.j|L Yang (Hsiung) chose what they liked (about
Tao); and what they had chosen were not what was the essence (of Tao),
and what they had said (about Tao) was incomplete and ambiguous.'
4. /0f- Yang Liang. His date was not known. However, he was
the first Chinese scholar who annotated Hsun-tze's work.
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annotated Hsun-tze's work, (preface dated 8.18 A.D.), and became the
authority on which all later texts were based, Hsun-tze has not been
in favour among scholars since then.
(3) During the Sung Dynasty (960-1279), the Yuan Dynasty
(1277-1367) and Ming Dynasty (1386-1644), there were scarcely any
scholars who specialized in the study of Hsun-tze, nor were there
any scholars in favour of him. A scholar named Hsu Chi criticized
5
Hsun-tze's theory of Man's Evil Nature . Su Shih, an important
literary writer of the Sung Dynasty, considered Hsun-tze's theory of
6
Man's Evil Nature to be an evil and confusing theory . The Ch'eng
brothers, the important Sung philosophers, also considered Hsun-tze's
theories 'most biased and impure (with regard to the tradition of
7
Confucianism)' . Chu Hsi, another important Sung philosopher, agreed
8
with the Ch'eng brothers' criticism . In fact, since then, the
8. :fjf[ Hsu Chi (1028-1103). Hsu Chi considered that Hsun-tze
suggested his^theories 'without clear-minded thinking'. For details,
please see %jj Hsun-tze Pien of n-Ting Hsueh-An of
^ Jc SUNG-YUAN HSUEH-AN by pSt JL Huang Tzung-Hsi
(1610-1695). >
6. Su Shih (1036-1101). In his essay
Hsun-Ch'ing Lun, he wrote,
'Hsun Ch'ing liked to suggest heresies and he never gave
way to others. He dared to make high-sounding assertions and
he never showed concern about others. His theories were
greeted with surprise by fools and delight by mean-spirited
men ( /j-> Hsiao-Jen) ... I think he must be extremely
stubborn, haughty and over-confident ... He ( Li Shih) did
not know that Hsun-tze hit upon his sudden ideas for his own
pleasure ... By means of Hsun-tze's theories, Li Shih
created chaos in the world.' ( ^ jft , i|§- 5^ /U
SU TUNG-P'O CHI, YING-CHA0 CHI XVIII, Chiian IX)'
7. "fit Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085) and g>|| Ch'eng Yi (1033-1107).
it ^ CHIN-SSU LU, edited by Chu Hsi, Ch'eng Hao's
views on Hsun-tze are quoted as follows: v
'Hsun Ch'ing is an extremely brilliant man, yet his flaws
(in his theories) are many . . . Hsun-tze is extremely
biased and impure (with regard to the tradition of Confucian¬
ism) . Only the one sentence that Man's Nature is Evil makes
his theories lose the essence (of the Confucian ethics). '
( ^ CHIN-SSU LU, Chiian XIV)
Chu Hsi (1130-1200). He quoted Ch'eng Hao's criticism of
Hsun-tze in his work CHIN-SSU LU.
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reputation of Hsun-tze's theories sank into obscurity, and most
scholars of this period considered them to be 'a branch of unorthodox
g
theories' whereas Mencius' theories, on the contrary, enjoyed great
attention.
(4) In the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), the studies of
Hsun-tze's philosophy saw a flourishing revival. Yao Nai refuted
Su Shih's charge against Hsun-tze's theories10. Ch'ien Ta - Hsin
and Hao I-Hsing, two important scholars of the Ch'ing Dynasty, argued
that Hsun-tze's philosophy did not deviate from the essence of
Confucius' and Mencius' theories1"1'. Other Ch'ing scholars such as
Lu Wen-Ch'ao, Hsieh Yung and Wang Nien-Sun offered new revised
editions of HSUN-TZE12, Wang Chung edited A GENERAL DISCUSSION OF
HSUN-TZE13, Wang Hsien-Ch'ien compiled A COLLECTION OF EXPLANATIONS
OF HSUN-TZE14 in 1891, and Chang T'ai-Yen discussed the theories of
15
both Mencius and Hsun-tze from a Buddhist viewpoint . These schol¬
ars all tried to re-evaluate Hsun-tze's theories from a sympathetic
9. ^ Tsa-Hsueh. Hsiung Sze-Lii (1635-1709),
for example, listed Hsun-tze's work as Tsa-Hsueh in his work
HSUEH-T'UNG.
10. ~$Lt »f^ Yao Nai (1731-1815). In his essay Li Shih
Lun he wrote,
'Hsun Ch'ing expounds the theories of the early (sage)
kings and highly praises the merits of the Confucianists.
Although his theories occasionally have successes and
failures, they as a whole outline the principles of rul¬
ing the country. Now Mr. Su considered that the disaster
brought by Li Shih was the fault of Hsun-Ch'ing; is this
not nonsense?' ( jfrf yjr JjL jiL HSI-PAO HSUAN
CH'UAN-CHI, Wen Chi, Chiian I) ^
11. Ch'ien Ta- Hsin (1728-1804). ^ Hao I-Hsing
(1757-1825). For details of their arguments, please see the
Appendix of HSUN-TZE.
12. JS -;r *7$ Lu Wen-Ch'ao (1717-1795). "flj^ *Jj% Hsieh Yung (1719-
1795). jJL ^ Wang Nien-Sun (1744-1832).
13. Wang Chung (1744-1794) f^HSUN-TZE T' UNG-LUN.
1-4. -^W^-Wang Hsien-Ch'ien (1842-1917) 3?^$$ HSUN-TZE CHI-CHIEH.
15. Chang T'ai-Yen (1868-1935). For details, please see
Chang's |gjj KUO-KU LUN-HENG.
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standpoint. However, T'an Szu-T'ung, another important Ch'ing scholar,
charged Hsun-tze's theory of politics with encouraging the two thousand
16
year old absolute or despotic monarchy in China
(5) From the fall of the Ch'ing Dynasty in 1911 to the present
day, Chinese scholars tended to pay much attention to Hsun-tze's theo-
17 18
ries of names (Ming) , and theory of knowledge . Some found
19
psychology in his thought . Besides annotated editions of HSUN-TZE,
there were books of introduction, exposition and criticism of Hsun-tze's
20
philosophy . Different aspects of his theories were also discussed.
There was a mixture ,of praise and dispraise given by these scholars.
Most of them, however, did not grasp the essence of his thought. They
16. T'an Szu-T'ung (1865-1898). In his work
JEN HSUEH, he wrote,
'Confucius' theories were made impure by Hsun-tze. . . .
Hsun seized the chance, assumed the identity of a Confucianist
and tarnished the theories of Confucius. . . . The politics
of these two thousand years was a copy of the politics of the
Ch'in Dynasty, and it was the politics of bandit leaders. The
learning of these two thousand years was the learning of Hsun-
tze, and it was the learning of the country hypocrites. It is
only the bandit leaders who know how to take advantage of
country hypocrites and it is only country hypocrites who labour
to flatter the bandits.' ( ^fp[. fs) # ft ^ m
T1AN SZU-T'UNG CH'UAN-CHI, JEN HSUEH, Chuan I) ^
:e
se see
17 Ming. Jp:^ ^ Liang Ch'i-Ch 'ao, for example, wrote
$ IE- 4?. M) HSUN-TZE CHENG-MING P'lEN. For details, pleas<
Liang's YINC—PING-SHI WEN-CHI.
18. Chao Wen-Hsiu, for example, wrote a book on
$9 1% HSUN-TZE TI CHIH-SHIH FANG-FA LUN) published in 1974.
19. Jsjp] Hu Shih, for example, mentioned Hsun-tze's psychology
worj{ vr Si -£ ^ ^ ^ CHUNG-KUO KU-TAI CHE-HSUEH SHIH,in hispp.40-46.
20. A list of important works on Hsun-tze is given in the bibliography
of this thesis.
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only offered a general outline of his theories. There were also a
21
few important philosophical studies only
Hsun-tze is the last of the Pre-Ch'in Confucianists, and
his teaching contains some of the most systematically structured
thinking in his times. It is most readably presented in a fine
literary form. His thinking is rich in philosophical value. His
historical destiny has not enjoyed the same attention as was given to
Confucius and Mencius, and whether the critics have given Hsun-tze a
fair judgement is also doubtful. The purpose of this thesis is to
re-evaluate his philosophy in a more careful manner.
THE CONTENT OF THIS THESIS
The first Part of this thesis offers an exposition of
Hsun-tze's philosophy. Its main themes are set out in four chapters,
namely: (1) theory of human nature, (2) theory of knowledge or of
22 23
the Epistemological Mind , (3j theory of Heaven and that of Tao or
24 25
the Ultimate Principle or of the Ultimate Mind , and (4) theory
21. It may be suggested that two of the most important philosophical
studies of Hsun-tze's thought are m & & Lao Sse-Kwang's
^ ^ CHUNG-KUO CHE-HSUEH SHIH or A HISTORY OFJDHINESE
PHILOSOPHY and T' ang Chtin-I's ■4> a =$ ^ fapr-MMb.
CHUNG-KUO CHE-HSUEflYUAN-LUN:YUAN-HSINGP'IEN AND YUAN-TAO P ' IEN , The
former charged Hsun-tze with leading Pre-Ch'in Confucianism astray
and bringing the Pre-Ch'in cultural spirit to a state of 'disillusion¬
ment' (please see Lao's CHE-HSUEH SHIH, pp.276-299). The latter
interpreted the important chapters of Hsun-tze and concluded that what
Hsun-tze was concerned with was the principles of rites and righteous¬
ness as 'a way of administering all classes with culture'. (See
Tan's YUAN-HSING P'IEN, pp.47-64 and YUAN-TAO P'lEN, pp.437-503).
22. Please see p.42, Note 55.
23. Please see p.2, Note 8.
24. Please see p.24, Note 37.
25. Please see p.42, Note 56.
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of politics, which may be considered to be reorganisation or
systematization of data for criticism of the next Part. Most schol¬
ars in the past who critisized Hsun-tze often failed to make an overall
connection among his theories*'6. They often argued against his theory
27
of the Evil of Man's Nature , or discussed his theory of exaltation of
28
rites and teachers, or attacked his theory of Wei or Artifice . His
theory of the Mind, both the Epistemological and the Ultimate Mind, was
29
also scarcely studied ' . In this Part an attempt is made to explain
the following:
(1) His theory of Evil of Man's Nature serves as an introduction
which leads to the core of his philosophy - the theory of the Mind.
(2) His theory of the Epistemological Mind serves to pave the
way for further investigation of his theory of the Ultimate Mind or the
Sage Mind.
26. Scholars such as Han-Yu (768-824), who mentioned Hsun-tze with an
opposing attitude in only a few sentences, did not offer a detailed
study of Hsun-tze's theory or the reason of his opposition.
27. For this theory please see pp.3-16.
28. Please see p.10, Note 28.
29. Scholars in the past hardly ever gave discussions of Hsun-tze's
theory of the Mind. A modern scholar, Lao Sse-Kwang, critizes
Hsun-tze's philosophy with a traditional unfavourable attitude. His
study of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind is concerned only with the Mind
as an observer of knowledge or the Epistomological Mind interpreted in
this thesis and fails to discuss Hsun-tze's theory of the moral func¬
tioning of the Mind or the Ultimate Mind interpreted in this thesis.
T'ang Chun-I, another modern important philosopher, gives a brief dis¬
cussion of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind with a much fairer viewpoint.
However he only mentions the nature of the Mind and he considers that
in Hsun-tze's theory, the nature of the Mind is morally good or j||-
Shan. He therefore concludes that Hsun-tze fails to give a transcend¬
ent reflection upon the nature of the Mind and to see the moral good or
Shan in.it. His study of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind must be con¬
sidered incomplete in the exposition of the theory. (A further discuss¬
ion on this point in Part II, chapter VII of this thesis.) Hu Shih
(1892-1962) offers a discussion of Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind with a
genuinely psychological viewpoint. Other scholarly works on Hsun-tze's
theories often neither give an exposition of his theory of the Mind nor
give an examination of it.
xvii
(3) The central theme of his philosophy lies in the discussion
of moral practice, or the Way of a Sage, which is also the Way of the
30
Mind to know and practise the Ultimate Principle of Man, or simply
speaking, morality. The observation of rites and righteousness and
the following of teachers may be considered to be some external guide
of moral practices. However, what Hsun-tze is concerned with are
31
the internal changes of the Mind from the state of Obsessions to
32
that of a Sage . External moral education or training may be con¬
sidered to be of possible assistance to one's internal struggle for
moral cultivation and perfection.
(4) His theory of politics is mainly the description of the
33
external projection of the virtue of a Sage-King " to society. This
is the minor theme of his philosophical system, compared to the theory
of the Mind.
However, in this Part, what has been attempted is to
systematize his theory without missing his meaning and essential ideas.
In the second Part an attempt has been made to give a close
examination of his four main theories.
(1) Certain mistakes are made through his concentration on
proving his belief that Man's Nature is Evil. Secondly his theory
34
of Transformation of Man's Nature , which is based immediately upon
30. Please see Part I, Chapter III, Section 2, B.
31. Please see p.2, Note 10.
32. Please see p.2, Note 11.
33. Please see p.6, Note 22.
34. Please see p.l, Note 3.
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his theory that Man's Nature if Evil, inevitably also has its
theoretical difficulties. Thirdly, in his theory of Wei or Artifice,
a single-minded development of only good Artifice is also a crucial point
which leads to the incompleteness and inconciseness of his thought.
(2) As to his theory of knowledge, or more precisely speaking,
that of names and virtue, it might be suggested that his theory of the
Epistemological Mind is an incomplete theory of psychology, his theory
of reasoning is one part of logic, and his theory of rectification of
names is designed mainly for a moral rectification or rectifying names in
terms of moral concepts. In short, his theories do touch on the theory
of knowledge in general, yet his intention is not ambitious. They only
serve as a preliminary chapter to his theory of the Ultimate Mind.
(3) As to his theory of Heaven, he tries to dispel man's
superstitions of a supernatural heaven, and to introduce a proper concept
of Heaven which is, to him, of a commonsense nature. It therefore can¬
not lead to cosmic metaphysics, religion and pure science. His theory
of the Way of the Mind is the core of his thought. Its value lies in
his concentration on ethical morality as well as social morality, which
combines the knowledge and practice of morality, which reveals a vivid
spirit of moral humanism and which also forms a theory of ethical meta-
35
physics. His theory of Lu or Deliberation' is a single-minded
development of merely rational Deliberation. This is again
another crucial point which leads to the defect of his theory of
the Mind. Although his theory of Tao or the Ultimate Principle and
that of the Ultimate Mind, as a whole, is incompletely and loosely
35. Please see p.8, Note 25.
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established, which certainly is another deficiency of his system of
thought, this cannot detract from the value of his philosophy as a
whole.
(4) With regard to his theory of politics, it might be
suggested that a crucial failure lies in his concern merely with a
king's way of ruling and his indifference to the establishment of a
democratic system of politics which would guarantee the legal rights
and interests of the masses. His theory of rule by a Sage-King
certainly has its theoretical and practical problems. This defect
originates, it migh-t be suggested, from his lack of consciousness of
different concepts of man's ethical duty and civic duty. His ideal
society therefore is only an impractical ideal which encourages the
masses to be contented only with 'fairness', if it may be so called,
in employment and salary, and not to strive for their legal rights
and interests. Besides some discussions of economic policies which
may still be valuable for reference, the rest of the theories offer
less contribution to the theory of politics but more value to the
theory of moral practice.
In the epilogue an attempt has been made to clarify the
historical unfavourable charges against Hsun-tze so as to evaluate
the contribution of his theories to Confucianism, the spirit of
philosophy and culture in the Pre-Ch'in Period, and to suggest the
proper position of his philosophy in the history of Chinese thought.
This thesis offers an expository study and an examination
of Hsun-tze's main thought, and an investigation of his position in
xx
Chinese history. It also attempts to give a systematical study of
his theory of the Mind. Although Hsun-tze repeatedly emphasizes the
importance of the moral functioning of the Mind, he does not make a
compact and schematic presentation of it. In this thesis an attempt
has been made to re-organize his opinion of the moral functioning of
the Mind in order to make his theory intelligible and explicit.
Throughout the thesis, quotations from Hsun-tze have been translated
by the present writer as part of the study. The translation is based
mainly on the version of HSUN-TZE Ssu-Pu Pei-Yao (a photographic re¬
print published by Chung Hua Press, Taipei, 1965) and HSUN-TZE ERH-
SHIH-CHUAN, Ssu-Pu Ts'ung K'an Ch'u-Pien Shu-Pen (a photographic reprint
published by Commercial Press, Taipei, 1967). The former version was
revised by Hsueh Yung in 1786, and the latter was annotated by Yang
Liang in 818. Other useful sources are, HSUN-TZE CHIEN-SHIH by Liang
Ch'i-Hsiung (Hong Kong, 1974, a revised edition of the work of the same
name published in 1936), HSUN-TZE CHIEN-CHU by Chang Shih-T'ung
(Shanghai, 1974) and HSUN-TZE TU-PEN by Wang Chung-Lin (Taipei, 1974).
A selected bibliography is also listed for other references which have
been consulted.
THE SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The 32 chapters in HSUN-TZE, including the last six
chapters which are considered to have been put together by later scol-
ars, have a wide-ranging content. The first 24 chapters, as a whole,
mainly aim at one central theme: the goal of human life is to learn
and practise to be a Sage. However, they touch on different subjects
xxi
concerning different aspects of life. If one studies the work
chapter by chapter, one may find that besides the main theme of its
content, there are miscellaneous pieces of interesting and profoundly
meaningful thought. This thesis is not intended to be exhaustive
in the whole range of Hsun-tze's thought and therefore, on one hand
the main themes of his thoughts may be revealed through selected data,
while on the other the reader will not be confused by irrelevant
information and miss the essence of Hsun-tze's theoi'ies. Consequently
only those theories which are relevant to the theory of human nature,
the theory of the Mind and the theory of politics, have been selected;
even so, the relevant theories are still too abundant to be quoted in
full and only the important ones have been employed. Therefore
although this thesis is entitled 'The Philosophy of Hsun-tze',
it is, in fact, necessarily limited to the exposition and examination
of his theories on the four main themes. This is a conscious
limitation of this thesis.
Secondly, in this thesis, emphasis has been laid only upon
the exposition and examination of the theories of Hsun-tze. With
regard to the historical problems of the philosopher, such as the
issues of his arguments against Mencius' theory that 'man's nature is
innately good', his opposition to the theories of Mo-tze and contempor¬
ary philosophers, the charges levelled against him and the reasons for
his unpopularity in the history of Chinese thought, it has not been
possible to discuss them here due to limited time and the limits on the
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HIS THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE
PART I
AN ANALYSIS OF HSUN-TZE'S THEORIES
CHAPTER I:
HIS THEORIES OF HUMAN NATURE
In this chapter, Hsun-tze's theory that Man's Nature1 is
2 3
Evil and his theory of the Transformation of Man's Nature are dealt
with. These two beliefs are the foundation of his whole philosophy.
From the awareness that Man's Nature is Evil and that the Transformation
of Man's Nature is necessary Hzun-tze holds that man may start on a new
4
Way of his Mind toward the ultimate goal of life: this leads to the
central theme of Hsun-tze's philosophy - the philosophy of the Mind.
Therefore in a study of Hzun-tze's thought, his theories of human nature
are a necessary start.
1. T5- Hsing, means 'nature'. It is a technical term in Hzun-tze's
philosophy. To him, the Nature of Man is innately Evil, (please see
Note 2) and an ordinary man is in general morally lower than the three
grades of moral men in Hsun-tze's theory, i.e. -~b Shih, the Scholar,
Chiin-tze, the Conscientious Man, and A. Sheng-jen, the Sage. There¬
fore Hsing is translated as Man's Nature throughout this thesis.
2. IjjL Wu, a technical term in his philosophy. It originally means:
'bad, evil, wicked, vice, to disgust, to sicken, to hate, to abhor, etc.'.
Hsun-tze often uses it slightly differently to mean 'prejudiced, vicious,
rebellious and chaotic' in the individual as well as a general atmosphere
in society. However, it seems that there is no better word in English
than 'evil' to denote Hsun-tze's idea, therefore a capitalized Evil is
used throughout in order to show its meaning as well as its difference.
3. Hua-Hsing, a difficult term in Hsun-tze's theories of human
nature. The word Hua, means 'to change, to influence'. Here it
is translated as 'to transform, transformation'. In his theory, there
is no explanation of what Man's Nature becomes after its transformation
(please see Appendix 3). This theory must be considered a deficiency
in his theories of human nature, which is fully discussed in pp.196-198.
4. Hsin, the most essential technical term in his philosophy.
It means 'heart or mind'. To Hsun-tze, Hsin is the faculty in
charging of man's internal and external activities. It is autonomous,
administrative and is the essence of man. The word 'Mind' is used
throughout in translation.
1
SECTION 1: HIS THEORY THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL
Hsun-tze firmly believes that Man's Nature is innately
Evil. This belief might have stemmed from the chaotic state of
the world in his time which would naturally lead him to come to
such a conclusion, or it might have arisen because of his uncompro-
5
mising opposition to Mencius who believes that human nature is
g
innately good . However, the academic value of his theory that
Man's Nature is Evil lies in its spirit expressing, whether con¬
sciously or unconsciously, the following idea: that the value of
7
man originates from his constant struggling against nature , which
8
Hsun-tze calls 'Heaven' , and against evil emotions and desires
9
which are part of Man's Nature" and against the Obsession of the
Mind"^, in order to strive for the ideal moral state of a Sage"'""'".
5. jIcL "5~ Mencius or Meng-tze, 372-289 B.C., an important
Confucianist earlier than Hsun-tze. He is often considered to be
one of the three greatest Confucianists in the Pre-Ch'in Period.
The other two are: ^ Confucius, (551-479 B.C.), the founder of
the Confucian school, and Hsun-tze.
6. For detail of his uncompromising attitude to Mencius,
please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter VI; of his attack on Mencius theory,
please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter XXIII.
7. Please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter XVII.
8. T'ien, means 'the sky, the heaven, Nature, God, where
God or the god$ live, natural, day, climate, weather', etc.
Hsun-tze uses it in the sense of impersonal Mature, and he attacks
the concept contained in the classics which was current in his time
that Heaven is an anthropomorphic Deity. The word 'Heaven' is
used throughout this thesis.
9. Please see HSUN-TZE, Chapter XXIII.
10. Pi. It means 'to cover, hide, screen'. To Hsun-tze,
it denotes a clouding or darkening of the understanding of the Mind
The word Obsessions seems to be the word closest to expressing his
meaning and is used throughout this thesis. Hsun-tze also gives a
discussion of the Obsessions of the Mind in Chapter XXI of his book
11. Sheng, the key moral concept of his whole thought. A
Sage is a combination of the ultimate wisdom and virtue, and he is
in the highest state of a moral life.
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Therefore even though this idea presents theoretical difficulties
yet his intention and efforts have a positive value.
A: HIS EXPLANATION OF 'MAN'S NATURE AND 'EVIL'
In his theories, Hsun-tze insists that Man's Nature is
innately Evil. How, then, does he interpret Man's Nature (Using)
and Evil (Wu)?
Hsun-tze's definition of the two terms is given in
chapter XXIII, entitled 'Man's Nature is Evil'. One may find that
in his theory of human nature, there are two important concepts
involved, namely; ,the innateness of Man's Evil Nature and the
universality of Man's Evil Nature. He explains Man's Nature in
13
terms of life , or more precisely, the biological needs and des¬
ires of life, which are not desirable in morality. Man's Evil
Nature is, he also holds, universal in character, i.e. each man is
born with the same Evil character. In other words, man, whether
14
he is a Sage or a Mean-Spirited Man , is born with Evil Nature.
The detailed grounds on which he holds such beliefs will be dis¬
cussed in the next part. The following is the original text of
his definition of Man's Nature.
12. A detailed discussion is given in chapter V, Part II of
this thesis.
13. ?}c~ Sheng, it also means 'to live, to be born, to breed,
uncooked, unfamiliar', etc.
14. Hsiao Jen, a technical term in his philosophy. It
denotes an immoral man. Please also see C of this section.
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(i) 'That which is as it is from the time of birth is
called Man's Nature'. (chapter XXII) (Vol. XVI, p.I)15
(ii) 'Man's Nature is what he is naturally born with;
it does not need to be learned, it does not need to be
strenuously pursued . . . Not needing to be learned and
striven after, that which is in man, is what is called
Man's Nature'. (chapter XXIII) (XVII,2)
(iii) 'That which is harmonious from birth, which is
capable of perceiving through the senses and of respond¬
ing to a stimuli spontaneously and without effort, is
named Man's Nature'. (chapter XXII) (XVI, 1)
(iv) 'There is a universal character in all men, . . .
which is that which is innate from birth'. (chapter IV)
(II, 10) 'Wherein they (the Sages) agree with all other
men and do not differ from them, is their Nature',
(chapter XXIII) (XVII, 3)
The first explanation is given from a biological point
of view, while the second and third are sociological ones. The
fourth shows his belief in the universality of Man's Nature. The
phrase that 'that which is harmonious from birth' indicates that
what is natural from birth are the biological qualities of men.
According to Hsun-tze, Man's Nature feels and responds naturally
li
when perceiving and receiving outside stimuli, and these inductions
v.
have no connection with the effects of experiences from learning or
practice. It accordingly is spontaneous, manifested naturally, and
genuinely biological. Hsun-tze argues that there is no sign of any
good quality in Man's Nature, nor is there any positive value at all
in it. Therefore man must supersede his own biological Nature in
order to advance to a social nature which is approved by a certain
15. All references are to Ssu~Pu Pei-Yao, a photographic
reprint published by Chung-Hua Press, Taipei, 1965.
<^§" Kan-Ying, i.e. perception and response of Man's Nature.
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standard of social ethics, and it is only through this process
that the Evil of Man's Nature can be controlled, and man can
ethically survive.
As for the explanation of Evil (Wu) given by Hsun-tze,
it is discussed in detail in chapter XXIII. He argues,
'In ancient time and now, throughout the
kingdom, what is meant by Good1'' is upright, reason¬
able, peaceful and orderly1®, and by Evil is
prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic1®.
This is the distinction between Good and Evil'.
(XVII, 4)
Hsun-tze thus establishes his criteria for defining these two
terms: Good (Shan) and Evil (Wu). To him, Good is upright,
reasonable, peaceful and orderly in the individual as well as in
society, whereas Evil is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and
chaotic in the two. But what then is upright, reasonable, peace¬
ful and orderly, and what is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and
chaotic? In chapter III, he gives the following definition:
17. -fa" Shan, means 'good, virtuous, to be good at, to remedy,
etc.'. Hsun-tze certainly gives a technical meaning to this term
which denotes only the uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order
in the individual as well as in society. He tends to establish a
psychological and sociological analysis to the term without attach¬
ing it much to ethical judgement. A further discussion on this
term is given on p.177.
18. JE. Cheng, ^ Li, P'ing, Chih.
19 • P'ien, Hsien, Pei, Luan.
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'What is in accordance with rites and
righteousness^l is called orderly; and what is
against them is called disorderly'. (II, 3)
Thus, to be in accordance with rites and righteousness is the means
to orderliness. In chapter XXIII, he argues,
'Now is Man's Nature in fact intrinsically
upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly? If so,
what need would there be for Sage-Kings22 and rites
and righteousness?' (XVII, 4)
What he means here is that since Man's nature has no uprightness,
reason, peacefulness and order, the existences of Sage-Kings, rites
and righteousness are always a necessity in order to control and
influence men. Hsun-tze supposes that man is innately lacking
the qualities of uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order, which
are the causes of one's acting uprightly, rationally, peacefully
and in order, therefore Man's Nature is, he concludes, Evil.
■Zw
20. 4\S. Li. It originally means 'to practise' and in common
usage, it is interpreted as 'ceremonies, rituals, or rules of proper
conduct in social institutions and human relations'. Hsun-tze uses
this term in a Confucian moral concept, which in practice, denotes
the actual rites according to ^ YI LI, or BOOK OF ETIQUETTE
AND CEREMONIAL, a record of procedures of ceremonies practised in
Chou Dynasty (1111-256 B.C.), and in theory denotes the principle
or meaning of rites according to the Confucian interpretations which
later in Han Dynasty (202 B.C. - 220 A.D.) are edited as
LI CHI, or BOOK OF RITES. However, the English term 'rites' is
employed throughout to denote his meaning both in theory and in
practice.
21. Yi. It originally means 'appropriateness'. Hsun-tze
often uses it to denote the .Confucian moral concept of righteous¬
ness within oneself as a motive of acting morally. Therefore the
English term 'righteousness' is used throughout this thesis. Hsun-
tze often attributes the establishment of rites and righteousness as
a great merit of the ancient Sage-Kings.
22 . Sheng-Wang, a key concept of Hsun-tze's political theory.
A Sage, to Hsun-tze, is a combination of ultimate or perfect wisdom
and virtue, and if a king possesses such qualities, or if a Sage
becomes a king, he is a Sage-King and he will, Hsun-tze believes,
bring peace and happiness to the country as well as to his people.
6
On the other hand, Hsun-tze also considers that in the
inner properties of Man's Nature, besides the qualities of pre¬
judice, viciousness, rebelliousness and chaos there lie desires
which also are the cause of Man's Evil. In chapter XXII he says,
Heaven, the emotions are the quality of Man's Nature
and desires are the responses or induction of the
emotion.' (XVI, 9)
Accordingly what is contained in Man's Nature also is emotion.
There are seven types of emotions, which are simply referred to
23
as 'the seven emotions' in chapter XXII, namely: delight, anger,
24
grief, joy, love, hate and desire . (XVI, 1) However, Hsun-
tze lays particular emphasis on desire, which is only one of the
seven emotions of Man's Nature. Here a point worth noticing is
that Hsun-tze does not directly indicate, when he speaks of Man's
Nature, that it is altogether evil; it is due to the fact that
it possesses, besides prejudice^ viciousness, rebelliousness and
chaos, emotions, and these emotions elicit evil desires, conse¬
quently the Evil of Man's Nature is manifested. To be more
precise, his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is a theory that
desires which are innate in Man's Nature are evil, or man's
desires are evil.
Man's Nature, what is upright, reasonable, peacefull and orderly
'Man's Nature is that which one receives from
Hsun-tze uses what is natural by birth to explain
23. Ch'i-Ch'ing.
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to explain Good, and what is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and
chaotic to explain Evil. Since Man's Nature is innately with¬
out the qualities of Good, his performance of Good, i.e. what is
upright, reasonable, peaceful and orderly, is a process of learn-
25
ing, Deliberation and decision of the Mind, otherwise he may
become Evil, i.e. prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and chaotic.
B: HIS ARGUMENT FOR THE THEORY THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL
In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze puts forward his argument
in nine paragraphs to prove that Man's Nature is Evil. In the
original script, it is said repeatedly, 'It is obvious that Man's
Nature is Evil'. An analysis of this nine-paragraph argument is
given here.
(i) Hsun-tze firstly points out that man is born with a
'fondness for profit, feelings of jealousy and hatred, the desires
of the eyes and ears, and fondness for beautiful sights and
sounds'. (XVII, 1) If a man follows his Nature and indulges
.
his emotions, and becomes involved in wrangling and strife, violence
and crime, license and wantonness will certainly occur, the virtues
25. Lu, an important technical term in his philosophy of
Mind. It originally means 'to consider, to take into account'.
Although Hsun-tze sometimes uses it in a meaning more close to
' ^ Sheng, or reflection', than to 'deliberation', the word
' Sheng or reflection' carries a serious meaning of 'to
examine, to introspect', which is related to a sense more of
ethics than merely function; while in his theory, Lii
is often referred to the function of the Mind. Therefore in
translation, the word Deliberation is used to keep its literal
originality and its difference from 'deliberation' in general usage.
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of courtesy and humility, loyalty and trust, and the principle
of rites and righteousness, and the form of decorum and order
will fade away. Hsun-tze also says:
'If a man follows his Nature and gives free rein
to his emotions, the result will certainly be fighting
and wrangling, offending against the social order and
confusing the ritual principles and finally he will
become a tyrannical man. Therefore there must exist
the influence of teacher and law, the instruction of
ritual and righteous principles, when he will behave
modestly and politely, his behaviour will be in accord¬
ance to what is suitable and right and the society will
therefore be under control. From this, one may see »
that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 1)
Since there are evil emotions in Man's Nature, Hsun-tze concludes
that Man's Nature is Evil.
(ii) Next he takes the examples of 'a crooked piece of wood'
and 'a piece of blunt metal' to illustrate the defect of Man's
nature. (XVII, 1) Since Man's Nature is Evil, it must be trans¬
formed by the instructions of a teacher, restriction of laws and
influence of rites and righteousness. Thus man may become upright,
reasonable, peaceful and orderly, just as the crooked piece of wood
and the piece of blunt metal, by means of special treatment, may be
straightened and sharpened. And he concludes his view on Man's
Nature as follows:
'If now man is influenced by teacher and law, and he
accumulates the learning of general education2® and prac¬
tices the principles of rites and righteousness, he
26. jr Wen-Hsueh, as a modern term, denotes 'literature or
a literary work'. However, in the Chou Dynasty, it means 'the
general education such as the teaching of classics'.
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is a Conscientious Man . If he gives free rein to
his Nature and emotions, feels at ease in his arrogance
and indulgence, and turns away from rites and righteous¬
ness, he is a Mean-Spirited Man. From this one may see
that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 1)
(iii) Hsun-tze then argues against Mencius' theory that human
nature is good. He thinks that Mencius does not understand the
28
difference between Man's Nature and Artifice. Hsun-tze thinks
that 'what is contained in Man's Nature is given by Heaven, which
cannot be learned, cannot be acquired by effort'. (XVII, 2)
He emphasizes that the various desires of the seven emotions are
the most essential'element in Man's Nature, while the activity which
man can learn and follow in accordance with rites and righteousness
is an Artifice. Thus Artifice is different from Man's Nature. He
goes on to rebut the argument of Mencius that human nature becomes
evil mainly because man loses his original good nature. He
27. -r Chiin-tze, a technical term in Hsun-tze's moral concepts.
He sets three moral grades of a man's life, i.e. -i" Shih, the
Scholar who has started to know and understand morality as his
final goal in moral life. Chiin-tze, the Conscientious Man
who is cautious in his knowledge and practice as a moral man, and
HP /^Sheng-Jen, the Sage who is ultimately wise and virtuous and
who has reached an ultimate state in morality.
28. \^ Wei, highly technical term in his philosophy. It
normally means 'false, simulated, artificial, illegal', and in
fact, it often carries a bad meaning in common usage. However,
Hsun-tze uses it in an opposite way. By Wei, he means 'man-
made, non-natural', and it is often used as a contrasting term to
Man's Nature which is natural, or by birth. He also often tends
to use it in a morally good sense, i.e. an activity which produces
moral good. Hsun-tze is the only philosopher in antiquity, or
perhaps in the history of Chinese thought, using this term with
such a good meaning. It is also difficult to employ a suitable
English word to denote his idea. The word 'Artifice' certainly
is not an ideal one, yet it is close to its common meaning.
Therefore the capitalized Artifice is used throughout.
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considers that as soon as man is born, the Evil of his Nature is
immediately expressed by showing his various desires, such as
'the desire for food when he is hungry, and the desire for warmth
when he is cold'. (XVII, 2) If a man follows his desires, the
Evil of his Nature is easily manifested. If a man is contrary
to his Nature and follows rites and righteousness, he is practis¬
ing Artifice which does not exist at all in his Nature. Therefore
Man's Nature is, he concludes, obviously Evil.
(iv) Hsun-tze goes on to argue that the way of filial piety
is that which is contrary to Man's Nature, yet it is in accordance
with rites and righteousness. (XVII, 2) Therefore to be filial
is to follow rites and righteousness and to act contrary to Man's
Nature. He says:
'If man follows his emotions and his Nature, he
will not behave modestly and politely. If he behaves
modestly and politely, his behaviour deviates from his
emotions and his Nature. From this, one may see that
it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 2)
Hsun-tze then makes the contrast between man's desires of reluctance
to behave morally and his courtesy and humility so as to prove that
the former reveals that Man's Nature is Evil, while the latter stems
from his Artifice.
(v) In this paragraph Hsun-tze first explains:
'Rites and righteousness originate from the
Artifice of the Sage, and they do not innately
originate from Man's Nature.' (XVII, 2)
Then he goes on to say that the Sage is primarily identical with all
other men in his Evil Nature. However, the Sage knows to transform
his Nature, encourage moral Artifice and eventually he reaches a
state of moral perfection, therefore he is ultimately not the same
as all other men. Then, considering the case of a man who desires
to perform morally, Hsun-tze adduces counter-evidence to the idea
that Man's Nature is Evil. He argues that a man who is meagre in
accomplishments, who is ugly, who is poor, who lives in cramped
quarters and who is humble, longs for greatness, beauty, wealth,
spaciousness and eminence. (XVII, 3) But a man who seeks to
improve himself to a moral state does so precisely because he is
Evil, i.e. he is lacking in Good, or because morality is not his
Nature. Hzun-tze then concludes that 'whatever a man lacks in
himself, he will seek outside'. (XVII, 3) Since Hsun-tze
4
believes that Good is what is lacking in man, i.e. the quality
of Goodness does not exist in Man's Nature, therefore man must
search for Good from outside. Then he extends his theory in the
same paragraph by saying,
'Now since Man's Nature is originally without
rites and righteousness, he therefore forces himself to
learn in order to possess them. Since his Nature does
not know rites and righteousness, he contemplates order
to know them. However, if he is uncultivated since
birth, he will not possess rites and righteousness and
will not know them. If he does not possess them, he
will cause chaos; if he does not know them he will
become rebellious. Therefore if he is uncultivated
since birth, he will possess rebelliousness and chaos
in himself. From this, one may see that it is obvious
that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 3-4)
(vi) In this paragraph, Hsun-tze refutes Mencius' theory
again. Firstly, he gives his definition of Good and Evil:
'Good is upright, reasonable, peaceful and
orderly, while Evil is prejudiced, vicious, rebellious
and chaotic.' (XVII, 4)
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Hsun-tze thinks that if Man's Nature is originally Good as Mencius
claims, there is no need for the existence of Sage-Kings to rule
over and to control man, and there is also no need for rites and
righteousness to influence him, for laws to restrict him or
for strict punishments to restrain him. Hsun-tze continues,
'Now let us fry to remove the rule of the King,
education of rites and righteousness, control of law
and prohibition of punishment, and let us watch on the
sideline how the people of the world treat one another:
one may see that the strong oppress and rob the weak,
the many terrorize and extort from the few. The world
will be in a state of complete chaos and its decay will
instantly come. From this, one may see that it is
obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.' (XVII, 4)
(vii) In this paragraph, Hsun-tze indicates that in establishing
one's argumentations the speaker should make his assertion according
to fact and to what can be proved to be valid, and he should make
it not just theoretical but also practical; by indicating this,
he tries to prove that his own theory is up to this standard, and
he derides the theory of Mencius as not in accordance with facts and
not capable of being proved to be valid. He mocks at Mencius
who 'sits on his mat propounding the theory and cannot stand up and
put it into practise, nor can he extend it over a wide area with any
success at all'. (XVII, 4) Hzun-tze thinks that if Mencius'
theory that human nature is good is valid, then why do there exist
the Sage-Kings, rites and righteousness? He also argues that be¬
cause of the existence of warped wood, the production of a straightening
board is needed, and because of the existence of the crookedness, the
plumb line is needed, and because of the Evil of Man's Nature, the
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government of the Sage-Kings and the elucidation or rites and
righteousness are needed. (XVII, 4-5) Therefore he says:
'The purpose of the establishment of the rule
of the King and the illumination of rites and righteous¬
ness is that Man's Nature is Evil. From this, one may
see that it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil.'
(XVII, 5)
(viii) In this paragraph, succeeding the one above, Hsun-tze
continues his argument by making the supposition that by nature,
the crooked wood is crooked, therefore it needs a straightening
board, and by nature the straight wood is straight, it does not
have to wait for the straightening board to become straight; thus
he deduces that by nature, Man's Nature is Evil, so it needs the
government of the Sage-Kings and the moral teaching and influence
of rites and righteousness, and only then can man obtain order and
conform to morality. (XVII, 5) Again he concludes the paragraph
by saying that 'it is obvious that Man's Nature is Evil'. In
general this paragraph is just a repetition of the preceding argument.
(ix) In his last argument, Hsun-tze tries to answer the claim
of a person who considers that rites, righteousness and the
29
accumulation of Artifice originate from Man's Nature, therefore
the Sages are capable of bringing them forth. Hsun-tze explains
by using as examples the potter and the carpenter as a simile of the
Sage. The cases of moulding clay for pots and carving wood for
utensils do not prove that moulding and carving are Man's Nature,
for these are only man's skill. The same is true of the Sage: the
29. Chi. Hsun-tze often speaks of the accumulation of
Artifice as if it were measurable quantity. In fact, in
Chinese language, most moral concepts are considered to be count¬
able, such as the accumulation of virtue Chi Te, the
accumulation of good _i|~ Chi Shan.
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ability to establish rites and righteousness and to accumulate good
Artifice is not Man's Nature, it is an Artifice. Then Hsun-tze goes
on to expound his doctrine of the universality of Man's Evil Nature.
He argues that there is a sameness of Evil Nature present in the Sage
and the ordinary man; in other words, the Evil of Man's Nature exists
in every man, no matter who he is, a Sage or a Mean-Spirited Man.
However, he distinguishes the Sage and the Mean-Spirited Man as follows:
'What is noble and respectable in Yao , Yu
and the Conscientious Men is that they are capable of
transforming their Nature and encouraging Artifice.
When Artifice is encouraged, rites and righteousness
are practised. Therefore rites and righteousness are
the accumulation of the Artifice of the Sage just as
the potter produces his pottery. From this, one may
see that the accumulation of the Artifice of rites and
righteousness is not Man's Nature. What is low and
hateful in Chieh32 and Chih33 and the Mean-Spirited
Man is that they follow their Nature, give free rein to
their emotions, feel at ease in arrogance and indulgence
and their behaviour is the result of their fondness for
profit, fighting and wrangling. Therefore it is
obvious that Man's Nature is Evil. ' (XVII, 7)
His distinction between the Sage and the Mean-Spirited Man becomes the
core of this chapter, or the key point of his moral philosophy. (1)
It is, in his opinion, obviously not because of Man's Nature that man
is honoured or despised, for all men are inevitably Evil in their
Nature, and the man who is worthy of being honoured is the one who
is capable of 'transforming his Evil Nature and of encouraging
his Artifice (to act morally)' (XVII, 5); while the man who is
30. Yao, a legendary Sage-King in ancient China, whose reign
is said to have extended from 2357 to 2253 B.C.
31. Yu, a legendary Sage-King and founder of the Hsia Dynasty.
32• Chieh, a tyrant and the last ruler of the Hsia Dynasty
(2183-1752 B.C.).
22• Chih, a legendary notorious robber said to be active during
the reign of -^jp rSj* Huang-ti (2700-2600 B.C.).
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to be despised is the one who indulges his Nature, follows his
emotions and refuses to transform his Nature. According to this
the distinction between the honoured and the despised is clear.
(2) Rites and righteousness are in Hsun-tze's view the result of
the conscious contemplation of the Sages and have been established
by them, and it is only by learning and moral training that man
can understand and practice rites and righteousness. Holding
this, Hsun-tze teaches and repeatedly advises man to control and
transform his Evil Nature.
By using this nine-paragraph argument, Hsun-tze
demonstrates his theory that Man's Nature is Evil. There are
logical mistakes in parts of his argument, and there are places
which are over-obstinate or over-confident, which will be examined
34
in the second Part of this thesis . However, there is one
point worth mentioning:- all Hsun-tze has been saying may be reduced
into one idea, which is the importance of the Transformation of Man's
Nature. In fact, what he is concerned with is the practical prob¬
lem of man's moral life. He warns man that Man's Nature is
innately Evil, and he also illustrates the image of a Mean-Spirited
Man as a concrete example of this theory. Therefore a survey of
his discussion of the Mean-Spirited Man is necessary.
C: HIS DISCUSSION OF A MEAN-SPIRITED MAN
In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze tries to prove that Man's
Nature is innately Evil. This is the general idea of the chapter.
34. An examination of his argument that Man's Nature is Evil
on pp.185-191.
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Furthermore, throughout his book he uses the notion of 'Mean-Spirited
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Man' as an example of a man who continues through life to manifest
the original Evil of his Nature. There follows a discussion of the
meaning of the term 'Mean-Spirited Man', which Hsun-tze puts forward
as a concrete example of Man's Evil Nature.
(i) The definition of a 'Mean-Spirited Man'
The Mean-Spirited Man whom Hsun-tze discusses is a
person who fully displays the original appearance of his Evil
Nature. In chapter IV, Hsun-tze says:
'Man is surely born as a Mean-Spirited Man. If
there were no teacher and no law, man would only care for
his own profit. Man is surely born as a Mean-Spirited
Man, and in a disordered world, he acquires degenerate
customs and practices; so from his Mean-Spiritedness, he
becomes more Mean-Spirited and his Evil becomes more Evil.'
(II, ID
From this, Hsun-tze clearly shows that Man's Nature is innately Evil,
i.e. man is not born with the qualities of uprightness, reason,
peacefulness and order. If a man is in a disordered world with
bad customs and practices, with no teacher and laws for him to follow
and obey, then he is not aware that the Transformation of his Nature
is necessary, thus his Evil Nature will come out easily and he may
become more prejudiced, vicious, rebellious and disorderly. As
for the definition of a 'Mean-Spirited Man', this may be found in
chapters VIII and XXIII. In the former chapter, Hsun-tze says:
'A man who gives rein to his desires and emotions,




Whereas in the latter, he says,
'He who gives rein to his desires and emotions,
feels at ease in his arrogance and indulgence and
turns away from rites and righteousness, is a
Mean-spirited Man.' (XVII, 1)
When these two statements are compared, they are seen to be
consistent. However, the latter description seems to be clearer
than the former. Man's desires and emotions are Evil, and if
he follows his Evil desires and emotions, he will become more
Evil, and he will not be able to control himself any more. If
he feels no shame in boasting of his accomplishments and his
indulgence and he does not honour his teacher and respect law,
then he does not follow rites and righteousness, and he is acting
against the ethical rules laid down by the ancestral Sages.
Therefore if a man does not make efforts to cultivate himself and
behave rightly, and instead, as Hsun-tze says in chapter XX,
'takes pleasure in fulfilling his desires', (XIV, 3) then he is
what Hsun-tze refers to as a Mean-Spirited Man.
In chapter III, Hsun-tze concludes,
'No reliance may ever be placed on his words, there is
no loyalty in his action. He is only ready to chase
after things which are profitable for him. Thus he is
called a Mean-Spirited Man.' (II, 5-6)
Therefore according to Hsun-tze, if a man speaks and acts not in
correspondence with the ways set by the ancient Sage-Kings, or with
the ways of rites and righteousness, and merely thinks of his own
desires and profits, then he is a Mean-Spirited Man.
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(ii) A Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man
In his book Hsun-tze puts forward illustrations of the
contrast betwen a Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man. What
he wants to establish in his theories is a means of achieving an ideal
personality, and the Conscientious Man is the first step towards such
an ideal, and also the first step away from the conduct of the
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Mean-Spirited Man
What characteristics does a Conscientious Man have in
contrast with a Mean-Spirited Man? In chapter IV, Hsun-tze says,
'A Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man are
identical in ability, innate Nature, knowledge and cap¬
acity. They both are good at loving honour, and hating
disgrace, loving what is advantageous and hating what is
harmful to them. It is in the way of life they follow
and in which they seek these things that they are
different.' (II, 10)
Hsun-tze then points out that originally, or innately, the Nature of a
Conscientious Man and a Mean-Spirited Man are both Evil; yet it is
due to their different approaches to two different goals or ways of
life that they become men with different personalities. In the same
chapter, there are further explanations of this point,
'Man has characteristics in common with others.
When hungry, he desires to eat; when cold, he desires
warmth; when exhausted he desires to rest; he loves
what is advantageous and hates what is harmful: these
are the qualities that men are born with and hold firm;
these come naturally so that men do not have to wait
till they learn them; these are also identical with those '
with which Yao and Chieh were born,' (II, 10)
36. Although Hsun-tze mentions -i: Shih or Scholar as the initial
step of becoming a moral agent, he in fact does not give much detail
about this term. He often makes contrasts between a Mean-Spirited
Man and a Conscientious Man, and between a Conscientious Man and a Sage.
Therefore it is taken here that the stage of a Conscientious Man is an
intermediate one between a Sage and a Mean-Spirited Man.
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Then how is it that a Mean-Spirited Man is a Mean-Spirited Man,
and a Conscientious Man a Conscientious Man? Hsun-tze argues
that there are two reasons for this: (1) the effort made by a
Mean-Spirited Man is insufficient, and (2) a Mean-Spirited Man
accumulates all the bad customs and practice, while the Conscient¬
ious Man accumulates good customs and practice. Thus in the same
chapter, Hsun-tze says,
'A man can become a Yao or a Yu, he also can
become a Chieh or a Chih, he can become a worker or a
craftsman, he can become a farmer or a merchant; it
all depends on,his accumulation of customs and practice.
These are also what man is born with and holds firm,
these come naturally so that man does not have to wait
till he learns them, these are identical with what Yao
and Chieh were born with. If a man is a Yao or Yu, he
always enjoys tranquillity and honour. If he is a
Chieh or Chih, he will always suffer danger and disgrace.
If he is a Yao or Yu, he always enjoys pleasure and ease.
If he is a worker, craftsman, farmer or merchant, he will
always suffer vexation and exhaustion. However, men
prefer to toil like the latter and few become the former.
Why is it? I say that it is because of the insufficiency
of effort made by man.' (II, 11)
Here Hsun-tze puts forward the idea of the 'insufficiency of effort
of man'. In the later part of the same paragraph, he also says,
'The insufficiency of effort of man is the common
adversity of the world, it is also the biggest disaster
and calamity of man.' (II, 12)
However, does Hsun-tze imply that the insufficiency of effort of man
is an innate defect? Obviously not; according to him, the
insufficient effort of man is the result of man's laziness. Thus
Hsun-tze says in the same chapter,
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'The virtue of Yao and Yii was not innate.
It was produced from the Transformation of their
Nature, and it was the accomplishment of their
cultivation and Artifice. They had to wait till
all their Evil Nature had ceased and then they were
perfected with virtue.' (II, H)
According to Hsun-tze, the Sage makes a great effort to do away
with his Evil Nature, to transform it, then to cultivate himself
and to accumulate good deeds and thereby accomplish virtue, and
become different from a Mean-Spirited Man. So the Nature of a
Mean-Spirited Man is the innate Evil Nature of Man and the Artifice
of a Sage is the accomplishment of his postnatal effort towards
virtue. The stage of a Conscientious Man is an intermediate one
between a Sage and a Mean-Spirited Man; and the Y/ay of a
Conscientious Man is the first step in doing away with Evil and
tending to Good. Thus Hsun-tze believes that man is ignorant and
imperfect by birth, and if he is not controlled and guided by
teacher and laws, he will become a Mean-Spirited Man; and that if
he tries to transform his Evil Nature and to cultivate himself,
then he will become a Conscientious Man. When all his Evil Nature
vanishes and his virtue is then perfected, he is then called a Sage,
just as Yao and Yii, the ancient Sages, were. This is a brief
summary of Hsun-tze's moral philosophy. The details of Hsun-tze's
description of the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage
will be discussed in chapter III of this Part. However, from this
summary, it is to be noted that what Hsun-tze values is the moral
practice of man. In the same chapter, he says,
'To observe the knowledge and capacity of a
Mean-Spirited Man, one has enough information to know
that a Mean-Spirited Man has sufficient capacity to
behave as a Conscientious Man.' (II, 10)
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Then why is a Mean-Spirited Man a Mean-Spirited Man? Hsun-tze
explains in chapter XXIII,
'A Mean-Spirited Man can become a Conscientious
Man, but he does not want to.' (XVII, 6)
(iii) Descriptions of Mean-Spirited Man
There are quite a number of descriptions of a
Mean-Spirited Man in his book. Here are some quotations which
give pictures of Mean-Spirited Men.
1. Appearance and behaviour:
In chapter II, Hsun-tze gives this description:
'A Mean-Spirited Man . . . though he is extremely
disorderly, hates those who criticise him; though he is
extremely evil, he desires others to praise him as a
virtuous man. His intention is as vicious as tigers
and wolves; his behaviour as wild as beasts, and he also
hates those who think he is a wicked man; he is intimate
with those who flatter him, and he estranges those who
admonish him. He laughs at those who are the most
faithful and loyal to the country.' (I, 7)
2. Ability:
In chapter III, Hsun-tze says,
'The ability of a Mean-Spirited Man is monstrous,
his inability is also monstrous. . . . When he has
skill, he allows himself to be haughty and biased so as
to be harsh and disrespectful to others. When he has
no skill, then he shows jealousy and speaks ill of others
so as to ruin them.' (II, 2)
3. Disposition:
In chapter III, Hsun-tze also says,
'When a Mean-Spirited Man . . . enlarges his
ambition, then he is arrogant and tyrannical; if he
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is narrow-minded, then he is licentious and
rebellious; if he is learned, then he robs, steals
and cheats; if he is stupid, then he is wicked,
crafty and disorderly; if he is given an important
assignment, then he is pleased with himself and
arrogant; if he is not employed, then he curses and
becomes crafty; when he is pleased, he is frivolous
and smug; when he is worried, he is dejected and
scared; when he is prominent, he is proud and narrow-
minded; when he is in poverty, he is self-abandoned
and in despair.' (II, 3)
From these quotations, it is apparent that a Mean-Spirited
Man, according to Hsun-tze, is one who does not restrain his desires
and emotions, causes troubles to others, and rejects rites and
righteousness, and. the Evil of his Nature is fully displayed. He
is also a man with the most evil intentions, as Hsun-tze describes
in chapter V,
'His appearance is good but his ambition is Evil,
and this does not exclude him from being a Mean-Spirited
Man.' (Ill, 1)
If asked why man becomes more and more Evil, Hsun-tze answers that
it is because of the insufficient effort of man and also because
of his accumulation of bad customs and practice which prevent him
from bringing himself up to a moral standard, that he himself fails
to toil fully to develop the function of his Mind to embark upon
self-improvement. Furthermore a Mean-Spirited Man loves to attend
to external objects. In chapter XVII, Hsun-tze says,
'The Mean-spirited Man misses what is within
himself and envies what is in the world. This is
why his (capacity of) Mind degenerates day by day.' (XI, 12)
The Mind degenerates daily, so Hsun-tze thinks, because a
Mean-Spirited Man only calculates his profit, and does not use his
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Mind to understand the Ultimate Principle of Man . Here Hsun-tze's
theory of the Way of Mind towards the Ultimate Principle of Man is
involved and it will be discussed in detail in the third chapter
of this Part. However, the behaviour and appearance, the speech
and arguments of a Mean-Spirited Man mentioned by Hsun-tze can be
regarded as a concrete example of his theory that Man's Nature is
Evil. Nevertheless, the main theme of Hsun-tze's philosophy
does not lie here. The reason why he argues for man's Evil
Nature and introduces the concept of the Mean-Spirited Man is
because he tries to warn man to understand the importance of the
Transformation of his Nature in order to reach the state of an
ideal personality, i.e. the Sage. Therefore one who studies
Hsun-tze's philosophy must observe carefully the purpose of his
theories before one can grasp the essence of them. The structure
37. ^ Tao, an important technical term in his philosophy.
or Tao, originally means 'way, a road, a method, a
principle, to speak, etc.'. ijo T'ien-Tao, the Way of Heaven,
j|f_ Ti-Tao, the Way of Earth~~and Jen-Tao, the Way
of Man. The first two form the principle of the universe. This
principle is not so much as a metaphysical principle as to be
attained by observation and experience. The latter becomes the
core of his philosophical searches and he finally affirms that
morality is the unique, universal and objective way of man, a way
on which all men should walk in order to perfect themselves in
life and in society. In this particular connection, i.e. Hsun-tze's
emphasis on morality as the Way of Man, it is therefore translated
as 'The Ultimate Principle' throughout this thesis. However,
since there are three aspects of Tao in his theory, the term
'Ultimate Principle' may be appropriate to his discussion on
the Way of Man, it may not always be appropriate to his two other
aspects of Tao, i.e. the Way of Heaven and the Way of Earth. It
is fully recognized that the translation is inadequate and may cause
linguistic difficulty when discussing his theory of Oneness of the
Mind in Tao and the theory that all things are a part of Tao. How¬
ever, what Hsun-tze tries to emphasize throughout his book about Tao
is the Way of Man and not the Way of the Universe, therefore it may




of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is a disputable matter,
yet the purpose of the theory is another matter; the former
leads to certain theoretical difficulties which will be discussed
in Chapter I of the second Part, while the latter, that is the
purpose of the theories, leads to the chapter which immediately
follows - the Transformation of Man's Nature - which is the key
theory in the development of his philosophical system.
SECTION 2: HIS THEORY OF THE TRANSFORMATION OF MAN'S NATURE
In his discussion of the Evil of Man's Nature Hzun-tze
emphasizes repeatedly that 'while Man's Nature is Evil is obvious,
his Goodness is an Artifice'. (Chapter XXIII) The latter part
of his statement forms the basis of discussion of this section.
What Hsun-tze says about Goodness, according to the meaning of the
passages in that chapter, is clearly about the Goodness of the
individual; thus an interpretation of it could be as follows:
the Goodness of the individual is acquired through moral Artifice.
To expound this further, it might be suggested that the Goodness
of a society as a whole results from collective work in which each
member of society is morally educated in order to generate the
good Artifice.
A: HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAN'S NATURE AND ARTIFICE
In Hsun-tze's theory, the words 'Man's Nature' and
'Artifice' are treated as a pair of opposites. In chapter XXIII
he says,
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'That which is within man, which cannot be
learned and worked for, is Man's Nature; that which
can be learned and worked for and be accomplished by
man is called Artifice; these are the distinctions
between the two.' (XVII, 2)
Thus, according to Hsun-tze, it is clear that Artifice
is not innate in man nor is it in his Nature; it is only through
learning and attention that a man may encourage its practice.
On the other hand, Nature is innate in man, and it comprises, as
mentioned in the previous section, the seven emotions. In the
same chapter, Hsun-tze explains,
'Just as the eyes love colours, the ears love
sounds, the mouth loves flavours, the mind loves
profit, the body loves pleasure and leisure; these all
originate from Man's Nature. When man receives a
stimulus, he responds naturally accordingly and these
are the things which man does not have to wait until he
has learned them in order to produce them.' (XVII, 3)
While in another passage, Hsun-tze gives an explanation of Artifice,
'If when man perceives a stimulus, which he
cannot respond to, and he has to wait until he has
learned and followed what he has learned before he
can respond accordingly, then it is considered that
his response is from Artifice.' (XVII, 3)
Thus according to Hsun-tze, Man's Nature is manifested when he is
stimulated by the external objects, and it comes forth directly
and immediately. On the other hand, the result of Artifice is:
when man is stimulated by external objects, the learned behaviour
does not come forth directly and immediately, it must wait until
man has made an effort to learn internally by his Deliberation,
and externally by the influence of rites and righteousness, the
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prohibitions of law and the admonitions of teachers, and only then
does Artifice come into play and is man encouraged to do good.
B: HIS DEFINITION OF ARTIFICE
Besides the contrast between Man's Nature and Artifice
just mentioned, Hsun-tze also defines Artifice in chapter XXII,
where he says,
'The Mind deliberates , and action therefore
moves; this is called Artifice. The accumulation
of Deliberation, and the practice of action thus
formed and completed is called Artifice.' (XVI, 1)
It seems that Hsun-tze has here given two slightly different
definitions of Artifice, although what he tries to give is a con¬
sistent explanation of the process of origin and completion of
Artifice. According to Hsun-tze, when man is stimulated by-
desires and excitement and he responds, his Mind instantly 'deliber¬
ates' the excitement and decides to accept or refuse it; thus
arises the working of Deliberation. Deliberation or 'Lii' is, in
modern terms, thinking. The mental selection and decision, Hsun-
tze holds, will then be expressed in man's behaviour and action,
and this is Artifice. Therefore Hsun-tze thinks that Artifice,
i.e. the artificial behaviour, or learned behaviour of man, is a
further manifestation of Deliberation. Furthermore, when man
constantly displays judgements and behaviour, he then forms an
accumulation of practices, which is also called Artifice. In short,
the former part of Hsun-tze's definition of Artifice is an explanation
of its origin while the latter is the exposition of its completed
state.
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C: HIS SUGGESTION OF THE CONCRETE MEANS TO ENCOURAGE
ARTIFICE
The origin of Artifice, accordingly, is twofold:
(1) internal Deliberation after an external stimulation, and
(2) the application of behaviour in accordance with the decision
of the Mind. These two steps are, Hsun-tze thinks, equally
important and interrelated; yet they are, more or less, easily
influenced by man's own learning or experience, and are easily
obsessed by his own insufficient knowledge of the external world.
In his book, there are therefore chapters especially devoted to
the discussion of learning and Obsessions, such as chapter I
■. entitled 'Encouraging Learning' and chapter XXI 'Dispelling
Obsessions'. However, Hsun-tze lays more particular emphasis
on learning, which is the first possible stage of encouraging
Artifice.
(i) Learning of rites
In chapter I of his book, he says:
'Learn until you die. Therefore, though the
content of learning, such as subjects and skills, has
its ending point, the meaning of learning should not
be disregarded even for a second.' (1,4)
The reason why a man is called a man is, Hsun-tze says, because
he holds firm the meaning of learning while a man becomes a beast
when he disregards it. Therefore to understand the meaning of
learning is important. As to the practical content of learning,
Hsun-tze explains in the same chapter:
'Where does learning start, and where does it
stop? I say, the subjects and skills of learning
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start from man's reciting classic books, and it ends
in reading RITES38.' (I, 4)
33
By classic books, Hsun-tze means THE BOOK OF ODES , and
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THE BOOK OF HISTORY , of which the former is, as he says, the
rhythm and harmonizer of sound, and the latter, the discipline of
political records. Rites, which are recorded in the RITES, is,
as he explains in the same chapter,
'the basic principle of moral laws and the essential
outline of social institutions.' (I, 4)
Therefore man who-lives in society and is surrounded by human
relations must learn it thoroughly. When a man thoroughly under¬
stands and devotedly practises rites according to RITES, he has,
Hsun-tze comments, approached the 'perfection of morality'. (I, 4)
In other words, such a man will, Hsun-tze believes, transcend
worldliness and attain holiness. From this, it is apparent that
the learning is, to Hsun-tze, not the learning related to subjects
of the external world, but learning of morality, which is in direct
contact with human relations and society. He makes this idea
clearer in the same chapter,
'The principle of learning should be practised
from the beginning of one's life as a Scholar, and be
completed when one has become a Sage.' (I, 4)
38• LI CHING, here Hsun-tze probably indicates the BOOK OF
ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL as well as some part of its interpretation
by the Confucianists, which latter in Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.)
was edited as BOOK OF RITES.
39. f-rf SHIH CHING.
40 SHU CHING.
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To Hsun-tze, a Sage is in a state of moral perfection, which
fully satisfies his lust for learning, or morality, therefore a
Sage needs no more learning but practice. At this point, Hsun-
tze follows the orthodox path of the Confucian thought on learning
which was first laid down by Confucius himself and then by Mencius,
i.e. to learn for morality's sake, or, more precisely, to learn in
order to develop the moral state of the individual. Thus a man
should reject the notion of learning for learning's sake, for he
should not, as the Confucianists hold, expend his life and energy
merely on knowledge of the external world. This is one of the
reasons why in Chinese philosophy, from the beginning, there is a
tendency for scholars to attach much importance to morality and
pay less attention to pure knowledge and science. Although parts
of the theories of Hsun-tze are different from those of the
Confucian thinking of Mencius, he is still considered to be a
member of the Confucian family, and his stress on the importance
of the principle of learning is one of the reasons which make him
a Confucianist. To learn the principle and practice of rites is
the main purpose of learning. It is one of the methods of trans¬
forming Man's Evil Nature, and also one of the ways to encourage
Artifice.
In his book there are numerous passages on the concrete
contents of theoretical and practical rites. In chapter XIX, he
devotes this whole chapter to the discussion of rites. Rites,
according to Hsun-tze, were established and introduced by the
ancient Sage-Kings such as Yao and Yu, who saw the fighting and
chaos caused by men trying to fulfill their own selfish desires.
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The merit of rites to society and to the individual, viewed from
outside, is mainly to classify the positions of men and to harmon¬
ize them in society, while viewed from internal viewpoint of the
individual, is to nourish his Nature. The function of classifi¬
cation of the rites in ancient China, were to be a standard to
show man's position in society. There were rites for an ordinary
man, which he should practise and according to which he should be
treated, so were those of an official, a minister, a feudal prince,
a king, etc. In this chapter, Hsun-tze also gives concrete
examples of rites. In the case of a funeral service, for instance,
the coffin of an emperor, according to RITES, should have ten
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layers ; of a feudal prince, five layers; of an official, three
layers; of a scholar, two layers; of a criminal, a three-inch
layer only. (XIII, 6-7) Therefore according to Hsun-tze, the
merit of rites is to distinguish the noble and the inferior in
political class, the elder and younger of the family circle, and
the rich and the poor of social class. In Hsun-tze's ideal,
rites include all the classes of politics, family and society;
that is to say, nothing which is not included in the human world.
As to the practice of rites, Hsun-tze thinks that man should show
neither exaggeration nor indifference of feelings; in other words,
in practising rites, man should express his feelings in a proper
way. As to the categories of rites, they can, Hsun-tze holds, be
summarized as being within the processes of man's life. The
real meaning of rites lies, to him, in respect for the living and
41. Ch'ung.
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exaltation of the dead. This is the principle and spirit of
X
rites. Special regard for their practical content is not so
important because the details of rites may be changed by social •
customs in different times. The multiplicity of rites is as
Hsun-tze sees it, a minor aspect, for details of rites may be
suitable for this time and this place but unsuitable for another
time and place. What he wants to develop is the spirit of rites,
namely: 'the principle of respecting those worthy of respect and
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being intimate with those worthy of intimacy' . (XIII, 15)
This is the greatest merit of rites.
In his book Hsun-tze devotes chapter XX to a
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discussion of music , mentioning music with rites as a medium of
encouraging good Artifice. In this chapter, he says,
'Music, is the unchangeable harmony; rites
are the unvariable principle. Music unites the
similar, while rites distinguish the different.
The unity of music and rites should be understood
42. if- &L WL Tsun-Tsun-Ch ' in-Ch' in-Chih-Yi .
This is also an important theme in the Confucian moral theory.
In practice, it reminds man of an equally important Confucian
theory that the king should behave like a king; the official,
like an official; the father, like a father; the son, like a
son. A son, for example, should, accordingly, respect and be
intimate with his father, internally with love, and externally
according to rites, to be obedient to his parents, to support
them when he is independent, and to remain in mourning for three
years after the death of his parent.
43. ^ Yiieh. &X- YtiEH CHING or the BOOK OF MUSIC was
lost, according to later scholars, during the Ch'in Dynasty
(221-207 B.C.). However, it was affiliated in the BOOK OF RITES
which was edited in the Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.).
Later scholars suggested that the words of its songs might be
selected from the BOOK OF ODES, its principle from the BOOK OF
RITES and it is expressed by > the official theatrical
performers.
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thoroughly in man's Mind. To completely
exhaust the origin (of man's feeling) and to make
the changes (of man's life) thoroughly compre¬
hensible is the nature of music; while to manifest
sincerity (of man's will) and to shun hyprocrisy is
the true meaning of rites.' (XIV, 3)
What Hsun-tze means about music, it might be suggested, is that
music itself thoroughly expresses the feelings of the author and
those of the audience who appreciate it. Therefore Hsun-tze
says that music 'unites the similar'. As to the nature of
music, according to Hsun-tze, it is to present the feelings deep
in the author's heart, and make them vividly manifested by means
of its musical notes. In short, one may say that by music, the
audience may trace out the feelings of its author as well as
those of their own. If it is a piece of good music, the
Confucianists hold, it may unite the moral men and influence the
evil men; if it is licentious and lustful, it may assemble the
evil men and have a bad influence on customs and spread an
immoral atmosphere in society. From this, it is clear that
(j
Hsun-tze's view on the function of music is mainly of moral
interest and that he does not depart from the Confucian thought
on the moral role of music.
In short, Hsun-tze views rites and music as one of the
practical means to encourage moral Artifice.
(ii) Respect for teachers
In chapter II of his book, Hsun-tze says,
'The purpose of rites is to rectify man's life.'
(I, ID
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If asked in what way man can learn rites, Hsun-tze answers in
chapter I,
'There is no more convenient way of learning
than that of being intimate with a teacher. RITES
and MUSIC record only the main principles and they do
not explain the details. The BOOK OF ODES and the
BOOK OF HISTORY record only the ancient events which
may not necessarily fit in with contemporary affairs,
and the SPRING AND AUTUMN ANNALS^4 records things so
briefly and indistinctly that the readers do not find
it easy to understand immediately. If one follows
a teacher, listening to his lectures and practising
what he says, then one will be cultivated and will
acquire a lofty personality and an all-embracing
knowledge, and thus one will become a man of deliber¬
ation who can deal with any situation he encounters.
Therefore I -say: There is no more convenient way of
learning than that of being intimate with a teacher.
In the process of learning, there is no quicker way
than that of esteeming a teacher, while the
exaltation of rites is the second most important thing. '
(I, 5)
The details of rites are recorded in the BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND
CEREMONIAL which are almost too brief and indistinct to be under¬
stood by beginners, therefore Hsun-tze suggests that rather than
groping in the dark, it is better for scholars to be intimate
with a teacher. He indicates that to follow a teacher is the
most effective way of encouraging Artifice. In putting forward
this idea, he emphasizes the role of a teacher. In chapter II,
on the one hand, he gives details of the relationship between
learning rites and following a teacher, while on the other, he
emphasizes the importance of a teacher. Thus he says,
j
44. CH'UN-CH'IU. The annals of the state of Lu
(722-484 B.C.) It is believed that Confucius, a native of Lu,
edited it at one time.
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'The purpose of rites is to rectify man's
life; the purpose of a teacher is to rectify rites.
Without rites, how can man rectify his life? With¬
out a teacher, how can man know that the rites he
practises are correct? Rites ought to be such,
wh.en man practises them as they are, that he is con¬
tent with them. When what the teacher says, the
man follows, then he understands that he should be
obedient to his teacher. To be content with rites
and to know that he should be obedient to his teacher
is to be a Sage. Therefore those who are 'against
rites are wild, irrational and lawless, those who are
against teachers have their mind closed to the concept of
the teacher. He, who does not accept teachers and
laws and who loves to follow his own judgement, is
just like a blind man who insists on distinguishing
colours, or a deaf man who seeks to distinguish sounds.
As a result, he will get nothing but disorder and
confusion. Therefore what man ought to learn are
rites and laws, and the function of a teacher is to
act as an example of right appearance and deportment
and to rectify these things in others. However, man
should give more importance to rites and laws and be
content with them.' (I, 11-12)
Here Hsun-tze makes it clear that the teacher is man's medium of
learning. To be a Sage, the ideal personality of Hsun-tze, man
should be content with rites and know how to be obedient to his
teacher; in other words, a Sage should be one who feels comfort¬
able and content with rites, and exalts and respects his teachers.
Thus the teacher is elevated to a very high position. Since a
teacher can rectify rites, as Hsun-tze says, the position of the
teacher is higher than that of rites. From this, it is apparent
that the practical means to encourage Artifice suggested by Hsun-
tze are as follows: (1) to exalt and respect teachers, (2) to
learn the rites, their practice and their meaning, and (3) to be
content with rites and to understand how to obey teachers.
As the quality of a teacher has much influence on the
pupil, and the function of a teacher is to rectify rites, the pupil
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must, according to Hsun-tze, seek a good teacher. By good
teacher, he means the one who is morally good and can be an
example of moral personality to his pupil. In the last
paragraph of chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze presents the theory of
45
Gradually Accumulated Influence to show his opinion on
the necessity of a good teacher:
'Though a man may have fine qualities so
that his Mind can distinguish and understand
things, he still has to seek and serve a good
teacher and to choose and be intimate with a
good friend. If he has a good teacher to serve,
then what he listens to will be the ways of Yao,
Shun4®, Yu and T'ang4?; if he has a good friend
to be intimate with, then what he sees will be
the practice of loyalty, honesty, respect and
humility. In this way, he will be on the way
45. '7P Mi, a technical term of his philosophy.
It originally means 'to disperse, to lean with pressure, to
waste; small, wonderful, etc.' Hsun-tze uses it in a slightly
different way to express his idea of gradual accumulation of
either good or bad influence from teachers and friends. There¬
fore the phrase 'Gradually Accumulated Influence' is used here
since it is difficult to render one English term similar and
appropriate to Hsun-tze's idea.
46. Shun, a legendary Sage-King said to have ruled
around 2000 B.C.
:&
47. T'ang, an ancient Sage-King and the founder of the
Shang Dynasty (1751-1111 B.C.)
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to being Human-Minded and to achieve righteousness
day by day, and yet he will not be aware of it. It
is the Gradually Accumulated Influence that makes
him so! Now if a man stays with those who are not
good, if what he hears is cheating, libel, swindling
and hypocrisy, and what he sees is unrestrained con¬
duct, debauchery and greediness, even if he is under
sentence of death, he is still unawakened. It is
the Gradually Accumulated Influence that makes him so!'
(XVII, 9)
This shows the standpoint of Hsun-tze, for he claims that man
should seek good teachers and friends so that a good Gradually
Accumulated Influence will be achieved.
D: HIS THEORY CONCERNING CAPABILITY OF AND POSSIBILITY
OF TRANSFORMATION OF MAN'S NATURE
According to Hsun-tze, the progress from the Evil of
Man's Nature to the origin of good Artifice, or from being one of
the masses to becoming a Sage, proves that Man's Nature is trans¬
formable. Hsun-tze repeatedly points out that the difference
48 Jen, it may mean 'benevolence, humanity, mercy,
kindness'. It became a technical term of Confucian ethics after
Confucius took it as his moral ideal. In Confucian theory,
Jen means perfect virtue, or the ultimate state of man's moral
life. In the chapters of the ANALECTS, although Confucius mentioned
different aspects of practising Jen, he never defined it in its
own terms. Therefore the philosophical inquiry of what Jen really
is becomes difficult, if not impossible, to answer properly as it
has been historically treated as an intuitive moral feeling, some¬
times including reasoning, which is perhaps undefinable. However,
the question of how Jen is practised is possible to construe. The
Confucianists claim that moral practise is the key to reach the
state of Jen, yet different concrete details of moral practice or
moral effort are advertised by different thinkers. However, in
translation, the modern moral term 'moral excellence' seems some¬
what too vague for it, 'benevolence' is also hot desirable, for
Jen, often denotes a stronger moral sense which can only be com¬
pletely manifested in the appearance and behaviour of the agent
after moral cultivation. It seems that it is not possible to find
an English term which bears a meaning similar to it, therefore the
term 'Human-Minded' is tried for Mencius at one time interprets
Jen as 'Human-Minded' (chapter VI, MENCIUS) meaning that Jen is the
ultimate state of the human mind.
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between a Sage and an ordinary man is that the former knows and is
able to transform his Nature, while the latter fails to do so.
In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze says,
'Therefore what makes a Sage identical with
the masses, or the same as the masses, is his Nature.
However, what makes him different and surpassing them
is his Artifice.' (XVII, 3)
In chapter IV, he says,
'Yao and Yii were not born perfect. It was
because of the Transformation of their Nature, and
the accomplishment of well-cultivated Artifice that
perfection is ;then attained after their Evil Nature
has all been transformed.' (II, 11)
This shows, as Hsun-tze firmly believes, that all men are born with
Evil Nature, that the accumulation of Artifice helps a man to trans¬
form his Evil Nature, and that by getting rid of his Evil Nature, he
performs more good Artifice and gradually he surpasses others and
attains holiness. Is then the Transformation of Man's Nature a
universal possibility or are there men whose Nature cannot be trans¬
formed? Since, following the rule of Transformation of Man's
Nature, all men could become as sage-like as Yao and Yii, is there a
reason for the chaotic state of the world with its millions of Evil
men? Hsun-tze answers these questions outstandingly well. In
chapter XVIII, he argues,
'Yao and Shun were the most proficient people
in the world at enlightening and civilizing the masses.
When they sat facing south4^ and listened to the
masses of the whole world5®, all men were stirred,
49. The seats of the ancient kings always faced south; later it
became a tradition that all kings' seats faced south.
50. T'ien-Hsia, or all under Heaven. In ancient China
the concept of territory was ambiguous, and most people considered
that under Heaven lies the territory of China.
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subdued and changed. Only Chu and Hsiang
refused to change; this, however, was not the
fault of Yao and Shun, but that of Chu and Hsiang.
Yao and Shun were the most sagacious in the world,
Chu and Hsiang, the most cunning and troublesome
in their times . . . Yao and Shun, though the
best at enlightening and civilizing the world,
could not change the most cunning and troublesome
men.' (XII, 9)
Sage-like though Yao and Shun were, they could not change their
cunning and troublesome relatives, i.e. Chu and Hsiang. This
was not the fault of the former, Ilsun-tze believes, for Transform¬
ation of Man's Nature is a very personal affair. According to
Hsun-tze, although there are rites and music, teacher and law, if
a man does not learn assiduously and does not associate with a
good teacher, then all these external means of help are useless.
In chapter XXIII, Hsun-tze further explains,
'Someone asks, "As for reaching the stage of
a Sage, man can accumulate (his Artifice) and attain it.
However, there are the masses who cannot accumulate
(Artifice). Why?" I answer: This is because man can
do what he likes, but he cannot be forced. Therefore
a Mean-Spirited Man could become a Conscientious Man,
but he does not want to; a Conscientious Man could
become a Mean-Spirited Man, but he does not want to.
A Mean-Spirited Man and a Conscientious Man could ex¬
change positions; however, they both reject the
exchange: this is because man can do what he likes,
but he cannot be forced. Therefore to say that anyone
in the street can become a Yu is correct; to say that
anyone in the street will eventually become a Yu is
probably not true. Though man will not necessarily
eventually become a Yu, it is not contradictory to say
he can become a Yu. Feet generally can walk every¬
where in the world, but in fact there are no feet which
can really walk every inch of the world . . . Then
the fact that man can do or become something does not
51. 4^
52.
Chu, the son of Yao.
Hsiang, the younger brother of Shun.
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necessarily mean that he will eventually succeed;
however, the fact that he does not succeed is no
contradiction of the fact that he can do so.
Thus the possibility of success and the capability
of man are obviously different, and that the two
cannot be exchanged in practice is clear.' (XVII, 6-7)
In this paragraph, Hsun-tze's argument is logical. The reasons
given that Man's Transformation of his Nature is not a universal
possibility are as follows: (1) external and objective power can
help man to transform his Evil Nature but cannot force him to be
transformed, and (2) internal and personal power of man can act
according to his will but to be or not to be is his own decision
and he is absolutely free to make his own decision. From these
two factors, Hsun-tze singles out one very essential point: man's
moral autonomy. The origins of Artifice are, according to Hsun-
tze, on one hand, derived from the learning of the external world,
including respect for the teacher and the law, and from the exalt¬
ation of rites and music; on the other hand, and more essentially,
from man's rational Deliberation and decision, and outward behaviour.
Accordingly, the Mind is the main origin of moral Artifice, and man
possesses moral autonomy. Hsun-tze clearly indicates that the
change or non-change of Man's Nature depends on the individual;
however, a man who has the capability to become morally good and
refuses to do so should shoulder the charge of being lazy, or of
insufficiency in his moral effort. The influence of external factors,
whether they are good or bad, cannot forcefully change anyone's
decision unless he is willing. Man has the capacity to encourage
good Artifice, but whether to follow the masses or the Sage is his
choice.
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Hsun-tze is the first in his time to suggest that Man's
Nature is Evil, and must be transformed. He also suggests that
man's final goal is to accumulate good Artifice in order to become
a Sage. The ways to a Sage are, externally learning and exalting
rites, being intimate with and serving a good teacher, and intern¬
ally seeking for his rational Deliberation. This leads on to his
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theory of a Great Clear and Bright Mind . Here Hsun-tze develops
his theory from the Transformation of Man's Nature to his investi¬
gations of the Mind, the essential part of his philosophy. However,
his introduction of the term 'Artifice' certainly is an innovative
one among classical writers. The theory of Artifice, on the one hand
links up with his theories of Man's Evil Nature and its Transform¬
ation, while on the other, points to the theory of the Mind. It
consistently runs through his entire system. Unfortunately later
scholars, lacking the patience to read and digest his arguments and
to understand the purpose of his theories of human nature, disliked
the idea that Man's Nature is Evil, and rejected the concept of
Artifice. Some even distorted the real meaning of these two tech¬
nical terms, and therefore Hsun-tze has had few followex-s, which is
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a matter for regret in the history of Chinese philosophy
53. Ta - Ch'ing-Ming-Hsin, a technical term of
his theory of the Mind. He uses it to mean the state of the Mind
when it is not obsessed.
54. A further discussion on p. 336.
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His theory of Mind might be divided into two parts:
55
(1) the theory of the Epistemological Mind , and (2) the theory
56
of the Ultimate Mind, or the Sage Mind . A survey of the first
part will follow immediately.
55. In his theory, there is no such technical term. It is employed
in this thesis as a special term to denote his idea of the capacity
of the Mind to know and to examine all external objects including
morality. It naturally involves itself in the realm of knowledge,
and his theory of the Epistemological Mind is discussed in the chapter
regarding his theory of knowledge.
56. -16b Tao-Hsin. This term is used once in his book when he
quotes from TAO TE CHING of Lao-tze, a philosopher earlier than him.
He uses it to mean the Mind which has already completely united itself
with the Ultimate Principle of Man, or Tao or morality. It simply
means a Mind with perfect virtue. It is equivalent to the term




HIS THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER 11:
HIS THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
It is obvious that Hsun-tze has no intention of
establishing a system of theory of knowledge. For him, what is
of most concern is morality, which he believes provides the only
way to save the chaotic world of his time. One may consider that
the purpose of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is to introduce
the theory of Artifice. After investigating the origin of Artifice
he goes on to emphasize the functioning of the Mind. His philosophy
then proceeds to the ,discussion of the relationship between the Mind
and the Ultimate Principle of Man or Tao. The direction of his: effort
indeed is assigned to morality. Only because he had to resist
contemporary sophistic theories did he develop his theory of know¬
ledge, in which he puts forward four main themes, namely (1) the
theory of names1, (2) the theory of the Epistemological Mind,
(3) the theory of reasoning, and (4) the theory of the rectification
of names. Here an attempt is made to discuss these theories in
order to give an outline of his opinion on knowledge.
SECTION 1: THE THEORY OF NAMES
Chapter XXII, entitled 'The Rectification of Names', is
in fact his theory of names, which can be analysed into the following
five parts.
1. Ming, means 'name, designation, title, rank, position,
honour, fame, reputation, famous, noble, great, etc.' Among the
Pre-Ch'in scholars, Confucius is the first who insists on the corre¬
spondence between name and reality. He considers that names should
serve as standards for social organization and personal conduct.
Hsun-tze's theory of names offers a further development of that of
Confucius.
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A: HIS EXAMINATION OF THE ORIGIN OF NAMES
In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze first traces the history of
names,
'When the later kings formulated names, in the
names of penalties, they followed the terms of Shang
Dynasty^; in the titles of the nobility, they followed
the terms of Chou Dynasty; in the names of ceremonies,
they followed the terms of the book about rites^. As
to the miscellaneous names given to all things, they
followed those which were established by custom and
were commonly approved in practice in the areas ruled
by Hsia Dynasty^. People at a distance followed these
standard uses of names and they made successful
communication with one another.' (XVI, 1)
From this, it appears that Hsun-tze considers the origins of names
to be derived from two sources, namely (1) the names of social
institutions, and (2) those of miscellaneous common names. The
former, including the names of laws, official ranks and rules of
politeness, originates from the established institutional terms
used by the ancient dynasties, while the latter originates from
people with different customs and from different areas ruled by the
Hsia Dynasty.
2. By the later kings or Hou-Wang, Hsun-tze refers them
to the Sage-Kings of early Chou Dynasty ( ^ 1111 -256 B.C.).
King Wen ( "3L-3^-) who paved the way for the founding of the dynasty,
and King Wu ( j£_ ), the son of King Wen and the founder of the
Chou Dynasty, are among those whom Hsun-tze praises as the models of
his ideal political personalities, i.e. the Sage-Kings.
3. Shang: approximately 1151-1111 B.C.
4. The book about rites which Hsun-tze mentions here is not
LI CHI or THE BOOK OF RITES which was edited by the Han scholars,
but YI LI or BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL which records
the rites established in early Chou Dynasty.
5. Hsia; approximately 2183-1752 B.C.
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Hsun-tze then emphasizes the importance of the
establishment of names for the purpose of communication, since two
men using the same name but meaning different realities, cannot
properly communicate with each other. Therefore a definition for
each name concerned is necessary. When a name is established in
common use, one also has to be careful if it is improperly or con¬
fusingly used by others. When a name is used loosely or abused, then
one has to rectify and clarify the position. This is Hsun-tze's
underlying idea in this chapter.
B: HIS DEFINITION OF NAME
In the same chapter, Hsun-tze defines the term 'name'
as follows:
'Names have no intrinsic appropriateness.
When men agree to use a certain name to apply to a
certain thing and that thing is named, when the agree¬
ment is effective and becomes a matter of custom, the
name may be said to be appropriate. If a name is used
against convention, it is said to be inappropriate.
Names have no intrinsic reality. When men agree to use
a certain name to indicate a certain reality, and that
reality is named, when the agreement is effective and
becomes customary, the name may be said to be a real
name.' (XVI, 4)
This argument so far as is known is first initiated by Hsun-tze
among the thinkers of ancient China and is indeed not only
pioneering but also of considerable profundity.
C: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE FUNCTIONS OF NAMES
His discussion of the functions of names which is found
through the same chapter may be summarized in two points:
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(i) Their political function
Hsun-tze discusses the intention of the Sage-Kings who
regulated the proper uses of names as follows:
'If names are fixed so that realities can be
distinguished; if the principles of regulating names
are practised so that the wills of men may be communi¬
cated, then the kings can meticulously lead their
people to comply and the world will thus be united.
Therefore those who contest their definition of words
and use unauthorized names to cause confusion in the
use of correct names, and thus arouse doubt among the
people and create much debate and litigation among
them are called great scoundrels; their crimes are
just like the crimes of those who make unauthorized
allies and measures for officials. Therefore those
of the king's people who dare not make strange terms
so as to confuse the correct ones are honest people;
since they are honest, they are easy to employ;
since they are easy to employ, they have achievements.
Since men among the king's people dare not make
strange terms to create confusion in the use of the
correct ones, they concentrate their efforts on observ¬
ing the law and they are cautious to act according to
the orders of the king, and thus the achievements of
the king are increased. If the achievements of the
king are increased, then success comes his way. This
is the ultimate attainment of politics, and this is the
merit of following faithfully the principle of
regulating and abiding by names.' (XVI, 2)
e,
In this paragraph, Hsun-tze discusses the merits of names with regard
to politics, or rather the relationship between names and politics.
(ii) Their practical functions
According to Hsun-tze, the purpose of the proper
regulation of names is to reach three goals, namely (1) from the
6. £^p Fu-Chieh, carried for identification as a warrant in
ancient China, usually carried by ambassadors when seeing high
officials of another country.
46
aspect of name itself, to enable man to distinguish the nobles and
the inferiors, the identical and the different; (2) from the aspect
of man, to enable him to point out realities and to explain his will,
and (3) from the aspect of events, to enable man to avoid the
unhappiness of difficulties arising therefrom. Therefore Hsun-tze
says,
'If different minds try to explain different
forms of things; if name and reality are mixed without
reference to actual things; if the noble and the in¬
ferior are not clarified; and if the identical and the
different are not distinguished, then the will of men
must endure the suffering of not being understood, and
the event must,suffer the calamity of being hindered or
of failing. Therefore the wise man distinguishes
different terms for the people, he regulates names to
point out realities, and thus, on a high level, the
result will be that the noble and the inferior are
clarified, and on a lower level, that the identical
and the different are distinguished. When the noble
and the inferior are set apart, and the identical and
the different are distinguished, then men's wills will
not have to endure the suffering of not being under¬
stood, and the event will not then endure the calamity
of being hindered or of failing; this is the reason
for having names.' (XVI, 2-3)
Therefore Hsun-tze's reason for having names is also his justification
of the practical function of names.
D: HIS SUGGESTION OF THE EXAMINATION OF NAMES
As to how to examine the correspondence of name and
reality, Hsun-tze suggests two ways:
(i) By means of the natural senses of man
By using man's sensory organs, man can perceive and then
know the similarities and differences of certain objects. In other
words, man knows external object by experience.
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(ii) By means of the Mind which can examine and understand
Hsun-tze suggests the Mind as the ultimate means of
knowing, understanding and examining external realities. He says:
'The Mind has the ability to examine and know.'
(XVI, 3)
That is to say, the Mind, by gathering and examining the sense
data which are received by the sensory organs, understands the exist¬
ence of external objects and then reviews whether the names given
are in correspondence with the factual truth. This suggestion
involves Hsun-tze's .theories on epistemology, which will be discussed
in Section 2 of this chapter.
E: HIS PRINCIPLES OF FORMULATING NAMES
In his principles of formulating names, Hsun-tze suggests
a threefold approach, namely (1) similarity and difference, (2) the
general and the particular, and
_ (3) the real number. To quote his
own words:
'When things are alike, then they are named
alike; when they are different, then they are named
differently. When a single name is enough to explain
a thing, then a single name is used; when a single
name is insufficient to explain, then a compound name
is used. When a single name and a compound name do
not conflict with each other, then a general name may
be used, and though a general name is used, it does no
harm to the meanings either. Knowing that different
realities have different names, he should not cause
confusion among them. Likewise he should refer to
the same realities with similar names. Therefore
though all things are manifold, when times occur when
men would like to speak of them all as a whole, he
will name them as "things"^. "Thing" is a broad
7. Wu, means things or physical objects.
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general name . Man deduces things according to their
classes and generalises them, after generalisation
there comes another broader general name till there
are no more broader general names, and then the deduct¬
ion ends. When times occur when man would like to
speak of one thing in particular, he will name it as
"bird" or "beast", (for example). "Bird" or "Beast"
are broad particular names®. Man carries on the
particularising and after particularisation, there
comes another more particular name till there are no
more particular names; then the particularisation
ends.' (XVI, 4)
In the above paragraph, Hsun-tze indicates his first two principles
of formulating names, i.e. the principles of naming the similar¬
ities and the differences, and the generalities and the
particularities. As to the third principle, he says:
but are in different places, there are also things which
have different appearances but are in the same places;
then they are distinguishable. Although things which
have the same appearance but are in different places,
can be called by the same name, they should be treated
as two realities. When the appearance of a thing
changes into a different one but its reality has no
change, this is called change1^. If a thing has
changed yet its reality is still as it originally was,
it should be treated as one reality.' (XVI, 4)
Hsun-tze's theories on the principles of formulating names are
indeed, as far as known, the first suggested in ancient China.
SECTION 2: THE THEORIES OF EPISTEMOLOGY
Hsun-tze considers names to be a medium of knowing things.
However, to examine whether a name corresponds with its reality,
'There are things which have the same appearance
8- b Ta-Kung-Ming.
Ta-Pieh-Ming.
10 . 4b Hua.
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Hsun-tze suggests that man should use his senses and Mind. Before
a name is fixed by common agreement and customary practice, the
distinction of different realities is also made, according to
Hsun-tze's theory, by man's sensory experiences. Therefore Hsun-
tze 's thinks that the necessary condition of knowing is man's own
experience. In chapter XXII, he sets a question to himself:
'Then by what means does man distinguish
the similarities and the differences?" (XVI, 3)
Here the argument proceeds to a further step in the investigation
of the necessary condition of knowing.
A: HIS EXPLANATION OF KNOWLEDGE FROM SENSES
Hsun-tze's first answer is as follows:
'I say, by means of the natural sensory organs.
When two men see things of the same kind and in the
same situation, their sensory organs should have the
same perceptions and make the same .assumptions.
Therefore they use gesticulation and comparison to
describe the thing they see, and they then understand
each other; this is also the time when they agree to
fix a name on that thing, so that their knowledge of
these things can be mutually transmitted to each other.'
(XVI, 3)
Thus Hsun-tze clearly indicates that the sensory organs of man are
the first means of knowing things. Then he continues to distinguish
the functions of man's five sensory organs: the eyes to distin¬
guish form, body, colour and shape; the ears to distinguish the
clear and turbid, broad and narrow and the strange of sounds; the
tongue to distinguish the sweet, bitter, salty, fresh, peppery, sour
and strange of tastes; the nose to distinguish the fragrant, stinking,
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aromatic, rotten of smells, the different odours of pig, dog, horse
and cow and the strange of smells; the body to distinguish the
pain, itch, cold, hot, smooth, rough, light and heavy of feelings;
the Mind to distinguish the pleasure and dislike, joy and anger,
sadness and happiness, love and hatred and desire of emotions.
Thus all these above are, for Hsun-tze, means of perceiving objects
of knowledge.
B: HIS SUGGESTION OF MIND'S EXAMINING OF KNOWLEDGE
In the discussion of means of knowing, Hsun-tze is not
satisfied with mere sensory organs, or more precisely, sensory ex¬
periences. He goes on to suggest the Mind as the faculty of
examining and rationally understanding. He says:
'The Mind has the ability to examine and understand.
Since it has the ability to examine and understand, thus by
means of ears, it knows sounds; by means of eyes, it knows
form and body.' (XVI, 3)
Therefore, according to Hsun-tze, the Mind, by means of sensory
organs, perceives and recognizes things; and the Mind hence is the
necessary condition of knowing. However, the realization of the
ability of the Mind relies much on the appropriate contact of the
related sensory organs. For instance, the condition that eyes can
see is simply and initially that there is a visible object. Now
supposing that the eyes can see and that there is an unknown object
which the eyes can see as white in colour and square in shape, of
which the eyes can see the approximate degree of whiteness and its
volume, yet the eyes cannot distinguish whether it is warm or cool
by sight. Therefore each sensory organ has its limitation in
providing the Mind with the data of the object contacted. In
other words, the data of an object received by the Mind is limited,
or conditioned by the senses. As to those things or existences
which human senses cannot reach, such as what there is beyond the
universe, or what is God, Hsun-tze suggests that man should admit
that these things or existences are unknowable to him. Hsun-tze
makes the above idea plain in these words:
'However, the Mind's ability to examine and
understand must wait until the sensory organs can
make an appropriate contact then can it be realized.
If the five sensory organs contact an object and they
cannot perceive sufficient data of it, then although
the Mind examines and tries to give a meaning or under¬
standing to the object, it cannot make a successful
explanation or interpretation, and because of this man
would say he does not know the object.' (XVI, 3)
This shows, according to Hsun-tze, that the ability of the Mind to
examine and understand external objects has its limits. Hsun-tze
admits, accordingly, that there are limits to knowledge from experi¬
ence, but he also considers that there is no way of obtaining
knowledge other than by experience.^
In his discussions of the means of distinguishing the
similar and the different, Hsun-tze puts forward natural organs and
the Mind to structure his system of epistemology. If asked how
the Mind examines and understands things, Hsun-tze gives a further
step in search for the structure of the Epistemological Mind as
discussed in chapter XXI:
11. Please note that to Hsun-tze, the Epistemological Mind in
examining and understanding external objects undeniably has its
limits, yet the Ultimate Mind in comprehending and practising
morality may have no limits. For detailed discussion, please
see pp.281-284.
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'How does the Mind know? I say: because of
12
its Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness
. . . There is nothing which the Mind does not store,
yet there is what is called Receptiveness12 in it.
There is no time in which the Mind does not know more
than two things, yet there is what is called Attentive¬
ness14 in it. There is no staticness in the Mind, yet
there is what is called Undisturbedness15 in it. Man
is born with the ability to know. After learning, he
has memory. Memory is to store knowledge. However,
what is called Receptiveness comes about when, in the
Mind, the thing to be learned is not obstructed by the
knowledge already stored; this is called the Receptive¬
ness of the Mind. The Mind is born with the capacity
of knowing; after knowing, the Mind distinguishes the
differences, and the differences can be known simultan¬
eously. However, what is called Attentiveness is that
this one is not obstructed by that one; this is called
the Attentiveness of the Mind. When the Mind sleeps,
it dreams; when it relaxes, it wanders away; and when
used, it works attentively; therefore there is no
staticness in the Mind. However, what is called
Undisturbedness means that fantasising and vexation will
not disturb the knowledge which has been stored; this
is called Undisturbedness . . . The Receptiveness,
Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of the Mind is called
Great Clearness and Brightness.' (XV, 4-5)
In the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness of
the Mind, or when the Mind is a Great Clear and Bright one, accord¬
ing to Hsun-tze, knowledge of old and new all have their place in
the Mind without obstructing one another, and there is always space,
too, to store the world. Knowledge stored will not be mixed and
12 • r?0 Hsu-I-Erh-Ching.
13. Hsu, means 'empty, hollow, void, unoccupied, shapeless,
unreal, false, deceptive, unfounded, groundless, weak, feeble, etc.'
Hsun-tze uses this term in a technical way meaning the capacity of
Receptiveness of the Mind.
14. I, an elaborate form of '-—■' (one) now used mostly in
accounting. Hsun-tze uses it in a technical way meaning a state
of the Mind which is devoted to, committed to, Tao. Attentiveness
is suggested here.
i-A
15. pff Ching, means 'still, motionless, tranquility, silent,
peaceful, serene, virtuous, chaste, etc.' Hsun-tze uses it in a
technical way meaning the state of the Mind which is undisturbed
by any internal and external situation.
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become indistinct, and it also will not be disturbed by dreams or
daydreams or vexation of the Mind. However, Hsun-tze says that
those who can keep their Mind in such a state are the Sages. Thus
it is clear that what he would like to achieve in this theory is to
direct knowledge to morality. This will be discussed in the next
chapter of this Part. However, his analysis of the condition of
knowing of the Mind is also outstanding in his time. He tries to
give a psychological explanation of how the mind has the ability
of knowing, the origin of memory and the capacity of identification.
Although his arguments are too succinct and his theory is not
compact, his contribution to ancient Chinese philosophy in the
field of psychology is significant.
C: HIS DISCUSSION ON ILLUSIONS
To keep the Mind in a state of Great Clearness and
Brightness is not easy to achieve, and illusion slips in easily
and thus the Mind will be obsessed. To dispel Obsessions of the
16
Mind , man should first understand the origins of illusions.
Thus in chapter XXI, Hsun-tze says:
'If a man sees a thing with a doubting eye,
and his Mind is uncertain, then external things
become indistinct, and the Deliberation of his Mind
also becomes unintelligent; and thus, man cannot
decide the right or wrong of his knowledge.' (XV, 8)
Hsun-tze at one point uses the metaphor of a pan of water as an
illustration. There is clear and clean water in the upper part of
16. For reference, please see p.2, Note 10.
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the pan and turbid and muddy water in the lower. V/hen even a mild
wind passes, the turbid and muddy water is moved down below while
the clear and clean thus become disorderly. Likewise, whenever
the Mind views when obsessed, Hsunt-tze claims, it doubts and
becomes uncertain. In other words, man cannot then control his
own Mind and it follows the ups and downs of the external world,
and thus the Mind cannot clearly distinguish external things.
The Mind thus fails to judge the validity of its cognition, not to
mention its capacity of identification. Therefore, accordingly
and consequently, illusions originate. In the same chapter, Hsun-
tze points out several kinds of illusions to illustrate his argument
that when the Mind is uncertain and follows the ups and downs of the
external world, illusions follow. One of his examples of illusions
may be quoted here:
'When walking in the dark, a man sees a piece
of rock lying and thinks that it is a crawling tiger;
he sees a row of trees and thinks that it is a crowd
of men following him. This is because of darkness
that obsesses his brightness.' (XV, 8)
Vj
Here Hsun-tze takes the example of a man walking in the dark; owing
to the uncertainty of his Mind, he has unnecessary suspicions of
seeing imaginary objects. It is not the brightness of sight that
darkness has obsessed but the brightness of the Mind. The
essential ideas of chapter XXI are to make plain the condition of
knowing and the origin of Obsessions of the Mind, and to find the
way of dispelling these Obsessions, or the way of keeping the state
of Great Clearness and Brightness of the Mind.
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Hzun-tze's theories of epistemology in this chapter
start from the appeal for rectification of names, then proceed to
the examination of why there are names and man's experience in
examining whether the names correspond to reality, and then turn
to the discussion of the origin of knowledge from sensory experi¬
ences and essentially from the Mind, and finally, the analysis of
the capacity of the Great Clear and Bright Mind, He lays emphasis
on knowledge from experience, yet he concludes his system with the
Mind's capacity of knowing the Ultimate Principle, when it is in
the state of Great Clearness and Brightness. Consequently, although
his theories are quite systematically structured, Hsun-tze always
puts forward his concept of morality as the final aim. In other
words, he has no ambition of founding a theory of epistemology or
knowledge, and therefore he does not develop his views on pure
thinking or pure knowledge. His view on knowledge is knowledge
for morality's sake, just like his view on learning, as mentioned
in the last chapter. The effort of Hsun-tze, and also of many
Chinese scholars of his time and of later times, is to pave the way
for man to reach the state of moral perfection; in other words,
all he and many others are concerned with is morality, or how to
achieve moral perfection.
SECTION 3: THE THEORIES OF REASONING
Hsun-tze considers the Mind to be the subject or source
of knowing. The Mind's capacity of knowing depends on the Mind
and the object of knowing being in contact with each other.
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Hsun-tze admits that man's experience is limited, and therefore
the contact of the Mind with the external objects is also limited.
Thus if asked the way in which the Mind may know more about the
world, Hsun-tze puts forward his theory of reasoning. However,
there is no complete system or discussion of theory of reasoning
in his book; in other words, he does not consciously establish a
whole theory of it. Only some fragments have survived in scattered
places, related to the theory. These fragments which are quoted
below may be divided into three kinds related to three types of
reasoning.
A: HIS SUGGESTION OF ANALOGICAL REASONING
In chapter V, Hsun-tze says:
'Therefore he (the Sage) measures the man of
the past by means of the man of the present, the
situation of the past by means of the situation of
the present, the classification of the past by means
of the classification of the present, and the merits
of the past by means of theories of the present.
He attains observations of all of these by means of an
Ultimate Principle: and he then finds that the present
and the past are alike and the measurement used is
always the same.' (Ill, 4-5)
The measurement the Sage uses is, according to Hsun-tze, the
Ultimate Principle, or Tao. However, knowledge by means of
analogical measuring or reasoning is, Hsun-tze considers, possible.
B: HIS SUGGESTION OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING
In chapter IX, Hsun-tze says:
'From classification, man observes the miscellaneousness
of all things. From one, man observes all.' (V, 7)
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In chapter VIII he says:
'From the shallow, man measures the deep,
from the past, he measures the present; from one,
he measures ten thousand.' (IV, 10)
Also in chapter V he says:
'If man wants to view one thousand years
later, then he should review today; if he wants
to know ten thousand or a hundred million, then
he should review one and two . . . From the
immediate, man knows the remote, from one, he
knows ten thousand; from the obscure, he knows
the obvious side.' (Ill, 4)
Here the words 'observe', 'measure', 'review', and 'know' used
by Hsun-tze all have the meaning of reasoning, and the way of
reasoning suggested which proceeds from one universal to a
thousand particulars is classified as deductive reasoning.
C: HIS SUGGESTION OF INDUCTIVE REASONING
In chapter III, Hsun-tze says:
'The emotion of a thousand or ten thousand
men are that of one man.' (II, 5)
Here Hsun-tze is using inductive reasoning to induce one universal
principle from thousands of particularities.
From the above, it is clear that although Hsun-tze shows
some interest in the use of names, and he tries to establish the
proper ones and to rectify the confused ones, yet he does not turn
his attention to pure knowledge and to founding a complete system
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of theory of knowledge. The main reason for this is that he has
no interest in non-ethical arguments. The above analyses merely
serve to demonstrate that he has said something related to the
theory of reasoning. If he had developed his thought in this area,
he might have made a greater contribution to the theory of knowledge.
However, although his words in this field do not go into detail, it
would be unfair to say that he had not touched on the topic.
SECTION 4: THE THEORY OF THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES (A)
- THE SOLUTIONS OF THE THREE CONFUSIONS —
In chapter XXII, entitled 'The Rectification of Names'
Hsun-tze firstly explains the function of names and the principles
of formulating names; then he tries to argue against the popular
sophistries of his contemporaries. He debates rigorously and
tries to point out their defects sharply. Thus he produces his
17
notable discussion on the 'three confusions' which later scholars
comment to be the most important arguments of Hsun-tze that involve
18
the problems of logic
Hsun-tze analyses contemporary sophistries into three
groups; and he charges them of (1) using words to confuse names,
(2) using fact to confuse names, and (3) using words to confuse
17. Huo. To Hsun-tze, Huo is a fallacy in the application
of name which gives rise to confusion.
18. However, the comment may not be valid, for Hsun-tze's discussion
of the three confusions itself is not as successful as is attributed.
For a further argument, please see pp.240-251.
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19
fact . In each discussion, he firstly gives examples quoted
from contemporary popular sophistical statements which unfortun¬
ately can now almost all be seen in fragements only, then he
follows by an investigation of the reason for their confusions
or deficiencies, and finally suggests a solution to each of them.
A: HIS DISCUSSION OF USING WORDS TO CONFUSE NAMES
In his first analysis, Hsun-tze says:
'To be insulted is not disgraceful. The sage
does not love himself. To kill a thief is not to
kill a man. .These confusions are caused by the speak¬
er's using words to confuse names. If the reason for
having names is examined, and the appropriateness of
names used is investigated, then the confusion can be
refuted.' (XVI, 5)
The first example of confusions is quoted from the
20
theory of Sung-tze that to be insulted is not disgraceful. In
chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze argues against Sung-tze's theory in detail:
'Master Sung-tze once said, "If the theory that
to be insulted is not disgraceful is clearly explained
and understood, then men will not fight; it is because
men think that to be insulted is disgraceful that they
fight; if they know that to be insulted is not disgrace¬
ful, then they will not fight". I respond, "Then you
consider that man feels that he does not hate to be
insulted?" The answer is 21, "He hates, yet he does *
not feel disgraced." I say, "If so, your wish must
I-Ming-Luan-Shih, I-Shih-Luan-Ming.
20. Sung-tze, 360-290 B.C., a scholar in the Warring States
Period. He is said to have written eighteen essays yet none of
them have survived. Hsun-tze must have read or heard of this state¬
ment of Sung-tze; however, one cannot now find it in any other
philosophical work of this period.
21. It is suggested by later scholars that the answer probably came
from the follower or disciple of Sung-tze.
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never be realized. The fighting of men is certainly
caused by their feeling of hatred rather than their
feeling of disgrace. Now watch the clown, the dwarf
and the comedian, they insult one another, yet they
do not start fighting. Do they not understand the
teaching that to be insulted is not disgraceful? In
fact, the reason why they do not start fighting is
that they do not hate (the game of teasing one another).
Now, there is a man entering inside someone else's
garden wall, and stealing someone else's pig, then the
master of the house takes up his sword to drive him
off. Now if the master of the house does not care
about his life in fighting against the thief, is not
that because he thinks that losing a pig is disgraceful?
In fact, the reason why he dares to fight is because he
hates (the behaviour of the thief). Although man may
think that to be insulted is disgraceful, if he does not
feel hatred, he will not start fighting; again, although
he may know that to be insulted is not disgraceful, if he
feels hatred,,he will certainly start fighting. Then to
fight or not to fight is not determined by the feeling of
being insulted or not but by the feeling of hatred or not.
Now Master Sung-tze cannot explain man's feeling of hating
to be insulted and he merely insists that man should not
feel he is insulted, is it not extremely erroneous!"'
(XII, 11-13)
In this paragraph, Hsun-tze argues the mistake of Sung-tze that if
man is insulted and does not feel disgraced, then he will have no
motive to fight. In debate, Hsun-tze considers that the motive
for fighting lies in the feeling of hatred of being insulted and
not in the feeling of disgrace because of being insulted. Since
Sung-tze misunderstands, Hsun-tze claims, the cause of man's fight¬
ing, his statement becomes a confusion. According to solution of
this confusion, suggested by Hsun-tze, man should examine the
different meanings of the words 'not disgraceful' and 'not feeling
hatred', and understand that the cause of fighting does not lie in
the feeling of disgrace. Thus the fallacy committed by Sung-tze
may be resolved.
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The second example given is 'the sage does not love him¬
self which might be a quotation from his contemporary Mo-ists,
22
follower of Mo-tze . Hsun-tze considers that the sage is the
one who loves all men, and so if one says that the sage loves all
men but himself, it is evident that the speaker does not under¬
stand that the terms 'men' and 'one's own self are two names with
one reality, or more clearly speaking, that the sage himself is a
man as well. It is contradictory to say that the sage loves all
men, including himself, but he does not love one man who is himself.
Therefore, according to Hsun-tze, if the speaker considers that the
words 'men' and 'the sage himself' bear a similar reality, this
confusing statement will be resolved.
The third example given 'to kill a thief is not to kill
23
a man', is a quotation which now can be found in MO-TZE
Hsun-tze considers that a thief is undoubtedly a man, thus the
\f? ">
22. ~7* Mo-Ti or Mocius, was born between 500-490 B.C. and died
between 425-416 B.C. He is one of the important thinkers in the
Warring States Period and the founder of Mo Chia or the Mohism or
the school of Mo. The book of MO-TZE is believed to be written by
his disciples. The quotation Hsun-tze uses here is in the latter
part of MO-TZE, which is often called MO-PIEN by later scholars.
There are six chapters in MO-TZE, which are commonly considered not
from the same author of the other chapters and possibly an appendix
added by the Mo-ists after Mo-tze to record the development or
achievements of a particular branch of Moism thought, which contains
a rich content of discussions such as the theoretical structure of
knowledge, the discussion of epistemological methodology, the defini¬
tions of certain names or terms, and discussions of logic in debate.
The third and fourth chapters are interpretations of the first two
chapters, and the later two chapters are of independent subject
matter. These six chapters, namely Ch' ing-Shang, "Jr
Ch'ing-Hsia, pjj-jL Ch' ing-Chieh - Shang, fjffi """ft" Ch'ing-
Chieh -Hsia, Ta-Ch'ii and 'J- Hsiao-Ch'ii, are usually
named MO-PIEN.
23. This quotation appears in the sixth chapter entitled 'Hsiao-Ch'ii'
in MO-PIEN.
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above statement, substituting the word 'thief by the word 'man',
reading 'to kill a man is not to kill a man' is eminently fallacious.
Hsun-tze thinks that the mistake of the statement is that the names
being used are unclarified and this causes confusion.
B: HIS DISCUSSION OF USING FACT TO CONFUSE NAMES
In the same chapter, Hsun-tze says:
'Mountains and chasms are on the same level.
Man naturally has few desires. A feast of grass-
fed and grain-fed animals has no tastiness. The
music of the great bell gives no pleasure. These
confusing statements are caused by the misuse of
fact to confuse names. If the means of disting¬
uishing the similarities and the differences is
examined, and the appropriateness of names used is
investigated, then such confusions can be stopped.'
. (XVI;, 5)
The first quotation given in the paragraph is suggested
24
by Hui-Shih . Hsun-tze considers that the source of knowledge is
man's experience and the statement of Hui-Shih is surpassing what
e,
man can experience. If a man stands on a plain ground, as Hsun-
tze would argue, what his eyes can see is obviously that the sky
and the earth are on a different level, and that the mountains and
chasms are also on a different level, the former being in the higher
24. r|| Hui-Shih, approximately 380-300 B.C., a friend of
Chuang-tze (approx. 369-286 B.C.) and a prime minister of
the State of Wei. Only ten paradoxes and a few fragmentary
statements of his work have survived and are quoted in the last
chapter of CHUANG-TZE (chapter XXXIII), a work by Chuang-tze and
possibly others. However, the background of why Hui-Shih says so
is not known.
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position while the latter are in the lower position. Therefore
Hzun-tze considers the mistake made by Hui-Shih is that Hui-Shih
does not examine the fact with his senses or experience.
25
The second example quoted is suggested by Sung-tze
In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze picks out the statement and makes a
full argument:
'Master Sung-tze says, "Man naturally has few
desires; if man thinks that he desires much, then he
is wrong". Therefore Sung-tze leads his fellows to
support his theory and to explain it clearly with
metaphors, with the purpose of making man understand
that man naturally is to desire little. In answer,
I say, "If so, then Sung-tze also considers that man
naturally does as follows: his eyes do not desire the
extremely beautiful colours, the ears do not desire
the extremely musical sounds, the tongue does not des¬
ire the extremely delicious tastes, the nose does not
desire the extremely pleasant smells, and the body
does not desire extremely comfortable leisure. Are
these five extremes not wanted by man?" The answer
is, "Man naturally wants these". I say, "If so,
then your theory will certainly not be realized. If
man thinks that man naturally wants these five
extremes but does not desire much of them, this is
just 1ike thinking that man naturally desires richness
and high position but he does not desire property or
goods, he loves beauty but he hates Hsi-Shih^®. Men
in the ancient time did not think like this; they
thought that man naturally desires much and does not
desire little. Therefore the ancient Sage-Kings re¬
warded his people with great wealth or punished them
by the death penalty or some other severe punishment.
This was the way which the hundred kings were similar
in their policy . . . Now that Master Sung-tze
considers that man naturally desires little and does
not desire much, that means accordingly that the early
25. The background of this statement is not known as the work of
Sung-tze or details of his philosophical system is lost.
26. Hsi-Shih, a very beautiful woman in the Epoch of
Spring and Autumn (approximately from 722-484 B.C.) who was
offered to King Wu ( .JjL Wu-Wang) by King of Yueh ( j£L
Yueh-Wang).
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Sage-Kings had rewarded their people with what the
people did not desire and punished them with what
they desired. There is no confusion greater than
this!'" (XII, 13-14)
From this it is evident that Hsun-tze considers that the mistake
made by Sung-tze is that Sung-tze's argument is not in accordance
with man's experience. Hsun-tze thinks that all men naturally
love beautiful colours, musical sounds, delicious tastes, pleasant
smells, and care-free relaxation, therefore the theory of Sung-tze
is contradictory to fact and experience and thus it is a fallacy.
The third and fourth examples quoted are similar in
their implication, and both may be from the contemporary saying of
27
Mo-ists . According to the theory of Hsun-tze, a feast of grass-
fed and grain-fed animals is delicious, a fact that every man may
have experienced. Now if a man partakes of such a feast, he can¬
not deny that the feast has great tastiness. Similarly, a great
bell produces fine music, which anyone may have experienced. Now
if a man is entertained by such a musical bell, he cannot deny that
the bell gives pleasure; because these are unquestionably facts.
Therefore, Hsun-tze considers that the two statements are
confusions, for they are not in accordance with facts and experiences.
C: HIS DISCUSSION OF USING WORDS TO CONFUSE FACT
In most of the Chinese classical texts, punctuation
was seldom used. When the v/ork was edited or rearranged for
27. Again why these statements are made remains unknown.
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publication in the later centuries, punctuation might be added
and the punctuation inserted often according to the interpretation
of the editor in every century. The validity of the interpretation
often became the subject of controversial textual researches. In
the case of the first nine Chinese words in the following paragraph
quoted by Hsun-tze, later scholars found it difficult to add appro¬
priate punctuation so as to divide them into intelligible sentences.
These first nine Chinese words, which Hsun-tze quotes in the third
discussion may have, according to later scholars, two possible
readings:
(1) 'He who censures (his enemy) visits him. The
pillar has an ox. A (white) horse is not a horse.'
(2) 'He who censures (his enemy) visits him and is
(politely waiting to be interviewed) beside the
pillar. To have an ox and a horse is not to have
a horse2®.' (X.VI, 5)
In the first way of reading them, the first example
quoted is, according to Hsun-tze, a confusion, for the words
'censure' and 'visit' seem contradictory to each other in their
meanings. Man naturally does not visit his enemy whom he censures.
The same interpretation can be used for the first example of the
second way of reading them. As to the second example quoted of
the first way of reading, there may be incorrect or missing words
28. The two ways of reading these nine Chinese words are:
(1) & if 4-, J, #
' Fei-Erh-Yeh, Ying-You-Niu, Ma-Fei-Ma-Yeh'.
(2) # vfo m
'Fei-Erh-Yeh-Ying, You-Niu-Ma-Fei-Ma-Yeh'.
It is difficult to know whose statements Hsun-tze is quoting here,
especially the first two of the first reading, although some later
scholars speculated that the words were derived from MO-PIE-N or some
other Mo-ist. The only thing one can be sure is that these 'words'
are popular in Hsun-tze's times and he feels that they are
sophistries about which he must have something to say.
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in the sentence, and it is still a riddle to later scholars. It
may be interpreted as follows: there is a carving of an ox on the
pillar, and if one simply says that the pillar has an ox, then the
words he uses are leading to confusion of the facts. As to the
third example of the first way of reading, the statement that a
(white) horse is not a horse is, most commentators suggest, quoted
29
from the sayings of Kung-sun Lung . Kung-sun Lung considers
that when man speaks of a white horse, he speaks of a particular
one, therefore (1) a white horse is not any horse but a parti¬
cular one which is spoken of particularly; (2) a white horse or
any particular horse cannot, therefore, represent all horses.
However, according to Hsun-tze, the term 'horse' is a general name
while the term 'white horse' is a particular name, and both can be
compounded to indicate one reality, therefore Hsun-tze considers
that a white horse is a horse or that a horse can always represent
all horses. Thus he claims that the words used in the statement
lead to confusion as to the fact. As to the other way of reading
it, it is evidently fallacious, for, according to Hsun-tze, an ox
and a horse are two realities; therefore to say that an ox and a
horse is not a horse is factual. If a man tries to make this
statement into a theory, it is apparent that he is trying to do
something which is meaningless, and this results in confusion.
Hsun-tze may thus charge it of being confusing. However, these
two possible ways of reading the nine words are also confusing to
later scholars; although the first way of reading them seems to
29. Kung-sun Lung, born 325-315 and died 250 B.C., one of
the famous sophists in the Warring States Period. In his work
entitled KUNG-SUN-LUNG TZE, in six chapters, he shows great interest
in the discussion of names.
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be more suitable to the original discussion, it has still remained
a subject for further investigation.
The solution suggested to these fallacies is, Hsun-tze
continues in the passage, as follows:
'If the agreement of names is examined, and the
appropriateness of realities which those names repre¬
sent and of the usage of those names is investigated,
then the confusion will be prevented.' (XVI, 5)
Therefore when the appropriateness of the names used and the
realities which they are intended to indicate is sorted out, the
mistake or the fallacy will not be repeated.
The above mentioned are the famed three kinds of
confusions and their solutions and Hsun-tze makes use of the three
ways of examining names, as he himself suggested, to argue against
these three confusions or sophistries of his contemporaries. The
three ways of examining names he uses are: (1) to examine the
reason for having names; (2) to examine the means of distinction
of similarities and difference, and (3) to examine what is agreed
of the name. In other words if one examines the appropriateness
of name and reality by means of one's experience, confused names
and statements may be rectified.
This is his negative way of rectifying confused names.
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SECTION 5: THE THEORY OF THE RECTIFICATION OF NAMES (B)
- THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ARTS OF DEBATE -
In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze says:
'Now the Sage-Kings are dead, the world is in
chaos and evil sayings arise.' (XVI, 6) < \
In a chaotic world Hsun-tze who wants to rectify names feels that it
is insufficient to rely merely on theories, and that to have practical
debate with those who make evil sayings and confuse correct names is
30
necessary and essential. Thus he introduces the arts of debate
as the practical means of rectifying names.
A: THE MEANING OF DEBATE
In chapter V, Hsun-tze says:
'A Conscientious Man must debate. There is no
one who does not like to speak what he considers good,
and a Conscientious Man is the most earnest of them.'
(III, 6)
It is evident that the reason why a Conscientious Man must debate is
that he likes to speak what he considers good, and if he does not
like to speak what he considers good, he is not a Conscientious Man.
In the same chapter, Hsun-tze also says:
'Man follows the earlier kings, obeys propriety
and righteousness and relates himself to learning, yet
if he does not like to speak, he does not take pleasure
in debate, then he certainly is not a sincere Scholar.
Therefore in order to speak (what he considers good), a
Conscientious Man loves it (i.e. debate) sincerely,
practises it easily and says it willingly. For this
reason, a Conscientious Man must debate.' (Ill, 5)
30 . Pien-Shu.
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In another paragraph, Hsun-tze repeatedly emphasizes that debate
to a Conscientious Man is just as important as Human-Mindedness to
him, thus he says:
'The practice of Human-Mindedness of a Conscientious
Man is insatiable, . . . The speaking (of what he con¬
siders good) of a Conscientious Man is insatiable.'
(III, 5-6)
In fact, what a Conscientious Man considers good is, according to
Hsun-tze, Human-Mindedness; therefore Hsun-tze concludes that
'what a Conscientious Man debates is Human-Mindedness'. (Ill, 6)
From this, it is cleap that the Conscientious Man introduced by
Hsun-tze is the one who loves to speak of and debate on what he
considers good, and to debate, therefore, is a conscious practice
of a Conscientious Man. This is the positive meaning of the
statement that 'a Conscientious Man must debate'.
On the other hand, the necessity of a Conscientious
Man to debate arises partly because he is in a chaotic world. In
chapter XXII, Hsun-tze says:
'Since the Conscientious Man is not officially
influenced and powerful and he is not in the position
to use official penalties to prohibit (evil sayings),
therefore he has to debate.' (XVI, 6)
For this reason, Hsun-tze considers the purpose of debate of a
Conscientious Man is to stop evil sayings, and thus to illuminate
the right and wrong, to keep the country under control and to bring
peace to the world. This is the negative meaning of the statement
that 'a Conscientious Man must debate'.
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In chapter XXII, Hsun~tze also suggests a definition
of debate:
To debate is to speak of the Mind's intimation
of the Ultimate Principle. The Ultimate Principle is
the common law and policy of administration. The Mind
should be in accordance with the Ultimate Principle;
the debate should accord with the Mind, and statements
should accord with the debate.' (XVI, 6)
In other words, to debate is to speak of the accordance of the Mind
with the Ultimate Principle, which manifests itself in, according
to Hsun-tze, morality, or in his term 'the Ultimate Principle of
Man'. This definition is also consistent with the above-mentioned
positive and negative meaning of debate. According to Hsun-tze's
suggestion, on one hand, and positively, to debate is to speak of
what man considers to be in accordance with the Ultimate Principle
of Man, and on the other hand, negativeljr to debate is to illuminate
the right and wrong, to keep the country under control and to bring
peace to the world.
In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze also says,
'To debate is to speak of what is no different in
name and reality and to explain the way of the dynamic
and the static*^1.' (XVI, 6)
Therefore accordingly, to debate is also a way of rectifying names.
This statement also points out the essence of debate: in debate,
any names used must be in accordance with its reality, otherwise the
Yin - Yang-Chih-Tao, or the way of Yin and Yang in Hsun-tze's theory.
It seems that Hsun-tze used the term in a non-metaphysical sense;
to him, it simply means the phenomena of the world.
31. Tung-Ch ing-Chih-Tao, an equivalent
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statement made becomes sophistry. As to the way of the dynamic and
the static, these are in fact the way of the events and principles
of the world, or the realities of the world. Therefore, accord¬
ingly, to debate is to use the proper word to explain the appropriate-
fact or reality of the world. Hsun-tze then continues in the same
passage:
'To give a name and to assign a fixed meaning
to the name is the function of debate.' (XVI, 6)
Therefore in the application of words in debate, man can employ
several names to construct a statement, or invent appropriate new
names. As to the necessary rules of debate, Hsun-tze suggests that
'the reasons must be fully given'. (XVI, 6) In other words, in
debate, man must display all the supporting reasons; if one debates
without giving any supporting reasons, it is just like not making a
debate at all. A debater must firstly have his reasons for debate,
then he should use names in their proper functions, assign fixed
meanings to names used, or give new names, and display his opinion
C-
or suggestions so as to reach the purpose of his debate.
Therefore to use a name, to designate a fixed meaning
to the name used, and to give a new name must all be in accordance
with fact or reality; then to explain fully the supporting reasons
so as to make clear principles or events is the essence of debate,
or simply speaking, a good debate. And from another point of view,
it is also a necessary condition of debate.
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B: HIS SUGGESTION OF WHAT A CONSCIENTIOUS MAN DOES NOT DEBATE
Although Hsun-tze insists that a Conscientious Man must
debate, there are circumstances which, he considers, a Conscientious
Man should not speak of or in which it is unnecessary for a
Conscientious Man to speak. These circumstances are as follows:
(i) In doubt
In chapter XXVII, Hsun-tze says:
'When in doubt, a Conscientious Man should not speak.'
(XIX, 12)
According to what he has said on the Obsessions of the Mind, if man is
in doubt, then his Mind is not clear and bright, and he cannot
correctly distinguish things. Therefore in such a circumstance, no
man should speak or make debate, not to mention a Conscientious Man.
(ii) When not concerned with Human-Mindedness or 'Jen'
In chapter V, Hsun-tze says:
'When man's speech is not concerned with
Human-Mindedness, then his speech can do no better
than his silence, and his debate can do no better
than his stammering.' (111,7)
According to Hsun-tze, if the content of the speech is not concerned
with Human-Mindedness or 'Jen', or broadly speaking, with morality, it
is better not to waste time in such a speech.
(iii) Valueless speech
In chapter XVII, Hsun-tze says:
'As to valueless speech and the investigation
of non-urgent matters, man should abandon them and
leave them aside.' (XI, 12-13)
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Then what is valueless speech? Hsun-tze explains in chapter XXI.
'If it is not to distinguish the right and the
wrong, not to deal with the crooked and the straight,
not to identify order and disorder, and not to research
on the Ultimate Principle of Man, then although man makes
such a speech, it is of no benefit to others.' (XV, 10)
Therefore accordingly, the valueless speech is that which is not
relevant to the ethical administration of man, or simply speaking,
to morality.
(iv) Speech and silence
In chapter VI, Hsun-tze says:
'To speak appropriately is wise, to be silent
in a suitable time is also wise. Therefore wise
silence is as good as wise speech.' (Ill, 10)
Speech and silence are a pair of opposites and Hsun-tze gives a
wise meaning to the use of them. He holds that to apply them in
the appropirate times is wise, and sometimes when silence is applied
properly, it is as good as speech. Therefore Hsun-tze says that a
wise silence is equivalent to a wise speech. So in certain circum¬
stances, as mentioned above, a Conscientious Man should not make
debate. In effect, his silence speaks.
In conclusion, Hsun-tze considers that a Conscientious
Man should not debate when he is in doubt, or when the discussion
is not concerned with Human-Mindedness, or broadly speaking, with
morality, or when it is a valueless speech. If to speak is not
appropriate, then it is better to remain silent. These are also
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ways of proper application of debate, or art of debate in a negative
sense. Thus ends his theory on the rectification of names and the
discussion of his theory of knowledge.
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CHAPTER III:




HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN AND THE
ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Principle is the very
core of his philosophy. However, in theory, before he can explain
what the Ultimate Principle is, it is logical for him to clarify
what it is not. For him, knowledge, the accumulation of various
kinds of thought, when it becomes an absolute value of life, is an
Obsession of man's thought; while Heaven, when it is considered to
be the absolute authority of the universe and becomes an object of
man's superstitions, is an Obsession to man's Mind; and these
Obsessions become the main factors of man's failure to see the
Ultimate Principle. Therefore the rectification of the name and
concept of Heaven becomes a necessary preliminary step for Hsun-tze.
SECTION 1: THE THEORIES OF HEAVEN
A: THE PROBLEMS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEAVEN AND MAN
In the New Stone Age (approximately 6000 years ago), the
Chinese people lived together in the valley of Yellow River1 and
started to form their agricultural society. Perhaps because of
such constant calamities as the flooding of the Yellow River, people
gradually came to fear nature, or the heaven and earth. Also,
because farming inevitably depended on nature, they could not help
feeling that they had to pray to nature for protection. Therefore,
as recorded by the classic in the three dynasties of Hsia, Shang and
1. Huang-Ho.
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Chou, the belief in ghosts, gods, and the business of divining or
foretelling were popular. Besides worshipping the Heaven God in
erder to ask for rain and blessings or to pray for protection against
calamities, they offered sacrifices to the Earth God, the River God,
2
the Mountain God, the gods of crops, the gods of the four corners ,
the Wind God, the Moon God, the gods of stars, etc., and they also
offered sacrifices to their ancestors in order to ask for blessing
and protection against calamities. This was different from the
ceremonies held in later centuries of offering sacrifices to ancestors
in remembrance of their life and teaching. This became an even more
popular fashion in the Chou Dynasty. From the beginning, however,
China favoured polytheism and not monotheism. To the ancient
Chinese, although the Heaven God is the master of the universe, it
seems that it has little contact with the ordinary masses. It is
the king's duty directly to pray and offer sacrifices to the Heaven
God for his people and his country. As to the masses, they pray
and offer sacrifices particularly to the Earth God and gods of crops,
who are of particular importance to them, and they also pray and
offer sacrifices to other gods and ghosts. Their general attitude
to their god(s) was a feeling of fear mixed with the hope to please.
Their beliefs in general were childish, naive, and unsophisticated,
or, simply speaking, were superstitious. Their god(s) to them was
merely connected with physical livelihood and survival rather than
the satisfaction of man's mental life. Men of that time seldom had
profound beliefs in one god, who was believed to be the origin of
the universe and of all lives, or from whose revelation they were
enlightened to an ideal of life. In other words, their beliefs were
only to fulfil their physical or practical needs.
2. Gods of east, south, west and north.
From the above it seems that the relations of Heaven and
man in ancient China led to superstition in which there was no
religious ideal or value. In short, the beliefs of the ancient
Chinese are a development of polytheistic superstitions. This
development extended to the times of Hsun-tze.
. In the time of Hsun-tze, near the end of the Warring States
period after the fall of the Chou Dynasty, when wars and calamities
occurred year after year, the traditional superstitions towards gods
3
and ghosts tended to become even more widespread. In Ch'i , there
was a group of scholars who devoted themselves to absurd and peculiar
thoughts. Among them were the accultists who talked about gods and
ghosts, monsters and demons, and the astrologers who talked about
the interrelations of Heaven and man. This tendency led to a
sharpened contrast between heaven and man, or between god and man,
or more precisely, that between a master and his subordinate. In
other words, the position of the supernatural god was getting higher
and higher day by day, while that of man sunk lower and lower.
Hsun-tze, who was strongly against these thoughts and tendencies,
felt it necessary to speak in order to put right this confusing
situation. The chapter entitled 'On Heaven' (chapter XVII)
functions as an elimination of superstitions on Heaven and as
rectification of the name 'Heaven'.
Hsun-tze's theories of Heaven can therefore be divided
into four parts: namely, his theory of the different power and
abilities of Heaven and man; his elimination of superstitions about
3.)=) Ch'i, one of the seven strong countries in the Warring States Period.
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Heaven; his concept of Heaven, and his suggestion on the possible
relationship between Heaven and man.
B: HIS THEORY OF DIFFERENT POWERS OF HEAVEN AND MAN
To Hsun-tze, Heaven and man are two different realities
and there is no moral causation between them. Therefore, the
statements such as 'to be damned by Heaven and Earth', 'Heaven and
Earth cannot accept', etc. are, to Hsun-tze, not apposite. And he
also considers that the power of Heaven and the ability of man are
completely different and not relevant at all to each other. In
chapter XVII, he makes it clear that 'those who understand the
difference between Heaven and man are called Sages'. (XI, 9)
In the same chapter he says:
'Success without making efforts and attainment
without seeking help are the power of Heaven. There¬
fore although man's Deliberation is profound, it cannot
affect Heaven; although his-ability is great, it
cannot affect Heaven; and although his observation is
thorough and accurate, it cannot affect Heaven. This
is what I would advise, not to compete for power with
Heaven.' (XI, 9)
From this it is evident that Hsun-tze admits the limit of human power.
No human ability can completely overcome the power of Heaven, or
nature. He goes on to say:
'The man with great skill is he who knows not to
strive (with Heaven), and the man with great wisdom is
he who knows what not to deliberate.' (XI, 10)
In other words, a wise man who is also sharp, keen and skilful knows
not to waste all his thoughts and ability on investigating Heaven.
79
However, Hsun-tze does not insist that besides morality, there is
no knowledge at all; thus he explains:
'What can be recorded and understood about
Heaven is its phenomena of which regular sequences
can be forecast by man. What can be recorded and
understood about Earth is its conditions in which
all things can be bred, increased and multiplied.
What can be recorded and understood about the four
seasons is the calendar by which man can cultivate
in spring, grow in summer, harvest in autumn and
store in winter. What can be recorded and under¬
stood about the Yin and Yang4 of all things is
their harmony, by which principle man may obtain
peace and control to the world. The officials of
the astronomical observatory should watch the
(changes of) Heaven, yet they themselves should
also follow the principle of man.' (XI, 10-11)
In this paragraph, Hsun-tze indicates clearly his standpoint on
science; he considers that the knowledge of the phenomena of nature
or the universe is merely for the purpose of employing or using
nature to increase and multiply all things so as to allow man to
enjoy a better life and to live harmoniously among all things.
Therefore an astronomer should, according to Hsun-tze, not only
keep to his duty as an astronomical observer, but also keep to the
principle of man, i.e. morality; as to the ordinary man, similarly,
he should keep to his life as man and his employment as his livelihood.
Thus Hsun-tze says:
'Heaven keeps its own time, the Earth has its
own riches and man has his own business.' (XI, 9)
In distinguishing Heaven and man as two different concepts, Hsun-tze
shows also that the relationship between the two only exists on the
level of the usefulness of Heaven in providing the need of man's life;
frfcr rtdL
4. XV) Yin-Yang, the phenomena of all things. Please see
p . 71, n. 31.
and there is no mysterious relationship or master-and-servant
relationship between them. The proper work of Heaven or nature
is, according to Hsun-tze, to maintain all things in being while
the proper work of man is mainly to maintain his life as a moral
being.
C: HIS ELIMINATION OF SUPERSTITIONS ABOUT HEAVEN
In chapter XVII, Hsun-tze repeatedly points out the
erroneous concepts of Heaven so as to establish a correct meaning of
the name Heaven to accord with its reality. He gives illustrations
of three kinds of such erroneous concepts.
(i) Natural phenomena
In this chapter Hsun-tze says:
5
'When the stars fall and the wood makes sounds,
people in the country all feel scared; they all ask,
"What are these?" In answer, I say, these are nothing
peculiar; they are the changes of Heaven and Earth, the
influence of Yin and Yang®, and the unusual phenomena
of things. If man finds them strange, it is reasonable;
if he is scared of them, it is wrong. The phenomena of
the eclipses of the sun and the moon, untimely wind and
rain, and the unexpected appearance of strange stars
occur not infrequently in every generation.' (XI, 12)
Here Hsun-tze explains that the unusual phenomena of the universe
are only the changes of nature and man can marvel at them since
they are rarely seen; yet there is no reason for him to be scared
of them. Some lines later he says:
5. ^ Ming-Mu. Hsun-tze is probably referring in particular
to a kind of sacred tree which can make certain sounds or crackings.
6. The dynamic and static movements of the universe.
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'Suppose one prays for rain and it rains.
Why is this so? I say: this is nothing peculiar.
It is just like not praying for rain and it rains.'
(XI, 13)
Again Hsun-tze tries to make it clear that the natural phenomena
are merely phenomena of nature and nothing more. Therefore the
popular superstitious concepts of these phenomena are foolish and
unnecessary and should be got rid of.
(ii) The relationship between natural phenomena and human
affairs
In Hsun-tze's time, people tended to relate the strange
phenomena of nature to human affairs. They thought that strange
natural phenomena indicated coming change in human affairs such as
a change of dynasty; the death of an important person; and they
believed that unusual natural disasters were a punishment from
Heaven or God, and that exceptionally auspicious phenomena such as
a good harvest, timely weather, or even the lack of a natural dis¬
aster in the year meant that Heaven or God was pleased with men.
To Hsun-tze, these are stupid superstitions and wrong concepts which
must be rectified. In this chapter he says:
'If those in high position are reasonable and
their policies are fair, then although these (disast¬
rous phenomena) occur continuously through the century,
they bring no harm (to the people). If those in high
positions are stupid and ignorant and their policies
are treacherous, then though these do not happen even
once, there is no advantage.' (XI, 12)
These statements show that the strange natural phenomena are merely
strange or unusual; they have nothing to do with human affairs.
In another passage, Hsun-tze takes this idea further:
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'Is the order and disorder of a nation preordained
by Heaven? I say: the sun, the moon, the stars and the
phenomena of the calendar are identical in the ages of
both Yu and Chieh,yet Yu makes the world in order and
Chieh in chaos; this proves therefore that the order and
disorder of a nation or an age is not ordained by Heaven.
Is it, then, fated by the time and circumstances? I say:
the time of the reproducing and flourishing of spring and
summer, and the harvest and storing-up of autumn and winter,
were identical in the time of both Yu and Chieh. However,
Yu makes the v/orld in order and Chieh, in chaos; this proves
therefore that the order and disorder of a nation or an age
is not preordained by time. Then is it preordained by
Earth? I say: the principles that the earth being well-
cultivated, all things are alive and survive, and the earth
being uncultivated, all things perish and vanish are identi¬
cal in the age of both Yu and Chieh. However, Yu puts the
world in order and Chieh,in chaos; this proves therefore
that the order and disorder of a nation and an age is not
preordained by earth.' (XI, 11)
Yu is a famous Sage-King and Chieh is a famous tyrant, both are
described by most of the Chinese classics. They ruled during the
Hsia Dynasty at different times, yet the former ruled successfully
while the latter, in failure. Hsun-tze tries to prove that it is
not Heaven, Earth or time that preordains the country but the virtue
of the ruler himself that determines the political destiny of his
nation. In other words, Hsun-tze considers that nature and human
affairs, especially with regard to the political situation, i.e.
order or disorder, have no relation to each other.
In Hsun-tze's theory, natural phenomena not only have no
connection with the order and disorder of the world, but also they
have nothing to do with the love and hatred of man. In the same
chapter, Hsun-tze says:
'Although man hates coldness, Heaven will not cease
to have winter for that reason; although man hates distances,
Earth will not therefore narrow its vastness.' (XI, 11)
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As there is no necessary relationship between natural
phenomena and human affairs, such superstitious concepts should,
Hsun-tze insists, be rectified.
(iii) The fallacy of divination
Owing to the mistaken concept that there is a necessary
connection between natural phenomena and human affairs, people in
ancient China had all sorts of superstitions. They believed that
there is a God in heaven, which they named Heaven, or 'T'ien', who
has a supreme power over all men. They later invented divination,
a way by which man may, they believed, communicate with Heaven in
order to ask for luck or to plead for mercy. In this chapter,
Hsun-tze also gives a definition of divination in an extraordinary
way:
'When there is an eclipse of the sun and the moon,
prayer is made to save the sun or the moon; when there
is a drought, prayer is made for rain; when there is an
important event to be decided in the country, a divination
is made; it is understood of all these (prayers and divin¬
ations) that success is not guaranteed for what is prayed
for; they are only to cover up the actual situation by
impressive ceremonies. Therefore a Conscientious Man
understands that these are only ceremonies, while the mas¬
ses believe them to be (communication with) God. It is
good to consider them only as ceremonies and it is bad
for man to consider these to be (communication with) God.'
(XI, 13)
It is worth noticing that Hsun-tze does not indicate that prayer or
divination itself is necessarily evil, nor are ceremonies deceiptful;
he accepts that all kinds of ceremonies, including official prayer or
divination are one kind of propriety or Li. He considers that the
purpose of official prayer or divination is, and should only be, to
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add confidence to the masses as well as politically to direct their
attention to ceremonial programmes so that they may temporarily for¬
get about their misery. This is just like a political game.
Only a Conscientious Man who is wise enough to understand this pur¬
pose does not blindly believe in the dramatical function of these
prayers and divinations; yet the foolish masses who whole-heartedly
believe them are swindled and thus excessive superstition may lead
to man-made disasters, such as unnecessary sacrifices of human life.
The three superstitious concepts of Heaven mentioned
above are significant in Hsun-tze's time. In his theory, they are
put forward in order to lay the ground for the demonstration of his
rectified name of Heaven. What, then, does he mean by the name
'Heaven'?
D: HIS CONCEPT OF HEAVEN
The Heaven Hsun-tze means is the nature of common-sense.
His concepts of Heaven are twofold, as follows:
(i) Constant regularity of Heaven
Hsun-tze lays emphasis on the fact that there is no
necessary connection, either morally or politically, between Heaven
and man; in other words, Heaven and man are two different realities.
According to Hsun-tze, Heaven or nature as a whole is constant,
regular and unchangeable. In this chapter he says:
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'Heaven has its constant regularity in its
movement. It does not exist and become orderly
because of Yao and it does not become disorderly
and perish because of Chieh.' (XI, 9)
How, then, does this constant regular and unchangeable Heaven exist?
In answer he says:
'The stars revolve in succession, the sun
and the moon shine alternately, the four seasons
arrive in order, Yin and Yang complete their
great changes, and wind and rain widely fertilizes
all things. Thus all things respectively attain
their harmony in order to grow and survive, and
their nourishment in order to mature and complete
their life. The workings of all these are not
seen but the operations are obvious. The
operations are wondrous .' (XI, 9-10)
Here Hsun-tze uses the word 'wondrous' to describe his attitude to
the work of Heaven. It is thus clear that what Hsun-tze means by
Heaven is nature, whose work is seen while how it works is unknown.
Therefore he says:
'Men all know its operations, but no one
knows its invisible form; this is called Heaven.' *
(XI, 10)
And what Hsun-tze is concerned with is that man should know the
accomplishments of Heaven so as to make good use of thera rather
than wasting time on the researches on the metaphysical or epistemo-
logical source of this invisible and unknowable form, or even worse,
worshipping it as a personified God. He claims that man should
realise when he is aware of the constant regularity of Heaven, he
is aware of the reality of Heaven.
7. # Shen. This term may also mean 'god'. However, Hsun-tze
has strictly rejected the idea of a supreme immortal. The term here
obviously should only be interpreted in its other meanings, such as
'marvelous, wondrous'.
86
(ii) Heaven has no faculties of distin_ction_and will
After Hsun-tze disposes of the mysterious concept of
Heaven, what is left of it is the phenomena which are visible and
knowable. Although Heaven can be distinguished by man, Hsun-tze
goes on to say, it does not itself have the power of awareness or
discrimination. Therefore Hsun-tze says:
'Heaven brings life to all things, yet it
cannot distinguish all things; Earth carries man,
yet it cannot administer man.' (XIII, 10)
It is clear that Heaven has, Hsun-tze claims, no faculty for
distinction and will. Hsun-tze thus removes its mysteries and
tries to establish that what is visible and knowable is its actual
reality. In such a way, he brings the positions of Heaven and man
to the same level. Heaven not only cannot distinguish between men,
not to mention ruling over men, but also Hsun-tze continues to dis¬
cern, does not have its will to punish man or to bless him. This
is a necessary further logical extension of his theory.
He also considers that the duties of Heaven are to
harmonize and nourish all things ana the attitude of man towards it
is to understand its duties in order to participate with and assist
in the completion of its duties. These are his main concepts about
nature or Heaven. As to the invisible and unknowable parts of
Heaven or nature, such as the question of the width and distance of
the universe, the origin of the world, they are unapproachable by
man, and they are the problems of nature itself, which man cannot
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and need not strive to know. This is Hsun-tze's attitude to the
knowledge of nature, and this is also the general idea indicated in
the chapter entitled 'On Heaven'.
E: HIS SUGGESTION AS TO THE POSSIBLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
HEAVEN AND MAN
In his theories Hsun-tze tries firstly to make people
understand that the power of Heaven and the ability of man are
different; then he tries to eliminate their superstitious concepts
about Heaven; and finally he goes on to reproduce its original
face with common-sense knowledge. He thus makes a rectification
of the name 'Heaven'.
In the relationship between Heaven and man, as Hsun-tze
suggests, man should, firstly, passively and negatively be able to
participate in its nourishing, and then he can actively and positively
advance to make the best use of the visible and knowable nature to
serve mankind, and to conquer the disadvantages or disasters of nature
that harm mankind. In this chapter Hsun-tze sets forth his doctrine
as follows:
'Rather than to honour Heaven and .admire it, it
is better to treat it as a material object to be
tended, looked after and mastered; rather than to
obey it and praise it, it is better to suppress its
destiny and to make use of it; rather than to look up
to the four seasons and wait for their gifts, it is
better to adapt oneself to the present time and make
use of it; rather than to let things increase by them¬
selves it is better to give a full display of one's
abilities to change them; rather than to be indulgent
in and become a slave of it, it is better to be
rational towards it and not to lose it; and rather
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than to admire its productions it is better to be
devoted to assist its completion. Therefore if man
misses what is in himself and admires Heaven, then
he will lose the understanding of the nature of all
things.' (XI, 13)
It is apparent here that what Hsun-tze is concerned with is human »
affairs, or simply, man, and not Heaven or nature. In another
passage, he says:
'If man strengthens his resources and cuts
down expenses, then Heaven cannot make him poor;
if he lives in good health, keeps precaution against
disease and his action is proper and in good time,
then Heaven cannot make him ill; if he is cultivated
according to morality and he sticks to it, then
Heaven cannot cause him trouble or disaster . . .
If his sources are deficient and his expenditure is
extravagent and excessive, then Heaven cannot make
him rich; if his regimen is unbalanced and he rarely
takes exercise, then Heaven cannot make him strong
and healthy; if he is diametrically opposed to moral¬
ity and acts recklessly and rashly, then Heaven cannot
make him trouble-free or auspicious.' (XI, 9)
According to Hsun-tze, it may be said that man's living relies on
nature, yet his life on himself. For man's living, Hsun-tze suggests
■ •
that man should conquer nature and make good use of it, adapt himself
to seasons or time and employ it, give full display of his abilities
to change things and be rational about things; yet for his life, he
should not miss what is in himself, i.e. his ability to approach to
morality, or in Hsun-tze's own word 'Tao', the Ultimate Principle of
Man.
The word 'Heaven' used by Hsun-tze therefore means nature.
He employs a common-sense nature to oppose his contemporary popular
mysterious deity. Thus he liberates man from a slavish attitude to
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the deity. Furthermore, he tries to educate man to conquer and
use nature; consequently, he makes man's position paramount in
the universe. However, his doctrine does not then lead him to
science, for his interest does not fall in that area, and he con¬
siders that science is just one side of human affairs. As to
the ultimate achievement of human affairs, he attributes it to
morality; and Tao or the Ultimate Principle is, according to him,
the culmination of morality. What, then, is Tao or the Ultimate
Principle, and how is it related to man?
SECTION 2: THE THEORIES OF THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
The theories of the Ultimate Principle are the very
essence of Hsun-tze's philosophy. In short, what he means by Tao
or the Ultimate Principle can be reduced to one single theory: the
Way of the Mind. However, although the theory of the Mind is the
culminating point of his philosophy and the core of his philosophical
system, it seems that he does not have it established in a well
organized way. Since the system of this theoi'y is scattered in a
rather disorderly way in different places or paragraphs in his book,
readers may find it difficult to get a thorough comprehension of
this theory unless they are capable of careful analysis and synthesis
of the relevant materials in his book. The following are an attempt
to reorganize the sources in order to adumbrate this theory according
to the text. Fif*st of all, he establishes the ground of his theory
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of the Mind by the theory that the Ultimate Principle is the
8
Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man , from which he
further construes that the Way of Man is the Way of the Mind.
A: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE WAY OF MAN
In chapter XVII entitled 'On Heaven', Hsun-tze says:
'All things are one part of Tao.' (XI, 14)
The word 'Tao' here indicates, according to Hzun-tze, the Ultimate
Principle of the Heaven and Earth, or the Ultimate Principle of
9
the Universe . However, when he speaks of Tao, he hardly applies
the word in this way; he usually means the Ultimate Principle of
Man. In chapter VIII, he says:
'Tao is neither the Way of Heaven, nor the Way
of Earth, but the Way which a man should practise, or
rather, which a Conscientious Man practises.' (IV, 3)
What, then, does a Conscientious Man practise? Hsun-tze goes on
to explain:
'What is called capable and virtuous in a
Conscientious Man is not that he is capable of doing all
that man is able to; what is called wisdom in a Con¬
scientious Man is not that he is capable of knowing
all that man can know; what is called eloquence in a
Conscientious Man is not that he is capable of debating
eloquently all that man can debate, and what is called
observant in a Conscientious Man is not that he is
capable of observing all that man can observe; there
are limits for him. As to measuring the high and the
low, the sterile and the fertile of lands and ordering
the sequence of the five cereals10 to suit the time for
8. Jen-Tao.
9. T' ien-Ti-Chih-Tao .
10. Wu-Ku. The five major seeds of grains, i.e. millet, paddy
bean, wheat and hemp.
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sowing, a Conscientious Man may do no better than a
farmer. In circulating currency, examining the good
and bad of commodities, and judging the expensive and
cheap of prices, a Conscientious Man may do no better
than a merchant. In designing patterns and measure¬
ments, arranging the standard, so as to produce fine
and delicate instruments for use, a Conscientious Man
may do no better than a craftsman. In recommending
each other and putting on airs, and humiliating and
swindling each other, without regard to rights and
wrongs, or to the facts of the case, a Conscientious
Man may do no better than those such as Hui-Shih and
Teng HsiH. To be able to judge another's virtue
and then decide his rank, to measure his ability and
then give him an official job, thus to let the capable
and virtuous and the rotten all have their places, and
the talented and the incompetent all have their jobs
and all things obtain what is most suitable for them,
when things change, a suitable response is forthcoming,
Shenl^ and Mo^, are not able to advance their doctrines,
and Hui-Shih and Teng Hsi dare not make any change or
alteration in their observations, so that speech is
absolutely appropriate to reason, and action to duty.
These are the characteristics of a Conscientious Man.'
(IV, 3-4)
Hsun-tze considers that a Conscientious Man is not necessarily one
with special technical talents like the farmer, merchant or crafts¬
man; yet he must be one who, with the Ultimate Principle in his
Mind, is able to administer all manner of human affairs. Therefore
-
what Hsun-tze means by Tao or Way is nothing cosmological. He
positively considers it to be the Way of Man, or the Ultimate
Principle of Man. In other words, Tao, to him, is the Way of Man.
If asked the reason why the Ultimate Principle or Tao
must be that of man, Hsun-tze gives his answer in chapter VIII and
11. ffjS JW" Teng-Hsi, a famous sophist, in Hsun-tze's time.
12. 'jjL S'J Shen Tao, a Faist. in Hsun-tze's time. His writings,
collected in forty-two volumes, are now lost.
13. -j*; Mo-tze.
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XXI. In chapter VIII he defines 'Tao' as 'the Way which a man
should practise, or rather, which a Conscientious Man practises.'
(IV, 3) In chapter XXI, he also says:
'Learning is to learn where to stop. Where
should it stop? I say: it should stop at the ulti¬
mate adequateness. What is the ultimate adequateness?
I say: to be a Sage. A Sage is the one who completely
fulfils his duty in human relations. A King is the
one who perfects the system of social institutions. If
a man completely fulfils both of these two, he will
obtain the ultimate achievement in the world.' (XV, 9-10)
Hzun-tze considers that the main duties of man in his
life are twofold: (1) completely to fulfil his duty in human
relations, and (2) completely to fulfil his duty in social institut¬
ions. In other words, a man should practise his duties of both
ethical and social morality. When a man faces all other men, whether
relatives, such as grandparents, parents, brothers, children; or his
social relations, such as teacher, senior, friend, junior, neighbour,
superior, inferior, or the relations of clan, nation, race; he asks
himself, 'How should I treat them?' When man reflects that there
must be an objective and universal principle according to which he
then will completely fulfil his duty in these human relations, and
when man comes to understand that morality, excluding social or legal
commitments of any kind, is the answer, then he is practising ethical
morality. However, if man tries to fulfil his duty in human relat¬
ions according to social institutions or rites, customs and laws,
then he is practising social morality. In Hsun-tze's ideal, if one
practices ethical morality, one should include the practice of social
morality, and if one practices social morality, one should eventually
promote oneself to the practice of ethical morality. Therefore by
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means of the Sage Mind, man completely fulfils his duty in human
relations and he thus becomes a Sage; and by means of good Arti¬
fice or moral education, man completely fulfils his duty in social
institutions, including rites, customs and laws, which are established
by the Sage-Kings. When man fulfils both the duties of human relat¬
ions and that of social institutions, he is then a Sage and his effort
of learning may stop at this point, for what remains for him at this
stage is merely the continuous practice of morality as practised by
a Sage. Hsun-tze repeatedly points out that in the moment when
man's Mind is clear and bright, he will see that morality is the
Ultimate Principle of Man, and his effort of practising morality,
both in an ethical sense and in a social sense, distinguishes him
from other animals and displays his nobility as a man. The nobility
of man lies, on one hand, in his proper use of his absolute freedom,
his decision and choice in the perfection of morality, and on the
other, his continuous efforts toward the perfection of morality.
Therefore Hsun-tze considers that the perfection of morality is the
ultimate achievement of man.
B: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE MIND AND THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
Hzun-tze considers that the Ultimate Principle of Man is
objective and universal. In his theory, he also expounds the quest¬
ion; how does man know it, or how is this objective and universal
principle accepted by man's Mind which is subjective and particular
or individual? Or simply speaking, what is the relationship between
the Ultimate Principle and Mind? In answer, Hsun-tze indicates two
processes whereby the Mind knows the Ultimate Principle: (1) the
psychological condition of the Mind in knowing the Ultimate Principle,
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and (2) the method of maintaining such a condition in order to
receive it.
(i) The psychological condition
Hsun-tze thinks that v/hen the Mind is in the state of
Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, or when it is a
Great Clear and Bright Mind, it will see and know the Ultimate
Principle. Therefore in chapter XXI he says:
'How does man know the Ultimate Principle?
I say: by means of the Mind. How does the Mind
know? I say: 'When it is in the state of
Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness.'
(XV, 4)
When the Mind is in such a state it may receive, according to
Hsun-tze, two aspects of knowledge, namely: the knowledge of know¬
ledge, and the knowledge of morality. In his discussion on the
Mind's obtaining knowledge of morality, he considers that when the
Mind is in the state of Receptiveness, it is then able to accommo-
date the Ultimate Principle; when it is Attentive to the Ultimate
Principle, it is then able to apprehend thoroughly this Principle,
and when it is Undisturbed, it is then able to observe and experi¬
ence this Principle. In other words, when the Mind has no chores
or confused and disorderly thoughts, or when it is not obsessed,
misguided and disturbed, it is then able to receive, understand and
experience the Ultimate Principle. In the following passage,
Hsun-tze explains this.
'For those who have not yet obtained the Ultimate
Principle, tell them about Receptiveness, Attentiveness
and Undisturbedness of the Mind. If they behave
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accordingly, then, with Receptiveness, they, who are
expecting the Ultimate Principle, are able to enter
into it; with Attentiveness, they, who are attentive
to it, are able to thoroughly practise it; and with
Undisturbedness, they, who contemplate it, are able to
understand it. Those who know it, understand it, and
practise it are the ones who experience it.' (XV, 5)
Therefore, according to Hsun-tze, the Mind is the faculty of knowing
the Ultimate Principle and the psychological condition of the Mind
when knowing the Ultimate Principle is when it is in a state of
Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, or when it has
Great Clearness and Brightness.
(ii) The method of keeping such a condition
In chapter XXI, Hsun-tze says,
'To direct the Mind with reason, to maintain it
with clarity and not to allow it to fall into worldy
things.' (XV, 7)
By these methods, the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and
Undisturbedness of the Mind can, Hsun-tze believes, be maintained.
As to a more practical method of cultivating the Mind
and governing the disposition, Hsun-tze says the following in chapter
II:
'If he has a hot or violent temper, then he
should be softened by harmonization; if he is re¬
served and abstruse, he should be bent on becoming
easy-going and straightforward; if he is brave and
violent, he should be assisted with instruction,
exhortation and warning; if he is too hurried, he
should be held down with calmness and steadiness;
if he is narrow-minded, he should be made open-
minded; if he is base, slothful and avaricious, he
should be corrected with incorruptibility and great
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morality; if he is an ordinary person, incompetent
and distracted, he should be taken from his bad
habits by teacher and friends; if he is lax and
crude, irreverent and frivolous, he should be warned
about the consequent disasters; and if he is stupidly
honest and serious, he should be nursed with proper
rites and music^, and be enlightened by means of
contemplation and introspection. In the methods of
cultivating the Mind and governing the disposition!5,
there is nothing quicker than following rites, nothing
more important than obtaining a good teacher and noth¬
ing more wondrously effective than concentrating
attention on to what is morally good. These are what
are called the methods of cultivating the Mind and
governing the disposition.' (I, 8-9)
From this, it is clear that what Hsun-tze suggests here is that man
should remove the Evil of his Nature, and the Obsessions of his
Mind in order to maintain a Great Clear and Bright Mind, then he
can fully identify himself with Tao or the Ultimate Principle of
Man. In chapter III, Hsun-tze also says;
'As to the cultivation of the Mind of a
Conscientious Man, there is no better way than
Sincerity!®; once he is devoted to Sincerity,
there is nothing else which needs (to be
attended to). To be sincere in the Mind, he
must maintain only what is Human-Minded or Jen,
and he must practise only what is right. If he
keeps to Human-Mindedness with Sincerity, his
14. Li-Yiieh, the Confucian rites and music which carries
the moral role of cultivating man's disposition.
15. ■JJcm Ch'i, means ' breath, the vital fluid, force, spirit' .
To Hsun-tze, it refers to disposition. However, it is not clear
whether Ch'i or disposition has, in his opinion, any connection or
relation to Man's Nature or the Mind.
16- Ch'eng, means 'sincere, honest, cordial, true'. The
concept has been historically adopted by most Chinese thinkers,
especially the Confucianists, in a morally serious way meaning 'to
be committed to' . The term 'Sincerity' is used here. However, one
must bear in mind also wherever it is used, it implies a strong
moral-seriousness of a sincere and respectful attitude of man toward
his moral ideal. It is quite near to the religious sense of piety.
In Hsun-tze's theory, Sincerity of the Mind is the commitment of the
Mind, to Tao or the Ultimate Principle of Man.
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moral goodness (Artifice) will certainly be formed
outwardly; if his moral goodness is completed, he
will be as wise and virtuous as the spirits17. If
he practises righteousness with Sincerity, he will
live in accordance with reason; if he lives in
accordance with reason, he will be considerate and
understanding; and if he is considerate and under¬
standing, he will be able to cope with all changes.'
(II, 4)
With Sincerity, according to Hsun-tze, man will be devoted in keeping
to Human-Mindedness and practising righteousness, and he will become
wise and virtuous, considerate and understanding, and he will be able
to assist the nourishing of all things and to cope with all changes.
Sincerity, too, is a'psychological attribute recommended by Hsun-tze
to maintain a Great Clear and Bright Mind.
In conclusion, when speaking on the Mind's knowing the
Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, Hsun-tze illustrates the
state of Great Clearness and Brightness of the Mind which enables
man to know the Ultimate Principle and the actual process of knowing
and experiencing it; and he explains the methods by which such a
state may be maintained. This is his doctrine of 'cultivating the
Mind and governing the disposition', which is in fact the first step
of the Mind's practising the Ultimate Principle.
(iii) The relationship between the Ultimate Principle and the Mind
In this part the question dealt with is: Why should the
Mind know the Ultimate Principle?
17. "f^Shen, Hsun-tze uses this word in a causal manner, or following
the prevailing customs.
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According to Hsun-tze, Tao or the Ultimate Principle, is
not the ultimate Principle of the universe, or the Way of Heaven,
but the Ultimate Principle of Man. In chapter XXI, he gives a
definition of Tao:
'The Sage knows the defect of the Mind and he
sees the calamity of its Obsessions, therefore he
advocates that man should dwell neither on desires
nor hatred, neither on beginning nor on end, neither
on nearness nor on distance, neither on profundity
nor on superficiality, neither on the ancient nor on
the modern; and that man should be able to enumerate
all things and keep a balance between them in the
middle. In this way the numerous varieties, though
they are different, cannot confuse one another and
disorder their .series. What is the balance? I
say: it is Tao.' (XV, 4)
According to Hsun-tze, the ancient Sages, seeing the calamity
originating from Obsessions of the Mind, laid down an objective and
universal principle in order to guide man to the right path of life,
and to arrange all things in their rightful place in human affairs.
This principle works like a scale or balance to weigh the positions
of all things and is named by Hsun-tze 'Tao'. The man who wants to
attain it must, Hsun-tze claims, initially remove or clear the
Obsessions of the Mind. As to the Obsessions, Hsun-tze suggests
two classes, namely: the Obsessions of external objects, and those
of man's view of the Ultimate Principle. In the same chapter he
especially points out the latter.
'If one defines Tao by practical usage, the whole
world may become utilitarian; if one defines it by
following what man desires, it is merely trying to please
all; if one defines it by laws or rules, it is easily
limited to the trifling classes of regulations; if one
defines it by influential position or power, it is merely
suitable for the convenience (of the rulers); if one
99
defines it merely by empty words and statements, it is
only good for dialectic sophistry; and if one defines
it by Heaven, it is only good for trying to explain
the origin of the world. However, all these several
definitions are merely one aspect of Tao.' (XV, 3)
Hsun-tze considers that to weigh and measure all things with any of
the above-mentioned aspects of Tao or the Ultimate Principle is
likely to have partial success as well as partial failure, for a'll
these aspects are only one part of Tao. Hsun-tze continues to
describe Tao as 'a constant substance with extremely changeable
forms'. (XV, 3) In other words, accordingly, the principle of
weighing and measuring all things is constant, yet the ways of
weighing and measuring are changeable and variable according to
its different objects, thus its form seems different also. There¬
fore, if man sees one of its forms and claims that he sees what Tao
is, his perception is partial and his claim is insufficient to be
said valid. Hsun-tze goes on to say:
'One aspect is insufficient to express the whole.
Those who have partial knowledge and observe only one
aspect of Tao are not able to know it at all. There¬
fore what they consider sufficient and feel satisfaction
with is what makes them confuse themselves internally,
and externally to mislead others. Thus superiors cause
Obsessions to inferiors, and vice versa. This is the
calamity of Obsessions.' (XV, 3-4)
Hsun-tze considers, therefore, that man's view of the Ultimate
Principle or Tao can also become a cause of Obsession of the Mind.
In the same chapter, Hsun-tze repeatedly lays emphasis
on the necessity of the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle. He
says :
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'The Mind must not be ignorant of the Ultimate
Principle. If the Mind does not know the Ultimate
Principle, it will not like it and instead it will
like the opposite of the Ultimate Principle-*-®. If
anyone puts no restraint on his desire, then would he
keep to what he does not like and desist from what
he likes? If one with a Mind which does not approve
of the Ultimate Principle looks for a man, then one's
criterion will match with those who do not practise
the Ultimate Principle and will not suit those who
practise it. If anyone with a Mind which does not
approve of the Ultimate Principle and who does not
practise it harasses with argument those who practise
it, this is the ultimate source of chaos.' (XV, 4)
Accordingly, the ultimate source of chaos of the world starts from
the Mind of the individual who does not know the Ultimate Principle
of Man, or morality. Hsun-tze believes that since the Mind does
not know the Ultimate Principle of Man which every man should follow,
man therefore will not follow what is right and proper. Furthermore,
he will not fulfil his duties in human relations and social institut-
t
ions. If what he follows is immorality and he gives free rein to
his Nature which is innately Evil, he will be licentious in his evil
desires and become a Mean-Spirited Man. When a Mean-Spirited Man
speaks of the Sage whose moral excellence always beats him back, he
will make every effort to insult the Sage with false and crooked
arguments and thus the chaos starts. Hsun-tze then goes on to
describe the advantages of the Mind ' s knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man.
'If the Mind knows the Ultimate Principle, then
the Mind will approve it; if it approves it, man there¬
fore will keep to the Ultimate Principle and desist from
the opposite principle. If man looks for others with
such a Mind, then he will meet those who practise the
Ultimate Principle although he may not be accepted by
those who do not practise it. To debate with a Mind
approving the Ultimate Principle and with those who
practise it is an important policy in administration.'
(XV, 4)
18. ft it Fei-Tao, immorality.
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The terra 'an important policy in administration' is in contrast to
the earlier term 'the ultimate source of chaos'. What Hsun-tze
tries to explain is that when the Mind in its state of Great Clearness
and Brightness knows the Ultimate Principle of Man, it will then
understand that this Principle is a principle which every man should
follow. After recognition the Mind practises it. Understanding
that the evil of the opposite principle, i.e. immorality, is the
source of chaos, man therefore tries to prohibit if by arguing against
it. In other words, the important policy in the administration of
the world as v/ell as in the individual is to attain an Ultimate Mind
or to become a Sage, arvd the first step is to enable the Mind,
to know the ULtttnafe Pritvclpla of Therefore the Ultimate
Principle of Man is, according to Hsun-tze, to save the Mind from
being confused and wicked. The theme of chapter XXI entitled
'Dispelling Obsessions' is to point out the necessity of the Mind's
knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man, and to point out that a Mind
which sees and understands it must keep to it and practise it. The
method of dispelling the Obsessions of the Mind in order to maintain
its state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, is
also an essential and primary way of cultivating the Mind and
governing the disposition.
From the above, it is clear that when Hsun-tze discusses
the relationship between the Mind and the Ultimate Principle his key
belief is that the Mind is capable of knowing it and the Mind must
know it. When a man knows it, he can, according to Hsun-tze, know
all things, know how to assist their nourishing and know how to fit
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himself among them with great harmony and know how to weigh and
measure all things and know how to arrange suitable places for them.
In this way, the Epistemological Mind has completed its first step
with regard to the knowledge of the Ultimate Principle of Man or
morality, and the next step is the question of how the Mind practises
it, or how the Mind becomes an Ultimate Mind.
C: HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN DETAILS OF THE ULTIMATE
MIND AND CONSCIENTIOUS MIND
Though in his philosophy, what Hsun-tze tries to establish
is the way or method of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man or
morality, he understands that knowledge of it must come first. He
therefore insists that it is necessary for the Mind to know the
Ultimate Principle of Man. How, then, could one describe the process
from the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle to its actually
practising it? This is also a question which Hsun-tze tries to
19
explain. In chapter XXI, he quotes the words of TAO •CHING ,
'the serious-mindedness of the Conscientious Mind and
the profundity of the Mind of Tao20' (XV, 7), -
in order to explain the following: how it is that one's Mind knows
how to be serious-minded, and is cultivated to become an Ultimate
Mind and how a man experiences the profundity of an Ultimate Mind.
19 • ijl By TAO CHING Hsun-tze.probably means the contemporary version of
J8 ^ ^TAO-TE-CHING. m CHIN WEN SHANG SHU#S|(LU SHU/Jf), there are
similar words with slight textual variations, yet the authority of this
book is doubtful for it is believed to be a forgery of Han scholars.
On the other hand, if Hsun-tze quotes these words from SHU CHING, he
would use 'SHU says' (as in chapters II, IX, XVIII, etc.) instead of
'TAO CHING says.' It was not until the Han Dynasty that SHU became a
'CHJNG', a standard reading for all scholars. However, in the existing
TAO TE CHING, one cannot find these words either. It is assumed that
Hsur.-tze quotes them from the version of TAO TE CHING of his times.
TAO TE CHING, another title of LA0 TZE, is considered to be written by
-5^3" Bao-tze (604-531 B.C.), the initiator of the school of Taoism.
20. i Jen-Hsin-Chih-Wei , Tao-Hsin-Chih-Wei . The
Conscientious Kind is, according to Hsun-tze, the Mind of the Conscientious
Man,, and the Mind of Tao is the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind. As for .
the explanation of Wei or serious-mindedness and Wei or ptofundity,
please see the discussion on pp. 110-115.
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(i) The Mind should know where to stop
According to Hsun-tze, an Epistemological Mind fulfils
its function by, externally, perception and response to the inform¬
ation gathered by the five sensory organs, and internally, its
observations of external objects. However, the knowledge of external
physical objects and the search for their principle is, to Hsun-tze,
an endless and pointless game, for if one searches for them, one
'can never reach them all throughout one's life'. (XV, 9) There¬
fore Hsun-tze considers that man should not chase after external
physical objects, or else his Mind will be obsessed by them and become
ignorant of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, which is, and
should be, the ultimate goal of man's life. Therefore Hsun-tze indi¬
cates that there must be a limit at which man's Epistemological Mind
has to stop. On the other hand, man can have knowledge of his own
knowledge, yet he cannot have all knowledge of that of others.
Hsun-tze points out that a farmer is good at his field, a merchant is
good at his market and a craftsman is good at his craftwork, yet a
farmer may not be good at the market like the merchant and at the
craftwork like the craftsman, and he may not be good at social
administration, science, etc. In other words, a man can never be
good at all sorts of skills. If a man desires to know all things,
he will finally find that it is not possible to fulfil his desires
at all, his Mind will be split and will collapse, in such a state as
Hsun-tze describes:
'When he is distracted by minor things, his
appearance changes clearly and his Mind collapses within.
Then his Mind is not clear and bright enough for him to
judge and decide even on common principles.' (XV, 7)
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Hsun-tze admits the limitation of the experience of the Mind and
considers that the Mind cannot know all things, nor can it know all
the skills of different men in order to administer them. Therefore
Hsun-tze thinks that one's Mind on learning knowledge must stop at a
21
certain point. Here a transcendent reflection of the Mind must
function before it understands its limit. Another question which
may come to one's mind is that if the function of the Mind is not
wholly epistemological researches, what then is its main function?
(ii) The two stages by which a Conscientious Mind recognizes
the Ultimate Principle
One's Mind must, Hsun-tze insists, desist from endless
and pointless searches for material knowledge and physical objects
and at the same time, it must not stop searching for the knowledge
of the Ultimate Principle. This is clearly expressed in Hsun-tze's
theoretical system. As to his discussion of the Mind's recognizing
the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, one may divide the
process into two stages.
(a) The initial stage
When a man knows that his searches for material knowledge
and physical objects must stop at a certain point, he is reflecting
transcendently upon the limitation of the Epistemological Mind in
things. According to Hsun-tze, this reflection of the Mind must
operate in the state of its Receptiveness, Attentiveness and
Undisturbedness. Therefore when the Mind is Great Clear and Bright,
it reflects that its knowledge of knowledge is limited, and it should
21. A reflection which is self-transcending, in the sense of going beyond
previous reflections.
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stop chasing after such knowledge. However, according to Hsun-tze,
man naturally has a desire for knowledge. When a man looks for the
goal of his life, and of all men's life, he is in the initial stage
of consciousness. Hsun-tze proposes the Ultimate Principle of Man
or 'Tao' or morality in a broad sense, as the goal of all men and he
suggests that one's Mind should dwell on it. Hsun-tze considers
that if a man reflects thoroughly on the following situations, then
he has started on the initial stages of recognition of the Ultimate
Principle of Man: (1) there must be an ultimate principle which man
should follow in his life, which satisfies his desire to search for
the goal of his life and all human life, and which is necessary,
objective and universal; (2) the Way of Man or the Ultimate Principle
of Man's fulfilling his duty in human relations and social institutions
is necessary, objective and universal, and enables man to achieve the
highest success in his spiritual life, to cope with the principle of
the changes of all things and to deal with the changes negatively by
his constant efforts to fulfil his duties and positively by holding
22
firm his belief in the Ultimate Principle ; and (3) therefore the
principle of man is the Ultimate Principle. In this chapter,
Hsun-tze says:
'The man who is both keen and cautious as regards
the Ultimate Principle is the one who is also both keen
and cautious in administering all things. Therefore
the one who is good at one thing23 is good at that part¬
icular thing; and the one who is good at the Ultimate
Principle is able to administer all things. For this
reason, a Conscientious Man concentrates his attention
on knowing and practising it so as to assist the working
of all things.' (XV, 6)
22. This will be discussed on pp.281-285.
23. $9 Wu, also means 'matter, the physical world, nature, etc.'
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Here the one who knows the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality
described by Hsun-tze, may not have the common knowledge of all
things, or the profound knowledge of their principles or causes,
but since he knows the Ultimate Principle of Man, he will then under¬
stand the way to respond to and deal with the changes of all things,
and to assist and participate in their changes as part of nature's
nourishing. However, most important of all, he will know how to
arrange a suitable place for each thing in the human world; thus
man in the world will not be confused by them or by his knowledge of
them. In short, Hsun-tze considers that the knowledge or under¬
standing of the Ultimate Principle of Man is the initial stage of
the Mind of conscious recognition of the Ultimate Principle of Man.
(b) The practical stage
Once man has recognized the existence and the externality
of the Ultimate Principle of Man, the next stage and also the neces¬
sary stage is to establish a way to internalize it into his Mind.
Hsun-tze suggests practical experience as the means of achieving
this. That is to say, man externally relies on the instruction and
direction of the teacher and social institutions such as rites and
laws, and internally cultivates the Sincerity of his Mind so as to
produce the external Artifice. In this process, the essential
factor is, Hsun-tze emphasizes, the Mind. Thus in this chapter,
Hsun-tze explains:
'In this state of the Mind, its choices are
unrestrained, yet its choices naturally reflect its
state. What is stored within it is numerous and mis¬
cellaneous, yet the acme of its essence is never twofold.'
(XV, 6)
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Then what is the acme of the essence of the Mind? Hsun-tze
suggests Sincerity. He considers that if the Mind concentrates
all its attention upon Sincerity, it will naturally maintain Human-
Mindedness and righteousness within itself; in other words, a
sincere Mind is that which is devoted firmly to the Ultimate Principle
of Man or morality. In this way the full functioning of the Mind,
i.e. its Deliberation, choice, decision and encouragement of Artifice
will operate within the scope of morality, and as a result good
Artifice arises. This is Hsun-tze's theory of the practical stage
of the Mind's recognizing the Ultimate Principle of Man, a process
which the function of the Mind operates from external to internal,
and then from internal to external. In this stage, the practice of
the Ultimate Principle of Man is involved. Thus Hsun-tze says:
'The man who knows the Ultimate Principle of
Man observes, examines and understands it, and he
who recognizes it practises, exercises and experiences
it; then he is called the one who really is in the
Ultimate Principle.' (XV, 5)
In short, man, after knowing the Ultimate Principle of Man, should,
by virtue of continuous efforts of practice, actually experience it.
The process of the Mind's knowing that it should desist
from endless and useless researches into material knowledge and
physical things, and go deep into the knowledge of morality, is the
important transition from the epistemology of knowledge to the moral
epistemology of the Mind. However, it seems that Hsun-tze does not
consciously establish a systematical discussion of the connection or
relation between the Epistemological Mind and the Ultimate Mind. In
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other words, Hsun-tze does not point out the transition from the
24
former to the latter
The Mind's approval of morality as the Way of Man or
the Ultimate Principle of Man and its knowledge that it should
practise the Ultimate Principle of Man, and finally its actual
practice and experience of morality, constitutes the consistent
functioning of the Mind. Hsun-tze therefore concludes that the
main function of the Mind is to know and practice the Ultimate
Principle of Man. When the Mind is in the initial stage of know¬
ing the Ultimate Principle of Man and understanding the necessity
of practising it, the Mind promotes itself from the stage of an
ordinary Mind to that of a Conscientious ?lind.
/ (iii) The Ultimate Mind
The process of the Mind's knowledge and practice of the
Ultimate Principle of Man, that is its transcendent reflection on
the transition from worldly knowledge to moral knowledge and its
actual practice in morality, is the ultimate perfection of the
function of the Mind. The Mind at this stage is not the Mind of
an ordinary man any more, and with constant practice of the Ultimate
Principle of Man it surpasses the state of a Conscientious Mind.
It becomes the Mind of a Sage; therefore it is named here 'the
Ultimate Mind', or, in Hsun-tze's own term, 'the Sage Mind' (Chapter 1, 1,3).
The Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind is that which is united or in
24. A further discussion on p.269.
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Oneness with the Ultimate Principle of Man or Tao, therefore
Hzun-tze quotes 'The Mind of Tao' of TA0-TE-CH1NG as an illustrat¬
ion. The process of the Mind's recognising the Ultimate Principle
«
of Man is named here 'the Way of the Mind', and according to Ilsun-
tze, the acme of the Way of the Mind, and also the final goal of
moral life, is the perfection of an Ultimate Mind or of a Sage.
What the Ultimate Mind accomplishes is, in Hsun-tze's theory, a Mind
which knows all things, knows how to classify them, assists nature's
nourishing of them, and maintains peacefulness and lives
harmoniously among them.
(iv) His distinction of the two Minds
In this chapter (XXI), Hsun-tze quotes the phrases of
TAO-T E-CHING, 'the Serious-Mindedness of the Conscientious Mind'
and ' the Profundity of the Mind of Tao'. Later scholars have
offered various interpretations of these two phrases and the reason
why Hsun-tze quotes them, yet they have failed to agree on the sub-
25 v. 26
ject. In the preface of THE GOLDEN MEANS , edited by Chu - tze ,
the editor makes the following exposition: since the Mind may have
all sorts of desires, man feels uneasy and worries as if he were
going to fall into a great crisis; and since the Mind of Tao is in
the Ultimate Principle of Man, it is so indistinct that it can hardly
be seen. However, this exposition may not, it may be suggested, be
sufficient if one would like to understand thoroughly the purpose
or meaning of Hsun-tze's quoting the phrase. The interpretation of
25. ^ 7% Chung-Yung, one of the V3 Ssu-Shu or the FOUR
BOOKS in Chinese Classics.
26 . Chu -tze or Chu Hsi (1130-1200 A.D.) a scholar
of Li or the Rational Principle of Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) famous
for his commentary on Confucian classics.
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the fourth and the eighth words should, according to Hsun-tze's
theory, be as follows: The fourth word ' or Wei' may mean:
danger, to fear, high and just, etc., and it may be better fitted
to Hsun-tze's meaning if it means 'as serious-minded as walking on
thin ice', thus according to Hsun-tze, if man is serious-minded in
the operation of the Way of his Mind towards the Ultimate Principle
of Man or morality, he is a Conscientious Man. In other words, he
is not worried and he has no fear, yet he is serious-minded and
attentive to his moral goal. The eighth word ' or Wei' may
mean: small, low, weak, hidden, etc., and it may be better fitted
to Hsun-tze's meaning if it is interpreted as 'profundity' rather
than 'indistinct'. Thus according to Hsun-tze, if a man transcend-
ently knows and actually practises the Ultimate Principle of Man, and
his Mind and body concentrate devotedly upon being in accord with
morality. His knowledge of morality is profundity and his appearance
and behaviour is natural, and is different from the serious-mindedness
of a Conscientious Man. However, the natural performance of a Sage,
or the Way of a Sage is not easy to distinguish for the ordinary man
as opposed the the wise man. In the same chapter, Hsun-tze
expresses this idea:
'If a man is humble and concentrates with
seriousness, then he is surrounded with honour; if
he nourishes the Ultimate Principle of Man and con¬
centrates upon its profundity, then honour is in him
yet no one notices ... As to the stage of either
serious-mindedness or profundity, it is only the wise
man that may have the knowledge.' (XV, 6-7)
However, according to Hsun-tze, to know and distinguish such a stage
is to be a wise man, and to practise it is to be a Sage. In a later
passage, Hsun-tze says:
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'There is a man named Ji living in a cave
among the rocks. He is good at solving riddles and
he likes thinking. He finds that when the desires
of ears and eyes assail him, they ruin his train of
thought, and when he hears the sound of gadflies,
they disturb his concentration. Therefore he
supresses the desires of ears and eyes and keeps
away from the sound of gadflies, and living in
leisure, and thinking in quietness, his thought then
flows free from obstruction. If he thinks of Human-
Mindedness in such a way, can he be said to be
profound? Mensius hates to be corrupted in his
virtue, therefore he expels his wife, and he can be
said to be able to drive himself hard. You-tze28
hates to doze (while reading), therefore he burns
his palms, and he can be said to be able to endure
self--infliction. However, they both are not good
enough. He who refutes the desires of ears and
eyes can be said to be able to drive himself hard,
yet it is not as good as to sink himself in deep
thinking; if he notices that when he hears the
sound of mosquitoes and gadflies his concentration
is disturbed, then he can be said to be serious-
minded, yet he cannot be said to be profound. The
one who is profound is the perfect man29. The
perfect man has no need to drive himself hard, to
endure self-inflicted suffering or to be serious-
minded. Therefore there are men with an opaquely
bright appearance and there are also men with a
clear bright interior state39. A Sage gives free
rein to his desires and also his emotions, yet what
he establishes or performs is reasonable and rational.
Thus what is the need to drive himself hard, enduring
self-inflicted suffering and being serious-minded?
The way the man of Human-Mindedness practices the
Ultimate Principle of Man is to do nothing; while
the way the Sage practises the Ultimate Principle of
Man is not to drive himself hard. The thought of a
Human-Minded man is respectfully serious while the
thought of a Sage is joyful.' (XV, 8)
27. Ji.
28. ^ You-t ze, a disciple of Confucius.
29- % A*. Chih-Jen, an equivalent to the term 'the Sage'.
30.
» Cho-Ming-Wai-Ching, Ch'ing-
Ming-Nei-Ching, the former statement is a description of the state of
Mind of a Conscientious Man, while the latter one is that of the
state of Mind of a Sage.
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In this passage, when Hsun-tze speaks of 'being serious-minded' and
'being profound', it is an echo of the earlier quotation of TAO-TE-
CHING. What he tries to explain is that there are many people who,
although they suffer much to overcome their desires, do not really
achieve the essence of moral principle. Hsun-tze describes them as
having an opaquely bright appearance, for although they know the
Ultimate Principle of Man, their practice is not proficient and
perfect. He also describes that a Sage, with his Ultimate Mind
which is extremely profound in the knowledge and practice of morality,
speaks and acts always in accordance with the Ultimate Principle of
Man, and his Mind which is clear and bright, is always intimately
united with the Ultimate Principle of Man. Therefore a Sage's
thought, without being too serious-minded, is joyful. In this way,
Hsun-tze also makes clear the distinction between the Way of a Sage
and that of a Conscientious Man.
Therefore the Way of Mind, as Hsun-tze claims, is
perfected only when it starts from the Way of the Conscientious Mind
and ends with the Way of an Ultimate Mind. This includes the whole
operation of the moral functioning of the Mind. One may say that
the progression from the serious-mindedness of the Conscientious
Mind to reflecting transcendently to knowing the Ultimate Principle
of Man, and to the generation of the moral functioning of the Mind,
is just like that of streams flowing down to the river which becomes
wider, deeper and more remote; yet, it has not yet run into the sea.
This is the Way of a Conscientious Man, in which he consciously
recognises the Ultimate Principle of Man, and what he thinks, speaks
and does is in a moral, serious manner. As to the Sage, his whole
Mind is united with the Ultimate Principle of Man and he completely
forgets to know and practise it; he becomes part of the Ultimate
Principle of Man, while it becomes part of him. This may be con¬
sidered in the following example: the river rushes to the sea and
ocean, and all of a sudden, it becomes part of the boundlessness
and limitlessness of the sea. This is the Way of a Sage, and the
9
turbulence and roaring in him are the Ultimate Principle of Man, or
Tao. Hsun-tze considers that a Sage is conscious that he is in the
Ultimate Principle of Man, and yet there is no need for him to be
conscious to know it and to know to practice it, for what he knows
and practises are already learnt on the path to the Ultimate
Principle of Man. The Ultimate Mind and its state may hardly be
known to the ordinary man; therefore Hsun-tze says that only a wise
man can understand the two stages. A wise man knows the difference,
but a Sage experiences the difference; for this reason, Hsun-tze
repeatedly makes it clear in his book that a Conscientious Man and
a Sage are not identical; and it is the stage of operating the
function of the Mind that makes them different from each other.
Therefore to Hsun-tze, the stages of practising the Ultimate Principle
of Man are on two levels; namely, the Way of a Conscientious Man and
that of a Sage. The philosophy of Hsun-tze in fact is to establish
the way of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality and
so the two stages mentioned are indeed the basis of his ideal way of
life. In his book, Hsun-tze quite often uses the way of a Mean-
Spirited Man to contrast with the ways of a Conscientious Man and a
Sage. However, this only serves to provide a background to make
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prominent the dignity of the latter. There follows some quotations
from his illustrations which give a picture of the ways of the two.
(a) Manner and appearance of a Conscientious Man
and his Way
Chapter I:
'A Conscientious Man says: Learning cannot be
stopped ... A Conscientious Man is learned and he
reflects upon himself three times a day; if so, then
his knowledge is clear and bright and his behaviour
makes no error ... A Conscientious Man is neither
rash and impatient, nor ambiguous in speech, nor blind
and obstinate to the situation. He should be serious-
minded and should order his thoughts when speaking . . .
He should instruct his eyes not to desire to see what
is not complete, and perfect-^!, his ears not desire to
hear what is not complete and perfect, his mouth not
desire to speak and his Mind not desire to consider
what is not complete and perfect.' (I, 1-7)
Chapter VIII:
'The speech of a Conscientious Man should have
its boundary or judgement as to rites, and his behaviour
should have its precaution and standard.' (IV, 13)
Chapter XX:
'The ears of a Conscientious Man should not
listen to wanton sound, his eyes should not see carnal
charm and his mouth should not speak abusive and evil
language. These three "should nots" are what a
Conscientious Man should be careful in.' (XIV, 3)
There are many more similar statements in HSUN-TZE.
In short, the manner and appearance of a Conscientious Man is, accord¬
ingly, serious-minded,, careful or prudent, honest and attentive; and
in the knowledge and practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man he
yearns for it, adapts himself to it, yet he is also restrained,
confined and imprisoned by it.
31. -jN 3f, ^ Pu-Ch'uan-Pu-Ts'ui, i.e. what is not morally
perfect, or not complete and perfect in morality.
115
The distiaction between_ the Way of a Sage and that of a
Conscientious flan
Chapter II:
'He who loves laws and regulations and practises
accordingly is a Scholar, or a man of learning; he who
firmly determines to follow the Ultimate Principle of
Man and examines and experiences it serious-mindedly is
a Conscientious Man; and he whose Deliberation is soaked
in the Ultimate Principle of Man and is wise and keen and
never exhausted is a Sage.' (I, 11)
Chapter V:
'Debate needs no preparation beforehand, no
strategy in advance, it is delivered properly and ration¬
ally, its literary elegance is perfect and it is in
accordance with the reality, and however it is presented
or rearranged, it adapts to all changes and its adaptions
are never exhausted; this is the debate of a Sage. If
the debate needs preparation beforehand, strategy in ad¬
vance; though it is delivered in an unexpected instance,
it is worthy enough to be listened to, it is reliable and
honest, and it is learned, straightforward and orthodox;
this is the debate of a Scholar and a Conscientious Man.'
(III, 7)
Chapter VI:
'A Conscientious Man ... is at ease and in
comfort, yet he is not negligent and idle; he is diligent,
yet he is not slow and remiss. However, the one who is
able to trace the source (of the Ultimate Principle of Man),
to stick to it so as to deal with all changes, and to
manage all things to their appropriateness, is then the Sage.'
(Ill, 13)
Chapter VIII:
'If one asks, "I wish from inferiority to become
honorable, from foolishness to become wise, and from poverty
to become rich. Is it possible?" I say: Yes, by means
of learning. The one who actually learns is called a
Scholar; the one who learns industriously and serious-
raindedly is called a Conscientious Man; and the one who is
profound and expert at learning is a Sage . . . The one
who considers following customs is good, who considers
commodities and currency to be the most precious treasure,
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and who considers the formula of healthy living and
personal interest to be the most essential way of life,
displays the Nature of an ordinary man. The one whose
practice is in accordance with laws, whose will is
determined and whose learning is not disturbed by his
own desires, can be said to be a resolute Scholar. The
man whose practice is in accordance with laws, and whose
will is determined, who loves to rectify what he hears
and learns, and to affect his emotion and Nature, whose
speech is mostly correct yet not clear enough, whose
behaviour is mostly correct yet not restful, and whose
knowledge and Deliberation is mostly correct yet not
complete and perfect, and who at the very best, can glorify
what he honours, and secondarily, can educate and enlighten
those who are less learned, can then be said to be a very
sincere Conscientious Man. The one who revises the laws
established by the hundreds of kings as easily as
distinguishing between black and white, who deals with
the immediate changes as easily as counting the numbers
one and two, who 'behaves and feels content with what is
according to rites as naturally as man is born with four
limbs, who achieves timely accomplishments and also does
not lose his power and influence as effortlessly as the
four seasons proclaim the growth and completion of all things;
who is fair and just, amiable and most virtuous; who, among
thousands of millions, is the most learned and devoted, can
then be called the Sage.' (IV, 4-6)
More distinctions can be found throughout the chapters of
HSUN-TZE. According to the author, a Conscientious Man holds firmly
to his way of practising the Ultimate Principle of Man and is thus
confined or imprisoned by it. In other words, since the Mind of a
Conscientious Man or the Conscientious Mind has not yet united with
the Ultimate Principle of Man, a Conscientious Man sees morality as
high and above him. A Sage blends his Mind with it and thus unites
the two. In other words, he is within it and it exists in him, and
he does not then need to act, speak, learn and exercise particularly
according to it, or to adapt himself to it, for all his speech and
behaviour will necessarily be in accordance with it.
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(c) The manner and appearance of a Sage and his Way
Chapter VIII:
'He is systematic and manages things in a
principled way; he is meticulous and strict and his
dignity and prestige earn him respect; he is determined
and firm and sees things through to successful completion,
he is peaceful and serene and his influence long-lasting;
he is joyful and devotes himself to the Ultimate Principle
of Man without fear; he is outstandingly wise and his use
of wisdom is keen and profound; he is orderly and in his
behaviour he takes into consideration every aspect of a
matter; he is refined and his writing is elegant; he is
cordial and he wishes others to have goodness and virtue;
he is sympathetic and he worries about others' impropriety;
if all these are so, then one can be said a Sage. His Way
originates from "one"^. What is "one"? I say: to hold
firmly to the "spirit"^ and 'De impregnable. What is the
"spirit"? I say.: to be perfectly good and controlled is
called the "spirit"; if all things are finable to corrupt
him, this is called being impregnable. To hold the
"spirit" and be impregnable is called being a Sage . . .
A Sage is the one who originates Human-Mindedness and
righteousness, who searches for the correct distinction
between the right and wrong, makes uniform his speech and
conduct and all is done perfectly without missing one point.
His success has no other way but concentrating all his
attentions upon practice.' (IV, 6-7)
Chapter IX:
'On one hand, he (the Sage) observes and knows
Heaven, and on the other, he manages and uses the Earth.
His Human-Mindedness fills up the universe, and his right¬
eousness applies to all things. He makes plain what is
hidden, he lengthens what is too short and he broadens
what is too narrow. By following the most simple principle
he becomes wise, extensive and profound. Therefore I say:
By one Principle, all principles are illustrated and
unified. The one who acts in this way is called a Sage.'
(V, 8)
In conclusion, the Sage, according to Hsun-tze, is in
possession of the Ultimate Principle of Man within himself, thus his
32. —™~ I, to Hsun-tze it is the moral practice.
33. ^ Shen, to Hsun-tze it is the spirit or attitude of moral practice.
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Mind knows thoroughly the principle of all things; he is loyal to
the Ultimate Principle of Man, thus nothing can corrupt him; his
Ultimate Mind is profound, yet clear and bright, and his inner state
34
is Receptive, Attentive, and Undisturbed so as to store the Ultimate
Principle of Man, and thus he is capable of dealing with all things
and all changes.
A BRIEF CONCLUSION OF THIS CHAPTER
In this chapter an attempt has been made to explain
Hsun-tze's theory of Heaven and of Mind. In the former Hsun-tze
reduces Heaven to its common-sense origin, and thus the obverse of
his theory is to try to eliminate man's superstitions about Heaven
while its positive purpose is to get man to keep away from supernatural
illusions such as personified gods, and to return to the search for the
consciousness of his own Mind; thus arises Hsunt-tze's theory of Mind.
The theme of the latter is to establish the two stages of the Way of
Mind. According to his theory the accomplishment of an Ultimate Mind
from an ordinary Mind is a continuous struggle waged with great effect.
He also suggests Tao or the Ultimate Principle of Man as his own moral
ideal, the principle which every man must follow, and its concrete con¬
tent is in the practice of completely fulfilling one's duty in human
relations and social institutions. A Conscientious Man is, Hsun-tze
describes, one who practises sincerely and honestly what he recognises
and learns, and a Sage is the one whose knowledge and practice are com¬
pletely united with the Ultimate Principle of Man. The characteristic
34. For reference of these terms, please see p.53.
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of a Sage and what makes him different from a Conscientious Man is,
according to Hsun-tze, that a Sage is not isolated from the public,
he mixes with the masses, not losing his nobility; he is good at
instructing and enlightening them in the search for the Ultimate
Principle of Man; that he follows the customs yet he does not lose
his clearness of the Mind and he cleanses their defects; that he is
wise and clever in dealing with changes; in short, he is wise and
Human-Minded. Thus describing the Sage, Hsun-tze completes the
establishment of his moral philosophy. This is the positive side
of his theory. On the other hand, Hsun-tze considers that if all
men delight in morality, and dispel the Obsessions of their Minds,
though their achievements may not be the same, or in other words
some may become Scholars, or Conscientious Men, or Sages, then at
least, Mean-Spirited Men will disappear from the world and control
and peace will be obtained. This is the negative side of his theory.
And thus his ideal moral society or his ideal world is introduced.
The interpretation and analysis of his moral philosophy has thus come
to an end. However, the completion of the whole scope of his theory




HIS THEORIES OF POLITICS
CHAPTER IV:
HIS THEORIES OF POLITICS
In his theory of human nature, Hsun-tze first suggests
that Man's Nature is Evil, and then by way of his theory of the
Transformation of Man's Evil Nature, he arrives at his theory of the
Mind. Thus his insistence that Man's Nature is Evil only serves as
a means to illustrate an ideal state of the Mind which can be achieved
only after the Transformation of Man's Evil Nature and the dispelling
of the Mind's Obsessions. The different characteristics of a Mean-
Spirited Man, a Scholar, a Conscientious Man and a Sage represent the
different stages through v/hich a man may pass. This is the essence
of his thought. As to his political theory, his establishment of the
image of the Sage-King is merely an extension of his moral philosophy.
SECTION 1: THE THEORIES OF THE WAY OF A KING
In his political theory most of Hsun-tze's discussion is
about the personality and policies of the Sage-King, and the way of
becoming a Sage-King. The following are the structure of his theory.
A: HIS DEFINITION OF A KING
In chapter VIII, Hsun-tze says,
'If he (the king) is capable, then the whole world
follows him; if he is incapable, then the whole world
abandons him.' (IV, 1)
Thus Hsun-tze defines the king as a capable man, and this is the key
to the understanding of Hsun-tze's theory of politics. The capability
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of the ideal king of Hsun-tze lies in moral cultivation. In other
words, the Sage-King is one who is capable of moral-cultivation to
the state of moral perfection and of educating to and influencing on
the moral life of his people.
B: HIS OPINION ON THE CULTIVATION OF A KING
(1) The necessity of a King's moral cultivation
In chapter XIV, Hsun-tze says:
'If the Men's Master1 is able to make understood
his virtue, then the world will follow him as the cicada
follows the bright fire.' (IX, 7)
From this, Hsun-tze makes significant his theory that a king must
make himself a morally cultivated man. In his book, there is a
statement from THE BOOK OF ODES repeatedly quoted by Hsun-tze:
'From the west and the east, from the south and
the north, there is no one that does not follow willingly.'
To make the people follow willingly, a king must, Hsun-tze holds, be
morally cultivated. In chapter XII, he says:
'If one asks, "May I ask the way to rule the
country?" I say: I have heard about the way of
cultivating oneself, yet I have never heard about that
of ruling the country. The king is like a model, his
people are like his shadow, when the model is upright,
so is its shadow. The king is like a wooden tray, his
people are like water, when the wooden tray is round,
the v/ater is round too. The king likes shooting, so
do his officers. Once King Chuang of Ch'u^ loved the
1. 3^ Jen-Chu, a similar term to the name 'king*. Hsun-tze also
uses the terms ' -yg- ' , Chun-Jen-Che, or 'the one who rules', ' Jen-Chun,
or 'man's ruler', 1 T' ien-tze, or the son of Heaven to describe the king.
2. Jfji: i£- Chuang-Wang, a king of Ch' u, (740-330 B.C.) a feudal
state in Chou Dynasty.
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slender-waisted women, and yet there were hungry girls
in the country. Therefore I say, I have heard about the
cultivation of a king, yet I have never heard about the
way of ruling the country.' (VIII, 3)
From this it is clear that what Hsun-tze considers important about
the king is not his policy but his virtue, for Hsun-tze believes that
with moral perfection a king will certainly implement beneficial
policies in his country and his people will have no sufferings.
(2) Moral-cultivation of a king
Hsun-tze suggests four essential practices of a King's
moral-cultivation in chapter XVI:
'The king who wants to v/in must first gain the
hearts of his people, and to gain their hearts he must
learn their way. What is their way? I say: it is
the practice of rites, righteousness, honesty and
trustworthiness . . . Therefore he who is above his
people should be assiduous in practising rites, right¬
eousness, honesty and trustworthiness, and then his
practice can be said to be appropriate. This is the
great principle of a king.' (XI, 4,8)
e,
This is also, Hsun-tze suggests, the method of moral cultivation of
a king.
(i) Rites
According to Hsun-tze, if the king practises rites as a
way of moral-cultivation, then the result is that capable and virtuous
men will come to serve him and the officials will be appropriately
appointed. In chapter XV, he says:
'Rites is the highest principle of government and
administration, it is the source of a country's strength,
it is the way to win prestige and get things done, and it
is the essence of achievement and fame. If kings and
dukes follow the principle of rites, they will win the
3. Hsiu-Shen.
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whole world, v/hereas if they do not follow it,
they will lose their country and do them harm.' (X, 9)
In chapter VIII, he says:
'Rites is the principle which the king uses to
measure his officials just as logically as one uses a
rule to measure an inch, a foot, eight feet"^, or ten
feet5.' (IV, 13)
In chapter XIV he also says,
'If a king assiduously practises rites and
righteousness, the the Conscientious Men will follow
him.' (IX, 7)
In short, to Hsun-tze, rites are the first essential practice of a
king both in his moral-cultivation and his political administration.
(ii) Righteousness
In chapter XVI, Hsun-tze says:
'Righteousness is what prohibits man from
behaving with evil and wickedness . . . Righteousness
is what is appropriate in man and appropriate in all
things, and what on one hand gives peace to the king
and on the other harmonizes the people. Righteousness
has the quality of being applicable to people close and
people afar, to both high and low . . . Righteousness
is the main source of good government and trustworthiness
is a secondary source.' (XI, 8)
Here Hsun-tze considers righteousness to be appropriate and proper
in the individual as well as in man's treatment of all things. It
is one of the essential factors in the moral-cultivation of a king,
as well as his policy.
a
4. Hsun, a measure of length in ancient China (roughly
equivalent to eight feet).
5. Chang, a unit in Chinese lineal measurement slightly
longer than ten feet.
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(iii) Honesty and trustworthiness
In chapter XII, Hsun-tze says:
'When people examine if the tassel matches the
tally, or if the counterfoils of the contract or agree¬
ment are identical, this is done for the sake of trust.
(VIII, 1)
Tassel and tally, and the counterfoils of a contract or agreement,
were symbolic and documentary bases for keeping promises in ancient
times. In fact, at first they were merely used to provide matters
of trust with a basis of proof, yet after some time the exchanges of
tallies, etc. became ritualized. According to Hsun-tze, a king who
has to deal with hundreds of thousands of officials and people, must
keep his promises and perform in such a way as to show his subordin¬
ates that he is trustworthy; thus his officials and people will then
trust him, follow him, and obey him. Hsun-tze also considers honesty
as one of the essential factors in the moral-cultivation of a king as
well as in his policy, for if a king is honest to his people he will
concentrate on implementing beneficial policies and see to their
completion; and in return, his people will be faithful and loyal to
him. To Hsun-tze, honesty and trustworthiness always come together;
if a king is trustworthy and honest to his people, his people will
then trust and be faithful to him.
The chief results of moral-cultivation of a king are
twofold; (1) capable and virtuous men will come to follow him, and
(2) by giving them suitable official positions and with their help he
may lead his country to become strong and wealthy. Thus it seems
that Hsun-tze's advice that a king should morally cultivate himself
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is a necessary practical policy; yet for Hsun-tze, the accomplishment
of the government and administration of a Sage-King is only the project¬
ion or extension of his virtue to the external and the more remote, and
just as for a Sage, so for a Sage-King, moral-cultivation is always
his ultimate aim.
6
(3) Policy-framing of a king
Hsun-tze suggests four ways for a king to frame his policy
and bring about orderly political administration, namely: (1) to love
the people and to maintain a policy of fairness; (2) to enrich the
country and to strengthen the army; (3) to root out evil and to
eliminate the traitorous; and (4) to follow the policy of recent
Sage-Kings.
(i) Loving the people and maintaining a policy of fairness
In chapter IX, Hsun-tze says:
'To choose the capable and virtuous, to employ the
sincere and respectful, to promote the dutiful son and the
brotherly man, to accommodate the orphans and the widowed
and to supply the impoverished and the poor; this is the
way to ensure that the masses will be content with such a
policy . . . and that the Conscientious Men will be un¬
disturbed and content in their official positions , . .
Therefore if the king wishes to have a peaceful and stable
policy, there is no way better than to love people and to
maintain a policy of fairness.' (V, 2.-3)
The positive function of this policy is to satisfy the needs of the
people as well as to keep them under protection, so that the masses
will be grateful to the king and follow and obey him; its negative
6. # ^ Hsiu-Cheng
function is to calm and smooth the relationship between the king and
his people as well as to stop the possible chaos and rebellion in the
country. Therefore in chapter XII, Hsun-tze says:
'If the king loves his people he will obtain a
peaceful and stable country; if he uses the capable and
virtuous men he will obtain glory and honour; and if he
does neither of the two, he and his country will be in
danger of perishing.' (VIII, 3)
In chapter XI, he also says:
'The relationship of the superior to his
subordinates is like the protection of the father to
his infants.' (VII, 10)
In short, the fatherly love of the king to his people is, according
to Hsun-tze, most important in a king's policy.
(ii) Enriching the country and strengthening the army
To Hsun-tze, the purpose of enriching the country is to
enrich the people, and that of strengthening the army is to protect
the people. The practical scheme of the former, Hsun-tze suggests,
negatively is to cut down expenses, and positively is to open more
sources of income. In chapter X, entitled 'Enriching the country',
he discusses this in detail:
'The way of enriching the country is by cutting
down expenses, letting people be rich, and by being wise in
storing up surpluses. According to the regulations and
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the system recorded in RITES , expenses will thus be cut
down; and by means of good administration, the people
will thus be enriched. If the government enriches the
people, it will have surplus (food and currency); if
the people are enriched, they will become wealthy and
self-sufficient; if they are wealthy and sufficient,
they will make their field fertile and the crops well-
cultivated, and the harvest will produce a hundredfold.
If the government takes (what is produced by the people)
according to a fixed price, and the people cut down their
expenses according to the regulations of RITES, then the
surpluses are as high as a mountain.' (VI, 2)
As to how to let people be rich or enrich the people, Hsun-tze suggests
some practical methods of opening up more sources of incomes in
chapter IX:
'When the grass and the trees a^g exuberant and
flourishing, axes should then not be allowed in the
mountains and forests; thus the grass and trees will not
be used up early and their growth will not be terminated.
As for spring cultivation, summer weeding, autumn harvest
and winter storage, if these four events are not missed,
the five major grains will thus not run out, and the
masses will have surplus food. If the closed season is
meticulously kept in ponds, lakes, gullies, marshes and
rivers, then fishes and turtles will be abundant and the
7. YI LI. What Hsun-tze is saying here is that if expenses,
no matter whether they are needed by the king or the people, are accord¬
ing to the regulations of YI LI and if excessive expenses on impractical
or luxurious entertainments or the like are avoided, then the economic
situation of the country as a whole will be improved. The word
'expenses' here means 'unnecessary expenses'. For example, the emperor
may have, according to the rites of the Chou Dynasty recorded in YI LI,
sixty-four dancers in the worshipping performance in the ancestral
temple of the royal family; while the feudal prince may have thirty-six
dancers; a minister sixteen dancers; and an official, four dancers.
In the time of Hsun-tze, these details of rites were not respected and
properly practised because the emperors of the Chou Dunasty were too
weak to control the feudal princes, ministers and officials whose grow¬
ing power and influence seriously threatened them. The rich and
powerful political figures became independent of the emperor and made
themselves kings. They adopted the details of the rites of the emperor
such as having sixty-four dancers in worshipping performance for their
ancestors. To Hsun-tze, such usurpations of title and practice of
rites were, in many aspects, incorrect. Unnecessary expenses and ex¬
travagance which exhausted the economic sources of the country was one
of the aspects which Hsun-tze feels he has to point out.
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masses will have surplus provisions; if the times of
felling and planting of trees are not missed, the
mountains and forests will thus not be barren and the
masses will have surplus timber. This is the way a
Sage-King manages his economy.' (V, 8)
In another paragraph he also says:
'What is covered by Heaven and what is borne
by the earth are all in peak condition and are avail¬
able for practical use. On one hand, they become
the ornaments of the capable and the virtuous; and
on the other, they nourish the masses and make them
easy and comfortable. This is called the great
administration. (V, 6)
Here Ilsun-tze suggests that a good policy includes positively opening
the sources of income so that on one hand, the supply becomes suffic¬
ient because of increased production, and on the other the lives of
the masses may become easier and enriched by promoting efficiency
through the division of labour and encouraging the expansion of busi¬
ness and markets. This is Hsun-tze's positive suggestion for
enriching the country. However, he also suggests some negative
policies to meet the purpose. In the same chapter he says:
'The taxation of cultivated lands should be
collected in tithes®; the customs stations and
markets should be checked but should not be taxed;
the mountains, forests, marshes and bridges should
be closed and opened at the appropriate seasons but
should not be taxed. To investigate the quality
of lands and then to fix the taxation accordingly;
to distinguish the distances of roads and then to
ask for the tribute; as regards currency, commodi¬
ties, grain and rice, not to allow them to become
dead stock but to let them circulate and be exchanged;
these policies should be carried to all four corners
of the country, and applied as to one family.' (V, 5-6)
8. •—" Shih-I, one tenth.
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There are many more passages in his book concerning suggestions for
enriching the country, which still have not lost their value in modern
times. The point worth noticing is that Hsun-tze's suggestions on
the subject show that he also considers the interests of the people,
though he often tends to see politics from the standpoint of the king.
On the other hand, Hsun-tze lays emphasis on the Human-Mindedness and
wisdom with which the ruler may supplement nature's nourishment and
utilize all things to improve the living standard of his people.
As to the policy of strengthening the army, Hsun-tze
explains its purpose in chapter XV, entitled 'Discussion on the army'.
'The Human-Minded Man loves men, and since he
loves men, he hates those who harm men. The right¬
eous man follows reason and principle, and since he
follows reason and principle, he hates those who bring
disorder to men. His army is for the sake of prohibit¬
ing the tyrannical and eliminating the dangerous, and not
for fighting for the leading role, nor for conquering
cities and capturing territories. Therefore the army of
a Human-Minded Man, wherever it stations, brings peace
and administration; whatever territory it occupies,
influences and civilizes its enemies, and it is just like
the fall of timely rain with which there is no one who is
not delighted.' (X, 8)
Here Hsun-tze clearly indicates that the purpose of an army is to put
down the tyrannical and eliminate the dangerous so as to bring peace
to the people, or in short, to protect the people against harm. What,
then, is the policy of controlling the army? Hsun-tze answers in the
same chapter:
'The essence of controlling the army and attacking
in battle is to unite the people . . . Therefore those
who are good at being close to their people are good at
controlling the army. ... To a great king, the
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management of his army is a comparatively minor matter,
. . . if he is virtuous, his country will be governed
in peace; ... if he honours rites and righteousness,
his country will be governed in peace ... To honour
rites and bring their functions tG full play, is the
best strategem; to value official salary and rank,
while honouring moral fortitude is the secondary policy;
to esteem utility and belittle moral fortitude is a most
foolish scheme ... He who is fond of the capable and
virtuous will strengthen his country, . . .he who loves
his people will strengthen his country, ... he whose
official orders are trustworthy will strengthen his
country, ... he who unites his people will strengthen
his country, ... he who offers heavy rewards will
strengthen his country, ... he whose punishment is
stern and severe will strengthen his country.' (X, 1-4)
This is Hsun-tze's policy of controlling the army and it is also a
succinct description of his policy of the way of a king. In chapter
XVII, he also says:
'If a king honours rites and respects the
capable and virtuous, he is a Sage-King; if he
esteems laws but loves his people, he is a mighty
chief.' (XI, 13)
As to the result of the army of the Sage-King, Hsun-tze says in
chapter XV:
'The people near him become delighted with his
good policy and those at a distance admire his virtue;
his army does not stain with blood, and the distant
and the near will come to follow him; his virtue
brings prosperity to those nearby yet his good policy
is extended to the four corners of the world.' (X, 9)
In short, the ideal army is led by a Sage-King and the effect or influence
of such an army is to bring culture and virtue to its enemy.
(iii) Rooting out the evil and eliminating the traitorous
The ideal policy of a king is, according to Hsun-tze, to
influence his people with his virtue. As to those who do not accept
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this, the only way to deal with them is, Hsun-tze holds, to root them
out. In chapter V, he describes the chief of the evil and the
traitorous:
'Listen to his speech and one will find that his
words are deceptive, sophistical, and without basis;
if one uses him as an officer, one will find that he is
tricky and deceiptful, and he has no merit; on one
hand, he is not good enough to serve a wise king, and on
the other, he is not good enough to harmonize and unite
the masses; yet his arguments are smooth, his promises
are restricted; he considers himself good enough to
join the class of the remarkable, and the great men and
the saviours of the country. He is the chief of the
evil and the traitorous.' (Ill, 7)
In short, such a man is an extreme example of a Mean-Spirited Man.
Hsun-tze considers that such a man must be put to death for he will
never bring good to others but be harmful to society and country.
Therefore the first thing a Sage-King must do after he has succeeded
to the throne is, says Hsun-tze, to eliminate such a kind of man.
The next person who should be rooted out is the tyrant.
o
In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze says:
'To eliminate a tyrant is just like killing an
ordinary man.' (XII, 2)
The tyrant does not love his people but instead he harms and endangers
them; he does not maintain a good policy but instead he employs a
selfish and unjust one; he does not enrich the country but instead
he wastes and exhausts the wealth of the country, and the reason for
him to strengthen his army is only to fight for supreme power or to
conquer more lands or for profit. Therefore, Hsun-tze holds that a
Sage-King, protecting the people from suffering, must eliminate the
tyrant.
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(iv) Following the policy of the recent Sage-Kings
There had been arguments among the Pre-Ch'in scholars
on the models for a king's policy - whether to follow the early
9 10
Sage-Kings or the recent Sage-Kings . The former Sage-Kings are,
according to them, the five famed ancient kings^, and the recent
Sage-Kings are those who ruled in the early Chou Dynasty.
Hsun-tze does not oppose the ancient Sage-Kings; on the
contrary, he sincerely praises the spirit of their policy. In
chapter VIII, he says:
'The ways of the early kings were an exaltation
of Human-Mindedness and in their actions they followed
the middle way (i.e. the appropriate principle) . . .
A true Confucianist should follow the pattern of the
early kings and exalt the rites and righteousness.'
(IV, 3)
In chapter I, he also says:
'Those who have never heard of the instructions
of the early kings will not know the profundity of
knowledge.' (I, 1)
9. Hsien-Wang, the ancient legendary Sage-Kings.
10. Huo-Wang, usually denotes King Wen, King Wu of early Chou.
11. Wu-Ti, they are listed at least in three different ways:
(1) J|^ Tai Hao, ^ Shen Nong, ^ ^ Huang Ti,
'J' Shao Hao, and 4£|| -jjS Chuan Hsu (according to LI YUEH LING
(2) Huang Ti, Chuan Hsu, ^ Ti Ku, Tao and Shun (according to
TA TAI LI CH'I ^rj| and SHIH CHINC, ^ $0^ ); and
(3) Shao Hao, Chuan Hsu, Ti Ku, Yao and Shun, (according to THE
HEREDITORY RECORDS OF THE KINGS)
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In chapter V, he says:
'All those speeches which are not in accordance
with the (spirit of) the early kings, and do not obey
rites and righteousness are wicked speeches.' (Ill, 5)
It is clear that Hsun-tze appreciates the establishment and the
exaltation of rites and righteousness of the ancient legenary Sage-
Kings and considers that their spirit should always be remembered.
However, the detailed contents of their establishment and exaltation
are not to be found after so many generations, and therefore Hsun-tze
objects to following their policy which had ceased to exist. In
chapter V he makes clear this idea:
'Before the five kings there were no legendary
Sage-Kings. This was not because there were no capable
and virtuous men before them but because so much time
had elapsed. No policy of the five kings has been
transmitted down to today. This is not because there
was no good policy among them, but because of the long
time which has elapsed. Although Yu and T'ang trans¬
mitted good policies, the details are not as observable
as those of the Chou Dynasty. This is not because
there were no good policies at their time, but because
of the long time which has elapsed. The longer the
time over which the theories were transmitted, the more
sketchy their contents became.' (Ill, 5)
In other words, Hsun-tze considers that it is foolish to take, as
models, the policies of the former Sage-Kings which have become
incomplete and indistinct after generations.
As for the reason for following the recent Sage-Kings,
Hsun-tze explains in the same chapter:
'If one wants to observe the merits of the policies
of the Sage-Kings, they can only be found among the recent
kings who possess them in a complete and clear form.
The recent kings are contemporary rulers. If men
abandon the recent kings and talk about those of pre¬
historic time, they are just like those who abandon
their own king and serve someone else's king.' (Ill, 4)
In chapter III, he also says:
12.
'The ways of the hundred kings of ancient times
are no different from the ways of the recent kings. J.f
a Conscientious Man examines the ways of the recent
kings and infers the ways of the kings before the hundred
kings, then he always feels easy and composed as a ruler
who rules without actually governing does1^.' (II, 5)
The recent kings collected the essence of the policies of the ancient
kings and their policies represent the complete form of the latter,
and therefore Hsun-tze insists that a king must follow the patterns
of the recent kings. In chapter VIII, he also says:
'If man asks about morality, he should be told
nothing more than the ways of the recent kings1^. If
1 ^
the comments go beyond the three dynasties^ , then this
is entirely unreliable. To follow the pattern of
different policies than those of the recent kings is
improper ... If the various theories of the hundred
schools do not include that of the recent kings, then
man need not listen to them.' (IV, 13)
This shows Hsun-tze's radical theory that a king or even an ordinary
man should follow the ways of the recent kings.
12. Pai-Wang. The term 'the hundred kings' denotes the
approximate numbers of kings from ancient legend.
13. What Hsun-tze means here is simply that the policies of the
recent kings are identical with those of the ancient kings.
14. The term 'the ways of the recent kings' means the practice of
rites and righteousness.
15. JZ* San-Tai, denotes "|[_ Hsia (2183-1752 B.C.), Shang
(c.1751-1111 B.C.) and Chou (1111-256 B.C.).
As to the detail of the ways of recent kings, it seems
that Hsun-tze has included them in his theories of the ways of a
Sage-King or his ideal policies. He agrees with the spirit of
the policies of the ancient kings or pre-historic Sage-Kings, but
he advocates that one should follow the details of the policies of
the recent Sage-Kings simply because they are transmitted in their
entirety. In this case, although his theory is opposite to that
of Mencius who is in favour of following the early kings or ancient
kings, the principle and the spirit of both indeed are not far away
from each other as far as policial ideals are concerned.
C: HIS DISCUSSION OF THE INHERITANCE OF KINGSHIP
The problem of the inheritance of kingship, or the
succession of the ruler is one of the major problems of the philo¬
sophy of politics. In his discussion, Hsun-tze suggests two
points: (1) the succeeding to the throne after the elimination
of a tyrant, and (2) the succeeding of a Sage by another Sage.
(i) Elimination of a tyrant
When a king is tyrannical to his people and harmful to
his country, a new Sage-King will, Hsun-tze believes, gain power
and eliminate the tyrant for the people. In chapter XVIII,
Hsun-tze says:
'If he (the tyrant) is without capability and
acts improperly, then inside the country, his people
hate him, and outside the country, the feudal princes
rebel against him. In the near circle of his kingdom
there is no unification within the border; and in the
distances, the feudal princes disobey him. His orders
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therefore are not executed in the country, and even
worse, the feudal princes invade and conquer him,
attack and subjugate him. If the situation is like
this, then although he has not been conquered, I would
say he does not own the world any more . . . Among
the feudal princes, there is one who is capable, virtu-»
ous, wise and powerful, and among the people in the
country, there is no one unwilling to have him as king
and teacher; though the tyrant is haughty and evil, he
will soon be eliminated by the Sage.' (XII, 2)
From this, it is obvious that Hsun-tze's judgement on the tyrant is
that either he will be killed by another capable and virtuous king
or the world will leave him and follow another good king, and
eventually he will lose his people and his country.
(ii) A Sage succeeding another Sage
In chapter XVIII, Hsun-tze says:
'If a Sage-King is dead and there is no other
Sage in the world, then there is no-one worthy to take
over the world. However, if the world has Sages and
their descendants are Sages, the world will not split
up and rebel, and there will be no changes of officials
in the court, no reformation of institutions in the
country, and the world will be peaceful and be no
different from the past; if a Yao succeeds to a Yao,0
then why should there be any changes? If the Sage is
not the descendant of a Sage-King but is found among
the ministers, then if the world follows him, is moved
by and yields to him, it will be peaceful and will be
no different from the past; if a Yao succeeds to a Yao,
then why should there be any changes? Only if the
court and the institution are changed, then comes the
difference. However, when the Sage-King is alive, the
world is unified, most peaceful and controlled; if he
measures his follower's virtue and allocates them appro¬
priate ranks, then after his death there must be someone
who is certainly capable of being responsible for the
world.' (XII, 6-7)
In the same chapter, Hsun-tze therefore argues the error of the use
of the term 'abdication of the throneby his contemporaries as
16. Ch'an-Jang. According to the legend, Yao selected Shun
as his successor and passed his rein of office to Shun before he died.
Shun selected Yu and made him king before he retired also. Both Yao
and Shun did not leave their thrones to their own sons for they con¬
sidered them not capable and virtuous enough to rule the world. Most
of the Pre-Ch'in scholars, especially Confucius and Mencius, highly
praised this legendary story.
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well as by many traditional scholars of the legendary story of
Yao and Shun. He considers the term to be used improperly as well
as unnecessarily for the following reasons:
(1) According to Hsun-tze, if a man is a Sage, the world
will follow him and make him a king. Therefore if the man to whom
a Sage-King abdicates the throne is a Sage, the world will certainly
accept him. It is not because the king has elected him as his
successor but because he himself wins the hearts of the people. On
the other hand, if a man is not the one whom a Sage-King chooses, yet
he is a Sage, the world will follow him and make him their king.
What makes a man king is, Hsun-tze claims, his virtue which makes
the world follow him, and not the abdication of the throne by a
former king. In the case of Shun and Yu, it was because of their
virtue that people willingly followed them and, in Hsun-tze's opinion,
their popularity was not because they were elected successors to the
throne. Thus the term is, in Hsun-tze's view, not in accordance
with the facts and it therefore is a misleading name or a confusion.
x_>
(2) Hsun-tze implies that the death of a Sage-King is like
that of a common man. There should be no changes in policy, offic¬
ials and institutions if another Sage-King succeeds to the throne
and follows the good policy or the kingly policy of his former.
Therefore he repeatedly emphasizes that if a Yao, a new Sage-King,
succeeds to a Yao, the aged or dead Sage-King, there should be no
changes in the country. Hsun-tze considers that the changes of
kings are not important as long as the good policy is maintained.
Therefore the term is unnecessary or of no importance to political
theory.
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3. To Hsuri-tze, when a Sage-King is living, there must be
many capable and virtuous men in the court; when he dies, there
is certainly at least one Sage who is capable and virtuous enough
to succeed to the throne. Therefore the formal procedure of
abdication of the throne before he dies is not a necessary one.
To Hsun-tze, the legendary story of 'abdication of the throne*
denotes, if it is a historical fact, an unresistant current of the
masses to follow whom they approve. Therefore the term itself
carries no political significance and should not, Hsun-tze claims,
be over-estimated as most of the scholars of his time do.
From the above, it is clear that what Hsun-tze is
concerned with is the virtue of the king in his moral-cultivation
and policy-framing. As to arguments about the term 'abdication of
the throne', and the banishment or elimination of the tyrant,
Hsun-tze sees these as only minor or insignificant details.
D: HIS ILLUSTRATION OF A SAGE-KING AND A KINGLY GOVERNMENT
Hsun-tze's ideal king is a Sage-King who possesses three
extremes as mentioned in chapter XVIII:
'A king's task is the heaviest, he must be
extremely strong to be competent for such a position;
it is the most important, he must be extremely good at
discrimination and evaluation properly to see his duty;
and it is the most varied, he must be extremely brilliant
to harmonize the masses. Unless he is a Sage, he can
never perfect these three extremes.' (XII, 7)
It is apparent that Hsun-tze considers that only a Sage can be a
Sage-King.
As to a more practical picture of Hsun-tze's ideal
government or a kingly government, he suggests 'the perfected
policy of a Confucianist', which is discussed in chapter XI:
'A Confueianist . . . must perfect his policy.
His court must exert every effort to know the rites and
righteousness and to discriminate between the noble and
the humble, if it does so, then the soldiers will all
value integrity and be prepared to die for their country;
his hundreds of officials must be organized in a uniformed
system, their ranks must be respected and their salaries
increased; if so, then they will all fear the laws and
obey orders; the customs and markets must be checked but
without imposing taxation, the judges and the laws must
put down evil doers and not follow them; if so, then all
the merchants and businessmen will become honest and pru¬
dent and they ,will trade without fraud; all the workers
must cut the wood in good time, the government must delay
the deadline in order to allow them to make full use of
their skills and techniques, if so, then they will all
become honest and trustworthy, and their products will not
be of low quality and not durable. In the villages and
remote places, the taxes must be reduced, the levy on pro¬
ducts such as knives and cloths must be reduced, corvee
must be kept to the minimum, and must not interrupt the
farming seasons, if so, then all farmers will work
diligently and no one will hide his capability. If the
soldiers respect integrity and are prepared to die for
their country, then the army will be strengthened. If
the hundreds of officials fear laws and obey orders, then
the country will be stabilized and will not become chaotic.
If the merchants and businessmen are honest and prudent
and not fraudulent, then the trade will be stable and the
currency will be circulated and the country will be self-
sufficient. If the hundreds of workers are honest and
trustworthy and their products are not of low quality and
are durable, then utensils will be ingenious and useful
and the currency will not become short. If the farmers
work diligently and do not hide their capability, then
above, the seasons of Heaven will not be missed, and below,
the profits of the earth will not be lost, while in the
middle, the harmony between men will be achieved and human
activities will not be interrupted. This will mean that
policy and orders are executed and customs are refined.
If a king keeps to such a policy, he will achieve stability;
if he uses it to quell rebels, he will strengthen his power;
if he keeps to defence, he will gain fame and name; and
whatever he does, will achieve merits. This is what a
Confucianist calls "the perfected policy".' (VII, 14)
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The appearance of a Sage-King is described in
chapter XII:
'A king observes without seeing, apprehends
without listening, knows without considering, achieves
merit without moving; he alone sits there and the whole
world as a body obeys him just as the four limbs follow
the Mind. This is called the great appearance (of the
king).' (VIII, 5)
When a king obtains such a 'great appearance', Hsun-tze considers
that his policy and educational influence on his people will reach
to the highest success; thus Hsun-tze says in chapter XV:
'The people follow him like running water.
Wherever he stays, he brings peace and control; whatever
he does, he influences and relieves his people. Those
who are tyrannical, fierce and mighty are changed into
the sincere and virtuous; those who are narrow-minded,
evil, biased and selfish are changed into the fair and
just; those who are quick-tempered and perverse are
changed into the harmonious. This is called the great
influence and the ultimate unification.' (X, 12)
In short, Hsun-tze's ideal policy is an effective moral education
and moral influence from the Sage-King to the masses.
Hsun-tze also suggests that the key policy of a Sage-King
is to act in accordance with rites and propriety. In chapter XII,
he says:
'"Please tell us about the way of a king". I
answer: he should discriminate and administer according
to rites . . . The way of employing an official is to
examine him by means of rites.' (VIII, 2)
From this, it is evident that Hsun-tze always considers rites to be
the most essential word in the king's moral-cultivation and policy-
framing. In chapter XIX, entitled 'Discussion of Rites', he says:
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•Rites are the culmination of the Ultimate
Principle of Man.' (XIII,5)
Rites assist the development of the Way of the Mind from an
ordinary man to a Sage, and complete the policy of a Sage-King,
therefore Hsun-tze always lays emphasis on the importance of rites
in its function as regards the individual as well as in politics.
The ideal policy of Hsun-tze is a ritual administration, and his
political theory is an advocation of the administration of a
Sage-King or a kingly policy.
SECTION 2: THE THEORIES OF THE WAY OF OFFICIALS
Hsun-tze devotes quite a large space in his book to
discussing the way of a king; yet he also extends to a certain
length the discussion of the way of officials. He mentions the
integrity of a prime minister, a general and officials and his
descriptions are concrete and detailed. Hsun-tze's suggestions
about the way of officials in general are twofold, namely: to
serve the king with absolute loyalty and obedience, and to attend
the people with love and protection, which latter point is not des-
cribed in great detail while the former is mentioned repeatedly. The
contents of his discussion can be divided into two parts: (1) the
virtue of officials, and (2) the capability of officials.
A: HIS DISCUSSIONS OF THE VIRTUE OF OFFICIALS
There are many passages in his book devoted to this
subject. Briefly, Hsun-tze's ideal official is a Sage-official
whose virtue should be that of a Sage.
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(i) Moral-cultivation
In chapter VI, Hsun-tze says:
'He (the official) is in a high position,
honoured and respected, yet he does not therefore
show haughtiness to others; he is sagacious, virtuous
and intelligent, yet he does not therefore make others
embarrassed; he is agile, nimble and energetic, yet
he is not on that account anxious to be ahead of others;
and he is tough, determined and brave, yet he does not
nevertheless hurt others. When he does not know, he
asks; when he is not able to do, he learns; even if he
is able, he is always moderate; then he is said to have
virtue. When he encounters the king, he performs the
duty as the king's subject or official; when he encount¬
ers villagers, he performs the duty of seniority and
juniority in age or generation; when he encounters
elders, he performs the duty of the younger; when he
encounters friends, he performs the duty of courtesy and
modesty; and when he encounters the young inferiors, he
performs the duty of correcting, advising, instructing
and forgiving. There is no one he does not love and
respect; he does not fight for anything with others;
and his Mind is as magnanimous and extensive as Heaven
and earth which monopolize all things. If he is so,
then the capable and virtuous will honour him, and the
ordinary people will love to be intimate with him.'
(III, 11)
This is Hsun-tze's ideal or standard of mcral-cultivation of an
official as an individual; and in fact, his description is quite
similar to that of a Sage. In other passages in his book, he
frankly reveals that his ideal official is a Sage-official. (IX, 1)
(ii) Loyalty
In chapter XIII, entitled 'The Way of Officials', there
is a passage which Hsun-tze particularly devotes to the discussion
of the loyalty of officials to the king. He considers loyalty to
be one of the essential virtues of an official. In that chapter,
he divides loyalty into three categories in contrast with rebelliousness
as follows:
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'To protect, benefit, and influence his king
with his virtue, this is great loyalty; to adjust,
regulate and assist the king with his virtue, this
is secondary loyalty; to admonish the wrong-doing
of the king with reason and to complain and be
resentful if the admonition is not accepted; this
is the lowest grade of loyalty; not to be concerned
about the honour and disgrace of the king, not to be
concerned about the good or bad of the country, to
avail himself of leisure times, to flatter and be
obsequious, to enjoy ease without regard to principle
and to cheat, only to receive official pay in order
to keep one's living, and to entertain guests and
visitors, this is rebelliousness.' (IX, 4)
(iii) Other necessary virtue
In chapter VII, Hsun-tze discusses the necessary virtue
of an official:
'If the king honours and respects him, he should
be serious, reverent and deferential; if the king
trusts and favours him, he should be serious-minded,
prudent and modest; if the king especially appoints
him (to take up an important task), he should hold fast
to it carefully and devotedly and complete it success¬
fully; if the king likes to be intimate with him, he
should keep company with the king and yet he should not
flatter him; if the king alienates him, he should keep
his loyalty and should not renounce the king; and if
the king criticizes him unfavourably and dismisses him,
he should be fearful and worried but he should not
resent it. Even though he is highly-placed and eminent,
he is not wasteful and extravagant; even though he is
trusted, he will not put himself in a compromising posit¬
ion; even though he shoulders an important role, he is
not dictatorial; even though wealth and profit run his
way, he always considers that he is not good enough to
gain them and he must do his best to avoid their accept¬
ance unless they are necessary. When luck comes, he is
cairn and rational; when disaster comes, he is clear-
minded, composed and rational; if he is rich, he gives
favours to others widely; if he is poor, he cuts his
own expenses; he can live in a position noble or infer¬
ior, wealthy or poor, yet he is prepared to be killed
but he cannot be forced to perform evil deeds. This is
the way for an official to gain the favour of a king, to
maintain his position and to keep to it through his whole
life without tiring of it . . . If he seeks for a way
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which assists him to be good at staying in a high
position, managing important duties, being in the
favour of the king of a country of ten thousand
1 7
chariots and which assures him of having no dis¬
astrous aftermath, then there is no better way than
to be willing to be associated with other men, help¬
ing and recommending the capable and virtuous,
relieving the masses with liberal aid, removing the
resentment of others and refraining from harming or
interfering with others. If his ability is good
enough to be employed, he should serious-mindedly
and prudently practise this way; if his ability is
not good enough to be employed, and he is worried
that he will lose the favour of the king, then there
is no better way than as soon as possible to share
his power with others, exalting the capable and
virtuous, abdicating to the able, and feeling at
ease to follow after them. If he is like this, when
he is favoured,then he will certainly achieve honour;
when he loses ,favour, he will certainly not be
accused of misdeeds. This is the golden law of
serving the king and the way to ensure that there is
no disastrous aftermath ... To honour and respect
is the first step, to be loyal and trustworthy is the
highest virtue, to act with caution and serious-
mindedness, to maintain these principles with dignity
and honesty; and in the moment of hindrance and
poverty, to struggle again and again with diligence,
exertion and determination in order to appeal and
make preparations for a comeback. Even though the
king does not know him, he has no resentment and
hatred; even though his achievement is quite great,
his face betrays no pride; he eagerly seeks occasions
for rendering distinguished service, and his love and
respect is never weary; if he is like this, there is
never anything that does not go smoothly for him. By
means of this, if he serves the king, he will certainly
have dignity and eminence; if he practises Human-
Mindedness, he will certainly become a Sage; this is
the art of living in the world.' (Ill, 15-17)
In short, the essential virtue of an official is no less than that
of a Sage; or in other words, an official should be a Sage. And
no matter whether he is a king or an official, he should Hsun-tze
claims, take this opportunity to project his virtue as a Sage right
down to the masses.
17. ^ Wan-Ch'eng-Chih-Kuo. In the period of the
Chou Dynasty, a king had ten thousand or more chariots at his command,
a feudal prince a thousand; this was a way to classify their
authorities, so a country of ten thousand chariots indicates an empire.
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B: HIS OPINION ON THE CAPABILITY OF AN OFFICIAL
The capability of an official is measured and thus
classified by Hsun-tze for the reference of the king. In
chapter XIII, he classified officials into four categories, namely;
the feigned official, the usurping official, the meritorious offic-
18
ial, and the Sage-official . He says:
'If inside the country, he is not good
enough to unify the people, outside the country,
he is not good enough to resist difficulties, if
the people are not intimate with him, and the
feudal princes do not trust him, and he is cunning,
clever, obsequious and flattering, and he is good
at gaining fayour of his superiors, he is a feigned
official. If on one hand, he is not loyal to the
king, and on the other, he is good at fishing for a
good reputation and publicity by flattering the
people, if he is not concerned about general
principles and constant rules, if he constitutes
cliques or personal parties and joins with others
to surround the king so as to gain personal profit,
he is an usurping official. If inside the country,
he is good enough to be employed to unify the people,
outside the country, he is good enough to resist
difficulties, if the people are intimate with him
and the officials trust him, if on one hand he is
loyal to the king, and on the other, he loves the
people without feeling weary; he is a meritorious
official. If on one hand, he is able to honour the
king, and on the other, he is able to love the masses,
if his policy is carried out and his instruction is
influential, and he himself is an example or model whom
the people follow like his shadow, if he deals with
sudden changes as effectively and speedily as the echo
follows the call, if he looks into the codification of
laws and applies precedents to new situations and thus
completes the revision and creation of institutions
and laws, then he is a Sage-official. Thus the one
who employs a Sage-official will become a king, the
one who employs a meritorious official will become
strong, the one who employs an usurping official will
bring the country into danger and the one who employs
a feigned official will cause decay.' (IX, 1)
18. /vJ* f^~ T ' ai-Ch 10n , £ £ Ts'uan-Ch'en,
Kung-Ch'en, Sheng-Ch'en.
146
In chapter III, Hsun-tze divides officials into four
groups as follows:
'If on one hand, he is able to honour the king,
on the other, he is able to love people, if things
approach, he can respond and deal with them, if when
events originate, he can manage and overcome them,
thus he can be said to be a clear and logical official.
If he does not alienate his inferiors in order to fool
his superiors, and he does not join with his superiors
to do harm to his inferiors, if in disputes he remains
neutral and he does not harm others with a personal
grudge, then he can be said to be a fair official.
If his merits are not known to his superiors or the
king, he will not resent it; if his shortcomings are
not known to his superiors or the king, he will not
secretly consider it fortunate, if he does not cover
up or disguise his shortcomings or merits and reveals
himself with the true facts and statements, then he
can be said a candid official. If he insists on
trustworthiness in his casual speaking, and insists on
serious-mindedness in his casual behaviour, if he shuns
following popular worldliness and he shuns considering
what he alone sees is right, then he can be said to be a
cautious official.' (II, 5)
These qualities of four groups of officials are what Hsun-tze
considers to be the basic qualities of an ordinary official.
A great Confucianist is, to Hsun-tze, a Sage, and a
Sage as an individual is high above all men and a Sage as an official
leader, i.e. a king or a ruler, or an official of high-position to
assist the king, is also high above all officials. In chapter VIII
he says:
'If his will is refined and restrained, then he
is able to be fair and just; if his behaviour is liberated
from passion, then he is able to cultivate himself; if he
is clever and inquisitve, then he is able to become vers¬
atile; if he is fair and just, self-cultivated and
versatile in his abilities, then he can be said to be a
147
moderate Confucianist. If his will is content with
what is fair and just, in his behaviour he is satisfied
with self-cultivation, his knowledge is clear and logical
and all-embracing, then he can be called a great
Confucianist. A great Confucianist can be a king or one
of the three prime ministers. A moderate Confucianist
can be a feudal prince or an official or a Scholar.'
(IV, 13)
In chapter XIII, entitled 'The Way of Officials',
Hsun-tze defines a series of terms related to the capability or
qualities of an official; he says:
'To obey orders and that which is advantageous
to the king is called obedience; to obey orders and
that which is,disadvantageous to the king is called
flattery; to disobey orders and that which is advanta¬
geous to the king is called loyalty, to disobey orders
and that which is disadvantageous to the king is called
usurpation . . . When the king commits mistakes in
plans and deeds, which might have the fearful possibility
of endangering the country and being harmful to society,
an official of high rank or one of the seniors in the
king's family can offer advice to the king and if the
king accepts it, he stays; if the king does not accept
it, he leaves; this is called admonition. If the
official is able to offer advice to the king and if the
king accepts it, he stays; if the king does not accept
it, he commits suicide; this is called struggle. If
the official is able to unite the wise and the powerful
and to lead all the other officials to force the king
and to correct him, so that even though the king is
uneasy, he has to listen and thus a great calamity to
the country is averted and a great danger is dispelled
and the honour of the king and peace of the country is
finally achieved, this is called assistance. If an
official is able to resist the orders of the king, to
employ important officials of the king in an unauthor¬
ized way, to oppose the king's conduct and thus dispel
the danger to the country and remove the disgrace of
the king, and this is sufficient to bring great advant¬
ages to the country; this is called expedient aid.
Thus the one who presents admonition, struggle, assist¬
ance and expedient aid is a servant of the society and
a treasure of the king. He should be honoured and
greatly favoured by a clever king, yet he may be
considered to be a rebel by a foolish and confused king.'
(IX, 2-3)
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In Hsun-tze's view, admonition, struggle, assistance
and expedient aid are also the qualities of the Sage-official.
As to the way of giving service to the king, Hsun-tze's
opinion on this subject is also outstanding. In chapter XIII,
he says:
'To honour, respect and be moderate; to obey,
follow and be flexible in carrying out orders, to shun
arbitrary decision and choice, to shun taking or giving
personal favours, and to obey the words of superiors as
though they were one's own wishes; this is the principle
of serving the Sage-King. To be loyal and trustworthy
and not to flatter, to admonish and struggle and not
toady, to be fortitudinous and determined, to be upright
and not be swayed, to say what is right is right and what
is wrong is wrong; this is the principle of servicing
an ordinary king. To be harmonious yet not to follow
worldliness, to be tender yet not to bend, to forgive yet
not to cause disorder, to explain the Ultimate Principle
of Man which harmonizes and adjusts all things, and to be
able to influence and change the Nature of the king and
always be able to advise and persuade him and help him to
return to a proper path; this is the principle of serving
a tyrant. It is just like governing an untrained horse,
nursing an infant or feeding a hungry man. He (the
official) seizes the moment when the tyrant is frightened,
then corrects his mistakes; when the tyrant is worried,
he then changes his Nature; when the tyrant is happy, he
then directs him to the Ultimate Principle of Man; when
he is angry, he then relieves his resentment; and he does
his best to be successful in these things.' (IX, 3-4)
Therefore only a Sage-official is suitable for and capable of such a
task.
In his theory of the Way of the official, Hsun-tze
particularly lays emphasis on the virtue and capability of officials.
He considers that the virtue of an official on one hand can influence
and change the king, and on the other can teach and nourish the
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masses, and that the capability of an official is to be able to
respond to and deal with the changes of any situations and to be
able to implement the policy and unify the nation. Thus on one
hand he can honour and add glory and grace to the king, or assist
him, and on the other he can protect the masses. If the country
is in the hands of a Sage-King and Sage-officials, then the country
will, Hsun-tze believes, be peaceful, strong, and wealthy.
SECTION 3: THE THEORIES OF THE WAY OF THE MASSES
In his book, Hsun-tze has left very little information
about his opinions on the masses in politics. He mentions, how¬
ever, the relationship between the king and his people, and also
gives some descriptions of the masses.
A: HIS DISTINCTION OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE KING
AND HIS PEOPLE
There are obvious differences in the political relationships
between the king and his people in Hsun-tze's theory. He suggests
two as follows.
(i) The Heavenly God and men or the parent and his children
Hsun-tze compares the relationship of the king to his
people to that of Heavenly God to men and a parent to his children.
It is necessary to explain that the term 'Heavenly God' which he uses
does not mean that he, having just opposed superstitious belief of
Heaven, has now returned to it; he uses this simile to follow the
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prevailing custom so as to help to illustrate his ideas. This
description is given in chapter X:
•To master ten thousand changes, to judge all
things, to nourish all people and at the same time
also to administer the whole world; there is no one
better than a Human-Minded Man. For his knowledge
and Deliberation is sufficient to administer the
world, his Human-Mindedness and sincerity is suffic¬
ient to calm the world, and his virtue and saying are
sufficient to influence and change the world. If
the world has him, then it will be under control; if
it loses him, it will become chaotic. The masses are
certainly dependent on his wise Deliberation, there¬
fore they themselves lead one another to work hard for
him in order to ensure his leisure so that he can
nurture and discipline his wisdom. They certainly
praise his Human-Mindedness, therefore they render
service at the cost of their lives, and sacrifice them¬
selves determinedly for him in order to protect and
save him so that he can nurture and cultivate his
Human-Mindedness. They certainly love his virtue,
therefore they cut and polish, engrave and carve, sew
and embroider, compose and write for him in order to
honour him and ornament his life so that he can nurture
and cultivate his virtue. Therefore if a Human-Minded
man is in the highest position, the masses will honour
him as the Heavenly God, and be intimate with him as a
parent, they render service at the cost of their lives
and are willing to sacrifice themselves for him and
they feel happy to do so, There is no other reason
for this except what they consider right really is very
fine, what they gain really is great and the benefits
they obtain are many.' (VI, 4)
It is evident- that Hsun-tze considers that the reason
for the hard work, sacrifices, offers of tribute and contribution
of the people for the king is simply because they love, admire and
adore him for his virtue and wisdom. And thus the relationship
between the masses and their king to Hsun-tze are like a flock of
innocent sheep following their shepherd or an infant wanting its
mother.
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(ii) Virtue and labour
In chapter X, Hsun-tze says:
'A Conscientious Man rules with his virtue,
and the masses serve with their labour. The labour
is the service due to the virtuous. The labour of
the masses depends on (the virtue and ability of the
Sage-King) to achieve merits; the group life of the
masses depends on it to obtain harmony; their wealth
depends on it to be accumulated; their condition
depends on it to obtain stability; and their life
depends on it to enjoy longevity. Thus the fathers
and sons must be intimate with one another; the
seniors and juniors must yield to one another; and
the men and women must be happy and harmonious with
one another. And thus the youngsters can be brought
up, and the aged can be supported and cared for.
Therefore I say: The Heaven and earth give birth to
the masses and the Sage perfects them.' (VI, 4-5)
It is evident here that Hsun-tze considers that the
virtue of the Sage-King and the labour of the masses are compliment¬
ary to each other and at the same time constitute an ideal world, or
rather, ideal politics. According to Iisun-tze's theory, on one
hand the Sage-King contributes his virtue and capability to rule, to
administer, to influence and to nourish his people and to have them
perfected and on the other, the people should offer their labour to
carry out the policy of the Sage-King in order to show their obed¬
ience, loyalty and trust as well as to work for their king's
necessities of life in order to relieve him from extra labour and to
express their love, admiration and adoration for him. This is a
supplementary theory to his saying that the relationship between a
king and his people is like that between Heavenly God and men and the
parent and his children.
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From the above, it is seen that the theme of Hsun-tze's
political theory is personality-administration or more precisely,
virtue-administration. Personality-administration is a government
brought about by virtuous ruler(s) or in Hsun-tze's term the 'Sage-
King'. To Hsun-tze, the ideal government is that which is ruled
by a host of Sage-officials led by a Sage-King, which may be con¬
veniently called 'the government of the Sages'; and to the ideal
relationship between the king and the people, which can be conven¬
iently termed 'the relationship between the Sages and non-Sages.'
B: HIS OPINION ON THE VIRTUE AND ABILITIES OF THE MASSES
Not much has been said by Hsun-tze on this subject
except a few words in passages seen at scattered places. In
chapter VIII, he mentions the ordinary man or the worldly man in
contrast with the worldy Confucianist, the Conscientious
Confucianist and the Great Confucianist. He says:
'He who does not know how to learn and to ask,
does not have proper and righteous conduct and he who
considers wealth and profit to be the ultimate in life
is an ordinary man or a worldly man.' (IV, 9)
In the same chapter, he also mentions the masses as
follows:
'His will is inevitably biased and selfish, yet
he expects others to think that he is fair and just;
his behaviour is inevitably reckless and uncontrolled,
yet he expects others to think that he is cultivated
and moral; his foolishness and innocence makes him
deeply confused and feeble-minded, yet he expects
others to think that he is wise and learned; he is a
common man, one of the masses . . . The masses are
to work as workers, farmers, merchants and businessmen.'
(IV, 12)
154
To Hsun-tze, the moral status of the masses is that
of a Mean-Spirited Man, and their social status or political status
are the components of the lower classes in the division of labour in
their country.
In chapter VIII, Hsun-tze mentions the virtue of the
masses as follows:
'To think that following the custom is good,
commodities and currency are treasures, regimen and
personal interest are the highest principles of life;
this is the virtue of the masses.' (IV, 6)
It is reasonable to believe tnat the words 'the virtue
of the masses' used by Hsun-tze means simply 'the common character¬
istic or qualities of the ordinary people', and it does not carry
the meaning of 'virtue in a moral sense such as the virtue of perform¬
ing what is morally good and avoiding what is morally evil'. In
other words, the 'virtue' and abilities of the masses are, in
Hsun-tze's view, always in the lowest of classes in morality as
well as in politics, or broadly speaking, society.
In chapter XII, there is a passage in which Hsun-tze
describes his ideal man in a family role:
'When asked about the way of being a father, I
say: one should be lenient, kind and polite. When
asked about the way of being a son, I say: one should
respect, adore and be extremely obedient. When asked
about the way of being an elder brother, I say: one
should be benevolent, loving and friendly. When asked
about being a younger brother, I say: one should respect,
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be moderate and should not be arrogantly impolite.
When asked about being a husband, I say: one should
be extremely gentle, joyful and should not have become
licentious, one should also be easily approachable and
yet should know the different duties of husband and
wife. When asked about being a wife, I say: if the
husband is polite, one should be tender, keep company
with and listen to and attend on him; if the husband
is impolite, one should fear him and keep him at a
respectable distance.' (VIII, 2)
Hsun-tze thus suggests a brief outline of individual
moral duties or virtue, which can also be considered to be his
suggestion of the ideal virtue of man, as a member of society.
However, anyone who< is able to perfect such virtue is already a
Conscientious Man, or a Sage.
Hsun-tze's impression of the masses in general is that
of the Mean-Spirited Man, while his ideal model of man in society
is still a Sage.
SECTION 4: THE THEORY OF IDEAL SOCIETY
A: HIS OPINION ON DIVISION OF LABOUR
In chapter X, Hsun-tze considers that in the division of
labour, the ruling class should serve with virtue and the masses
should serve with work or labour. He says:
'The way of making the whole world to be economically
sufficient is to discriminate the various duties. To meas¬
ure the land and make clear the boundary, to cut the weed
and to cultivate the crops, to apply sufficient fertilizers
and to keep the land well-fertilized; this is the work of
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the farmers, the masses and the ordinary man. To
observe the time and seasons and to encourage the
people, to promote business and to improve results,
to harmonize and unify the masses and to prohibit
people from becoming lazy; this is the business of
officials. To keep the high lands free from drought,
and the lower lands free from flood, to let the work
of winters and summers be adjusted and be appropriate
and the five crops ripen in time; this is the busi¬
ness of Heaven and earth. However, to serve, to
protect and nourish the whole world, to serve and
love the whole world, to serve, conquer and administer
the whole world; when in the year of famine, mis¬
fortune, flood and drought, to enable the masses to
survive the disasters of severe cold and hunger; this
is the business of the Sage-King and the virtuous and
capable prime ministers.' (VI, 5)
In other words, tho masses should contribute their labour to raise
productivity, the officials should keep business going and going
well, and the Sage-King and his high-ranking officials should direct
the business to a proper path, make over-all plans, take care of and
benefit their people. This is the idea of a centralized government
ruled by the Sages, which Hsun-tze considers would benefit society
most aUat, and his scheme of division of labour is the initial
step to his ideal society.
B: HIS IDEAL SOCIETY - AN ULTIMATELY FAIR SOCIETY
In chapter IV, Hsun-tze says:
'The ancient kings established rites and
righteousness to classify men, thus allowing men to
have different ranks from the noble to the lowly, dis¬
crepancies between seniority and juniority, distinctions
between the wise and the innocent, the capable and the
incapable. All these were in order to enable people to
obtain their respective occupations and to gain their
appropriate rewards, and then to let the more or less,
the increasing or decreasing of official salaries be
regularized; this is the principle of harmony and unity
in social life. Therefore if a Human-Minded man is in
a high position, then the farmers will put the fields to
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full use with their labour, the businessmen will put
the currency into full use with their clever observ¬
ation and investigation, all sorts of workers will
put the implements and tools to full use with their
techniques; from officials in general onwards, up to
prime ministers and feudal princes all will put their
official duties into full play with their kindness,
sincerity, wisdom and capabilities; this is called
Ultimate Fairness1®.' (II, 13)
The ideal society, or the society of Ultimate Fairness
is, according to Hsun-tze, that in which all men are occupied in
work which is most suitable to their capabilities, and in which all
men receive the most appropriatefpay mmmmHMf to their contribut¬
ion to society. The term 'Ultimate Fairness' used here should
mean the fairness as to man's capability as well as to his salary,
and furthermore, to his position in society. It is only the Sage-
King, according to Hsun-tze, who can complete such a task; to
measure the virtues and capabilities of man and to give him 1m a
suitable place in society, and it is only by means of rites that a
Sage-King can fulfil such a task. That is to say: after the
measurement, the Sage-King offers man an appropriate position and
treats him with related rites and pays him with the salary fixed
by the regulations of RITES or YI LI, and on the other hand, that
man can enjoy what is offered to him according to the regulations
20
of RITES such as the style of clothing, food and pay, office and
residence, and style and amount of chariots and horses, etc. For
this reason, the foundation of the Ultimately Fair society is
established on rites. In chapter VIII, Hsun-tze says:
19. JL Chih-P ' ing.
20. In ancient China, officials were paid partly with rice and
partly with currency.
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'Rites are the principle of the king to measure
the merit or defects of his officials and the classifi¬
cations of men are all included and completed in them.'
(IV, 13)
Thus to understand whether an official has fulfilled
his duties, a king can, Hsun-tze suggests, examine whether the
behaviour and speech of that official have been according to the
regulation of RITES and to the spirit of righteousness. If in
the country, all men including the king, officials and the masses
practise the principle of rites and righteousness, or more
precisely, the Way of a Sage, then Hsun-tze's ideal society may
be realized. Thus in chapter XII, Hsun-tze says:
'When asked about the way of a king, I say:
classify and administer by means of rites, evenly,
uniformly and not with bias. When asked about the
way of being an official, I say: serve the king
with rites, be loyal and obedient and not neglectful.'
(VIII, 2)
Hsun-tze proceeds to his suggestions on the way of
being a father, a son, a husband and a wife, by means of various
forms of rites, quoted earlier in this section. In chapter IX,
entitled 'The Constitution of a Kingly Government', he says:
'If there is no Conscientious Man, then the world
will not be administered, and there will be no uniform¬
ity in rites and righteousness. If on one hand, there
are no rites and righteousness among the king and teach¬
ers, and on the other, there are no rites and righteousness
among father and son, this is called the utmost chaos.
Rites and righteousness of the king and officials, father
and son, the elder and younger brothers, the husband and
wife, are, from the beginning to the end, and from the end
to the beginning, the same principle as that of Heaven and
earth, and will endure for ten thousand generations; this
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is the great foundation. Thus the same truth is
in the practices of funeral services, the sacrifices
offered to gods or the deceased, official intercourse
among feudal princes and the armies in military affairs;
thus is the same principle in the classification of the
noble and the lowly, the use of capital punishment and
reprieve!and the punishment of depriving man of his
civil rights; thus is the principle by which king
should be a king, officials should be officials, fathers
should be fathers, sons should be sons, elder brothers
should be elder brothers, and younger brothers should
be younger brothers, and thus is the same principle by
which farmers should be farmers, scholars should be
scholars, workers should be workers and merchants
should be merchants.' (V, 7)
To Hsun-tze, the truth and principle which has existed
and will exist eternally is that of rites and righteousness. In
chapter XXI, he concludes his theories of his thought in the
following lines:
'To be a Sage is to perfect thoroughly the
duties in human relationship and to be a king is to
perfect thoroughly the duties of social institutions.
If one has perfected these two, one will have
sufficient to reach perfection in the world.' (XV, 9-10)
To be a Sage is the core of Hsun-tze's moral philosophy,
and for a country to be administered by a Sage-King is the core of
his political philosophy. He lays emphasis on a Sage-King
administering his country by perfecting the duties of social insti¬
tutions or by following the principle of rites and righteousness,
so that the external behaviour of the individual in society will
be regulated and restrained. However, according to Hsun-tze,
rites are effective only in assisting man to promote the Mind to
a higher level of moral practice. As to the essence of morality,
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Hsun-tze always considers that the functioning of the Mind is
the most important factor. The Sage is the one who individually
perfects his virtue as a man and socially perfects the institution
of rites and righteousness. The principle of becoming a Sage is
applicable to all classes in society, therefore Hsun-tze uses the
sociological terms: king, official, father, son, elder brother,
younger brother, husband, wife, and also farmer, scholar, worker
and merchant for the purpose of making explicit that all these
names or terms must first be rectified; that is to say, a king
should behave as a king, an official should do what an official
should do and so on. As to the way of rectifying these names,
Hsun-tze suggests rites and righteousness. The society of
Ultimate Fairness, or a society of great propriety, is in fact
the final aim of his philosophy.
From the theories of Man's Evil Nature, Transformation
of Man's Nature, to the theories of the Way of the Mind which are
connected by the theories of knowledge and of Heaven and the
Ultimate Principle of Man, Hsun-tze surveys the moral duties of
man. As to his political theories, they are only an extension of
his theory of the Way of the Mind to the social duties of man.
In short, what Hsun-tze is concerned with is the establishment of
an ideal personality, or his ideal man, the Sage. However, his
theory of the society of Ultimate Fairness, or his ideal society
which is initially ruled by the Sage-King and in which finally all
men are Sages, brings an end to his philosophy. The chapters of
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PART II
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF HIS THEORIES
CHAPTER V:
CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF HUMAN
NATURE
SECTION 1: HIS THEORY THAT MAN' S NATURE IS EVIL
The original purpose of Hsun-tze's theory that Man's
Nature is Evil is to establish the theory of Transformation of Man's
Nature and that of Artifice, and then to develop the theory of the
Way of the Mind in order to introduce the stage of Sagehood. The
Evil of Man's Nature may not be the main emphasis of his philosophy.
However, since the theory forms part of the basis of his philosophical
system and since it has been a focus of dispute in the history of
Chinese thought, it seems necessary to first examine it in the
criticism of his theories of human nature.
A: HUMAN NATURE IS NOT A GOOD OR AN EVIL IN ITSELF
(i) The logical and linguistic traps in the theories of
innate goodness or innate evil of human nature
In the Pre-Ch'in Period, earlier or later than Hsun-tze,
or contemporary with him, there are five types of hypothesis on the
theory of human nature, namely:
(1) The theory which says that human nature is neither good (Shan)
1 2
nor not good (Pu Shan). This theory is put forward by Kao-tze .
1. 14 M -ir ^ 4- Hsing Wu Shan Wu Pu Shan, this statement
is recorded and discussed in MENCIUS, Chapter VI.
Kao-tze, a contemporary of Mencius. His discussions
with Mencius about human nature and the undisturbed Mind which are
recorded in MENCIUS, Chapter VI, are the sources one may find about
him and his thought.
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(2) The theory which claims that human nature has the
3
potentiality of realizing goodness (Shan) or non-goodness (Pu Shan)' .
(3) The theory that there is good (Shan) Human nature and
4
there is evil (Wu) human nature .
(4) The theory that human nature is innately good (Shan),
5
whose establishment is attributed to Mencius .
(5) The theory that Man's Nature is Evil (Wu), which is put
forward by Hsun-tze.
What these theories have in common is that they all
focus on the topic of whether human nature is good (Shan) or evil
(Wu). Since then, the later thinkers in their discussion of the
theory of human nature tend to limit the moral content of human
nature to good (Shan) and evil (Wu).
Some Chinese philosophers have discussed the good and
evil of human nature in terms of the following two sets of concepts:
(a) the essence, or the potentiality, or the spiritual aspect of
human nature. These are approaches to human nature that are pri¬
marily of non-empirical emphasis; and (b) the postnatal develop¬
ment, or the empirical reality, or the physical or biological state
of human nature. What they have in common is that they, as Chinese,
3. 14- "*J VA ^ 41- , ~llr , HsingK'ol Wei Shan,
K'o I Wei Pu Shan. This statement is also recorded in MENCIUS,
Chapter VI. but it is not known who proposed this argument.
4, 'fj -H; > ^ ; Yu Hsing Shan, Yu Hsing Wu. This
statement is also recorded in MENCIUS, Chapter VI, however the one
who suggested this theory is not stated.
5- 'life. "a." . Hsing Shan. Mencius gives his opinion on human nature
in Chapter II and VI. However, he never uses the term 'Hsing Shan'
or 'good human nature' although his theory implies this.
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show a traditional attitude of 'searching for practical solutions'
for the problems of the nature of human nature, i.e. no matter
what the nature of human nature is, moral-cultivation as well as
moral education or training is important. Although such a
conclusion is reached practically in order to solve the problem,
the premise is still a problematic one when one wants to determine
whether the nature of human nature is good or evil; and so in
the history of Chinese thought, arguments on this problem have
been and are still unceasing.
A one-sided or temporary solution of such a problem
may lie in the examination of the interpretation in which the term
'human nature' is used by the arguer, whether he speaks of human
nature in the sense of physical or biological life or experience,
or whether he speaks of it in the sense of its reason or rational
reflection as its essence, or potentiality or spiritual aspect.
After such an examination is made, the arguments may be dissolved
if different methods of thinking are recognized and accepted and
the focus of attention is redirected to the conclusions, not the
premises, of the problem, i.e. how can human nature, no matter how
one defines it, be trained or cultivated to realize or manifest
itself in the state of moral perfection? However, if one searches
more deeply into the source of the problem, one should not only
look at the interpretation of the term 'human nature', but also
consider whether it can have a moral content of either moral good
(Shan) or evil (Wu). If man naturally desires food when hungry,
warmth when cold, then the question is whether these natural
desires, or physical or biological desires can be distinguished as
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morally good or evil. One may see that these natural desires
themselves are neutral, or not a good or evil in themselves except that
when man gives free rein to them the intention and practice of giving
free rein may lead to evil activities and results. There are,
however, cases in which, even though man gives free rein to his
natural desires, his action may not be judged as morally evil.
Suppose that a man gives free rein to his desire for food and eats
excessively, as a result he gets fatter and fatter or he gets an
illness from being too fat, yet his desire and action and the result
of the action cannot be judged as morally good or evil at all.
Therefore, even if human nature is genuinely interpreted as the
manifestation of physical and biological life, it still may not
necessarily have such content as moral good or evil. If, taking
another example, a man desires to become wealthy, and he exhausts
all efforts, mentally and physically, to smuggle, to transport
illegal goods, to play tricks to gamble or to set traps to swindle
others, then can this worldy thinking or reflection be distinguished
as moral good or evil? In other words, if human nature is interpreted
as including the conscious reflection of the mind, then can human
nature be judged in moral terms? The answer is positive. When
conscious thinking is involved, personal choice and decision on a
moral activity may follow and morally good or evil consequences from
that activity may be distinguished.
In conclusion, there is nothing morally good or evil in
human nature itself, nor in the mind itself, yet in the moment when
conscious thinking 01- reflection is manifested, it immediately
decides the good or evil of man's behaviour.
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For the above reason, the statement that human nature
is necessarily morally good or evil has no philosophical value,
and any arguments about such a statement can only fall into
self-made traps.
(ii) The meaning of good (Shan) and evil (Wu)
The problem which an attempt has just been made to
solve, is that of whether human nature itself possesses a moral
content of good or evil. In answer, it is suggested that human
nature is obviously not good (Shan) or evil (Wu) in itself.
In fact, when one discusses morality, it is not enough
for one to observe morality occurring within the agent; one
should also notice and examine morality occurring in the activities,
mentally or physically, occurring in the relationship between or
among the agent and other people. In this stage, the conditions
of a moral activity may occur in the situations as follows:
(1) The subjective condition of a moral activity: That is
moral activity which is accomplished by man's internal moral conscious¬
ness to encourage the action of his external physical faculties.
'Moral Consciousness' here, means the internal awareness of the
necessity of morality in the individual as well as in society, and
an understanding of a subjective and objective need for moral practice.
Therefore it is not an innate knowledge of morality, nor is it an
organic or psychological faculty for the knowledge of morality.
It is rather, it may be suggested, an internal awareness of the
necessary existence of morality in the sense primarily of the concern
of the agent with the welfare of others and his respect for all
166
lives. It may manifest itself vaguely in a not well morally-trained
mind but distinctly in a rationally functioning mind which knows that
it must choose to do what is morally right or appropriate. There¬
fore 'moral consciousness' is a process of rational moral thinking
in the light of awareness of morality in the above-mentioned sense.
It is a guide to moral conduct and the source of moral activity.
For all men, whether or not they are morally trained, educated or
cultivated, their possession of moral consciousness must be a
distinctive character which differentiates them from other animals.
Every moral activity must be the responsibility, to a large extent,
of the moral consciousness of the individual, and the consequences
of the moral activity which is completed by the physical faculties
must also be dependant, to a certain extent, upon the physical
faculties of man. In short, all moral activities must be the
responsibility of the agent himself.
(2) The objective condition of a moral activity: The
moment in which a moral activity is necessarily possible, or when
the functioning of one's moral consciousness is needed may be
conveniently called the moral situation and is the objective condi¬
tion of a moral activity. For example, when a man is walking with
his friend along the street, chatting about some events in daily
life, he is not at all in need of exercising his moral consciousness.
Yet at the moment which needs his decision on a moral issue, for
instance, whether or not to rob a bank with his friend or to rescue
his friend from indulgence in alcohol, he must exercise his moral
consciousness in a morally distinctive way. One's moral consciousness
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should manifest itself and be exercised by the agent at the
necessary moment; however, there is not always a need for such
an exercise of the agent. In other words, moral good may be
attributed to the fact that while man's moral consciousness is
exercised at a proper time in a proper way, yet it does not follow
that when man's moral consciousness is exercised at an unsuitable
time yet a proper way, something which a morally serious man often
does, evil will occur.
It may be suggested that a moral judgement in this case
may therefore be based on the above two conditions. In other
words, the moral act which originates from man's moral consciousness
encouraging the physical faculties in a moral situation and its con¬
sequence are the objects of the moral judgement. The following
example may serve to explain the above suggestion. A man finds a
brief-case of money on a quiet road. At that moment several
considerations may flash through his mind as follows:
(1) He may think of the laws and customs that say 'to pick
up what others have lost and keep it as one's own is against the
law as well as customs', therefore he decides not to pick up the
money. If his decision is made for the fear of law and punishment,
then it has no merit of morality at all; if it is because he does
not want to flout the law or he shows his respect of the law, then
it may have the merit of social morality, which only identifies
moral activity with concern with and respect for the social laws
and customs. However, in both cases, it has no merit of morality
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in a strict sense. By morality in a strict sense, or ethical
morality, is meant the knowledge and practice of one's concern
with and respect for all lives, a rational and moral sensation
which springs genuinely from reflexive consideration of the
welfare of all lives, and which is separate from restraints of
social laws or national laws or customs.
(2) He may think: (a) if it were he himself who had lost
the money in the brief-case, no matter whether he were a million¬
aire or a penniless man, he would naturally hope that the lost
property would be returned to the owner; thus he reflects that
the owner who has lost the money will have the same wish; (b) if
the lost money is very important to the owner, then the possible
situation that he may not find it again will become a great loss
to him mentally and physically; (c) if he (the agent) picks up
the money, with such a large amount of money he will possibly
either survive hunger, or spend it as extra income or supplement
his own, or buy something which has been longed for, but if he had
not suddenly found this money, then he would have had to do some¬
thing to avert this crisis; and if he considers himself no
opportunist, then he should improve himself, strengthen himself
and renew himself in order to seek for his own survival or his own
needs and he should not be tempted by the present convenience.
With these trains of thought changed several times,
at this very moment of the situation of whether he ought to or
ought not to leave the money in the same place, and with consider¬
ations, setting aside the questions of social and national laws or
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traditional customs and starting genuinely from his concern with
and respect for the owner of lost money, he makes a decision, and
this decision is that of his moral consciousness. Thus his action
of picking up the money or not is a moral activity. In this
case, if a judgement is to be put on him, it should be founded on
judging both his thought and his action. The situation may be as
follows: (a) if his consideration tends to ethical morality and
his final decision is not to pick up the money, then his act can
be justified morally good; if he picks up the money and makes
every effort to return it to the owner, either through the police
or the press, then this should be considered another act of good;
(b) if his consideration tempts him to pick up the money and he
actually decides on it and eventually does it, then his act can be
said to be evil, morally and socially; and (c) if his consider¬
ation tempts him to pick up the money, but however he has no chance
of doing so either because of certain inconvenience such as
pedestrians approaching and passing or because the owner returns
searching for his lost brief-case, then although he does not perform
any external or visible evil deeds, his mind or thought has committed
it; in other words, his internal moral activity has committed evil.
There may be a case like the following in the same
example: the man who finds a brief-case of money on a quiet road
has suffered hunger for a while and obviously he cannot offer himself
food. A succession of thoughts flashes through his mind several
times and at last he decides to pick up the money and buy some food.
This can be explained by the fact that he is too hungry to consider
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morality. Yet viewed from another aspect, it can be said that
even if he does not get social benefits for some reason, he is
too lazy to work for his living or find a way, legally and morally,
to save him from starving. In a moral situation, if man's decision
is made genuinely according to his physical nature, then it is
because of his lack of cultivation and training of his 'moral
sentiment'. Moral sentiment, it may be suggested, is a non-
physical faculty, primarily a morally intuitive feeling, which
leads to the exercising of rational moral thinking of the moral
consciousness. Therefore his mind is, in Hsun-tze's term,
'obsessed', and his moral consciousness does not manifest itself.
When a man's moral consciousness does not manifest itself, it be¬
comes a failing of his consideration or thinking and consequently
affects his action; in other words, his action is blind and in
this case, his act, strictly speaking, has not much value in moral¬
ity. However, such a case cannot possibly occur; that is to say,
a man cannot have virtually no cultivation and training of his
moral sentiment, and his moral consciousness thus cannot have no
manifestation at all. The reason is that, viewed from an external
aspect, man must live in a society, and a society must have its
established laws and customs; one of the functions of a society
is not to restrain its citizens with laws and customs but to direct
and cultivate them with education, no matter what forms of education
it delivers to them; academic education, or social or custom norms,
for example. Therefore if there is a man who doep not know laws
and customs, it is the fault of society and its education. Viewed
from an internal aspect, man should absorb experiences of his own
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life and livelihood and knowledge of what he hears and sees and
he should internalize these experiences and knowledge within
himself in order to encourage the sentiments of either ethical
morality or at least of social morality. In other words, it is
necessary that every man must have some knov/ledge of morality as
his life in society develops. If a man says that he has never
heard of the restraint of law or customs or that he has never for
a moment been concerned about the welfare of other people or not
paid the least respect to other people, and tries to evade acting
morally or exercising his moral responsibility, he is either
consciously or unconsciously deceiving himself and deceiving others.
In either case, it is mainly his fault.
Kan gradually accumulates influences "by cultivating
and training his moral sentiment and developing a moral
conscieusness through good work. This is additional to the
educational merit provided "by society. Consequently, a
man cannot have no cultivation and training of his moral sentiment
and his moral consciousness cannot have no manifestation at all.
Morality in a strict sense, or ethical morality originates from the
consideration and decision of man's moral consciousness; and in
such a case moral judgement must be based on his consideration and
decision, and his action and its effect or consequence.
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moral judgement: moral activity and the effect or consequence of the action
Thus the meaning of moral good (Shan) and evil (Wu) can
be defined as follows: In a moral situation, when the decision of
man's moral consciousness encourages moral acts, good and evil can be
distinguished. Moral good, or Shan, is always, for the agent,
concern for the welfare of all life and the respect for all life
including persons, and his effor-ts in action to meet his ideal. For
the visible fact, a result of the agent's moral activity which shows
the virtue of his concern and respect and brings direct or indirect
advantages to the welfare of the recipient. Although the philo¬
sophical interpretations of the word 'good' have appeared to be a
semantic multiplicity, and the suggestion of 'concern' and
'respect' as good here does not necessarily displace the other notable
concepts of goodness, such as, for example, utilitarian goodness and
Hedonistic good. One cannot deny that almost all kinds of interpret¬
ations of the word 'good' have intrinsic connections. 'Concern' and
'respect' may be considered to be good as an end or terminal and
intrinsic good, which carry a utilitarian view of pursuing what is
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beneficial and avoiding what is harmful to the greatest number, and
may include also the Hedonistic view in the sense that concern and
respect for others' pleasure also brings pleasure to the agent.
Moral evil, or Wu, on the other hand, is always caused by the
excessive demand when considering the advantages for oneself and
harm to others and by the act that follows accordingly.
(iii) The idea of human nature as good or evil is mere belief
From the above argument it may be suggested that the
origin of moral good and evil lies in the decision of man's moral
consciousness and that moral judgement, if it is to be made, should
be based mainly on that decision. If human nature includes con¬
scious reflection, then it can be said that the conscious reflection
of human nature is the source of moral good or evil. However,
human nature itself cannot be seen as good or evil, nor can it be
said a good or evil in itself. It is only in its functioning that
one may see and say whether the resulting activity is morally good
or evil. If human nature is interpreted as a physical element of
life, then again it cannot be maintained that something inherent is
justified as morality. In other words, there is no good or evil in
human nature, and therefore to say that human nature is good or evil
is not correct.
One certainly cannot deny that all men have certain
inborn characteristics which some people such as Hsun-tze may directly
call 'human nature'. These basic inborn characteristics, such as
learning and exploratory behaviour, will be either more strongly
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manifested after years of formation and become one of the distinctive
characteristics of an individual, or differentiated in their develop¬
ment by great; changes of postnatal social and cultural
environment, learning and cultivation into several special characters
which may preserve some of their originality or which may almost
completely lose their traits. However, although these inborn
characteristics may be classified as good or bad in their qualities,
they are not a moral good or evil in themselves. Human nature is
a term which may also denote man's attributes in general. Different
philosophers of different centuries have given different interpret¬
ations to it. Some consider that human nature consists of psychological
attributes such as delight, anger, grief, joy, love, hatred, and
desires, including the physical desires for fame and profits, bio¬
logical desires for sexual activity, or desire for morality, etc.
As to the total content of these psychological attributes, it remains
a recurrent philosophical argument which has not yet, nor may it
ever, reach common agreement. Some philosophers also go on to
analyse the good or bad qualities of these psychological attributes
of human nature. However, their analysis should not become a moral
judgement. Some people, for example, tend to classify human nature
into two groups: inborn good qualities such as gentleness, quietness,
and inborn bad qualities such as greediness and emulativeness. How¬
ever, these classifications should only touch on the level of good
or bad qualities, and not that of moral good or evil. The reason
for this is that all men must understand what morality is before
they may act morally and their behaviour then may be justified as
morally good or evil. If seeing man's moral activities, one tries
to trace their source, and concludes that it is man's inborn
characteristic or human nature leading to his morally good or evil
act, this dogmatical conclusion may be charged with emotions either
too optimistic or too pessimistic, and these statements emerge with
little credit in moral philosophy.
In conclusion, it may be suggested that one should admit
that all men have basic inborn characteristics which are themselves
morally neutral, and the continuous development of these character¬
istics may become the postnatal psychological attributes which may
be distinguished as good and bad characteristics. If one wants to
trace the sources of man's acquired behaviour and tries to ascertain
that man may have good or bad potentialities, this is not badly
mistaken though it rather expresses a belief than a theory. How¬
ever, when a moral judgement is to be made upon man's moral conduct
one must only judge from the consideration, decision and action of
each moral activity.
Chinese scholars through the centuries have tended to
adopt theories that human nature is innately either good (Shan) or
evil (Wu), and they commit themselves to an endless argument. Some
of them further argue, adopting the theory suggested above, that the
origin of moral good and evil, viewed from the internal aspect of
the individual, is mainly in the moment of the decision of man's
moral consciousness. That is to say, the moral consciousness
within man is good and that it should follow that human nature is good^.
6. A typical example of this argument may be found in Prof. T'ang's
A TREATISE OF THE ORIGIN OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY - THE ORIGIN OF HSING.
Hong Kong, 1968, pp. 53-58.
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Such an argument leads itself back to the same old topic of the
dispute on human nature. It is obvious that the arguer pre¬
supposes that moral consciousness is within the essence and
potentiality of human nature and that moral consciousness is the
ultimate source of morally good conduct, therefore it is logical
to conclude that human nature is also morally good. Moral
consciousness itself, however, is neither morally good or evil, it
is only when in its functioning moral good or evil may emerge from
it. If the difficulties of this problem, which will be listed
below, are appreciated, then the dispute may possibly be brought
to an end.
(1) Two pairs of key moral concepts here appeal to be
brought forward for further clarification. They are Shan and Wu,
Hao and Huai. In Chinese, Shan may be defined as 'moral good,
intrinsic good, ultimate good, highest good or summum bonum', with
Wu as its opposite. Hao, though it has often been used as a
secondary or weak synonym to Shan, i.e. it carries a less serious
concern for morality than Shan, seems, at least for the present
purpose of investigation, to be distinguished as 'something good in
quality which, if related to morality, is an instrumental good, or
good-making characteristic', leading to the source or achievement
of Shan; and Huai is its opposite. However, these two pairs of
terms, particularly the term Shan, have been historically used with
extreme looseness mainly because philosophers, presupposing its
existence, made no further enquiry into its proper nature or con¬
tent and tend to take its meaning for granted. It is undeniably
true that some, if not most, Chinese moral concepts such as Jen and
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Shan are often loosely applied as if they were not designed for
conceptual investigation or analysis. They are rather sets of
intuitive, creative concepts and although it may be difficult, if
not impossible, to submit them to a universal test by common
empirical experience, are real and true in the inexhastive under¬
standing of different Chinese philosophers who claim to have
experienced them. The point is: since Shen and Hao are used
without discrimination, difficulties arise when, particularly in
moral discussion, there is a need to free them from their entangle¬
ments. It may therefore be suggested that Shan should be used in
r
a strict moral sense, while Hao may be applied in a sense including,
but wider than, morality. To avoid confusion one should say 'moral
good or evil' and 'good or bad characteristics'. Thus if one says
that moral consciousness is within man and such 'withinness' is
good, one is actually applying the concept of Hao and not that of
Shan. One would also agree that such 'withinness' lays the basis
for the source or achievement of Shan and it is itself not an ultimate
good but rather an instrumental good or a good-making characteristic.
Similarly, to say that human nature is good or bad in quality, or Hao
or Huai, for some provable reasons is acceptable; yet to say that it
is morally good or evil, or Shan or Wu, leads to the same difficulties
which have been repeatedly discussed above. Consequently, when one
says that human nature is innately good or evil, or Shan or Wu, one
may have used these terms inaccurately or incorrectly in a way which
does not concisely express what one wishes to say, or what one means
may be simply that human nature is in some way innately good or bad,
or Hao or Huai, in quality. This reveals a misuse of language.
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(2) The criterion of moral good and evil is often historically
obscure or improperly applied. If the theories that the origin of
moral good and evil is in the decision and action of moral conscious¬
ness and that moral judgement as to the case is founded on such a
principle are accepted, then the judging of moral good and evil will
certainly not be based on the essence or potentiality of human nature,
for the reason that when its essence and potentiality have not yet
revealed themselves and been realized, or the moral consciousness
has not yet manifested itself and the moral activity has not formed
and been performed, there is no way to see an act done and to judge
whether the act is morally good or evil. Therefore if one considers
that the moral consciousness within man is morally good, or Shan,
then one commits faults not only in the application of language but
also in logic. Similarly if one says that human nature is innately
good or evil, Shan or Wu, one commits the same mistakes.
The above are the difficulties of the propositions that
human nature is innately good or evil. It is clear that the descrip¬
tive statement that human nature is good or bad in quality, or Hao or
Huai, does nevertheless not express any ultimate moral appraisal of
human nature. Why then have Chinese scholars through the centuries
tended to subscribe to such theories? The answer is, because of
their beliefs. They may believe that nothing comes from nothing;
therefore there must be a concrete and reasonable origin of everything,
and they find it easier to say and believe that there is innate moral
good or evil in the nature of all men in order to go on to explain the
reasons why man's acts are morally good or evil. In other words,
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since there is good or evil in human nature, therefore there is,
they claim, good or evil realized in his act, or man's acting
morally or immorally is, more or less, caused by his innate nature.
It is no merit to disagree and argue against this for it is a
question of belief or a mind-comforting opinion. And since such
an opinion does not touch upon moral activity either internally
or externally, it is considered only a belief rather than a
philosophical statement and judgement.
(iv) The origin of moral value
r
It may be suggested that to say that human nature is
innately good or evil is a statement of belief. However, even
though the statement itself has committed mistakes in the use of
language and logic, Chinese scholars throughout the centuries have
never stopped expressing their recognition or approval of it.
After all, viewed from the standpoint of morality in a strict sense,
such a statement of belief cannot offer much as a contribution to
moral philosophy; that is to say, if moral value of man's activity
originates from his innate good or evil nature which may be realized
by means of man's cultivation and training, then the real value of
man's life is not distinct. That man is honourable and noble is
not merely and not necessarily in the possession of certain good
characteristics in his nature, or in the potentiality of certain
possible good tendencies in his nature. It is his continuously
making efforts in the processes of achieving moral good in himself
as well as in his action that makes him honourable and noble. In
other words, it is because man continuously practices the rational
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thinking of his moral consciousness and directs himself toward morality
that his moral value is revealed. Therefore the theory pre¬
supposing an a priori conviction that human nature is innately
good, does not reflect the dignity and nobility of man; nor does
it explain the real value of man's life. The origin of the moral
value is in the effort of his moral consciousness in making a proper
decision and action in a moral situation, and it is also in this
theory itself that one may find its necessary philosophical value.
To summarize the above, it may be suggested that the
statement that human nature is innately good or evil is a two-sided
linguistic and logical trap that brings endless arguments; that it
is a subjective belief of the individual; that the origin of good
or evil is in the decision and action of man's moral consciousness
in a moral situation; and that the moral value of man is in the
continuous efforts of deciding and practising his moral conscious¬
ness: these are the foundations of the examination and critique
of Hsun-tze's theories of human nature in the following pages.
However, it is not possible here, nor is it intended in this thesis,
to undertake an exhaustive investigation and clarification of moral
concepts. In this thesis, it is also intended to set aside the
problems of the detailed nature of human nature except to say that
human nature is morally neutral in terms of moral activity. There
may be many forms of 'perceptions' or viewpoints of the nature of
human nature, and the knowledge which one perceiver or viewer claims
may be as true as that of another, as each of them may have perceived
or viewed an aspect, or some aspects, of human nature in a different
light. The point is that the study of the nature of human nature
may serve as a reference to the study of moral philosophy. However,
without the former study, a study of moral philosophy is no less
possible and may be no less valid.
An attempt has been made to discuss the generation of
moral good and evil from the functioning of moral consciousness, to
distinguish the difference between the Chinese terms Shan and Hao,
or the moral good and the good quality, in order to build up, or at
least adumbrate an outlined structure of some important aspects of
moral philosophy sufficient for the purpose of making an examination
of Hsun-tze's theories of human nature.
7
Hsun-tze considers Man's Nature to be physical life
and thus concludes that it is Evil. However, as he clearly says
that Man's Nature is Evil, viewed from the system of his philosophy
and not from the purpose of his speech, his statement falls into a
self-made trap and he is speaking according to his belief regardless
of the linguistic and logical difficulties the statement may give
rise to. On the other hand, that he also clearly discerns the
function of the Mind and the merit of morally good Artifice and
recognizes that the necessary and continuous effort of performing
morally in order to become a Sage make parts of his theories accord,
to a certain extent, with the principles of moral philosophy
mentioned above. The Mind mentioned by Hsun-tze can be interpreted
as moral consciousness. Here, a few words to further explain the
7. For reference please see p.3.
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nature of moral consciousness may be needed. Moral consciousness
is, as suggested above, an awareness of morality which is, more or
less, primarily or partially intuitive. Nevertheless, the process
of exercising moral consciousness in a moral situation is often a
practice of human reason while the approach to the assumed existing
morality is rational thinking and behaving. However, it is perhaps
sufficient for the present purpose to call a halt to further concept¬
ual analysis. The point is, moral consciousness, or the Mind, in
Hsun-tze's terminology, is morally neutral and the fact that Hsun-tze
always assumes that the Mind itself must necessarily be a rational
one or its functioning must lead to a moral good, makes the theory
rather too biased and narrow.^ However, if he argues that Man's
Nature, or the psychological attributes of man's inborn characteristics
is of bad qualities, or Huai, because it lacks the good quality
of uprightness, reason, peacefulness and order, then this argument
is, though still disputable, not seriously wrong. However, his
insistence that Man's Nature is Evil, or Wu, is a confusion. On
the other hand, he considers that the postnatal or learned or
"to
cultural characteristics^which he gives the general name 'Mind',
t
always lead to a morally good result, whose functioning IS the
source of Deliberation and Artifice, and that postnatal moral evil
is caused by the Obsessions of the Mind. This is a dogmatic
radical analysis.
When Hsun-tze comes to explain the origin of human
moral acts, however, he indicates that morality is the result of
8. A further argument on this in pp.269-271.
man's conscious thought (Deliberation) and behaviour (Artifice) in
a moral situation: this is a correct viewpoint in moral philosophy.
However, (1) if Hsun-tze had not insisted that there
must be a strict difference (a) between Man's Nature and Artifice, and
(b) between Man's Nature and the Mind; (2) if he had not insisted
that Man's Nature is Evil and Artifice is good; and (3) if he
could have gone more deeply into the investigation of Artifice,
then he would have offered a greater contribution in moral philosophy.
In short, his theory that Man's Nature is Evil is that
of a subjective belief, which as a part of the structure of his
philosophy presents natural and obvious difficulties. However, in
his theories of human nature, the main emphasis is obviously given
to the theory of Transformation of Man's Nature and not to that
which maintains that Man's Nature is Evil, while in his philosophy
the emphasis is also given to the theory of the Mind and not to
that of human nature. In his philosophical structure, human nature,
placed in the lower level, is gradually cancelled in the higher
levels, and the process whereby the Mind exalts itself, level by
level, to its highest stage, i.e. a Sage Mind or an Ultimate Mind,
is what Hsun-tze attempts to establish (please see Appendix 3).
His theory that Man's Nature is Evil is a defect of his theory of
human nature; yet this should not greatly vitiate his contribution
as a whole to moral philosophy.
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B: THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE STRUCTURE OF HIS THEORY
THAT MAN'S NATURE IS EVIL
In accordance with the above discussion, it is suggested
that Hsun-tze's theory that Man's Nature is Evil is his subjective
belief, the use of which as a part of his philosophical structure
has its theoretical difficulties. In a detailed study of his
arguments of this theory, it is found that the words he uses are
often too forced and far-fetched to have the effect of logical
conviction.
In the'first paragraph of his argument, he tries to
prove Man's Evil Nature by observing that man's desires are always
evil. However, he does not make it clear how he determines that
these 'evil' desires, i.e. the fondness for profit, feelings of
envy and hatred, the desires of the eyes and ears and fondness for
beautiful sights and sounds, are definitely innate within Man's
Nature and not the conscious decisions and choices of the individual.
After all, these 'evil' desires mentioned may merely be bad (Huai)
qualities or characteristics of human nature, and should not be
counted morally evil, (Wu). If, however, there occurs a process
of decision and choice of 'following' and 'indulgence' in these bad
qualities of human nature in a moral situation, then the result of
man ' s mental or physical activity can be discerned to be morally evil.
In the third paragraph, Hsun-tze distinguishes strictly
the differences between Man's Nature and Artifice. This is a
crucial turning-point in his theories for with the notion of Artifice
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he may rescue himself from this extreme view on human nature.
However, he adheres too much to the points that (1) they are
necessarily different, and (2) that their difference lies only
between what is learnable and attainable and what is non-learnable
and non-attainable. Thus on one hand, he insists firmly on his
theory that Man's Nature is inevitably Evil and this leaves no
chance for the theory to recover and survive, and on the other hand,
he externalizes Artifice to a certain extent by emphasizing excess¬
ively the importance of rites and teachers and fails to discuss the
fact that the morally good Artifice originates directly in man's
own moral consciousness, or in his term 'Deliberation' or, broadly
speaking, the functioning of the Mind, and to let his thoughts
develop from that. Therefore this paragraph must be considered
an incomplete argument.
In the fifth paragraph, Hsun-tze offers counter-evidence
that since man's desire to perform morally is because of the innate
lack of what is morally good, or Shan, in his Nature, therefore
Man's Nature is born Evil. The examples he gives to support his
argument are forced ones. If man's aim in doing good is indeed to
improve his own imperfections, then Hsun-tze's argument is valid,
if not, then it is a bad argument. Unfortunately Hsun-tze does not
reveal his arguments more deeply in this direction. Also in saying
that Man's Nature is Evil, and that therefore he desires to do good
it does not necessarily follow that man desires to do good, therefore
his nature is evil, and Hsun-tze's argument here also is in danger
of logical fallacy. Also he claims that good (Shan) is what is
lacking in man, therefore man must search for good from outside, i.e.
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from rites and teachers. Since he denies that good primarily
exists within human nature, it is logical for him to claim that
Man's Nature is Evil; however, he is perhaps too confident in
supposing that there are no good qualities in human nature at all
which may become the source of moral achievement. Some good
qualities such as gentleness, quietness, are empirically experi¬
ential, and may be developed to encourage moral action. He also
claims that not only is there no possession and no understanding
of rites and righteousness in Man's Nature, but also that chaos
exists in it from birth. His claim is rather confusing. It is
clear that rites and righteousness are not. human nature, they are
only social and customary systems or institutions made by man;
and it is also clear that since man does not understand rites and
righteousness, he is easily cramped in the state of chaos because
of the temptations of the external world. Therefore rites and
righteousness are the creation of society and chaos is the con¬
sequence of man's behaviour. flsun-tze's argument that chaos
innately exists in Man's Nature is perhaps too briefly claimed.
There are also two more points which Hsun-tze must be charged
in this connection: (1) In his supposition that since there are
no rites and righteousness in Man's Nature, there exists chaos in¬
stead, he may be accused of over-confidence in his belief. (2) He
does not point out why man desires to do good and reveal the import¬
ance of the functioning of moral consciousness. It is man himself
who decides and chooses to do good or evil, and his decision and
choice is certainly and directly related to the cultivation and
training of his moral sentiment. The chaos made by man is the
consequence of his behaviour and if his behaviour is a moral act,
then it certainly originates from the functioning of his
moral consciousness. Therefore the argument of this paragraph is
the weakest one in his chapter.
In the sixth paragraph, Hsun-tze gives his own definition
of Good and Evil: to be Good is to be upright, reasonable, peaceful
and orderly; to be Evil is to be prejudiced, vicious, rebellious
and chaotic. However, Hsun-tze does not amplify
his definitions, and this easily leads to their ambiguity. Further¬
more, whatever opinions he holds, he falls back .into his self-made
trap of insisting upon his belief that Man's Nature is Evil. He
may be accused of being obsessed by his own belief. Also he does
not discuss the problem of how the good of society is to be trans¬
ferred to that of Man's Nature. In other words, the relationship
between the good of society, e.g. uprightness, reason, peacefulness
and order, and that of Man's Nature is not carefully pondered upon
by him and it certainly needs more interpretation and unfortunately
he does not leave his reader with a detailed picture of his ideas
in this aspect.
In the seventh paragraph, Hsun-tze considers that the
reason for the Sage-King's establishment of the institutions of
rites and righteousness is to be found in the intention to restrain
Man's Evil Nature. However, Hsun-tze fails to indicate clearly
that rites and righteousness established by the Sages are only a
means to assist man to understand social morality and also one of
the forms of education, and that the function of such an institution
is, on one hand, to guide man to cultivation and training of his
moral sentiment in order to exalt his moral consciousness towards
good and, on the other, to restrain man from offending against
the peace of society by making him keep the principles of social
morality in relations between himself and others, or in a narrow
sense, in society and the country, in short, to decrease criminal
acts. Such a failure of Hsun-tze is a possible cause for the
charges made by the later scholars that Hsun-tze lays emphasis only
on the forms of rites and righteousness and considers them to be
9
the origin of human value . As to his dispute with Mencius, since
there are differences in content of the uses of the same terms,
such as the different interpretations of the term 'human nature' by
10
the two thinkers , of which Hsun-tze himself seems to be not fully
aware, his argument is therefore not a good one. Nevertheless,
there is one point worth noticing here: Hsun-tze lays much emphasis
on experience and practice. H e explains that on making an
assertion, arguments should accord with the facts and what can be
proved to be valid. His suggestion is a constructive one. Also
when he says that because of the existence of warped wood, the pro¬
duction of a straightening board is needed, and because of the Evil
of Man's Nature, the government of Sage-Kings and elucidation of
rites and righteousness are needed; the process of the above
reasoning is logical. However, wherever his theory extends to
his basic belief that Man's Nature is innately Evil, it seems that
there is no way out from his self-drawn circle.
9. The charge was an incorrect one. For detailed discussion,
please see p.266.
10. Hsun-tze interprets 'human nature' as 'life' whereas Mencius
interprets it as 'potentiality'. For a detailed exposition of
Mencius' theory on human nature, please see, for example, Lao's
A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY.
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In the last paragraph, Hsun-tze considers that whether
a man is honourable or shameful is judged by whether he can have
his Evil Nature transformed and whether he can thus act morally by
good Artifice. Here Hsun-tze tries to break through his self-
drawn circle, or more clearly speaking, his determinism on the
theory that Man's Nature is Evil. This argument is naturally an
important and successful break-through within his circle of ideas.
In moral philosophy, however, it is not essential to establish
whether human nature is good or evil, therefore his break-through
brings little contribution.
In paragraphs two, four and eight, there is nothing
particularly illuminating or profound. Briefly, in his arguments
on the theory that Man's Nature is Evil, not only is there not much
sharpness and discovery but there are also places where forced
statements occur. In fact, since Hsun-tze has already expressed
his subjective belief in the theory of human nature, it is not a
necessary step for him to prove his belief. However, the sentences
which he puts forward in order to support his belief are not strong
enough to be persuasive and to make others have the same subjective
feeling. This is a failure of his argument. In his argument in
which he points out the distinction of Man's Nature and Artifice,
the latter word gives a new life to his philosophical system. If
he had gone deeper in considering the origin and meaning of his own
theory of Deliberation and that of Artifice, then he would have
achieved a more fruitful success in moral philosophy. Viewed from
the structure of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, it is not
strong enough to support a great system. However, it is obvious
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that Hsun-tze does not found his philosophy on it, and that he only
treats it as a stepping stone which, though it does not seem quite
secure, it does not have much major destructive effect on the whole.
By passing it, he stands firm in his theory of Transformation of
Man's Nature and that of the Mind and marches on to the end which,
in some way, makes his theories worthy of respect.
C: A SURVEY OF HIS THEORY OF THE MEAN-SPIRITED MAN
Hsun-tze's discussion of a Mean-Spirited Man is based
on his theory that Man's Nature is Evil. He considers that a
Mean-Spirited Man fully displays the original appearance of his
Evil Nature. In his definition of a Mean-Spirited Man, he says
that a Mean-Spirited Man is the one who gives free rein to desires
and emotions, feels at ease in his arrogance and indulgence and
turns away from rites and righteousness. From the verbs he uses,
i.e. 'gives free rein to', 'feels at ease', and 'turns away', he
can in fact easily go more deeply into the problem of man's moral
consciousness, or the moral functioning of the Mind. However, he
does not ponder very carefully over it. The reason for his care¬
lessness may be that (1) all Deliberations, to him, are always
good and wise ones. This is indeed a great defect of his theory
of the Mind. (2) He may consider that the origin of 'giving free
rein to', 'feeling at ease' and 'turning away' is in Man's Evil
Nature and not in the free choice of man's moral consciousness.
(3) On the other hand, he claims that a man is born a Mean-Spirited
Man and such a claim seems rather absurd or at least unconvincing as
a theory of moral philosophy, for if a Mean-Spirited Man who gives
free rein to his desires and emotions is evil because he has an
innate evil nature, something which he compulsorily possesses from
birth, then he should not be held responsible for any moral duty
at all. In other words, it is natural for man, or every man,
according to Hsun-tze, to do evil. (That is why Hsun-tze claims
that it is 'unnatural' for man to do good and all man's good actions
are from Artifice.) However, if man gives free rein to his desires
and emotions and chooses to do evil, then it is he himself who
should be completely responsible for his own acts; in other words,
it is his moral consciousness which is responsible for a morally
evil act and not his innate nature. Since Hsun-tze confines him¬
self to his own theory that Man's Nature is Evil, when he speaks of
the Mean-Spirited Man his viewpoint is biased and obsessed.
As to his distinction between a Conscientious Man and
a Mean-Spirited Man, if his misleading theory that there is no
difference between the two in the Evil of their Nature is excluded,
it is still worth mentioning his emphasis on their two different
ways of seeking the principles of life. He considers that a
Conscientious Man who seeks the way of becoming a Sage tends to
direct his way of life toward morality, while a Mean-Spirited Man
who only seeks the way of an easy comfortable life, whose Mind is
obsessed by worldliness, completely exposes his Evil Nature in his
behaviour. The point worthy of notice here is that Hsun-tze
suggests the theory of insufficiency of effort of a Mean-Spirited
Man, a theory explaining that the immoral activities of a Mean-
Spirited Man is simply caused by his laziness in making the effort
to perform morally. However, it seems that here Hsun-tze is holding
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two theories which can be mutually divergent or conflicting.
(1) If the laziness of moral effort of the Mean-Spirited Man is
part of his Nature which is innately Evil, then this laziness is
natural and should not be responsible for his immoral conduct.
(2) If this laziness is not part of his Nature and either (i) it
is an evil Artifice which he has brought about and which should, as
Hsun-tze implies, be held completely responsible for his immoral
conduct, then it may logically be suggested that not every Artifice
is, as Hsun-tze often unconsciously assumes, necessarily morally
good, some Artifices can be evil; or (ii) it is neither part of
Man's Nature, nor is it a piece of evil Artifice, but something
that causes a man to become more Mean-Spirited, then it may also
logically be suggested that the alleged Evil Nature of Man is not
seriously 'Evil', for it is a secondary, not the first, cause of
one's evil deeds.
An outline of Hsun-tze's idea may be illustrated as
follows:
A is a born Mean-Spirited Man for he possesses an innate
Evil Nature, however, with morally good Artifice, he may
become a Conscientious Man and eventually a Sage.
B is a born Mean-Spirited Man for he possesses an innate
Evil Nature, and with his laziness of moral effort he will
become a more Mean-Spirited Man.
The difficulties here are (1) Hsun-tze's insistence on
his belief that Man's Nature is innately Evil, a premise which is
unconvincing as well as unnecessary; (2) he does not give his
opinion as to whether there is a relationship or connection between
the Evil Nature of Man and his laziness in moral effort. How can he
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extricate himself from this confusing situation or how would he
fill the gap between the two? In fact, he leaves these questions
without answers. Because of this theoretical inconsistency, he
may be charged with carelessness in his logical analysis.
He also mentions that a Conscientious Man makes efforts
to seek for the way to become a Sage by transforming his Evil
Nature, accomplishing self-cultivation and self-training, and that
he has to wait till all his Evil Nature has ceased and then he is
perfected with virtue. The way to become a Sage is internally to
demand of oneself to make earnest efforts towards self-discipline,
and externally consistently to follow good customs, and here it is
evident that Hsun-tze also appreciates, though without saying so
explicitly, that the moral value of man originates from his
continuous efforts to promote his moral consciousness towards good.
Also, when he mentions that the difference between a Conscientious
Man and a Mean-Spirited Man is that the former is able to transform
his Nature while the latter cannot and would not like to do so, it
is obvious that Hsun-tze agrees that whether a man may come to have
moral excellence depends entirely on the functioning of the Mind,
his moral Deliberation, decision, Artifice or, in short, the moral
efforts of the agent, and he thus implies that the value of Man
lies in his Mind, or his moral consciousness.
To summarize the above, Hsun-tze's discussion of a
Mean-Spirited Man and his belief that the essence of a Mean-Spirited
Man is his Evil Nature is an extension of the error in his theory
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that Man's Nature is Evil. As to his suggestion of the insufficiency
of effort of a Mean-Spirited Man and his suggestion that man is
certainly born a Mean-Spirited Man it is evident that they are
theoretically inconsistent. Thus it is sufficient to see that
his belief that Man's Nature is Evil serving as a structural theory-
is too weak to be of importance. As to his description of the
appearance and behaviour, ability and disposition of a Mean-Spirited
Man, he observes these from an empirical viewpoint and his observ¬
ations are fairly to the point. However, because of the theoretical
shakiness of his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, his theory of a
Mean-Spirited Man offers no philosophical contribution to his system
of thought, and on the contrary, it often easily exposes the error
of the former one. In other words, it proves that the theory which
is based on the concept of Man's Evil Nature is difficult to make
consistent and convincing.
SECTION 2: HIS THEORIES OF TRANSFORMATION OF MAN'S EVIL
NATURE
The theory of Transformation of Man's Evil Nature is a
key turning point in Hsun-tze's theories of human nature. At one
end, it is connected with his theory that Man's Nature is Evil, and
at the other, it leads to that of Mind. However, theoretically,
it immediately touches on the difficulty of the validity of the
term 'Transformation of Man's Evil Nature'.
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A: THE DIFFICULTIES OF THE THEORY
As Hsun-tze insists that Man's Nature is innately Evil
it is logical for him to claim that if one wants to perform morally
and to be a Sage, one must first do away with one's Evil Nature for
good, and thus he suggests the theory of Transformation of Man's
Nature. However, as discussed in the last section there are
practical difficulties in his theory that Man's Nature is Evil,
therefore the following difficulties are bound to occur in his
theory of Transformation of Man's Nature which is immediately
founded on the former.
(i) As has been discussed, human nature is not a good in
itself. The theory that human nature is good or evil is a subject¬
ive belief and to try to found a theoretical structure on a
subjective belief is methodilogically unsound. As human nature
itself is not evil as suggested above, the theory that man's Evil
Nature must be transformed, or that the Evil of Man's Nature must
be cancelled, seems impossible to maintain.
(ii) Hsun-tze lays strong emphasis upon the necessity of
Transformation of Man's Nature, yet he does not make it clear what
it is that Man's Nature is then transformed into after its Trans¬
formation. In other words, if Man's Nature has already been
transformed, then in what way it will reappear is a question
waiting to be explained.
(iii) As the theory leads to that of the Mind, the relation
between Man's Nature and the Mind is not explained by Hsun-tze
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either. Viewed from the structure of his philosophy (please see
Appendix 3), it is seen that beyond his theory of Transformation
of Man's Nature, there is no further development in his theory of
human nature, and he then concentrates his attention upon the
structure of the theories of the Mind. It may be suggested that
after its Transformation, Man's Nature becomes an unobsessed Mind,
yet this suggestion may not be immediately fitted into Hsun-tze's
original idea, for he often indicates that Man's Nature is Evil
while the Mind is the possible source for moral perfection,
thus it seems that he presupposes that the Mind and Man's Nature
are two different elements. This is a logical and philosophical
gap to which Hsun-tze certainly needs to give more interpretation.
In fact, it seems that Hsun-tze himself is not fully aware of such
a difficulty at all.
(iv) The origin of moral good and evil is, as suggested
above, in the decision and action of man's moral consciousness
which is responsible for its own moral activities. The capability
of man's moral consciousness of promotion toward morality is
greatly dependent on the cultivation and training of his moral
sentiment, therefore it is clear that if man desires to shun his
Evil Nature and perform what is morally good, he must start from
the cultivation and training of his moral sentiment and thus the
possible decision of his moral consciousness to do evil can be
reformed. Therefore to say 'to transform Man's Nature' is mis¬
leading and it is a misuse of language and defective logic. If
the words 'to make virtuous man's moral consciousness' are used
instead, theoretically it seems more easily comprehensible.
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Since Hsun-tze confines himself to his theory that Man's
Nature is Evil, it is necessary for him to establish the theory of
Transformation of Man's Nature. It is a weak point of his moral
philosophy which begins with this theory and founds the rest of
his theories of human nature on it. Furthermore, it seems that
he fails to reflect thoroughly on the origin of moral good and
evil. Therefore in the structure of his moral philosophy, although
he suggests the moral functioning of the Mind which is similar, to
a certain extent, to that of moral consciousness, and he also
suggests the theory of removal of Obsession of the Mind which is
similar, to a certain extent, to avoid the moral consciousness
falling into the temptation of performing evil, he may still be
accused of not positively pointing out the importance of cultivation
and training of man's moral sentiment in order to make virtuous his
moral consciousness. This is the defect of his theory of the Mind
which will be discussed in more detail in chapter VII of this Part.
However, the shallowness of his theory of human nature in which he
starts by assuming that human nature is in a once-for-all mould of
unchangeable evil, leads to the weakness of the theoretical structure
of his moral philosophy.
B: THE DIFFICULTIES OF HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN MAN'S
NATURE AND ARTIFICE
The difficulties of Hsun-tze's theory of Transformation
of Man's Nature lies in the linguistic and logical error of the
connection to the theory that Man's Nature is Evil. However, the
value of the theory should not thus be denied altogether. The
first part of the supposition of the theory says that since Man's
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Nature is Evil, therefore it is necessary for man to have his
Nature transformed; and the latter part says that the way of
Transformation is in the artificial moral education, or by means
of moral Artifice. The notion of 'Artifice' is a discovery of
thought in his time.
innate, or man-made, and it is encouraged by learning or education.
Artifice may be interpreted as either the moral functioning of the
Mind or the external practical performance, and it is difficult to
know which interpretation Hsun-tze uses on different occasions.
What is clear is that Artifice is not a part of Man's Nature nor
is it a part of the Mind, for Man's Nature is always Evil, and
Artifice is always, in his theory, morally good. It may be reason¬
able to think that Artifice arises from the functioning of the Mind,
i.e. at the moment when the Mind deliberates on a moral issue then
an Artifice also arises (therefore Hsun-tze always says that the
performance of moral good is an Artifice). In short, Artifice is
born by encouragement of the dynamic functioning of the Mind, as
well as by external assistance, such as rites, righteousness, law
and teachers. However, a conceptual puzzle may arise as follows.
11
If moral Artifice is what is unnatural in man as Hsun-tze claims,
it may follow that the functioning of the Mind from which Artifice
arises may also be unnatural in man; this may imply a presupposition
that, originally and naturally, it is not in the nature of the Mind
to perform morally. Such an analysis may end in a puzzling query
as to what the nature of the Mind is. Hsun-tze perhaps does not
Artifice, or Wei, to Hsun-tze, means unnatural, not
4l, Ch'i Shan Che Wei Yeh.
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intend to designate his concept of Artifice for objective analysis
and he just, as often, subjectively and intuitively takes it for
granted.
Hsun-tze considers that the difference between Man's
Nature and his Artifice lies mainly in whether or not it can be
learned and attained, and he suggests that it is impossible for
Man's Nature to be learned and attained, while Artifice can be.
However, since he insists that Man's Nature is Evil (although it
would be possible to avoid all these errors if he did not insist
on this), he naturally and logically only considers the possibility
of morally good Artifice as a contrast to the Evil of Man's Nature
and ignores the possibility of a morally evil one. Although
he says that Man's good behaviour is artificial, it does not seem
wise for him to suppose that all Artifices are morally good. It
is, in fact, possible to have morally good or morally evil
Artifice. As Artifice is the "learned behaviour of man, including
that which does not directly result from moral education, it is
difficult to maintain that Artifice is certainly of one nature, as
Hsun-tze holds, i.e. that it is certainly always morally good.
According to what has just been suggested, it is possible to have a
morally good Artifice as well as a morally evil one, and it all
depends on, internally, the decision and choice of man's moral
consciousness and, externally, learning and education. If learn¬
ing and education tend to moral goodness, they may cause man to
turn to morality; if they tend to moral evil, they may cause man
to keep to evil. The difficulty here is: it seems that Hsun-tze
tends to describe only the positive side of his theories of Man's
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Evil Nature, Transformation of Man's Nature and morally good Artifice
and their connections, excluding the other possible alternatives of
these theories. He may be charged with over-stubbornness in his
series of beliefs in human nature. Some indications of his
stubbornnes may be found in chapter XIX, where he says:
'Without Man's Nature, Artifice will have
nothing to be added to; without Artifice, Man's
Nature will be unable to beautify itself.' (XII I,10)
Here it is evident that Hsun-tze tries to contrast
the two situations in man, namely: the innate Evil of Man's Nature
and the morally good Artifice from moral education. In his belief,
Man's Evil Nature necessarily exists so that the morally good
Artifice can stem from it, and the morally good Artifice is neces¬
sarily possible so that Man's Evil Nature can thus be transformed,
and the morally good Artifice is then encouraged and eventually
Man's Nature thus beautifies itself. However, the notion of the
self-beautification of human nature is never clearly explained by
Hsun-tze. It seems that he is not serious about the use of this
new concept, or else he again runs into trouble for theoretical
inconsistency or for introducing it without clear-minded consider¬
ation, for it seems inconceivable that Man's Nature, which is
innately Evil, can be self-beautified by transforming itself into
a nothing or cancelling itself completely. Since he considers
that Artifice is always morally good, and he does not hold firm to
the theory that the origin of moral good lies in man's moral
consciousness itself, his defect here is indeed a serious theoret¬
ical after-effect caused by his theory that Man's Nature is Evil,
and that of strict distinction between Man's Nature and Artifice.
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C: A SURVEY OF HIS SUPPOSITION OF ARTIFICE AS A CAUSE
OF MORAL GOODNESS
To Hsun-tze the Evil of Man's Nature is innate. However,
does he consider that Artifice is voluntary and self-conscious? The
answer is positive. According to his theory, Artifice originates
after the process of Transformation of Man's Nature. Man's Nature
hereafter vanishes completely and the newly originated Artifice is
influenced, on one hand, by the learning from external situation, and
on the other, certainly by man himself for example, by the way he
receives the learning. In other words, man himself directly part¬
icipates in the whoLe process; and Artifice thus originates in a
voluntary and self-conscious state of man. It is clear that to
Hsun-tze, the Transformation of Man's Nature is an internal struggle
of man. This is the reason why Hsun-tze considers that the Sage,
who well performed the Transformation of his Evil Nature and fully
develops his morally excellent Artifice, is identical with all men
in his Nature and is different from all men in his Artifice.
Does Hsun-tze then consider that Artifice is a necessary
cause of moral goodness? His answer is also positive. According
to his definition of Artifice: the Mind considers and action thus
ensues, Deliberations accumulate and the full functioning of the
Mind is exercised, and thus Artifice is formed and completed. In
other words, Artifice is the result of Deliberation and decision of
the Mind. However, Hsun-tze tends to speak merely of the positive
side of Artifice, i.e. morally good Artifice and to neglect its
negative side, i.e. morally evil Artifice. In chapter XVIII, he
defines Deliberation as follows: when man is stimulated by external
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objects and he responds to them and when his Mind selects a decision
for him, the selection is called Deliberation. Here the definition
itself does not imply the quality of Deliberation, i.e. whether or
not it is rational and wise. But in chapter X, he says:
'His (the Sage-King's) knowledge and Deliberation
is sufficient to manage the world.' (VI, 4)'
In other chapters, the same notion appears. This
indicates that Hsun-tze always thinks that Deliberations are rational
and wise and encourage man to act in a morally good way. For Hsun-
tze it is perhaps logically necessary to propose and affirm this,
however, the argument here is that man's Deliberation is not always
rational, wise and moral, and that man's action may possibly come to
be morally evil. In other words, Artifice is not necessarily a
cause of moral good. The result of man's moral activity, object¬
ively speaking, is unlikely to be guaranteed to be certainly morally
good, and in fact, in the process of moral activity, what can be
guaranteed is the absolute freedom of decision and choice of man's
moral consciousness. In other words, man is absolutely free to
choose to perform good or evil, yet it is not possible for moral
activity to have an objective guarantee of certain moral goodness
and that no external moral education or training can possibly have
a guarantee of reforming man's moral consciousness toward the moral
good. Or, it is man's moral consciousness itself which decides its
moral activity and it is man's moral consciousness itself which
decides the behaviour of moral good or evil; not the external moral
education or training or Artifice.
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In conclusion it is suggested that the means of
assuring the direction of man's moral consciousness towards good may
be to cultivate and train his own moral sentiment towards good by
continuous efforts of self-consciousness, self-strengthening, and
self-improvement: this is an internal and basic practice, while
the accumulation of practices of learning and moral education in
moral activities is an external and additional one of slightly
minor importance. It is not suggested here that learning and moral
education are not important at all; on the contrary, it is admitted
that they are undeniably of great importance as long as they are in
the position of successfully assisting man to become morally con¬
scious and eventually become a morally excellent man. Viewed from
outside, they are the most important means of educating or cultivat¬
ing man's personality, and they are only a useful external guide to
his search for moral life; however, without them, he may also prac¬
tise his moral effort by other means such as self-strengthening, and
self-improvement. The point is, even if one is to benefit from
these external aids, one still needs to fully exercise one's moral
consciousness to make good use of them before one can actually
achieve moral perfection.- However, Hsun-tze does not clearly con¬
strue the relationship or connection between the Mind and Artifice
which is philosophically vitally important. He indicates only that
Artifice is the cause of moral goodness. His indication is either
too brief to be comprehensive or too partial or biased or only viewed
from a social standpoint to complete an all-round theory. And this
was the main reason why later scholars misguidedly charged him with
over-emphasis on external guidance.
204
D: A DISCUSSION OF HIS SUGGESTION OF RITES, MUSIC, TEACHER
AND LAW AS THE SOURCES OF ARTIFICE
According to Hsun-tze the initial methods of man's moral
efforts are twofold: (1) internally to seek for the removal of
Obsessions of the Mind as well as for the Transformation of his Evil
Nature, and (2) to seek for the external assistance of rites,
music, teachers and laws by learning from them. The theory of
removal of the Mind's Obsessions belongs to Hsun-tzes' theories of
the Mind and will be discussed later. In this part, his suggestion
of the external assistance of rites, music, teachers and laws is
dealt with.
(i) Rites and music may be conveniently considered to be a
group which represent a moderate way of moral education. To Hsun-
tze, rites restrain and rectify man's internal and external activi¬
ties, and music harmonizes man himself and his life in society.
Teachers and law may be conveniently grouped together as a radical
way of moral education or training and to Hsun-tze, a teacher guides
man to a proper approach to morality while law controls and prohibits
man from committing crimes or further crimes.
(ii) Viewed from another point of view, rites and law belong
to the particular methods of restraint of social morality and law
is established and applied when the influence or force of rites are
not strong enough to deal with the evil of man. Music and teachers
belong to the group of social educators. By music main is tamed and
cultivated, and by teachers man's mischiefs are rectified.
From the above Hsun-tze suggests a complete system of
education and restraint in order to make man perform morality.
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It is also a complete outline of a social educational system.
However, in what way do these four essential elements of assistance
to man's Artifice become unanimously effective in their function of
guidance and influence or moral education for man? This is not
obvious from Hsun-tze's book. Also, in what way are the practical
details of these four elements connected with the actual demands of
moral education? This again is not discussed.
Generally speaking, the purpose of rites, music, teachers
and laws exists to stimulate man's moral sentiment, to cultivate and
train it, to allow it to have a complete and thorough understanding
of the principle of morality and to make it possess a sense of moral
responsibility. Thus in the process of moral activity, man's moral
sentiment will be able to effectively direct its moral consciousness
to make morally good decisions. Therefore the purpose of the exalt¬
ation of rites and music and the respect for teachers and law is to
show an appreciation of their assistance or guidance to man's moral
goal and moral practice. It should not be a blind adoration of
them. Viewed from the standpoint of modern theories of education,
the ways of moral education are manifold: one's own experiences,
the mute teachers such as books and magazines, the immediate teachers
including any individual, for example, members of the family, school
teachers or any men contacted directly or indirectly with the learner,
and other means of communication such as radio, television, films and
records. Therefore the media of moral education are not necessarily
restricted to the classic rites, or a serious and morally conscient¬
ious teacher, as suggested by Hsun-tze. Hsun-tze lived in a chaotic
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period and his appeal for respect for teachers and rites seems
necessary and natural in order to protect himself as a teacher and
scholar and to survive those dangerous and disorderly times. On
one hand he is limited by his times, and on the other it is a need
of his times. However, the emphasis itself needs more theoretical
explanation, for it is only by serving a good teacher that the
advantages of his instruction can be gained, and by fully under¬
standing the meaning of rites that his performance or practice of
it can be said to be proper. If a bad teacher who is incapable of
fulfilling his duty is followed, the pupil may learn nothing moral
from him. The pupil will then become innocent of the principle of
rites, music and law, or he may know merely the minor details of
them; thus he not only receives no influence of their assistance
or education, but also practises their empty forms without a sense
of true respect and sincerity. Although Hsun~tze suggests the
theory of Gradually Accumulated Influence in which he emphasizes
the importance of a good teacher, this theory is not given in
c
sufficient detail to establish this point. In later times, sophists
borrowed his theory of exaltation of teachers and laws to become part
12
of their own theories, and formed the school of Fa Chia . This
situation was certainly not foreseen by Hsun-tze. Nevertheless,
if he had made this point clear he would have avoided the unnecessary
accusation by the later scholars of encouraging the rise of that
u 13school
% L »
12. ^ Fa Chia, one of the schools of learning in Pre-Ch'in
Period, stressing law and punishment as the means of control of the
king.
13. For a further argument that Hsun-tze is different from the
Fa-ists, please see pp.355.
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In HSUN-TZE there is a chapter devoted to the
discussion of rites, that is chapter XIX entitled 'On Rites',
in which some details of rites are listed. Hsun-tze distinguishes
different contents of rites practised and applied to different
classes of man in society, i.e. the ordinary masses, officials,
feudal princes and the king. His distinction and opinion on
rites was considered to be a standard one by Han Confucianists and
in the BOOK OF RITES which they edited, there were many quotations
from this chapter and other chapters of HSUN-TZE. His interpret¬
ation of the Confucian concept of rites contributes a more detailed
theoretical system than the aphoristic sayings of Confucius and the
interpretations of other Confucianists in Hsun-tze's time. However,
his viewpoints on rites are, from a modern standpoint, feudalistic
and anachronistic. What Hsun-tze considers important is the
principle of rites and not its minor details. Therefore the chap¬
ter is not completely valueless or invalid. There is also chapter
XX, entitled 'On Music' in which he devotes his efforts to interpret¬
ation of the Confucian concept of music. The ancient music, i.e.
the music of Yao and Shun, was lost, according to later textual
researchers, in the Ch'in Dynasty (221-207 B.C.), when it ceased to
be heard and studied; however, arguments for and against its exist¬
ence and its excellence have been extended until the present day.
14 15
Confucius once heard the Music of Shao and highly praised it
14. Shao, the music during the time of Shun (ruled
around 2000 B.C.).
15. THE ANALECTS, chapter III and chapter VII.
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However, Hsun-tze is the first Confucianist who provides a full
discussion of the importance of a piece of good music in moral
cultivation. One of his aims in this chapter is to argue against
the Mo-ist's Anti-Music theory. Nevertheless, his concern with
the importance of music from a moral viewpoint is constructive and
valid even today. His main suggestion is that a piece of good
music, i.e. the music like Shao or that of the Sage-Kings such as
Yao and Shun, may promote the moral well-being of man and peaceful-
ness of society; while a piece of evil music which spreads the
sounds of licentiousness, wantonness, or unpleasant noises may
disturb man's mental state of serenity or his effort in moral prac¬
tice and consequently may violate the peacefulness of society.
THE BOOK OF MUSIC edited by Han Confucianists also adopted and
quoted many of Hsun-tze's words from this chapter. One may find
that Hsun-tze's discussion on rites and music have had a great
influence on later scholars and indeed this is also his important
contribution to Confucian philosophy. And his opinions on these
subjects, especially his interpretations of the moral role of rites
and music are universally considered accurate and to the point.
However, it is also difficult to give further comment on it with¬
out a complete understanding of the concrete content of ancient
music. In chapter I, entitled 'Encouraging Learning', he points
out the importance of the teacher, yet the importance of a good
teacher is not much discussed for, to him, a teacher who is worthy
to be followed is always a morally good one. As to law, there is
no chapter devoted to this and in his work nothing much about law
is given in detail. In chapter XII, he says:
'There is only the tyrant but no tyrannical
country; there is only the ruling man but no ruling
law . . . Law cannot exist independently and its
regulations cannot be implemented by themselves . . .
Law is the beginning of administration and a
Conscientious Man is the source of Law.' (VIII, 1)
From this it is evident that Hsun-tze does not have
the intention of especially emphasizing the law itself, for he
considers that a virtuous law-maker is more important. The
question of how a Conscientious Man is related to law or becomes
the source of law is not clearly explained, and the exact meaning
and the detail of'this statement needs further discussion and
explanation, and Hsun-tze fails to give this.
In his theory of Artifice, the exaltation of teacher
and rites is the first and important step, while the implement¬
ation of law is "a secondary policy. However, Hsun-tze on one
hand fails to hold firm to the^ discussion of how rites, music,
teacher and law become unanimously effective in moral education,
and on the other fails to point out their position only as media
of moral education. Therefore although his theoretical structure
of this theory is formed it is incomplete in content as well as in
theory itself.
The main theoretical difficulty of the theory of
Transformation of Man's Nature lies in the following: (1) it is
limited because of his belief that Man's Nature is Evil, and (2)
he fails to hold firm to the theory of the origin of moral good
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and evil in man's moral consciousness. This also affects his
theory of Artifice which itself, though philosophically meaningful,
is theoretically weak and incomplete.
Hsun-tze's whole set of theories of human nature is
like a piece of jade with trivial flaws or defects which may not
seriously damage its essence as jade, though it is no longer a




CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF KNOWLEDGE
CHAPTER VI :
CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF
KNOWLEDGE
The fact that Hsun-tze has no ambition to establish a
whole system of theory of knowledge has been discussed in Part I,
chapter II. What he tries to explain about knowledge is that all
searches for common knowledge are endless and of no great value to
man's life and it is only in morality that man will find his home.
In his theories Hsun-tze starts from the theory of names (Ming) in
which he discusses the origin of names, their definition and function,
the principles of formulating names and the relationship between names
and man's experience, and his intention is, in principle, to explain
the importance of the relationship between names and man's moral
reality. He then points out the three types of 'confusions' (Huo)
of contemporary sophists and he gives solutions to these confusions
by correcting their errors in the relationship of names to reality.
Hsun-tze also tries to establish the principle or art of debate with
the purpose of elucidating the ideal that man should not only speak
properly but also speak nothing but morality, for there is nothing
more important in man's life than morality. Of morality he claims
that man should speak on the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of
Man, and thus he paves the way for his theory of the Mind. As his
efforts aim at morality and not knowledge itself, Hsun-tze does not,
either intentionally or unconsciously, go deep in pure thinking in
order to contemplate the central issues of knowledge such as its
content, scope and limit, and value. What he would like to
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establish is the Confucian ethics of notions like 'to respect those
worthy of respect and to be intimate with those worthy of intimacy'
and 'a king should be a king, officials should be officials, the
father should be a father, the son should be a son, the senior should
be a senior, the junior should be a junior, and the farmer should be
a farmer, the scholar should be a scholar, the worker should be a
worker and the merchant should be a merchant', (chapter IX). In
other words, he would like to see that all men in society are in
their appropriate positions and that they all fulfil and perfect
their virtue as men and as members of society. This is also the
purpose of his philosophy. Therefore it is better to consider this
part of his thoughts as belonging to the theory of names and morality
rather than the theory of knowledge.
However, in his theory of names and morality, there are
theories actually related to or within the scope of theory of know¬
ledge and they are discussed outstandingly well; therefore it is
still convenient to call them here 'his theory of knowledge'.
SECTION 1: HIS THEORIES OF NAMES
In his judgement, there is nothing as necessary as
appropriateness in the relation of a name (Ming) to reality (Shih).
After men have agreed upon a certain name to indicate a certain
reality and have used it in practice, then a firm relationship between
name and reality is, Hsun-tze claims, established and its application
can be said to be appropriate. However, he observes that in his
days, the sophists spread their artful and peculiar argumentations or
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even worse, they lie and make deceptive speech in order to confuse,
fool and swindle man, and thus make name and reality lose their
appropriateness. Hsun-tze therefore insists that a Conscientious
Man must debate and his debate should start from the rectification
of names, and he also considers that the definition and function
of name, the examination of names1 and the principle of formulating
2
names are three inseparable aspects of the knowledge of names.
The following pages examine these three aspects.
A: THE THEORETICAL INSUFFICIENCY OF THE CLASSIFICATION
AND FUNCTIONS OF NAMES
A name should indicate a certain reality, or a name should
be in accordance with a certain reality: this is the main principle
of formulating names and also the main function of names in Hsun-tze's
theory. In chapter XXII, entitled 'Rectification of Names', he says:
'When a name is heard, its reality is thus
clearly expressed: this is the function of names.'
(XVI, 6)
However, in common-sense, is name necessarily obliged to
be in accordance with its fixed reality? In most cases the answer
may be positive, yet there are exceptions. In the case of a horse,
for example, it is necessary to call a horse which possesses all the
characteristics of a horse, a horse, and it is necessary to name that
which shows all the characteristics of a horse, a horse. Thus the
name 'horse' and its reality 'which possesses all the characteristics
of a horse' are in correspondence to each other, and when man uses
1. Yen-Ming. For reference, please see p.47.
M « Chih-Ming. For reference, please see p.48.
214
the word in this way, he is making a proper application of the name
and his application can, according to Hsun-tze, be said to be appro¬
priate. Yet in the case of proper names, it can be quite different.
For example, to name a new-born horse 'Prize Winner' is only to show
the expectation of its owner or whoever names it. The name 'Prize
Winner' itself does not have guaranteed reality, that is to say, the
horse with such a name may not be guaranteed a future prize winner.
In other words, proper names are often used simply to draw the
hearer's attention to or remind him of the presence of the person
or thing so named, and the proper name itself does not necessarily
have a descriptive sense. The argument here is that the scope of
classification of names suggested by Hsun-tze is incomplete; in
other words, he is speaking merely of some kinds of names and not
all names. For some kinds of names it is possible for semantics
and reality to be in correspondence. However, for some other kinds
of names, such as proper names, they generally only carry a vocative
function of calling a hearer's attention to or reminding him of
someone or something present or existent. In other words, Hsun-tze
starts with the assumption that every name must have a referent or
have the function of referring to something in the world so as to
make the name itself an intelligible meaning. Yet his investigation
on names is incomplete and his assumption is thus theoretically
weakened. On the other hand, his theory of referential relation of
name to reality itself is not self-sufficient, for there are the
cases of names such as proper names, which may not have a referential
reality. And the theoretical insufficiency of his theory of names
is clear. In chapter XXII, he suggests two classes of names:
(1) names of social institutions including names of
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of penalties, titles of the nobility, and names of ceremonies; and
(2) names in general, e.g. Nature, Deliberation, Artifice, etc. which
he calls 'miscellaneous common names'. The classification itself is
obviously an incomplete one. From the modern viewpoint the former
class belongs to 'common names' and the latter to 'abstract names'.
He does not mention those names which also lie in the category of
names such as proper names and collective names. Furthermore, Hsun-
tze only gives examples of the miscellaneous common names of man and
he does not mention the miscellaneous common names of other things than
man, such as places, things and animals. Thus his classification is
limited to the class of attributes of man and that of social institut¬
ions. It can be seen that the classification itself is quite partial
and narrow. However, to Hsun-tze, these two classes of names, for
the sake of keeping the social institutions and restraining man's behav¬
ior, must have their fixed realities and a man who is involved in or is
in possession of some names of these classes should behave in corre¬
spondence with the realities of the names. In other words, the
officials should fulfil his duty as an official, the masses should ful¬
fil their duties as members of the country, and a man should fulfil
his duties as a man. Doubtlessly, this is a logical and necessary
theory in Hsun-tze's moral philosophy. The point is that since his
classification of names carries a special function concerned only with
morality, the result is that in his distinction as to whether or not
a man uses a name appropriately or possesses a name appropriate to
reality, always involves moral judgement, whereas such cases are rare
in the classification of names in syntax.
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In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze considers that the functions
of names are twofold; (1) politically, if names are fixed and
realities can be distinguished, then the world will be united for
there will be no dispute and confusion about them; and (2) practic¬
ally, (a) names enable man to distinguish the noble and the inferior,
the identical and the different, (b) man is thus able to point out
the realities and to explain his will, and (c) man is thus able to
avoid the unhappiness of having events becoming difficult and failing.
His emphasis of the functions of names mentioned in fact is laid on
their practical functions, for the former one is a result of the
success of the latter. After a close examination of the latter,
certain difficulties are found as follows:
(i) Hsun-t<ze says that a name enables man to distinguish the
noble and the inferior, but the statement is ambiguous. The term
'the noble and the inferior', if it is spoken in a social sense, may
imply those of either the political class or the economic class; if
it is spoken in a moral sense, it may imply the Conscientious Man or
V/
the Sage and the Mean-Spirited Man. No matter what sense Hsun-tze
implies here, the function of names always results in a moral judge¬
ment. For example, to call someone a high-positioned official, to
use the name or title he bears implies, according to Hsun-tze, that
he should fulfil his duties as a high-positioned official and he
should show the virtue required by his position. In other words,
the reality behind the name should be reflected in the actual behavior
of the man who is thus named. The difficulty here is that man's
name itself, whether a social title or a moral title, sometimes does
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not reflect his actual behaviour or situation. For instance, the
fact that a man is named a morally Conscientious Man does not further
imply his social status; or the fact that a man is named a prime
minister may imply that his ability is sufficient for him to be in
such a position or that he, being in such a position, should fulfil
his duties, but the name 'prime minister' itself does not give inform¬
ation as to his actual conduct or virtue. Therefore Hsun-tze's
statement stands accused of the following: (a) the criterion of
'the noble and the inferior' is not clear, and (b) name itself is
not a sufficient means for such a distinction. The same difficulty
applies to the immediately following pairs of 'the identical and the
different'.
(ii) The second and third points of the practical functions
of name are also not clearly presented. It is obvious that Hsun-
tze should give more examples to interpret his opinion but he fails
to do so. There are names which enable man to point out the real¬
ities but they do not necessarily explain his will, or they have
nothing to do with his will. The words 'the unhappiness of having
events becoming difficult and failing', are not clear too. That
the event becomes difficult and fails is not entirely due to names
though it may be a part of the trouble. However, even when the
correct name is applied, it is still possible for difficulty and
failing of events to occur.
The reasons for the difficulties of his theory of
classification and that of the function of names are:
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(i) Hsun-tze does not indicate the particular scope of his
theory of names, which compared with that of syntax is narrow and
incomplete. Therefore what he says in his theory also becomes
narrow and incomplete. This constitutes a limitation of his theory
of classification of names and that of the function of names.
(ii) The main purpose of Hsun-tze's theories of names is
evidently to elucidate the fact that man in his position should
appropriately fulfil his duties. In other words, Hsun-tze is
speaking of morality in a wide sense: that is, man should fulfil
his duties in both social and ethical morality. Therefore his
theory is a means to morality and not an end in itself. This
forms another limitation of his theory. In short, Hsun-tze in¬
sists that every name (however, to him, it only means names of
moral concern) must have a referential reality (to morality) so as
to establish for itself an intelligible meaning (to morality).
If he had gone more deeply to the assumption itself that every name
must have a referential reality so as to establish its intelligible
meaning, he might have possibly developed some interesting patterns
about between the
of metaphysical argumentation •tf^the relation •^meaning of a name
and its referential reality. However, what he is concerned with
is not to construct a philosophical enquiry into a theory of lang¬
uage, but to draw attention to the relationship between name (Ming)
and morality, or simply an appeal for 'man in society as a genuine
moral being'.
Since his theories of names have a moral purpose and
only to a small extent relate to philosophical inquiries of pure
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knowledge, although parts of them are outstanding and unique for
his times, it may be considered that they are only a partial success
in theory of knowledge. However, this may serve as evidence that
Hsun-tze's intention lies in the discussion of the relations of
names and morality and not in conceptual investigation of name or
knowledge itself.
B: A SURVEY OF HIS EXAMINATION OF NAMES
Hsun-tze's theory of examination of names suggests, on
one hand, the examination of the validity of the established names
by means of man's experience of its referential reality, and on the
other, the formulation of new names also by means of man's experience
on the realities. In Hsun-tze's words, the method of examining is
'by means of man's natural sense' and of 'man's Mind which can
examine and understand'. The theory is indeed rich in an epistemo-
logical sense. Hsun-tze tries to answer the following questions:
How does man know external objects? Or how does knowledge originate?
&
To Hsun-tze, knowledge originates from man's physical
senses or his sensory organs and his Mind or his Epistemological
Mind, while names originates from the fact that men have the same
feelings for the same things which they compare and mutually under¬
stand and then finally agree on a new name and put it into practice.
The method he suggests to examine the validity of knowledge here is
in the main an empiricist criterion which generally refers to sensory
experience as a necessary condition of knowledge. He also investi¬
gates the function of name in communication in which by means of
names, the identity, similarity and correspondence between the
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speaker and hearer may be achieved. For him, names of moral
vocabulary, for instance, father, expresses the morally correct
role of a person so described. To extend this idea further, he
claims that such an interrelationship between names and realities
thus make human communication possible. This doctrine is a keen
and profound observation by Hsun-tze. He also considers that the
Mind unifies and controls all the physical senses, and that the
physical senses such as eyes, nose, ears, mouth and the body can
receive and distinguish external objects, but they cannot know and
understand them. In other words, the Mind is the faculty of think¬
ing and the key to examine and know external things. Thus in
theory, Hsun-tze starts from the experience of man's physical
senses and then he lays emphasis on the comprehension of the Mind.
This makes him not only genuinely an empiricist but also a rational¬
ist. However, though he is a combination of both, he is not at all
inconsistent if his theory is understood as follows: in the sense
of the origin of knowledge, or in the initial step of knowing, it
is necessary for man to experience external objects by means of his
physical senses in order to allow information for the purpose of
examining and understanding to reach the Mind. Therefore in chapter
XXII, he says that the ability of examining and understanding of the
Mind must wait for suitable contacts with objects by related sensory
organs, before it can be realized. In the explanation of the
structure of knowledge, it is necessary for man to admit the import¬
ant role of the Mind. The five sensory organs, i.e. eyes, ears,
mouth, nose and body are capable of perceiving and distinguishing
objects; yet if the perceived data do not go through the examination
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and understanding of the Mind, then an appropriate judgement on the
object cannot be given, therefore in the process of knowing, the
Mind unifies and controls all the physical senses.
To the question of the origin of knowledge, Hsun-tze
has suggested a dualistic viewpoint. However, his suggestion
merely solves the problem of the process of man's subjective know¬
ledge. As to the issues of the object of knowledge, such as its
nature, the value and its content, Hsun-tze does not mention any¬
thing of these in his book. This is perhaps because he always
relates names to morality, and perhaps because he concentrates his
attentions on the Ultimate Mind and not on the Epistemological Mind,
thus limiting his treatment to the philosophical issue of the theory
of knowledge.
C: A SURVEY OF HIS PRINCIPLE OF FORMULATING NAMES
The initial step of formulating names, Hsun-tze suggests,
is to examine whether the established name and its referential reality
are in correspondence with each other by means of man's five senses
and his Mind, and its practical step is to formulate a new name
when necessary by the principle of similarity and difference, that
of generality and particularity and that of numbers. His theory
is, in content, rich in a syntactic sense.
In his system of names, Hsun-tze suggests two terms; the
broad particular name and the broad general name3; and he takes
'bird or beast' as an example of the former term and 'things' as
that of the latter. From this it can be seen that his theoretical
3. For reference, please see p.49.
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system of this classification is not sufficiently compact.
According to the modern study of names, an object has at least
three names: its common name, its particular name and its proper
name. For example, apart from its taxonomy in biological study,
the common name for a cat is of course a cat, its particular name
is, for instance, a Siamese cat, and its proper name is perhaps
Sai-mi. If Hsun-tze's terms are used, a broad general name for a
cat is a living thing or creature, and its broad particular name
is a cat. However, he fails to at least mention the proper name.
Perhaps he is aware of this defect; therefore in chapter XXII he
suggests that man deduces things according to their classes and
generalizes them until there is no more broader general name and
then the deduction ends, and that man carries on the particularizing
until there is no more particular name and then the particularization
ends. It seems that the incompleteness of his theory is thus
slightly modified. The following example may help to clarify
this point. Supposing that 'man' is a general name, deduced to a
broader sense, 'man'is a kind of animal, and an animal is a kind of
living thing or object; therefore living thing or object is the
broadest general name of 'man'. On the other hand, if carried on
to particularization, the Chinese is one of the nations of men, Han
is one of the clans of the Chinese, Cantonese is one of the natives
in the clans, Wong is one of the families of Cantonese, and Wong
Hsiao-erh is one of the members of the Wong families; therefore
'man' is a broad general name for Wong Hsiao-erh while the name
'Wong Hsiao-erh' is the most particular name in Hsun-tze's terminology
or proper name in modern terminology. Thus although Ilsun-tze does
not mention the term 'proper name', what he says in fact implicitly
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includes it. If his principle of formulating names is applied here
a corresponding result of a similar type can be obtained. For example,
Andrew and Douglas are men, and a common name for them is human beings.
Andrew is three and Douglas is thirty. Since their ages are differ¬
ent, therefore the different names for them are: child for Andrew and
adult for Douglas. Since they are male, therefore a single name for
them is male; in detail, the compound name for Andrew is boy and for
Douglas, man. A general name for them is man and their particular
names are Andrew and Douglas. Thus the validity of Hsun-tze's theory
is tested and in principle, it is acceptable. However, the names or
terminology suggested are rather too simple to form a complete and
well-founded theory, yet that his ambition does not lie here is
understood.
As to his discussion of formulating numbers, he suggests
that things which have different appearances but are in the same place
are two realities with the same name and they should be numbered as
two, that things which have the same appearance but are in different
places are still two realities but they should be numbered as one, and
that a thing which has changed but still retains its original reality
should also be numbered as one; thus accordingly, all things can be
properly numbered. Here it may be helpful to explain his theory more
clearly by using the following example: In the case of water, although
there are differences, at least in taste, between sea water and river
water, they are without doubt water, and thus they are named similarly
for they are one reality. As to the three conditions of water, from
water to ice, or to steam, although its appearance changes, its reality
as water has not changed, therefore to number it man should, Hsun-tze
holds, name it as one (reality). In the case of water and land,
they are of different classes, and therefore they are given two names
and numbered as two (realities). Thus accordingly the numbers of
one, two, ... etc. are produced and distinguished. This is also an
outstanding theory in his theory of knowledge of his time, and indeed
it does possess more meaning in pure epistemology than in morality.
4
As to the term 'good name' which he suggests, since it means the
name which, according to man's mutual agreement and common practice
to be appropriate, is in correspondence with its actual reality and
which, when applied, is clear and straight-forward and not against
its reality, thus it again involves moral judgement as discussed in
A of this section.
His theory of formulating names, as a whole, was outstanding
in his times, and is also valuable in the field, although some parts
of it need to be further polished in the manner suggested and they
need to be further supplemented to complete a compact system.
SECTION 2: HIS THEORIES OF THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL MIND
The theories of the Mind are the keynote of Hsun-tze's
philosophy. They can be divided into two main parts: (1) epistemo-
logical theory of the Mind, or the theory of the Epistemological Mind,
and (2) moral theory of the Mind, or the theory of the Ultimate Mind.
The latter part will be discussed in the following chapter and in this
section, the former one is to be examined.
4~ ^ ^ Shan-Ming. Please see HSUN-TZE, chapter XXII (XVI, 4).
225
A: A SURVEY OF HIS EXPLANATION OF KNOWLEDGE FROM THE
EXAMINATION AND UNDERSTANDING OF THE MIND
In B of the last section, the theory that the Mind
unifies and controls man's five senses and that it examines and
understands external objects is discussed. Knowledge originates,
to Hsun-tze, in the combined function of the Mind and the senses.
However, he merely pursues the issue of how man knows or the
subject of knowledge, and the issue of how things are or the object
of knowledge is neglected; the latter failure becomes a deficiency
of his theories of knowledge.
From his discussion on the subject of knowledge the
following question inevitably arises: if in the process of knowing,
the Mind is capable of unifying and controlling the senses and of
examining and understanding the object, then why can it examine and
understand it, or how is knowledge possible in the Mind? Hsun-tze
in fact does not give an answer.
In chapter XXI, entitled 'Dispelling Obsessions', he
suggests that the state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and
Undisturbedness of the Mind is the way to know. By Receptiveness
of the Mind he means that there are, besides the storing-up places,
empty places in the Mind for further storing. Although the knowledge
stored-up in the Mind is great, the Mind will not thus lack empty
spaces for more knowledge; in other words, the capability of the Mind
of receiving knowledge is unlimited. By Attentiveness, he means that
the Mind is able to know two things simultaneously and it is able to
distinguish that these two things are not one thing; in other words,
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the Mind is able to attend to and recognise the different objects
learned without confusion. By Undisturbedness he means that although
there is a time when the Deliberation ceases to function temporarily,
and daydreams start to arise, nevertheless when it is working the
internal confusions or contradictions of the Mind will vanish and the
acquired knowledge of the Mind is always still and not disturbed.
In short, the Mind is able to receive knowledge unlimitedly, to know
without confusion and to think undisturbedly. Therefore, in Hsun-
tze's thinking, when the Mind is in the state of Receptiveness, Attent-
iveness and Undisturbedness, or when it is unobsessed, it is able
to obtain knowledge of an external object. However, if one examines
this closely, one may find that such a state of Mind, i.e. Receptive¬
ness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness may only serve as an
explanation of the condition of the possibility of knowledge, yet it
does not answer the question of why the Mind knows the object. What
he has said is based upon a presupposition that the Mind is capable
of knowing external objects. And his explanation of the condition of
possibility of knowledge of the Mind is rather a psychological one and
not a pure epistemological one.
It may be helpful to investigate briefly the difference
in scope or concern between psychology and epistemology in order to
establish a support for the arguments here. Although the study of
epistemology has been historically intimately allied with that of
psychology, it does not follow that they are one field. A fundamental
difference lies in the fact that psychology is concerned solely with
the investigation of states of the mind while epistemology investigates
not only the cognitive state of the mind, but attempts to grasp
227
different types of object of cognition. Therefore epistemology
embraces a wider scope of study of knowledge, namely the possibility
of knowledge, its origin, its limits, its categories, and some philo¬
sophical issues such as the problem of the ji priori, the structure of
the knowledge-situation, and the problem of truth. Psychology, on
the other hand, may involve itself with epistemology only when the
cognitive activity of the Mind is under discussion, yet it is still
distinctively different from the latter in its field of interest.
Briefly, psychology is interested only in the description and explana¬
tion of certain states of the mind, including its conscious cognitive
activities, whereas epistemology tries to deal with the various philo¬
sophical issues such as the relation of the subject of knowledge to
the object of knowledge, or the structure of a knowledge-situation
and the source of genuine knowledge in the mind. Although some
analyses or interpretations of both studies may suggest interdependent
data to each other, a clear cleavage in their directions of interest
or in their methods of approach to their subject matter is always
distinctive. Since Hsun-tze does not explain in detail whether it
is because of a transcendental rational cause or an empirical cause
that the Mind is able to know, to examine and to understand or recog¬
nise external objects, nor is he interested in the investigation of
the structure of knowledge-situation, i.e. whether external objects
exist independently of man, his theory is not strictly speaking an
approved one in epistemology.
In the same chapter, Hsun-tze also mentions that when
man's Mind is Receptive, Attentive and Undisturbed, when he looks he
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sees; when he sees he distinguishes, and when he distinguishes he
knows and understands; and that when man's Mind is obsessed, his
cognitive reactions are completely opposite. This again is obviously
a psychological description, for Hsun-tze does not explain the reason
why, when a man is in a conscious state or, in his terms, when a
man's Mind is Receptive, Attentive and Undisturbed, he is able to
see, distinguish and know. The following example may help to
explain the argument here: a man sees Mr. Cheung, for example, and
he will not mistake him for Mr. Lee, or a man sees a deer and he will
not mistake it for a horse. What makes him recognise without mistake?
Furthermore, a man, after recognition, is always able to make judge¬
ments according to what he has recognised. For instance, when a man
recognises Mr. Cheung and he hears someone call Mr. Cheung by the name
of Mr. Lee, he is able to correct the mistake, or when he recognises
a deer and hears someone call it a horse, he is able to correct the
mistake. Why is he able to do so? Is reason or experience the
source of his identification and judgement on the accuracy, objectivity,
necessity and efficiency of his own knowledge? These questions lead
to the field of epistomology or the theory of knowledge, and they lie
outside the scope of psychology.
Hsun-tze's explanation, therefore, that the reason for the
knowing of the Mind lies in its Receptiveness, Attentiveness and
Undisturbedness, or the fact that he tries to use a psychological
explanation to solve the cognitive validity of the theory of knowledge,
is a theoretical error.
229
B: A SURVEY OF HIS EPISTEMOLOGICAL MIND AS AN OBSERVER
OF KNOWLEDGE
Hsun-tze in one place makes use of a metaphor to explain
his view of the Mind. In his thinking it seems that there are
originally two levels in man's Mind as with the water in the pan.
The Obsessions of the Mind are similar to the deep turbidity of the
water in the bottom, whereas the state of Great Clearness and Bright¬
ness of the Mind is similar to the clear brightness of the water on
the top. If man's Mind is in its highest state which man's Evil
Nature and other Obsessions sink to its bottom and are buried there
and thus man's Deliberation may come into full play, then it may,
Hsun-tze claims, observe and understand the Ultimate Principle of
Man and thus it may observe and understand the principle of all
things in the physical world. However, he also maintains, if man's
Mind is obsessed by physical objects, and his Evil Nature is exposed
unbridledly and ungovernably as with the blowing of a breeze on the
pan so that the water inside is totally disturbed, then it is not
able to distinguish the right and the wrong, the true and the false.
It seems that the Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is that which is respons¬
ible for man's knowledge, in other words, it is in this connection
an Epistemological Mind and its function is to observe and understand
what it perceives. Some later Chinese scholars therefore argue that
since the Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is just an observing Mind which
is able only to observe and understand at its best, the principles
of the physical world, and which itself does not originate morality;
therefore it, the Mind, is not, they conclude, the source of moral
value, or his theory of Mind as a whole has no value in moral studies.
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These arguments and comments show a lack of thorough
understanding of Hsun-tze's theory. According to Hsun-tze, the
Epistemological Mind may observe all knowledge, including the know¬
ledge of morality. Undoubtedly, Hsun-tze never lays much emphasis
on general knowledge, or knowledge in general, except moral knowledge.
For him, the knowledge of morality is higher in level than that of
general knowledge. Therefore what the Mind may desire to observe
in its state of Great Clearness and Brightness is obviously, accord¬
ing to his theory, not only general knowledge and its principles but
also the knowledge and principles of morality. Here a puzzle about
moral knowledge in Hsun-tze's theory of knowledge may arise: what
does he mean by moral knowledge or knowing morality, the Ultimate
Principle of Man? In fact, the question of what is Tao or the Way
or the Ultimate Principle or Li or the Rational Principle, or what¬
ever it is called, has historically hardly ever been objectively
investigated by most of the Chinese thinkers. Moral knowledge is
to Hsun-tze and many other Chinese thinkers, seen as a matter of
£
conviction rather than an analytical understanding. From such a
knowledge or conviction, thinkers such as Hsun-tze make every effort
to keep to it by certain form(s) of moral practice(s). In other
words, they try to affirm the reality of such knowledge by means
of concrete moral experiences. By these experiences they are en¬
lightened with a new knowledge of experience of 'morality and self'.
From such a new knowledge, they devote themselves to continuous moral
practices, elevate themselves level by level to an experience of
'Oneness with morality', or a state of moral perfection. However,
the experience of 'Oneness with morality' or the state of moral
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perfection may be mainly a psychological and subjective feeling.
However, it does not follow here that their moral knowledge and
moral experience which may not immediately form an objective principle
are not true or valid. The above narration may give some indication
of the traditional Chinese thinkers' attitude when they speak of
morality. Since the Chinese thinkers believe that they may communi¬
cate and be allied with morality by means of their own moral cultivation,
there has been almost no conscious establishment of objective and
systematic analysis of moral knowledge in Chinese philosophy. However,
this does not imply that Chinese thinkers consider that moral practice
is possible without moral knowledge. For most of them, the knowledge
of certain forms of moral practices such as rites and their moral
meanings is itself moral knowledge, while the knowledge of morality
is subjectively identical with each level of moral practice and culti¬
vation. In short, they are concerned only with empirical moral
knowledge as the way to morality. Perhaps because of this an establish¬
ment of objective and systematic investigation of moral knowledge has
not been important and necessary to them. In Hsun-tze's theory of
knowledge, moral knowledge is never properly defined. In fact, he
often unwittingly identifies it with moral practice of rites in human
relationships and social institutions. However, the ambiguity of
certain concepts such as Tao, and knowledge of Tao, may also be one
of his theoretical deficiencies in conceptual investigation. As to
the question of whether the Mind is the source of moral value or
whether his theory of Mind as a whole has value in morality, this
will be discussed in the next chapter. However, since what Hsun-tze
is concerned with is morality and not knowledge, he has thus limited
the development of his theory of the Epistemological Mind.
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C: A SURVEY OF HIS THEORIES OF THE OBSESSED MIND AND
ILLUSIONS
In chapter XXI, Hsun-tze lists the Obsessions of Mind
as follows:
'Desire is Obsession, hatred is Obsession, the
beginning is Obsession, the end is Obsession, far is
Obsession, near is Obsession, broadness is Obsession,
narrowness is Obsession, the ancient is Obsession, and
the present is also Obsession. If things are differ¬
ent, then they are considered to be obsessed by each
other. These are the general defects of the Mind.'
(XV, 1)
To summarize his words, the Obsessions of Mind include
man's emotion or desires, event, space, knowledge, time and things
which roughly are in the general categories of known objects. It
is apparent that, to Hsun-tze, objects themselves are not the
Obsessions, it is the biased interpretation by the Mind of these
external objects which give rise to Obsessions. In other words,
the origin of the Obsessions of Mind lies in the Mind itself.
The Mind turns to external objects and it is then more and more
remote from morality, and wherever it turns to and whatever it
chases after, Obsessions are to be found. Therefore in the begin¬
ning of this chapter, Hsun-tze says that if a man's knowledge is
biased and his Mind is obsessed, then he becomes innocent of the
'great principle', i.e. the Ultimate Principle, and this is 'an
affliction of man'.
However, the explanation Hsun-tze has tried to give of
the different kinds of Obsessions of Mind again belongs to the realm
of psychology. Furthermore, to say that all known objects are
likely to cause Obsessions is highly disputable. Viewed from the
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standpoint of morality, this statement of Hsun-tze is acceptable
since he also explains that the Mind is the origin of its Obsessions.
However, if the question is explored more deeply, the following
difficulty is found. (1) As all external objects are merely
possible causes of the Obsessions, and the Mind itself is the main
cause of its Obsessions, then it is the Mind that chooses to follow
external objects and it is the Mind that should be responsible for
its culpable choice. In other words, external objects are not
responsible for the Obsessions of the Mind. There is 110 reason
therefore for man to devalue all external objects as objects of
knowledge, which Hsun-tze in fact has been trying to do, in order
to negatively make perfect the virtue of the Mind. Therefore the
fact that Hsun-tze does not want to lay much emphasis on general
knowledge is, in theory, inconsistent and it is difficult for him
to reconcile these two positions. (2) On the other hand, the
fact that he considers only morality and nothing else is also likely
to cause Obsession of his own Mind and of his philosophical systems,
although his great effort to establish his ideal in morality and
to apply it to man is quite understandable and highly commendable.
As to the method of dispelling or removing the Obsessions
of Mind, Hsun-tze suggests that one should make the Mind keep to its
state of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, in other
words, to let the Mind know and understand the Ultimate Principle
of Man or morality. This leads to his theory of the Ultimate Mind
and the core of his philosophy, which will be discussed in the
next chapter.
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The origin of illusion according to Hsun-tze, lies in
the fact that the Mind, observing things and having doubt, feels
uncertain or confused. The causes of doubtfulness in the observ¬
ation of things are, Hsun-tze suggests, darkness that blinds the
eyes, improper application of the senses which confuses man's
5
sensory organs , distance and height that disorder man's sight,
wine which disturbs man's clear-mindedness, and man's own foolish¬
ness and over-fearfulness. In other words, external physical
causes, man's own physiological causes and his psychological causes
are possible factors in the uncertainness of the Mind. To Hsun-
tze, no matter which of the above causes occur, while the Mind is
in doubt and is uncertain, illusions easily emerge; and at this
time, what is in the Mind should not be used as the basis of Consider¬
ation and decision. However, Hsun-tze attributes the origin of
illusions to psychological explanations which may not lie within the
scope of episteraology or the theory of knowledge. In other words,
his disucssions of the Obsessed Mind and illusions or, roughly speak¬
ing, certain states of the Mind and the activities as a result, may
primarily be of psychological and not epistemological concern.
It is apparent from the above that his theory of the Mind
is not originally designed for epistemology, and that what is involved
in his theory of the Epistemological Mind is indeed in the main his
theory of psychology. However, Hsun-tze does not have the ambition
of establishing a system of psychology and what he tries to explain is
the different kinds of Obsessions of Mind, with the intention of
paving the way for his further discussion of the theory of the Ultimate
Mind. Therefore, although he may be considered the pioneer in the
5^ One of the examples given by Hsun-tze is that man covers his ears
with his hands and hears loud sounds which in fact outside his ears
are soft and low.
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field of psychology in ancient China, as some modern scholars
6
comment , he is not discussing psychology for its own sake, and
furthermore, he does not establish a school of psychology. It is
perhaps an Obsession arising from his over-stubbornness as regards
morality.
SECTION 3: HIS THEORIES OF REASONING
In Hsun-tze's system of thought the theories of analogical
reasoning, deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning may more or
less theoretically supplement the insufficiency of his theory of the
knowing and examining of the Mind. In other words, the limit of
knowledge by means of the Epistemological Mind can be slightly amended
by his theories of reasoning. However, two difficulties immediately
follow, namely, the efficiency of the theory of reasoning as a means
to knowledge and the relation of the theory of reasoning to that of
knowledge.
A: THE EFFICIENCY OF THE THEORY OF REASONING IN EPISTEMOLOGY
(i) Examination of the theory of analogical reasoning
In chapter V Hsun-tze takes the Sage as an example to
explain the theory that by analogical reasoning a Sage may know all
7
human situations, relations, and so forth . The Sage is the
model of Hsun-tze's perfect personality, devoting himself to the
6. A typical discussion may be found, for example, in the introduction
of Wang Chung-Lin's translation (into modern Chinese) of HSUN-TZE.
7. For reference, please see p.57.
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Ultimate Principle and thus there is nothing, according to Hsun-tze,
he does not see, hear and know. By practising his moral excellence
the Sage may also measure and deal with all human affairs. However,
the following difficulties immediately emerge:
(1) Men are not all Sages. In the case of an ordinary man,
the knowledge which he attains by applying reason as far as he can
to the best of his limited ability may turn out to be quite different
from the knowledge of the Sage. In other words, the subjective
analogical reasoning of an ordinary man may not guarantee a cognitive
validity.
(2) The Sage, according to Hsun-tze, by means of his practice
of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, may also know the
principle of all things. However, the principle of all things which
Hsun-tze advertises as the Sage's knowledge in fact may not be the
detailed physical principle of all things. This is a statement
8
needing further interpretation to be intelligible . As to an
V/
ordinary man, such knowledge is not easily obtained, therefore the
level of objective efficiency of the knowledge resulting from the
analogical reasoning of a Sage is difficult, if not impossible, for
an ordinary man to achieve.
(ii) Examination of the theory of deductive reasoning
In chapters V, VIII and IX, the argument put forward by
Hsun-tze is that it is possible to know ten thousand by one, by the
9
Conscientious Man or the Sage . In other words, by means of moral
8. For a further interpretation, please see p.283.
9. For reference, please see p.58.
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practice the Conscientious Man or the Sage is able to assist and
participate in the working of nature or Heaven and to classify all
things. However, seeking for epistemological knowledge with such
a theory of moral practice will eventually run into the two
difficulties mentioned above.
(iii) Examination of the theory of inductive reasoning
In chapter III, Hsun-tze argues that the emotions of a
thousand or ten thousand men are that of one man^? He is again
taking the example of a Conscientious Man who, putting his moral
knowledge into practice may apprehend the principle of all things.
Similarly, such a theory inevitably meets with the above-mentioned
difficulties.
To summarize the above, no matter whether in his theory
of analogical reasoning, or that of deductive reasoning, or that of
inductive reasoning, Hsun-tze is only taking the example of the
%
Conscientious Man or the Sage who, by means of moral practice, comes
to know how to deal with all things and all changes in a special way.
In short, a way of obtaining knowledge is, he suggests, moral practice.
Hsun-tze may thus be accused of the following: (1) Ambiguity in his
argument. The knowledge claimed to be achieved by the moral agent
is not the genuine epistemological cognition of external objects,
but may be either the knowledge of certain forms of moral practice
or a special way to deal with all things and all changes; however,
it is difficult to know to which of these Hsun-tze is referring.
10. For reference, please see p. 58.
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(2) It is also difficult to express these theories satisfactorily
in an objective manner for only a Sage may achieve certain, if not
all, epistemological knowledge by means of moral practice and an
ordinary man may not. It seems that Hsun-tze fails to take into
account the position of the ordinary man. (3) His main defect
lies in his neglect of the different realms of morality and know¬
ledge. He has been incorrectly including knowledge in morality
and fails to see knowledge as an independent study. Besides,
whether the theories of reasoning can sufficiently supply man with
genuine knowledge, or at least valid cognition, is also doubtful.
B THE RELATIONS OF THE ESSENCES OF THE THEORY OF
REASONING AND THAT OF THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
The theories of analogical reasoning, deductive reasoning
and inductive reasoning are, in principle, three methods of making
use of the known knowledge to deduce the unknown. Although Hsun-
tze 's arguments always unconsciously tend to an unnecessary-
entanglement with morality, his commentators cannot deny the fact
that his arguments also involve themselves unconsciously in the
category of methodology of knowledge. However, these three theories
of reasoning belong only to the category of methodology of knowledge
itself. The basic difference between the two is that the former is
primarily and principally the study of the form and principle of
reasoning while the latter is principally the study of the knowledge,
the possibility of knowledge, its limits, its origins, its categories,
its structure and its validity. The analysis of different forms of
reasoning and their validity in acquisition of knowledge may be
considered to belong to epistemology. However, the theory of
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reasoning itself may not be the concern of epistemological validity.
In other words, these two studies are of different interests.
Therefore Hsun-tze's arguments on the theories of reasoning have
accidentally touched on logic or methodology of knowledge; they
cannot then be considered to be in the field of the theory of know¬
ledge for Hsun-tze does not go more deeply into a philosophical
discussion or an epistemological inquiry into their cognitive valid¬
ity. In conclusion, his theories of reasoning, though they are
practically of some importance in his system and they suggest some
sources in logic, are theoretically of little merit with regard to
the theory of knowledge.
SECTION 4: HIS THEORIES OF RECTIFICATION OF NAMES
Hsun-tze's theories of rectification of names consist
negatively, of an argument against three contemporary sophistic
statements and of giving his own solutions to them, and positively,
establishing the way of debate.
A: DISPUTABLE POINTS IN HIS SOLUTIONS OF THE THREE CONFUSIONS
The three confusions which Hsun-tze argues against are;
(1) using words to confuse names; (2) using fact to confuse names;
and (3) using words to confuse fact1'*'. They are so named because
in all of them the names and realities fail to correspond and thus
cause man's confusion. The following is a close examination of
these three confusions.
11. For reference, please see pp.60-68.
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(i) "sing, words to confuse names
To take an example, to say that someone is not happy
does not, in theory, necessarily mean that he is sad, or to say
that someone is not poor does not necessarily mean that he is rich.
Therefore if one considers that 'not happy' means 'sad' or 'not
'poor' means 'rich' one may be guilty of imprecise meaning and the
words one applies may lead to confusion of the factual truth. As
put forward by Hsun-tze, the confusion itself is undisputable for
such a confusion is possible. However, what is disputable are the
first two statements quoted as examples. Whether they are 'confus¬
ions' as Hsun-tze charges is worthy of being examined as follows:
(a) In the example of Sung-tze's statement that to be insulted is
not disgraceful, Hsun-tze considers that the reason for man's not
12
fighting is that he does not hate to be insulted . However, this
may not be in correspondence with Sung-tze's original idea. The
structure of propositions of both thinkers may be outlined as follows:
Sung-tze: If one considers that to be insulted is not
disgraceful then one will not start fighting.
Hsun-tze: If one considers that to be insulted is not
hateful, then one will not start fighting.
Both of them come to the same moral conclusion; however, their
premises are slightly different, yet not entirely contradictory to
each other. The former considers that the fact of being insulted
is not disgraceful, while the latter thinks that the Mind does not
feel hateful about the fact of being insulted. It may be suggested,
however, that both factors can be the reasons for man's not fighting.
12. For reference, please see p.60.
241
and it all depends on the high or low level of man's cultivation or
moral education. In other words, Sung-tze's reason that man does
not consider being insulted as insulting and thus does not fight is
one of a negative attitude in morality, while Hsun-tze's reason that
man does not hate to be insulted and thus does not fight is one of a
positive attitude in morality. Therefore the statement of Sung-tze
is not necessarily to be considered a confusing one, or deviating
from fact or, in Hsun-tze's term, 'reality'.
(b) In the second example, the .statement quoted from the contemporary
popular saying that the Sage does not love himself, Hsun-tze argues
that a Sage should love all men including himself as one of all men,
13
for the names 'man' and 'oneself' is of one reality . Viewed from
another aspect, the statement may be interpreted as meaning that the
Sage does not pay attention to love for himself but extends his love
14
to all men. In the chapter of 'Ta-Ch'u' of MO-PIEN it is written:
'To love all men is not excluding one's own
self, for one's own self is in those whom one loves.'
Accordingly, the Sage needs not particularly love himself
for he himself is included in his love for all men, and such an inter¬
pretation is the same as that of Hsun-tze. He may perhaps have heard
of the saying of some contemporary Mo-ists, yet he may not have heard
of the one quoted above which can be found in MO-PIEN. However, the
point is that the statement itself is not necessarily the sophistic
confusion which it is accused by Hsun-tze of being.
13. For reference, please see p.62.
14. ^ Mo-Pien Ta- Ch'ii.
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As to the third example, the statement seen in MO-PIEN
that to kill a thief is not to kill a man, Hsun-tze argues that
the thief is also a man, therefore to kill a thief is to kill a
15 10
man . However, in the same chapter, i.e. 'Hsiao Ch'u' of
MO-PIEN, a paragraph is written as follows:
'A thief is a man. However, to say that there
are many thieves does not mean that there are many men;
to say that there is no thief does not mean that there
is no man ... To say that one hates that gang of
thieves does not mean that one hates a group of men, or
to say that one wishes there is no thief does not mean
that one wishes there is no man. If viewed from the
identical point of them both, then it is valid to say
that though one is a thief, one is a man. However, to
love a thief is not equivalent to loving a man; similarly
not to love a thief does not mean not to love a man. And
thus to kill a thief is not to kill a man.1
Accordingly, viewed from the physical identities of man,
all men are alike, and therefore a thief is qualified physically to
be called a man. However, viewed from the individual identities
of each man, all men are not the same, and more importantly, if
viewed from the standpoint of morality, men are moral beings, and
the thief who has broken a moral rule or ceased to follow a moral
code is not a moral man. Thus in the original statement, it is
said that a gang of thieves is not equivalent to a group of men.
It is also apparent that the following two statements in the original
carry the same idea. Love for a thief should have a special meaning,
in other words, the love for a certain thief is not transferrable to
another person. As to the last and most important statement: to
kill a thief is not to kill a man, it may be interpreted in the
15. For reference, please see p.62.
16. Mo-Pien Hsiao-Ch'ii.
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following ways: (1) viewed from the viewpoint of physical
identities of men, a thief is also a man; thus to kill a thief
is undoubtedly to kill a man; and (2) viewed from the moral
identities of each man, a thief is not a moral man, or not a man
in a moral sense, thus to kill a thief is not to kill a man in a
moral sense. Therefore the intepretation of the author of Hsiao
Ch'u and that of Hsun-tze are different viewpoints under different
lights, and in theory, their interpretations can both be said to be
correct. However, in practice, to kill someone, either a thief or
not a thief, is non-moral activity, therefore the killer is also
not a man in moral sense. Perhaps one more statement may be added;
the one who kills a thief is also not a moral man. In law,
however, a thief is a man in society; thus to kill a thief is
certainly to kill a man. In this case, the accusation of Hsun-tze
against the statement is reasonable.
(ii) Using fact to confuse names
In one of the poems of theT'ang Dynasty (618-907 A.D.),
it is written:
'On the sea rises the moon bright; though far
away we share this moment this night.'17
If taking the poetry as an example, one expounds further
its meaning, one may also examine the validity of Hsun-tze's accus¬
ation here. Taking the latter part of the sentence, if the actual
situation is, for example, that someone is in Hong Kong on a June
17. 'Gazing at the moon and thinking of someone far away' by
J&?" Chang Chiu-ling (673-740 A.D.), one of the greatest
poets inT'ang Dynasty.
night and the one he thinks of in South America on the same night,
then the realities of the two places are doubtlessly different, i.e.
a summer night in Hong Kong and a winter night in South America,
while for geographical reasons they cannot possibly see the moon at
the same time. However, if the geographical distance is drawn
nearer, for example, someone is in Hong Kong Island and the one he
thinks of is in Kowloon which is a few miles away from Hong Kong
Island, it is possible for them to watch the moon at the same time
and the same night. Therefore, viewed practically the words 'far
away' should not mean a place really too far away to be in correspond¬
ence with the words 'this moment' and 'the moon'. However, dismissing
the practical concepts of time and space, one may find that the
following interpretation is possible: though someone and the one he
thinks of live far apart, they may psychologically share the same
moment. For example, someone is in London where the time is eight
hours behind that of Hong Kong, and the distance between them is
thousands of miles, and now when he is in London thinks of someone in
Hong Kong, he can easily feel and know the possible situation of his
friend's life as this is a part of recollection in his memory and
sometimes he may even feel and know that the one he thinks of is also
thinking of him too. Therefore, in psychology, a complete meeting of ,
two minds can be possible. Thus the poetry seems to be psychologically
reasonable and in fact a lyrical poetry is always considered good at
psychological descriptions.
Returning to Hsun-tze's accusation of man's using fact to
confuse names, it is apparent that the accusation is unsuccessful for
there are psychological exceptions. The reality or fact for Hsun-
tze always means only an experienced or common-sense one, and he
always excludes psychological feelings and responses, which are also
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realities. The experienced or common-sense reality perceived by man
is the subjective knowledge of that reality, and his psychological
feelings and responses are also a reality of man's feeling. In other
words, cognitive validity depending on individual perception is subject
to relativity. So arguments against different perceptions from one's
own may be unnecessary. Briefly, the psychological fact does not
necessarily confuse names and thus lead to a sophistic confusion.
The examples quoted by Hsun-tze are thus again disputable ones.
(a) The first example quoted is Hui Shih's statement that
18
mountains and chasms are on the same level . The statement can now
be found in the book CHUANG-TZE:
'The heaven and earth are similarly low and the
mountains and chasms are on the same level.' (XXXIII)
In Hui Shih's thinking the universe is boundlessly large.
What the man on earth sees as 'sky' or 'heaven' is in fact the atmos¬
phere, and viewed from the standpoint of the universe the 'sky or
'heaven' and the earth on which man stands can be said to be as if
on the same level. Similarly, if man stands on very high ground
or, in modern days, if man sits in an aeroplane and looks down, he
will see that the mountains and chasms are as if on the same level. ,
If one takes another example as follows: viewed from a distance men
are as small as ants, one may find that such a perception is as true
as any other perception of men. The point here is: since cognitive
validity depending on individual perception is subject to relativity,
Hui-Shih's perception may be as true as Hsun-tze"s, although its
18. For reference, please see p.63.
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epistemological validity may lead to further controversial arguments.
On the other hand, the ground on which Hui-Shih bases his statement
is simply his own rich imagination and his own intelligent intuition.
And in the modern scientific world, his wild imagination is not
altogether impossible. Therefore the statement of Hui-Shih may
not be a confusion as Hsun-tze accuses it of being.
(b) In the second example, Hsun-tze quotes Sung-tze's
statement that man naturally desires little; Hsun-tze considers that
man naturally desires much and not little and thus he concludes that
the statement is a confusion. However, viewing it from another
aspect, one may argue that when man's moral sentiment is cultivated
and educated to a high level, the desires of the ears and the eyes
for sound and colour will gradually be decreased, and perhaps sublim¬
ated or transformed , and instead there are sentiments of appreciation,
which are certainly different from the desires of possession. There¬
fore the meaning of Sung-tze's statement that man 'naturally wants
19
these (i.e. the enjoyments of the ears and eyes, etc.)' is that
man may desire or want the existence of such enjoyments but he does
not necessarily desire to occupy them all. Man loves beautiful
colour and fine sound simply because they are beautiful and fine, and
he loves them with a sense of aesthetic appreciation. For example,>
man loves to see beautiful roses in the garden, he enjoys their
beauty, he watches them, he praises them and he appreciates them.
However, he will certainly feel unhappy if he cuts them to decorate
his vase or to place them on his desk and thus shorten their natural
19. For reference, please see p.64.
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lives. Similarly, when man is morally cultivated and educated, one
may say that at this stage he may naturally desire little of physical
objects. In other words, the physical desire of a morally good man
is relatively decreased. Thus it is because of the different con¬
tent and meaning of the words 'desire' used by Sung-tze and Hsun-tze
that Hsun-tze's accusation may not necessarily be valid.
(c) In the third example Hsun-tze quotes the statements which
are speculated to be from the saying of Mo-ists that a feast of grass-
fed and grain-fed animals has no tastiness and the music of the great
bell gives no pleasure and Hsun-tze accuses them of not being in
20
accordance with facts and experiences . The fact that delicious
food and wonderful music give tastiness and pleasure to man is prac¬
tical common sense; however, there are men who eat without tasting
anything, who hear without hearing a sound, for they are psychologic¬
ally very ill and what they are doing is often a mechanical repetition
without feeling. In fact the changes of subjective emotion in man
often affect his behaviour and his responses to common-sense. In
such a case it should not be treated as a sophistic confusion.
Hsun-tze always considers that the fact of common-sense
or empirical knowledge is the reality and any fact of non-common-sense
or non-empirical knowledge which is not in correspondence with the
empirical reality is therefore a confusion. One may say that his
accusation against these sayings are not sufficiently careful and
compact.
20. For reference, please see p.65.
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(iii) Using words to confuse fact
The examples quoted in Hsun-tze's accusation are again
subjects of dispute. In the original text there is no fixed reading
21
of the examples" . According to the first reading, in the first
quotation that 'he who censures his enemy visits him', the words
'censures' and 'visits' are not necessarily the causes of confusion.
For example, an employee censures his manager for some reason and he
has to visit him in order to ask for a favour. The case simply
implies the necessity of the objective situation and it does not
imply inconsistence in the man's feeling and behaviour. In the
second quotation that 'the pillar has an ox', since the statement
itself is too ambiguous to understand, any argument against it seems
a waste of time. The third quotation that 'a white horse is not a
horse' is a famous theory of Kung-Sun Lung. Hsun-tze considers that
a white horse is a horse and it can always represent all horses and
22
that thus the statement is confusing as to the fact . However, this
statement may be interpreted in a different way that: a white horse
is not an ordinary horse. In the study of category, 'horse* is a
general name while 'a white horse' is a particular name. A white
horse possesses the special quality of whiteness which makes it
different from other horses. Therefore viewed from the aspect of
similarity, a white horse is a horse; however, viewed from the aspect
of difference, a white horse is not a horse of ordinary quality but of
special quality in colour. Viewed from the standpoint of Hsun-tze's
principle of formulating names, i.e. name should correspond with its
21.
22 .
For reference please see p.66.
For reference please see pp.67-68.
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reality, no matter which kinds or colours of horses, they are horses
and should be called horses, therefore one cannot say that a white
horse is not a horse. However, viewed from the standpoint of Rung-
Sun Lung, by using analysis of category, one may say that a white
horse is not a horse of an ordinary kind. Hsun-tze concentrates
his attention on the 'horse' in Kung-Sun Lung's statement and finds
it absurd if one refuses to agree that a white horse or any horse is
not a horse. Kung-Sun Lun emphasizes the word 'white' in his state¬
ment and finds it logically necessary to proclaim that a white horse
is not a (an ordinary) horse. In short, a class of white horses is
not equivalent to a class of horses in general. Nevertheless, if
one goes deeply into the statement, one may also find that the state¬
ment itself has its theoretical fallacy which is different from the
practical fallacy claimed to have been found by Hsun-tze. According
to Kung-Sun Lung's proposition: If a part it not equal to its whole,
then a white horse is not a horse. The following diagram may be
useful to see his argumentation:
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However, the fact that Kung-Sun Lung takes colour as the
quality-in-common of horses is an error. In other words, when
man distinguishes horses, he cannot take colour as the principal
criterion or the only distinctive characteristic of a horse.
When he thinks of a horse, he will think of an animal with thin
legs, long face, small ears, having a mane, hair, a long spreading
tail, the capability of running fast, etc. Although it is possible
for a man to think simultaneously of a coloured horse, he may not
confine his thinking to a horse of certain colour; he may think of
a white, or black, or brown or mixed-colour horse. Similarly, he
may also think of a big, or medium or small horse. The point is,
when a man thinks of a horse, he is thinking of its qualities-in-
common, such as its general shape and its general attributes, and
he is not thinking of its qualities-in-particular, such as its
colour and its size. Therefore the fact that to concentrate on
the whiteness of a horse and to conclude that a white horse is not
a horse is a mistaken focus or concentration of thought. Or one
may say that the statement itself is logically valid in form but
not intelligibly meaningful in content. It seems, therefore, that
the two interpretations of the statement, i.e. (1) a white horse
is not a horse of ordinary quality, and (2) a white horse cannot
represent all horses, are without error in logical analysis but they
are theoretically unsound as far as their cognitive or factual
meaning is concerned. This theory of a white horse is, most comment¬
ators claimed, one of the important theories of the Ming Chia or the
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school of names in the Pre-Ch'in Period; however, the theory
itself is indeed forced or sophistical and it does not offer an
important contribution to the study of epistemology and logic.
As to the other reading of these statements, to the
first part, i.e. 'he who censures his enemy visits him (and waits)
besides the pillar', the argument suggested in the above is still
applicable. As for the second part, i.e. 'to have an ox and a
horse is not to have a horse', it is obviously a correct statement
and it seems unnecessary for Hsun-tze to argue against it. There¬
fore it may be suggested that the second reading of the statement
is possible not valid.
The method suggested by Hsun-tze in the solution to
these three confusions is to use the principle of names and reality.
Since he always uses experience or common-sense as the cognitive
method to examine the efficiency of name and reality in a statement,
thus what he can examine is only that which is in man's experience
or which is common-sense knowledge. As to those statements such as
23. % Ming Chia, one of the important schools of thought
in Pre-Ch'in Period, represented by Hui-Shih, Kung-Sun Lung.
Their main interests lie in epistemological inquiries about philo¬
sophical issues of logic and metaphysics. Their sayings are often
considered to be sophistries by their contemporaries and some later
commentators. However, although some of their statements seem to
be rather sophistical, the rest are highly logical, philosophical
and metaphysical. They are often looked down upon by orthodox
Confucian commentators such as Hsun-tze simply because their sayings
are often far from empirical or common-sense knowledge and are
difficult to understand and accept. Only six chapters of
Kung-Sun Lung's work have survived. The work of Hui-Shih and the
other sophists have not been preserved and only fragments are recorded
in the books CHUANG-TZE, MO-TZE and HSUN-TZE.
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psychological descriptions, intuitive thinking, and genuine
metaphysical discussions, where their truth-value may be in¬
dependent of plain common-sense or general explanation they all
seem sophistries to him, and become examples of confusion in his
theory. However, since the name and reality in his theory is
obsessed by experience and common sense, this becomes a deficiency
of his theory of rectification of names.
Hsun-tze's reasons for accusing the three confusions
of deficiency are theoretically correct. However, the quotations
he uses as examples of confusions are almost all irrelevant. Per¬
haps it is because the statements themselves are too ambiguous to
be understood properly, for at least they often have more than one
interpretation. Therefore either Hsun-tze has used the wrong
examples or he makes some wrong judgements on them.
From the solution of the three confusions, it is clear
that the direction of Hsun-tze's effort tends to look for the fact¬
ual meaning of a statement or empirical truth. This is because
Hsun-tze emphasizes heavily the principle of name and reality and
its relations to man's experience and this affects the way he deals
with the problems of epistemology.
B: A SURVEY OF HIS THEORY OF THE ARTS OF DEBATE
The essence of debate (Pien) to Hsun-tze is, on one
hand and positively, to speak of what man considers to be in accordance
with the Ultimate Principle of Man and, on the other hand and
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negatively, to enlighten people as to right and wrong, to keep the
country under control and to bring peace to the world. In debate,
name and reality must be completely in correspondence. The solu¬
tions of the three confusions given by Hsun-tze in fact are examples
of a standard debate. However, his interpretation of the debate is
always confined to the realm of his moral philosophy. Therefore
he says that there are cases on which a Conscientious Man does not
debate. The useless speech which he suggests, for example is in
24
fact that which has no relation to morality . Therefore it is
i
apparent that the debates of the Conscientious Man or the Sage,
to Hsun-tze, are those of morality and not those of pure theoretical
knowledge. They are also, precisely speaking, debates of names and
virtue and not those of philosophical, conceptual, logical and
epistemological concern. In other words, his theory of debate
makes little contribution to that of pure thinking or pure knowledge.
As to his principles of the situations which a
Conscientious Man does not debate, i.e. when in doubt, or if the
topic is not concerned with Human-Mindedness, or if speech is use¬
less, or when he should not speak and should keep silent, they all
aim at the moral cultivation of the debator and naturally are
valuable in the sense of morality.
The way or method of rectification of names suggested
by Hsun-tze, no matter whether it is negatively to solve the three
confusions, or positively to establish the arts or principle of
debate, reveals the following two limits:
24. For reference, please see p.73.
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(1) It examines names and reality merely by experience and
common-sense, as a result of which sometimes the scope of
examination becomes confined or too narrow.
(2) He suggests that man debates only what is morally
relevant so that the semantical meaning of the term 'debate'
becomes biased for it is only of moral interest and not of cognitive
concern.
His theory of solutions of the three confusions has
recently been very,enthusiastically discussed by Chinese scholars
and some of them consider it to be a great contribution to the
study of logic. However, although it has some value in clarifi¬
cation of the idea of names, it makes little contribution to the
theory of knowledge in general.
SECTION 5: CONCLUSION
A REASSESSMENT OF HIS THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE
In his theory, since Hsun-tze speaks of knowledge
originating from man's sensory organs, it is evident that he follows
the theory of empiricism which suggests experience as the source of
knowledge. However, when he speaks of the knowing and examining of
the Mind, it is true that he is not far away from the theory of
rationalism which proclaims reason or the rational functioning of
the mind as the source of knowledge. Therefore his combination of
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viewpoints of the origin of knowledge may be said to be close to
that of 'criticism'. By criticism is meant that which reconciles
empiricism and rationalism by proposing that both reason and
experience play a role in the constitution of knowledge. Never¬
theless, in his theory of the Epistemological Mind, he stresses
cognition of morality and not that of knowledge, and his theory of
the rectification of names is always related to experience and
facts of common-sense, thus these two theories indeed lean to
empiricism.
Hsun-tze scarcely touches on such matters as the
structure of the knowledge-situation or its validity. The special
branch of names which he indicates are the names of social institut¬
ions and those of man's attributes and they do not include all kinds
of names and concepts. The reality is also confined to common-
sense existence, and since he always considers that reality must be
examined by man's experience, the reality thus indicated is common-
sense existence within experience. He does not explain whether
external objects can exist independently of man, the knowing subject,
and whether it is identical with the data of knowledge. The point
is that the problem of the structure of knowledge is not one with
which he is concerned for it is not a problem of morality; therefore
it is not surprising that he offers no discussion or argument on it.
In his discussion in general, Hsun-tze claims that the
scope of possible knowledge of the external v/orld or that of all
objects in the universe is boundless and limitless, and that man's
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knowledge is limited within his own experience or common-sense.
He also holds that man should examine the names and realities of
external objects by means of his five sensory organs and the Mind
and that if man's sensory organs do not perceive sufficient inform¬
ation about external objects, his Mind will not be able to examine
them. However, in his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man,
he believes that a man, when he is united with the Ultimate
Principle or when his Mind is an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind, may
become aware of a way to deal with the boundless and limitless
25
world . It is obvious, however, that his theories are primarily
and ultimately not pure epistemological inquiries. He does not
deal with the questions of the possibility of knowledge, and limits
of knowledge, in a professional way as an epistemologist does. In
other words, he does not deliberately make an objective investigation
or analysis of these issues. One may find it difficult to classify
him with such a profession name as a sceptic.
The above is a general criticism on his theories of name
and virtue, or theory of knowledge. His attitude to the theory of
knowledge is non-radical. The reason for his non-radical position
is perhaps that what he devotes himself to is not an objective study
of knowledge itself but primarily and ultimately an appeal to moral¬
ity. Therefore the theories which accidentally involve the theory
of knowledge are not well-designed or well-organized, or are merely
a skeleton without any flesh. This may explain why Hsun-tze has not
argued himself into an extreme position as many others have.
25. A further discussion on p.283.
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As to his theory of the Epistemological Mind, it is in
the main a rough theory of psychology. His theory of reasoning
may be attributed to the study of logic. His theory of method of
debate may be considered to be a chapter of moral cultivation.
However, Hsun-tze does not intend to cover a full discussion of the
theory of knowledge, therefore it is not surprising that he does
not pursue his inquiries into the nature, structure, validity and
some other philosophical problems in the theory of knowledge.
The traditional development of Chinese philosophy, with
the exception of such less significant scholars as the Ming-Chia or
the school of names, tends to lay more emphasis on morality and
less on pure knowledge; therefore there are quite well-formed studies
of morality, while objective and systematical studies of pure know¬
ledge are almost non-existent, not to mention the intentional studies
and developments of other sciences in the dominating school such as
Confucianism. Hsun-tze is a traditional Confucianist and a moral¬
ist; thus it is natural that he cares only for morality and slightly
despises the studies of pure knowledge. It is perhaps too demanding
to expect his theory of knowledge to construct a system of epistemo¬
logical studies, and in fact his theories in this field are
sufficiently outstanding for his time. In his discussion there are
sections which could possibly have led him to a study of pure know¬
ledge and pure thinking; however, he misses or perhaps gives up the
chances altogether. It may be because the studies of pure knowledge
and pure thinking were not the most urgent business for a philosopher
at that time of extreme chaos. In a nutshell, in his theory, morality
sometimes becomes an obsession to his thought on knowledge.
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In this chapter an attempt to discuss the insufficiency
of Hsun-tze's theory, if it can be so considered, of knowledge is
made. Although it is evident that Hsun-tze has no ambition to
establish a complete theory of knowledge, the fact that his discus¬
sions, more or less, have actually touched on some parts of the
field of epistemology, psychology and logic, cannot be denied.
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CHAPTER VII:
CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN
AND OF THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
CHAPTER VII:
CRITICISM OF HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN
AND OF THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
SECTION 1: HIS THEORIES OF HEAVEN
When man faces the world, the wonder of its geographic
structure and the changes of human affairs, he may ask himself:
'What really is it that I see? Is all that I see really as I see
it or does it have other faces behind it?'. When he continues to
contemplate the essence of the world, its final cause or first
principle, he is considering what is historically called the problem
of metaphysics. He may ask himself such questions as, 'What is the
meaning of life? What is the value of life?'. When he goes on to
contemplate the problem of life and livelihood, he is now considering
what is called the problem of moral philosophy. The theories of
Heaven and of the Ultimate Principle are the opinions of Hsun-tze on
the above-mentioned problems.
&
A: A SURVEY OF HIS CONCEPT OF 'HEAVEN'
Hsun-tze considers that the names 'Heaven' and 'man' are
different names with different realities, therefore he elucidates his
theory of the different abilities and duties of Heaven and man"*". He
points out that if Heaven minds its own business, then 'all things
will respectively attain their harmony in order to grow and survive,
and their nourishment in order to mature and perfect themselves', and
that if man administers his five senses by means of his Mind in order
1. For reference, please see p.79.
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to obtain what is most suitable for his life, if he takes food in
order to grow his body, if he follows nature and simultaneously
overcomes and controls it in order to obtain what is most suitable
for his livelihood, then he is considered to have paid proper
attention to and well fulfilled his duties for his life and liveli¬
hood. Hsun-tze's main purpose in this chapter is to pave the way
for his theory of Mind, thus he says, 'the Sage clears his Mind,
properly uses his senses . . . thus he will know what he should do
and what he should not', and to Hsun-tze, man's duty in principle
is to know what he should do and what he should not. In other
words, when man's Mind knows and practises the Ultimate Principle
of Man or morality, he is performing his duty as a man. Since the
duties of Heaven and man are different, Hsun-tze suggests that man
should pay full attention to his own business and not that of Heaven.
After this clarification, Hsun-tze advances to the attempt at solving
man's confusions about Heaven; that is to eliminate man's super¬
stitions about natural phenomena, the relations of natural phenomena
2
to human affairs, and divination . What he tries to clarify is that
Heaven is not a personified god with faculties of distinction and
will or intention, nor a masterly god with supreme powers, that
Heaven is nature as it is commonly understood, and it should not be
the object of man's superstitions. Hsun-tze thus transforms the
relations of Heaven and man from that of master and subordinate to
a relationship of equality or balance. In other words, he liberates
man from slavery to divinity. Before Hsun-tze, the theories of
elimination of superstitions had been established. Confucius says,
2. For reference, please see p.81.
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'While one does not know life, how can one know about death?'
It is obvious that Confucius has no ambition in the business of
divinity. However, his presentation of this idea is negative and
that of Hsun-tze is thorough, direct, positive and revolutionary.
It may be suggested that the anti-theism of Hsun-tze far surpasses
that of any of his antecedants. His theory of Heaven is a common-
sense view of Heaven which gave a stunning blow to contemporary
superstitions, and his clear-minded exposition of the position of
Heaven is, though not of metaphysical interest, logically analytic
and factually correct.
As to the conception of Heaven, Hsun-tze tries to
establish a genuine natural and common-sense Heaven, or more
precisely, nature whose constant regularity men can experience.
Therefore his concept of Heaven is formed according to the principle
of the theory of names. Hsun-tze considers that nature is a physical
reality whose existence cannot be denied, but its value is only to
supply conditions for life to all things including men and to nourish
4
and preserve them, and it does not have thinking and will . He
thus purposely exalts man's position which had been inferior and sub¬
ordinate to that of nature in his time. He also considers that man
not only can externally distinguish things, but also can internally
cultivate and nourish his own Nature and Mind so that when his Mind
accords with the Ultimate Principle of Man he can, on one hand part¬
icipate in and assist the changes of nature, and on the other make
5
full use of it as well as control it, Thus the position of man
3. THE ANALECTS, Chapter XI. sect.XII.
4. For reference, please see p.87.
5. For reference, please see p.88.
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in the universe is gradually heightened, not only as high as that of
nature, but in certain aspects, even higher than it. This is the
essential meaning of his theory of Heaven.
B: A CONCLUSION THAT HIS THEORIES DO NOT LEAD TO COSMIC
METAPHYSIC, RELIGION AND SCIENCE
In his theory of heaven, Hsun-tze discusses Heaven or
nature from the aspect of man's common knowledge. He does not ask
the question of the ultimate cause or the first principle of nature,
of how the world is constructed or of how it should be structured,
nor does he ask the- metaphysical cognitive questions such as whether
the essence of nature or the universe is singular or plural, and
whether it is material or ideal or spiritual. In fact, Hsun-tze
never considers Heaven as the ultimate principle of all things.
Therefore his discussion of it is merely that of common knowledge
and not that of metaphysics. In short, his theory of Heaven in no
way leads to cosmic metaphysics.
On the other hand, Hsun-tze completely denies that behind
Heaven there is an all-mighty reality or a supreme god. His theory
of Heaven therefore falls within the viewpoint of atheism and his
philosophy naturally cannot be developed into a religion in a general
sense, i.e. a god-centred religion.
Furthermore, although Hsun-tze clarifies the conception
of Heaven, and he advocates that man should observe its natural
phenomena in order to make full use of them, what he is concerned
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with is research for a practical and utilitarian purpose and not that
of pure science. To him, though man exhausts his life in investigat¬
ion of the vast universe, he certainly does so in vain; and after
all, research into Heaven of the universe is just one subject of
human knowledge, which there will be experts to study and which is
not a compulsory course for all men. In other words, what all men
should study is the knowledge of the Ultimate Principle of Man or
morality, and not that of special subjects such as science or
astrology. In Hsun-tze's opinion, man should learn and practise
on one hand, the principle of ethical morality, and on the other
his social duties: this is the way of promoting man's virtue.
Thus his philosophy opens no way to pure science.
The viewpoint of Hsun-tze on Heaven basically adopts
that of the traditional Confucianists who do not consider Heaven as
the ultimate cause of the universe, who do not believe that it is a
supreme being or god, and who do not develop a purely scientific
study of it. Traditionally, therefore, there are no theories of
cosmic metaphysics, theology, religion and pure science in Confucian
philosophy. The reason for this may be that the Confucianists
tend to concentrate mainly on morality which, to them, is the
ultimate ideal and final goal of man's life, and besides which there
is nothing else more important and worthy of concern.
One may therefore say that Hsun-tze's theory of Heaven
has no contribution to make to cosmic metaphysics, teleology, or
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religion, or pure science. However, his clarifications on the
confusions in his contemporary thinking on natural phenomena and
6
their connection with human affairs are scientifically put forward
and their achievements as regards general knowledge are positive.
SECTION 2: HIS THEORY OF THE ULTIMATE MIND
Although Hsun-tze's theory of Heaven does not lead to
cosmic metaphysics and teleological religion, his theory of Mind is
rich in the spirit of both. This theory may be divided into that
of the Mind's knowing the Ultimate Principle and that of its practis¬
ing the Ultimate Principle, which will be discussed in the following
pages.
A: SURVEY OF HIS THEORY OF THE WAY OF MAN AS THE
ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE
Hsun-tze considers that Tao or the V/ay or the Ultimate
Principle is what man metaphorically should walk on, in other words,
7
it is the Way of man . He also considers that the Way of a Sage
is the ultimate ideal goal of man. He thus tries to give the word
Tao or the Ultimate Principle a sense of objectivity and universality.
It is clear that the Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's
theory is the Ultimate Principle of Man, or more precisely, morality.
He is, among all the scholars and thinkers in the Pre-Ch'in Period,
6. For reference, please see p.82.
7. For reference, please see p.24, note 37.
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the most thoroughgoing advocate of 'Man-ism' and 'Moral-ism', since
he always emphasizes man as the most important being in the universe
and morality as the most important and final goal of man. His
theory of the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man discusses
the relations of men and suggests that man should complete his
duties of ethical morality and social morality, by means of an
Ultimate Mind or a Sage Ming; thus it combines theory with practice
8
and reveals a strong-consciousness of moral humanism . This is a
success of his theory of Mind.
B: SURVEY OF THE PROBLEM OF 'MIND AND THE ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE'
AND THAT OF 'THE MIND AND THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE'
Hsun-tze always emphasizes that the Mind should seek its
Way or the Ultimate Principle. Is Hsun-tze then suggesting that the
Mind and theUltimate Principle or the Way are two separate existences?
This question has in fact been the subject of dispute among Chinese
scholars throughout the centuries. It is a common opinion of some
Chinese scholars that the Mind and the Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's
9
theory are two separate existences . Some scholars also comment that
the Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is the observer of the Ultimate Principle
and thus the Ultimate Principle is distinct from the Mind and thus the
origin of value is also distinct from the Mind10. To clarify the
8. A further discussion on p.287.
9. Please see the discussion of Prof.-T'ang Chun-I's 'THE ORIGIN OF
CHINESE PHILOSOPHY - The Origin of Hsing, Hong Kong, 1968, pp.47-58.
10. Please.see, for example, Lao's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY,
pp.283-287.
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problem, one should review the two stages of Mind in Hsun-tze's
theory. According to Hsun-tze, Tao or the Ultimate Principle
originally is not in man's Mind, and it is an objective and self-
existent principle which man's Mind may or may not know and realize.
That the Mind should know the Ultimate Principle and that man should
practise it is the main emphasis of Hsun-tze's theories. However,
it is obvious that at this stage, man's Mind is not the origin of
this external Ultimate Principle, or the Mind is not the Ultimate
Principle. When man's Mind knows it and practises it, the Mind at
this stage then possesses the Ultimate Principle within itself;
in other words, the Ultimate Principle is in the Mind. More clearly
speaking, when man's Mind becomes an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind, it
is united with Tao or becomes Oneness in Tao. And at this stage,
the Ultimate Mind is the Ultimate Principle. Therefore man's Mind
and the Ultimate Principle are two separate existences but the
Ultimate Mind and the Ultimate Principle is one reality.
On the other hand, it is logically not necessary for
Hsun-tze to establish the notion 'the Rational Principle' or Li
which was suggested as the ultimate essence of the universe as well
as of man by some later Confucianists^, for it is included in his
11. '%L v^. Sung-Ming Li-Hsueh Chia.
In the Sung Dynasty and Ming Dynasty, a group of Confucian thinkers
who were named 'Li Hsueh Chia' or 'philosophers of the study of the
Rational Principle' or simply Neo-Confucianists, showed great interest
in the theory of 'The Rational Principle'. Among the chief exponents
4% >>l Ch'eng-I-Ch'uan (1033-1107), ^ Ch'eng Ming-Tao
(1032-1086) and Chu Hsi (1130-1200), for example, considered
that Li is the metaphysical principle of all things, and is also identi¬
cal with their nature. Lu Hsiang-Shan (1139-1193)
asserted that it is identical with man's mind, and Jt, Wang Yang-
Ming (1473-1529) claimed that the mind is the embodiment of it. In
short, these scholars considered that a metaphysical substance or, in
their term 'Li' or the Rational Principle is identical with either the
nature of man or the mind, and is the origin of the value of all exist¬
ence. For a detailed discussion of this school, please see, for
example, Prof. Mo Tsung-San's 'HSIN TI YU HSING TI' , Taipei, Taiwan, 1968.
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term Tao or the Ultimate Principle as interpreted here.
If asked whether the Mind is the origin of the value
of man or whether besides the Mind there is an external existence
which is the origin of the value of man, Hsun-tze would unhesitat¬
ingly take the former answer, that is: the Mind is the origin of the
value of man. Two confusing points left to the later scholars are:
(1) Hsun-tze often mentions the importance of rites, righteousness,
law and teacher, which many later scholars consider to be his indicat¬
ion on the origin of human value; (2) Hsun-tze's metaphor of a pan
of water which some scholars consider to be his opinion on the function
of the Mind. As to the first confusion, it is clear that the confus¬
ion itself is groundless, if one studies carefully what Hsun-tze has
been concerned with. The theory of the Mind is the central theme of
his philosophy, and the proper functioning of the Mind is what is his
main concern. The assistance of rites, righteousness, law and
teacher is important for they are the external means of encouraging
man's Artifice. However, it is only when the Mind is in the state
of Receptiveness, Attentiveness and Undisturbedness, Hsun-tze repeat¬
edly claims that it will receive the benefit of this external
assistance. Therefore, it is obvious that in his thought, neither
the existing rites, nor righteousness, nor law nor teacher is the
direct origin of human value; they are functioning rather like a
midwife helping to deliver the baby, i.e. the morally good Artifice,
to be born. As to the second confusion, again it is rootlessly
grounded. They believe that to Hsun-tze, the function of the Mind
in its stage of Great Clearness and Brightness, is to observe all
things and their principle. However, the observation of Mind may
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include that of the principle of all things, including that of the
principle of morality. As Hsun-tze considers that morality is
more important than any other knowledge or things, therefore it is
clear that in his theory the Mind seeks to observe not only know¬
ledge of all things and their principle, but also and essentially,
that of the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality. He considers
that the value of man or man's nobility is in his continuous efforts
at knowing and practising the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality.
In short, what he tries to establish is not only a theory of the
Mind's knowing morality but also and more importantly a theory of
the Mind's practising morality. Thus the Ultimate Mind or the Sage
Mind suggested must be considered to be the origin of moral value,
and the origin of the value of man. Therefore if commentators
consider that in Hsun-tze's theory the Mind is not the Rational
Principle or Li, they are interpreting it only as an Epistemological
Mind; and it is obvious that either they misunderstand the meaning
of Hsun-tze's theory of Mind or their understanding is partial and
incomplete. If they consider that the Rational Principle or Li is
the quality that makes man different from other animals in the
universe and it is the result of the deliberation of man's moral
consciousness, then Hsun-tze's theory of Deliberation or the
functioning of the Mind may serve the same purpose. Hsun-tze
emphasizes that if the Mind, level by level, elevates itself towards
morality or moral excellence, then man in his moral world may grad¬
ually be able to deal with the changes of the external world and
may also internally encourage Artifice to perfect himself. At
such a stage, his Mind is the Ultimate Mind which is identical with
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the Ultimate Principle or Tao, or in the later commentators' term
the 'Rational Principle' or Li.
Therefore the above-mentioned commentary is caused by
a misguided interpretation. However, the possible cause for this
may lie in the lack of conciseness in Hsun-tze's description of the
function of the Mind. In his discussion of the observation of the
Epistemological Mind, Hsun-tze gives a clear description, but in
his discussion on the Mind in accordance with the Ultimate Principle,
there is no detailed definition of an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind,
and also there is a lack of description of the interrelation of the
Epistemological Mind and the Ultimate Mind. This lack of theoretical
conciseness leads to confusion and dispute among the later scholars.
However, studying more closely Hsun-tze's theory of Mind, one may say
that although he does not strictly distinguish the two notions 'Mind'
and the 'Rational Principle' or Li, the relation of the two is
implied in his theory. From the point of view of knowledge and
learning, Hsun-tze considers that the Mind may function as an
observer; nevertheless, from the standpoint of the relations of the
Mind and the Rational Principle or Li, he considers that the Mind
may unite with the Ultimate Principle or Tao or the Rational Principle
or Li, and finally becomes one ultimate reality: the Ultimate Mind
or the Sage Mind. Thus the Rational Principle or Li is not distinct
from the Mind and indeed at this stage it is identical with the Mind.
Therefore Hsun-tze does not especially establish the technical term
the 'Rational Principle' or Li and offer a discussion of the relations
of the Mind to it. It is also clear that in his theory of Mind,
Hsun-tze is consistent in his thought. One crucial comment may be
that: since Hsun-tze does not clearly explain the relation of the
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Epistemological Mind to the Ultimate Mind, his theory of Mind becomes
rather loose and ambiguous. He repeatedly emphasizes that only by
constant moral practice may the Mind be gradually united with the
Ultimate Principle; however he does not clearly give an account of
the moral role of the Epistemological Mind, a concise definition of
the term the 'Ultimate Mind' and a clear description of its function¬
ing. Since his theory of Mind is not put forward in a well-organized
way, (the exposition and discussion of this theory in this thesis has
been reorganized in order to make it easier to apprehend) an unconscious
theoretical gap such as the one commented on above may easily occur.
It is obvious that Hsun-tze has no ambition to carry out a philosophical
and conceptual analysis of the terms or concepts he has been using.
His suggestions have arisen out of his moral practice or are awakened
intuitively in his moral contemplation.
C: AN EXAMINATION OF THE PROBLEM OF RATIONAL DELIBERATION
In chapter XXII, Hsun-tze claims that when Man's Nature
is stimulated, Deliberation chooses and decides a suitable response
and encourages external faculties to exercise Artifice. In other
words, the Deliberation is the reflection leading to decision and it
includes the whole process of the function of the Mind. In short,
it is the highest level of moral functioning of man's Mind. According
to Hsun-tze, Deliberation is caused by external stimulation. If
this external stimulation gives rise to the processes of the examining
and knowing by the Mind, then the Deliberation functions as an epistemo-
logical choice and decision. This may lead to his theory of
epistemology or that of the Epistemological Mind. If external stimu¬
lation gives rise to a moral reflection, then the Deliberation functions
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as a moral choice and decision. This may lead to his theory of
the Way of the Mind. In other words, the Deliberation originally
may be analysed into both by its epistemological deliberation and
its moral deliberation; and in fact, the former leads to his
theory of an observing Mind, and the latter leads to that of an
Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind. However, as far as the epistemo¬
logical deliberation is concerned, whether the decision is
appropriate is naturally affected by both the intellectual ability
of the individual and his learning and experience. In other words,
the epistemological deliberation may or may not be a wise one.
On the other hand, where the moral deliberation is concerned,
whether the decision is appropriate is mainly influenced by the
cultivation and training of man's moral sentiment. In other words,
the moral deliberation may or may not be a rational one.
When speaking of Deliberation, Hsun-tze always tends to
think that it is a rational and wise reflection leading to the best
moral decision. He fails to see that the foundation of moral
deliberation is built upon the cultivation and training of man's
moral sentiment. This is the insufficient or incomplete aspect of
his theory of the Mind. On the other hand, Hsun-tze fails to
explain the difference between epistemological deliberation and
moral deliberation. In chapter XXI, when he discusses the removal
of the Obsessions of the Mind, the Great Clearness and Brightness of
Mind and the metaphor of a pan of water, his discussions, in theory,
are not clear and concise enough to reveal what he intends to express.
He fails to construe the interrelationship of these theories so as to
make an intelligible argumentation of his opinion of the Mind. This
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leads to misinterpretation by some later scholars and commentators
who consider that in Hsun-tze's theory of the Mind, the Mind itself
is only capable of epistemological observation or cognition and it
does not have a moral capacity. Hsun-tze should certainly be
partly responsible for such a misinterpretation as a result of his
ambiguity in explaining his opinion.
Therefore the fact that Hsun-tze tends to use rational
and wise Deliberation to display the capacity of the Mind is a
mistake. The cause of such a mistake perhaps originates from
Hsun-tze's successive beliefs on Man's Evil Nature, Transformation
of Man's Nature, and good Artifice. He considers that since
Artifice is always morally good and it originates from Deliberation,
the latter must also be morally good. This is indeed a train of
careless and erroneous reasoning or induction. On the other hand,
he fails to ask how rational and wise Deliberation is possible
before he freely uses the term and its implications. Thus the
problem of Deliberation in his theory becomes a leaking hole waiting
to be repaired in his system of moral philosophy.
D: A DISCUSSION OF HIS DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE MIND,
MAN'S NATURE AND THE NATURE OF THE MIND
In the structure of his moral philosophy, Hsun-tze makes
a distinctive separation of the Mind and Man's Nature; it is appar¬
ent that Man's Nature, as it is Evil, is placed at a lower level,
whereas Man's Mind, when not obsessed, is placed at a higher level.
His separation of the Mind and Man's Nature is unique among classical
thinkers. However, it is also logically necessary for him to have
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this separation. Hsun-tze clearly indicates that Man's Nature
is innately Evil, and that a possible origin of moral goodness
lies in the performance of good Artifice or moral education. Thus
the internal origin of good Artifice and the internal reception of
moral education naturally cannot rely on Man's Nature. As he
claims that the reception of moral education and the exercise of
Artifice cannot be forced, it is natural that he attributes them to
an internal faculty of man which seems to him to be capable of
controlling and administering the senses, therefore he identifies
the Mind as the over-all internal authority of man. It is logical
for him to assume that the Mind and Man's Nature are two distinct
realities and not reducible to each other. However, if the fact
that the Mind desires to follow the Ultimate Principle can be
considered as meaning that the Nature of Mind, a term suggested by
12
the later commentators , is good, then is Hsun-tze inconsistent
in insisting that Man's Nature is Evil while the Nature of Mind is
good?
In Hsun-tze's theory, the function of Mind is to
deliberate, to choose, to decide and to encourage the exercise of
Artifice. One should look on all these as a single activity which
cannot be analysed into its parts. In other words, neither
Deliberation nor choice nor decision nor action of Artifice is a
complete moral function of the Mind; and only the combination of
12. <\i; »)£ or Hsin Hsing, a term popularly used in the late
development of the Li-Hsueh or Neo-Confucian movement in which
Wang Yang-Ming (1473-1529), one of the chief exponents, identified
man's nature (Hsing) with the mind (Hsin), which is also the
Rational Principle of the universe.
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the four forms its completion. Therefore it is clear that the
fact that the Deliberation desires good is merely the first step
of its function and at this stage, it cannot yet be decided that
the Mind must complete a morally good act only since the Deliberation
desires good. If one considers that the Deliberation tends to be
morally good.and therefore concludes that it is necessary that the
Nature of the Mind is also morally good, then one may be charged
with over-confidence in one's conclusion. Firstly one may have
confused oneself with the terms 'good and bad in quality' or
Hao or Huai and 'good and evil in morality' or Shan and Wu.
Although Deliberation tends to morality, one may not conclude that
the complete functioning of the Mind will also eventually be moral
without exception. Therefore the possession of 'possible tendency
to morality' of the Mind is a good quality in its potentiality, but
such a possession itself is not the good or Shan, and its further
justification must wait until its full realization of its potentiality.
Secondly, one may have misinterpreted the function of the Mind as
though it were its Deliberation only. More clearly speaking, the
desire of the Mind to do good is the will of an individual, which in
itself does not necessarily reach the stage of practice; in other
words, the desire cannot guarantee a successful realization. There¬
fore the later commentators' argument that in Hsun-tze's theory, the
Nature of the Mind is good or Shan have committed either the misuse
of language or the misinterpretation of the theory. Viewed from
another aspect, a possible supposition of this situation is that: of
the ideal state of moral good or moral excellence; Hsun-tze may not
want to lower his standard to and be content with the level of desire
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of the Mind without further indication of its practical complete
functioning. In the theory of the Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind
it is obvious that the above supposition is not groundless for his
suggestion of the Way of the Mind is indeed a procession of practice
and effort toward morality, he is certainly not content to rest his
philosophy at the shallow level of mere desire to perform morally;
and when he mentions the Mind, he counts only its total functioning.
In other words, he would like his followers to realize such a desire
of the Mind through the level of moral practice or moral effort.
This is throughout the essential theme of his moral philosophy.
Therefore it is logical for him not to discuss the problem of the
Nature of the Mind since, to him, it is not a real problem at all.
This problem in the hands of later Chinese commentators
originates from two sides. On one hand, they themselves not only
miss the point of Hsun-tze, but also confine themselves within their
self-made trap; i.e. (1) they consider that good and evil are the
moral content of the so-called 'Nature of Mind' whereas in fact,
before the actual activities of the Mind are performed, there is no
manifestation of moral good or evil; (2) they insist upon their
subjective belief that Man's Nature or the Nature of Mind must be
morally good; and (3) they misuse the term 'good and bad in quality'
to mean 'good and evil in morality'. However, on the other hand, it
is also a careless fault of Hsun-tze. When he describes the function
of the Mind he tends to mention only its right sides, i.e. its
rational Deliberation, choice, morally good decision and well-
intentioned encouragement of the exercise of moral good. This leads
to the confusion of the readers.
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E: A DISCUSSION OF THE TRANSCENDENT REFLECTION OF THE
ULTIMATE MIND AND THE FUNCTION OF THE MIND
The Way of Man's Mind should, according to Hsun-tze,
externally lead to the Ultimate Principle. However, given that
Deliberation knows to stop starting useless searches for knowledge
of material objects and that it chooses and decides to seek for the
knowledge of the Ultimate Principle, the Mind, in its state of
Great Clearness and Brightness, must have a distinctive reflection
upon the life of the individual. In other words, man reflects that
what his life requires is an objective and universal principle which
he may follow and practise through life. The Mind, after its
Deliberation, choice, decision and the encouragement of the exercise
of Artifice, should reflect consciously upon whether the Ultimate
Principle it has been making efforts toward is in correspondence
with its original need or intention. For example, if man reflects
that his ideal goal of life is to become a Sage, then he starts,
putting Hsun-tze's theory into practice, by learning rites, their
functions, classifications and practical exercises. He then con-
V./
templates the meanings of rites and tries not to allow himself to
become merely a formalist. Finally he practises the meaning of
rites or their spirit or essence. However, at this stage he
should review the result of his learning, contemplation and practice
of rites, and also their relation to the perfection of a Sage. In
other words, he should consciously reflect upon the,content of
becoming a Sage and the efficiency and sufficiency of rites in the
practice of becoming a Sage. He thus makes a transcendent reflection
upon all his practical activities. This is the full range of the
function of the Mind.
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The transcendent reflection of the Mind is a crucial
point in the transition of Man's Mind to the Ultimate Mind. The
course of origin of this transcendent reflection lies in a special
exercise of man's moral consciousness, an exercise whose object is
its past reflection. By this reflection man may be able to confirm
or adjust his direction of effort toward his moral ideal. In other
words this transcendent reflection leads to a new morally profound
state of moral consciousness and besides its Deliberation, choice,
decision and encouragement of action as suggested by Hsun-tze, the
full functioning of the Mind must also include its transcendent
reflection. However, Hsun-tze fails to grasp the principle that
man's moral activity is dependent on his moral consciousness, or
in other words has not gone sufficiently deeply into the discussion
of the transcendent reflection of the Mind. Therefore his discussion
of the moral function of the Mind is incomplete, inconcise or perhaps
somewhat ambiguous, and this also leads to the incompleteness and
laxity of his theory of the Mind.
F: DISCUSSION OF HIS SUGGESTION OF A PRACTICAL METHOD OF
EXERCISING THE WAY OF MAN BY FULFILLING THE DUTIES
OF HUMAN RELATIONS AND SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
In chapter XXI entitled 'The Removal of Obsessions of
Mind', Hsun-tze explains that man's Mind is always obsessed and he
suggests that the way of removing the Obsessions is to let the Mind
know, experience and practise the Ultimate Principle. In this
chapter, he also discusses the origin of illusions and some differ¬
ent kinds of Obsessions in order to give exhortation to man that
his Mind should not be obsessed by these things otherwise he may
become a Mean-Spirited Man. However, what Hsun-tze tries to
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establish is the theory of the Mind's practice of the Ultimate
Principle and not only that of the Mind's knowledge of it. He
also suggests the two processes of the Way of Mind: i.e. the
state of the man's Mind of the Conscientious Man and that of the
13
Ultimate Mind or the Sage Mind of the Sage . The main theme of
Hsun-tze's philosophy is the Way of the Sage. Whether it be the
Great Confucianist who has no official authority or position, or
the Sage-Official who has influence, power and position in the
court or government, or the Sage-King who is the ruler of the
masses, Hsun-tze gives them the general name of 'Sage'. And, in
fact, in the whole book there is no chapter in which he does not
mention the appearance, manners, speech, behaviour, of the Sage.
He believes that all the attributes of the Sage are demonstrations
of the practice of the Ultimate Principle of his Ultimate Mind or
Sage Mind. Therefore one may say that the book of HSUN-TZE is
meant to establish the theory of the Mind's practice of the Ultimate
Principle; in short, it is a theory of moral practice. In this <
j
stage man's Deliberation always dwells upon moral excellence, his
Artifice is morally excellent, his Mind is an Ultimate Mind and the
man is a Sage.
Some readers may complain that Hsun-tze only mentions
some attributes of the Sage such as his appearance, manners, speech
and behaviour, yet what is the concrete content of moral practice
in Hsun-tze's ideal? In the last section of chapter XXI, Hsun-tze
13. For reference please see p.110.
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puts forward the principle of man's complete fulfilment of the duties
of human relations and social institutions as the concrete content of
the practical exercise of a Sage. The duties of human relations
are practised by a moral Mind or an ethical Mind or in Hsun-tze's
term, 'an Ultimate Mind or a Sage Mind', whereas the duties of
social institutions, i.e. rites, customs, and laws, should be practised
by a morally excellent man with moral cultivation and training or,
in Hsun-tze's term 'Artifice'. In other words, the concrete content
of moral practice in Hsun-tze's ideal is externally the morally excel¬
lent Artifice encouraged by rites, music, teacher and laws, and
internally by morally excellent Deliberation together with the
transcending reflection or the full function of the Mind; and the
ideal moral state of Mind is the state of a Sage. The principle of
complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social
institutions is discussed directly or more often indirectly or implicitly
throughout the book. Therefore it would be unfair to Hsun-tze to
comment that he does not mention the concrete content of his ideal
moral practice. It is to be regretted, however, that his theory of
the Mind as a whole appears to be too much scattered in different
chapters to form a coherent whole and, in fact, in its present form
it may be considered to be not thoroughly well-established. The
ancient thinkers in general did not pay much attention to the
structural or systematical layout of their thoughts; it seems that
they spoke as they thought without regard to systematization or
further polishing of what they had said. Therefore in the classical
writings it is always to be observed that there is much irrelevant
and miscellaneous material in the chapters, and that there are places
where the theorizing lacks compactness and completion. It seems
that their common deficiency is to explain a theory without apply¬
ing a theory of explanation, and this sometimes is similar to the
case of explaining logic without logic. Therefore if the reader
interprets a passage of Hsun-tze without consulting the whole
chapter or even the whole book, his interpretation or conclusion
may easily lead to confusion, or his comprehension may not grasp
the main theme of Hsun-tze's thought.
G: DISCUSSION OF HIS THEORY OF THE CONSCIENTIOUS MIND, THE
ULTIMATE MIND AND MYSTICISM
The difference between the Conscientious Mind and the Ultimate
Mind in Hsun-tze's theory is, in practice, the difference between
the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage. The Conscientious
Mind and the Ultimate Mind are the two levels of the Way of Mind
whereas the Way of a Conscientious Man and that of a Sage are the
completed processes of the practice of the Ultimate Principle.
In his book, Hsun-tze always makes a contrast between the differ¬
ent aspects in order to explain their differences. In short, the
Sage is the one who combines himself with the Ultimate Principle;
in other words, the Sage himself is in the Ultimate Principle and
the Ultimate Principle is in the Sage; therefore his Deliberation
and Artifice are always morally excellent. The Conscientious Man
is the one who is still in the stage of learning to become a Sage,
therefore he is always serious-minded for fear that his Deliberation
and Artifice may not meet the requirement of morality. The follow¬
ing example may be helpful in explaining the viewpoint of Hsun-tze.
To a beginner in poetry what he cares about most, in his composition
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nay be the form or style, the rules and the rhyme of poetry. He
- f
may cautiously do everthing according to the rhyme book. Thus he
may compose a piece of poetry for the sake of its form, rules and
rhyme and forget to put his feelings into it, or he may be over¬
cautious in it3 form, rules and rhyme and fail to naturally express
his feelings. To a gifted poet, smoothly and. naturally, whatever
he utters is good poetry which always corresponds excellently with
the standard form, rules and rhyme. It is the degrees of practising
the Ultimate Principle that differentiate the Sage and the Conscient¬
ious Man. j The former's practice of the Ultimate Principle has
reached the stage where it becomes a part of his natural
behaviour whereas the latter has only just started out in that
direction.
Some readers may say that the Way of a Conscientious
Man is comprehensible; however, that of a Sage is difficult to
understand, or rather like a myth. In chapter III of Part I in
this thesis, where his theory of the Conscientious Mind hhd the Ultimate Mind
are discussed, an explanation has also been proposed in order to
14
clarify this problem . According to Hsun-tze's description, the
efforts of a Sage toward morality and his achievement In morality
seem profound. However, Hsun-tze is also aware of this possible
confusion, therefore he says that only a wise Conscientious Man may
see or that only when a Conscientious Man becomes wise through the
accumulation of practising the Ultimate Principle may he then see
the profundity of the Way of a Sage. In other words, when a
14. For reference please see p.110.
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Conscientious Man surpasses his Way and starts practising the Way
of a Sage then in his transcending reflection he must be conscious
of his efforts and he also clearly sees his goal. Therefore in
theory and in practice, Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Mind is
possible, or the stage of a Sage is not an impossible dream but a
practical reality which all men, with constant efforts, may event¬
ually reach and achieve. Nevertheless, Hsun-tze has also put
forward his principle of complete fulfilment of the duties of human
relations and social institutions as the concrete content of his
ideal moral practice; thus it is apparent that he always considers
that moral practice is more important than mere theory. As
to the achievement of moral practice, it is bound to the moral
cultivation and training of the individual. However, as Hsun-tze
has provided the practical method to become a Sage and the outline
of the possible state of a Sage Mind, this differentiates his
philosophy from mysticism.
H: SURVEY OF HIS DISCUSSION OF A SAGE
In Hsun-tze's theory the characteristics of a Sage may
be summarized as follows:
(i) Thorough comprehension and excellent management of all
changes
This point which has been repeatedly mentioned by
Hsun-tze is worth noticing. It is the nature of the world or the
universe to be changeable, as are human affairs. Hsun-tze admits
as regards these changes that man cannot take charge of them, nor
can man fully explain them. Therefore the knowledge of all sciences,
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to him, is an attempt to analyze or explain some of the changes, and
the attainment of these branches of knowledge is the analysis or
explanation of some phenomena of the world, including that of human
affairs, or that of the universe; yet this knowledge does not
provide an objective and universal principle or truth for man to
follow and practice throughout his life, nor can it give a full
explanation of the changes as a whole. The Sage, Hsun-tze's ideal
moral image, is characterized by his thorough comprehension and
excellent management through all changes. ' It is clear that the
knowledge of a Sage certainly is not that of pure science nor is his
comprehension of the changes that of the physical principles of the
changes. All a Sage knows is an unchangeable principle, i.e. the
Ultimate Principle or morality, and he deals with all changes with
it. Therefore Hsun-tze's statement that the Sage knows and success¬
fully deals with all things may become intelligible if it is
interpreted as follows: If a Sage practises morality, then he always
enjoys the great freedom of his Mind - and in fact the only freedom
of man - and although he is among all the changes of human affairs,
of the world or universe, he will understand that they can do no
harm to him or his moral effort. In other words, when the Sage
keeps his Mind in a state of Great Clearness and Brightness in order
to be receptive and attentive to morality, he will not be changed or
bothered by external changes. Therefore with his one unchangeable
principle, i.e. morality, he may have thorough comprehension and
excellent management of all changes in a special way. That is to
say, a Sage devotes himself to morality and he may in practice
neglect the external changeable world and its problems and this is,
negatively speaking, the thorough comprehension and excellent
management of all changes.
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(ii) Ability of knowing the Ultimate Principle and also
knowing the principle of all things
In Hsun-tze's theory when the Mind reflects that it
should not chase after physical or material objects and be made
materialistic by them, and it thus fully functions with devotion to
the knowledge and practice of the Ultimate Principle of Man or
morality, nothing will become a cause of annoyance to it. On the
contrary, it may calmly observe all things. In Hsun-tze's ideal
the relationship between the Mind, the Ultimate Principle of Man
or morality and the universe is that the Ultimate Mind which unifies
the Mind with the Ultimate Principle, transcends the physical re¬
straints of the universe and thus enjoys a great freedom in morality.
However, the Sage certainly does not possess an overall comprehension
or cognitive knowledge of the physical principles of all things.
As discussed in (i) a Sage who holds firm to the unchangeable
principle or devotion to morality realizes the one principle of all
things, i.e. that all things are changeable, and with indifference
to the changeable external world, he concentrates his attention on
the knowledge and practice of morality.
(iii) His wisdom
According to Hsun-tze, when the Mind is in its Great
Clearness and Brightness, it observes all things clear-headedly as
an onlooker who watches what is going on with detachment. It also
holds firm the unchangeable principle - the Ultimate Principle or
morality, in order to understand and deal with all changes. Thus
all changes of human affairs, of the world or the universe cannot
hinder it and it enjoys a state of great freedom. In this stage it
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may, on one hand, participate in and assist the nourishing of the
universe and control and use the properties of the world; on the
other hand, it may measure and judge natural phenomena which are
connected with human affairs and fix them in the most suitable
position with the purpose of putting them into full play. In
other words, a Sage, on one hand, teaches man not to be confused
by natural phenomena and encourages man to improve life by means
of them, and on the other, establishes social institutions by means
of the objective and universal principle or the Ultimate Principle.
This is, in Hsun-tze's term, 'the establishment of a Sage-King'.
A Sage certainly is not a god. He only holds firm to his moral
ideal and practises it devotedly. Since his moral ideal leads to
>
the complete fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social
institutions and is an objective and universal principle which is
appropriate to all men, a Sage, practising it thoroughly, may
'measure and judge the function and value of all things, and establish
and formulate the great principle (of rites)', (chapter XXI). This
is the ultimate and excellent wisdom of a Sage.
»
These are the characteristics of a Sage in Hsun-tze's
theory. The following examples may be helpful in the comprehension
of his opinion. The administrative officers of a university, for
example, may not be specialists in the studies of literature, science,
engineering, etc. However, they are responsible for the organization
and the implementation of the business of the university. The same
situation may be found in the management of a hospital, factory,
business enterprise, etc. Again the president of a country, for
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instance, may not be a skilled worker, or farmer, or soldier, nor
be professional in any other occupation; however, with his ability
as a president of a country, the experts of all occupations follow
his ruling. A Sage-King may also not be an expert in any particular
field; however, during his rule, he is able to offer official places
to suitable persons, and settle the masses according to their
abilities in the places which best suit them. However, a Sage and
an administrative officer may not be completely similar to each
other, for to Hsun-tze, a Sage must rule with his moral excellence
rather than his wisdom and ability, whereas a modern administrator
must show his ability in management rather than individual moral
cultivation, yet they are more or less similar in their function.
From this it is clear that the discussion of a Sage in
Hsun-tze's theory is not a theory of mysticism in the sense that
it is not capable of verification. What he tries to demonstrate
is that the complete functioning of the Mind of a Sage may assist
and encourage the development and improvement of human relations
and affairs. However, since Hsun-tze lays much emphasis on morality
as the only property of a Sage, it is naturally difficult for his
theories to develop in the field of pure knowledge and science.
Thus when Hsun-tze mentions the characteristics of a Sage, viewed
from the standpoint of common knowledge or that of an ordinary man
with no experience in the state of a Sage, the theory may seem
dogmatic and obscure.
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The practical exercise of a Sage is in the complete
fulfilment of the duties of human relations and social institutions.
In other words, in his practice of morality a Sage is closely
related to rites. Therefore Hsun-tze says that man's cultivation
and training in morality start from learning rites. What, then,
is the relation between a Sage and rites? In chapter I, Hsun-tze
says: 'Learning is completed in the reading of RITES'. The
later commentators consider that this statement reflects the fact
that Hsun-tze does not have a thorough comprehension of Confucius'
theory which emphasizes the meaning, not the form, of rites. How¬
ever, their interpretation is misleading. According to Hsun-tze
the proper way of learning morality is initially to learn rites.
Rites are the social institutions and moral laws established by man
with the purpose of maintaining order and interrelation in human
society. Therefore all men may practise rites and completely fulfil
their duties to society. However, man may not be content with
blindly practising rites without 'a further inquiry into their meaning.
When a man reflects that rites are an initial way of guiding or
directing man to achieve the moral excellence of a Sage, he will then
understand that to remain at and go no further than formal performance
in the formality of rites is wrong; for if man practises rites
merely for the sake of rites, the practice itself may become meaning¬
less in morality. Therefore Hsun-tze says in the same chapter that
the result of learning is eventually to enable man to become a Sage.
If the reader studies his description of the appearance and manner
of a Sage he may see that the Sage does not confine himself to the
formality of rites. In Hsun-tze's theory, a Sage practises rites
with his Sage Mind which is full of Jen or Human-Minded and Ch'ih or
wisdom, while in Confucius' theory, a Human-Minded Man or Jen Jen,
286
his moral man, practises rites with Human-Mindedness. If the
theories are compared carefully, it may be found that Hsun-tze's
theory seems to be a further development of that of Confucius.
Hsun-tze also repeatedly emphasizes the importance of the principle
of rites. Therefore it is confusing to say that he does not have
a thorough comprehension of Confucius' theory of rites.
I: THE VALUE OF HIS THEORY OF THE ULTIMATE MIND
The meaning and value of Hsun-tze's theory of the
Ultimate Mind or the Way of Mind is profound and significant. A
discussion follows here to reveal its value in moral philosophy, its
meaning in correspondence with religion and its value in ethical
metaphysics.
(i) Its value in moral philosophy
Hsun-tze's theory of an Ultimate Mind and his theory of
an Epistemological Mind compose the theory of Mind. He indicates
that the reason for the Mind's knowing and practising the Ultimate
Principle depends on its Deliberation, he then develops his whole
theory to its climax: the moral ideal - the state of a Sage mind;
the ideal moral personality - the Sage; and the moral practice
in theory, the Way of the Mind, and in practice, the complete fulfil¬
ment of the duties of human relations and social institutions. All
these developments are direct extensions of the function of the Mind.
In other words, the value of his theory of Mind lies in his emphasis
upon the importance of the function of the Mind. It is clear that,
15
to him, the Mind is the origin of moral value or the value of life
15. For reference, please see p.267.
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In the process of the Way of Mind, Hsun-tze always emphasizes the
continuous efforts of moral cultivation and training of the individ¬
ual. The Mind promotes itself level by level from its state of
Obsessions to that of Great Clearness and Brightness and finally to
that of a Sage by means of its continuous and conscious efforts
towards moral excellence. This may be considered to be his theory
of value. His concern with man and morality forms a significant
and influential account of moral humanism in his time. It is
also the value of his theory and its contribution to moral philosophy.
In conclusion, in his theory of the Mind, the full moral
functioning of the Mind in order to encourage moral Artifice operates
directly within the agent. Hsun-tze lays emphasis on the moral
effort of man, and on one hand he points out that Man's Nature is
Evil with the purpose of warning man to be conscious of his own
innate defects, and on the other he also claims that man's Mind may
easily be obsessed in the hope of instructing man to maintain a Great
e,
Clear and Bright Mind. All Hsun-tze's effort is to encourage man
to be self-conscious, self-strengthened and self-improved in order
to elevate himself to the state of moral perfection. Hsun-tze's
theory thus reveals a strong sense of moral humanism which must be
considered a success of his theory. As to how his theory of the
Mind is significant in his time, this is a historical question which
16
will be discussed in the Epilogue
(ii) Its meaning in correspondence with religion
Religion, in general, deals with the relationship between
man and the supreme being or reality. In theory, if one considers
16. A further discussion of his contribution of moral humanism to the
spirit of Chinese culture in p.381.
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or believes that this supreme being or reality is a supernatural
being or beings, with its or their supernatural ability or abilities,
and that man can imitate it or them in order to be analogous to it
or them and man can spiritually communicate with it or them; yet
man can never become a supernatural being or take its place, then
one is thinking in terms of the theory of 'supernaturality and man'.
If one considers or believes that this supreme being or reality is
a transcendent reality, which is surpassing all realities, and that
man, through continuous efforts of practice toward it may eventually
become this transcendent reality, then one is thinking in terms of
the theory of 'transcendency and man'. In order for these two
theories to be called religion(s), they must fulfil the following
points which might be suggested as the structure of religion.
(1) Belief in this supreme being or reality, which on one
hand is objectively and necessarily the ultimate source of the
universe, which surpasses the natural or physical world, and on the
other hand, surpasses man's nature.
(2) Through continuous efforts of practice towards belief
in this supreme being or reality, man may communicate with it,
imitate it, or become united with it.
(3) The type of practice may be either through mental
experience such as meditation or physical experience or both. How¬
ever, the practice must be recognized or identified by an organization
of a social group bound together by the above belief, which possesses
its institutions, rites and basic doctrines or prohibitions.
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Religion based on the theory of 'supernaturality and
man' is found in the western traditional religions, or religions in
general; such as Christianity, Judaism, Islam. The theory of
'transcendency and man' is found in the philosophy of Pre-Ch'in
Confucianism and that of the Mahayana or 'Great Vehicle' schools in
Buddhism. However, in Pre-Ch'in Confucianism, although Confucius
and Mencius mention that man may be united with Jen or Human-
Mindedness, which is believed to be the supreme reality or the tran¬
scendent reality, or in the case of Hsun-tze, that man may be united
with the Ultimate Principle or Tao which is also believed to be the
supreme or transcendent reality, none of them directly conclude
(though they may have implied) in their theories that man at a
certain stage is the supreme reality. Therefore their theories may
be considered to be the theory of 'transcendency and man' in a
negative sense. In the case of the 'Great Vehicle' schools in
Buddhism, their emphasis is always laid upon one belief, the belief
that man may become 'The Awakened One' or a Buddha, who is a supreme
being; and all their theories flourish from this belief. There¬
fore their theories may be regarded as the theory of 'transcendency
and man' in a positive sense. However, what makes the Pre-Ch'in
Confucianism not a religion in a strict sense and what makes Buddhism
a religion? The answer is that Buddhism is an organization of a
social group bound together by its belief, which possesses its own
institutions, rites and basic doctrines and prohibitions for a
Buddhist monk or nun as well as for a Buddhist fellow believer, and
that Pre-Ch'in Confucianism is a theory without organization. There¬
fore Buddhism is a religion whereas Pre-Ch'in Confucianism is not.
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If the feelings or motions of self-interest such as
utter dependence, awe, fear of punishment and damnation, gratitude
for mercy and protection, or perhaps hope of salvation, etc. are
excluded, the source of man's religion ideally stems from the
following. Man has a feeling or desire or a need to have his life
be in communication with a supreme being or reality purely because
he believes that it is where truth and moral excellence originate,
and he commits his feeling or desire or need to an objective and
universal supreme being or reality through the practice of knowing,
understanding and believing it. He then from this commitment,
receives a revelation which he believes to be sanctioned by the
supreme being or reality. Through continuous practice of certain
forms, he believes that his life may directly communicate with the
supreme being Or reality and that in this communication, his initial
feeling or desire or need may reach the state of absolute satisfaction.
This process may be considered to be a religious one. However, when
man actually participates in a certain religious group or society,
or he himself creates one, it may be concluded from such an involve¬
ment that this man is a religious believer or he has a religion.
In this stage, his initial feeling or desire or need is a religious
feeling, his commitment becomes a religious belief and the revelation,
a religious ideal, The supreme being or reality becomes a centre of
his religion, and the various forms of practice as means of communicat¬
ing with the supreme being or reality are religious practices. Thus
the value of a religion, ideally speaking, is threefold:
(1) Viewed from the standpoint of the individual, religion in
general fulfils man's feeling or desire or need to communicate with a
supreme being or reality.
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(2) Viewed from the social viewpoint, religion usually serves
as a metaphysical basis of social morality.
(3) In its emphasis upon practice, religion always is a
great assistance to man's self-cultivation although the autonomy of
morality lies in man himself and the motive of man's activity in
ethical morality should exclude the influence of religion.
The discussion so far may have established some points
in order to examine the value of Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate
Mind in correspondence with the spirit of religion. His theory of
the Ultimate Mind is that of 'transcendency and man'. One may
consider his theory in the following way: If a man has a feeling or
desire or need to have his life in communication with a supreme being
or reality, his feeling or desire or need, in Hsun-tze's terms, is a
rational Deliberation. In his commitment to an objective and
universal supreme being or reality which, in Hsun-tze's terms may be
called the 'Ultimate Principle', man attains a revelation as his
religious ideal, which in Hsun-tz's term may be called the 'state of
a Sage'. Through continuous efforts of practice, which in Hsun-tze's
term is the process of the 'Way of Mind', man eventually communicates
with the supreme being and feels absolutely satisfied, which is in
Hsun-tze's theory, described as follows:
'The Sage whose Ultimate Mind is tightly united
with the Ultimate Principle, is pleasant and contented
in his thought and does not need to force or restrain
his behaviour.' (chapter XV, 8)
However, Hsun-tze's theory of the Ultimate Mind certainly
need not necessarily follow the above interpretation. What it has
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been attempted to explain is that his theory which is that of
'transcendency and man' is rich in a religious sense, and that
although it does not eventually lead to the creation of a religion,
it is in correspondence with some of the values of a religion and
its achievement in morality, moreover, is more than that which a
religion can achieve. The reason why his theory of Ultimate Mind
does not lead to the creation of a religion is perhaps that, (1)
Hsun-tze considers that the Ultimate Principle should be practised
by all men and therefore the world of men may be considered to be a
large social group or organization to practise it, thus the form of
organization which is essential to the structure of religion is
obscurely implied though not clearly applied; and (2) he considered
that enlightening teaching is important to man when he is in the stage
of knowing and understanding the Ultimate Principle while individual
experience of the Ultimate Principle should be left to individual
practice. In other words, the institutions, rites, doctrines or
prohibitions of religion are not necessary. It is clear that the
philosophy of Hsun-tze tends to exclude itself from religion, and in
fact, most of the philosophies in the Pre-Ch'in Period have this tend¬
ency. Thus not only is there no teleology or theism among them, but
also almost none of them created a religion.
(iii) Its value in ethical metaphysics
The purpose of metaphysics is generally regarded as being
primarily the study of the ultimate cause or first substance of
things in the universe. In his theory of the Ultimate Mind, Hsun-tze
considers and believes that the Ultimate Principle or Tao is a
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transcendent reality and the ultimate source and substance of the
universe. What then is the value of his theory of the Mind in
metaphysics? An examination may be carried out as follows:
(1) The Ultimate Principle in Hsun-tze's theory originally
indicates three sources, namely: the Ultimate Principle of Heaven,
the Ultimate Principle of Earth and the Ultimate Principle of Man.
In other words, the Ultimate Principle is like a trinity, three in
one. According to the name, the Ultimate Principle is a general
name, whereas that of Heaven, that of Earth and that of Man are its
classified names. .Since morality is always the main theme of his
philosophy, and it seems that he has little interest in a theory of
metaphysiscs, he often reduces the usage of the term 'Ultimate
Principle' to the meaning of the 'Ultimate Principle of Man'. How¬
ever, it is clear that although Hsun-tze exalts the meaning of the
Ultimate Principle of Man, he does not deny the existence of the
Ultimate Principles of Heaven and Earth, or in short, the Ultimate
Principle of Nature.
(2) Since Hsun-tze mentions that all things are a part of
17
Tao, the term 'thing' , or 'physical object' seems to be, in his
theory, the constituent of the Ultimate Principle of Nature. There¬
fore some recent commentators suggest that Hsun-tze's viewpoint on
cosmology is close to materialism in the sense that matter is the
fundamental constituent of the universe. However, it is apparent
that Hsun-tze never encourages the spirit of materialism in the sense
that attaches supreme value to material goods or that human actions
and cultural changes are determined solely or largely by material or
17. jjv/ Wu.
294
economic factors. On the contrary, owing to his special interest
in moral issues, he shows an attitude of considering the knowledge
of all physical objects to be relatively worthless. To him, the
Mind may be completely united with Tao or become Oneness in Tao,
and in that stage it is a metaphysical substance which identifies
itself with Tao, the transcendent reality which pervades the entire
universe. One may thus say that in this aspect Hsun-tze's viewpoint
on the Mind is close to pure idealism or spiritualism in metaphysics.
However, although in putting forward his theories he sometimes tends
to adopt the viewpoints of both materialism and idealism, he does not
then consider that the Mind and material matter are in opposition to
each other. As to his theory of Mind and Man's Nature, he strictly
distinguishes between them as two different realities and in this
way he seems to imply their opposition to each other. However, he
never proposed a detailed analysis of the interrelationship of these
terms: the Mind and the external physical objects (things ox* Wu)
and the Mind and Man's Nature. He simply discusses what is of
greatest concern to him and puts aside conceptual argumentations or
analyses. These may be generally considered important in philosoph¬
izing but, to him, they are a less urgent business with less practical
value in his time.
(3) Hsun-tze considers that the Ultimate Principle of Nature
has nothing to do with human affairs, and that it is treated in the
realm of general knowledge, therefore he does not take further his
study of its epistemological reality. Although he says that nature
has its regularity, he also claims that man may control it and use it.
To Hsun-tze, the knowledge of nature can be attained by common-sense
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or experience, and it therefore has nothing supernatural about it
and it is also not metaphysical. In this aspect his viewpoint
about the universe is close to naturalism which holds that the
universe requires no supernatural cause and government but is self-
existent, self-explanatory, self-operating and self-directing. His
view has to be contrasted with the theory of determinism that all
events in the physical universe are determined and conditioned by
certain laws or causes In his theory of the Ultimate Principle of
Man, he claims that the aim of man's practice of the Ultimate
Principle is twofold: externally to completely fulfil his duties
in human relations and in social institutions, and internally and
ultimately to reach the stage of a Sage. In other words, all moral
efforts aim at the good or the stage of a Sage. Hsun-tze's viewpoint
in his theory of the Mind is also close to teleology.
(4) The Ultimate Principle of Nature, in Hsun-tze's theory,
is not a supernatural being or a_ transcendent reality. Although it
is not clearly defined by Hsun-tze, he seems to imply that it is a
collection of natural phenomena with its own laws of movement or,
in his words, its regularity of which man, with his common-sense,
may have some knowledge. Its reality is not then further investigated
by Hsun-tze. However, it is obvious that he certainly does not con¬
sider it to be a supreme being or reality. In other words, his theory
of the Ultimate Principle of Nature is atheism. As to his theory of
the Ultimate Principle of Man, Hsun-tze elevates the position of man
who, when he reaches the stage of a Sage, is believed to be able to
measure all things. In other words, this theory is also atheism.
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(5) Since Hsun-tze considers that nature has no intention or
will, his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Nature is neither
necessitarianism nor determinism. As to his theory of the Ultimate
Principle of Man, man has absolute freedom in his choice of practis¬
ing morality; in other words, his moral activity is independent
and free from the determination of causality. Therefore it is close
to the viewpoint of libertarianism or indeterminism.
(6) In his theory, Hsun-tze does not elaborate an
epistemological investigation of the Mind. His main interest lies
in the discussion of the Way of the Mind which is closely related
to the practical aspect of man's moral life. Therefore it is not
surprising that one cannot find any further epistemological investig¬
ation of the Mind or inquiry into its nature or its 'faculties' or
structure. He does not extend his theory to the inquiry of the
philosophical issues of the Mind such as its very possibility of
existence and its relation to the body.
To summarize the above, although the Ultimate Principle
in Hsun-tze's theory is a kind of trinity, he is only interested in
the Ultimate Principle of Man upon which his moral philosophy is
founded. Therefore his theory of the Ultimate Principle of Nature
is irrelevant to metaphysics, or in other words, it offers no contri¬
bution to metaphysics. However, in his theory of the Ultimate
Principle of Man, Hsun-tze believes that to completely fulfil the
Way of Mind is the complete fulfilment of the Ultimate Principle of
Man, and that the Ultimate Principle of Man is the basic principle
of all human affairs. In other words, morality is believed to be
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the ultimate condition of the human world. It is in terms of
ethics that he defines the traditional Confucian notions of the
Ultimate Principle or Tao which is believed to pervade the universe;
and he sees that metaphysical principles have an ultimately moral
significance. Thus his theory of the Mind is in correspondence
with the essence of metaphysics. And the theory of the Ultimate
Mind may be regarded as the metaphysical foundation of his moral
philosophy. His theory of the Ultimate Mind leads to that of
ethical metaphysics, and it establishes the metaphysical basis for
his moral philosophy. This is also the value of this theory.
J: CONCLUSION
The main achievement of Hsun-tze's theory of Mind is in
/
his analysis of man's continuous efforts in moral practice. As to
his description or outline of moral practice and moral effort it
certainly has its value. There are a great many philosophers, in
the past or present, who try to outline or describe their experience
in morality in various ways. However, whether through these ways
of practice, man may eventually achieve moral excellence is a crucial
point. In Hsun-tze's theory, when the Mind proceeds to the complete
fulfilment of duties of human relations and social institutions, it
will then perfect itself with moral excellence. His theory may
universally be applied to all men. In other words, his advocacy
of moral practice and moral effort reveals the spirit of objectivist
ethics which argue that ethical truths are not relative and certain
actions are right and good for all individuals alike. His great
concern with man and his moral life or his advocacy of 'man-ism' and
'moral-ism' also reveal in his theory of Mind a commendable spirit of
moral humanism.
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Secondly, although his theory of Mind does not become a
religion, it is closely in correspondence with the meaning and
value of religion.
Thirdly, since the theory of the Ultimate Mind is the
metaphysical basis of his moral philosophy, it may be considered
that it has value as ethical metaphysics.
However, what is regrettable is that there are weaknesses
in his theory. Firstly, since his discussion on the subject is
scattered and not systematical, and his language is often ambiguous
and confusing, the reader may find it difficult to comprehend.
Secondly and vitally, since he is merely concerned with moral practice,
he leaves on one side ambiguous terms or philosophical issues with¬
out any discussion or investigation, which are essential to the
understanding of his theory of moral philosophy. That is perhaps
why there have been few followers of his philosophy and there have
been so many objections against and misinterpretations of his theory
of Mind. On the other hand, what he has been describing or establish¬
ing is a moral ideal recommended as the best way of life or a guidance
of moral activities, and he fails to make an objective analysis or
cognitive study of such issues as the primary or fundamental moral
concept, the scope of moral action, moral judgements and the conditions
for moral agency. In short, his moral philosophy which pertains only
to the practical aspect of moral life or to the ideal of becoming a
Sage is therefore theoretically incomplete. Most of the ancient
Chinese philosophers tend to speak of morality as their own experiences
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in moral activity, and it seems that they seldom treat morality as
an objective subject for investigation or analysis. This is per¬
haps because traditionally they attach much importance to practice
and subjective experience and they seldom commit themselves to
thoughts of pure knowledge such as logic or epistemological inquiry
and to objective analysis of certain philosophical issues such as
the issues of human nature and the mind. Hsun-tze is a typical
example of them in this respect.
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CHAPTER VIII:
CRITICISM ON HIS THEORIES OF POLITICS
CHAPTER VIII:
CRITICISM ON HIS THEORIES OF
POLITICS
Hsun-tze's theory of politics is basically an extension
of his moral philosophy; it is a theory of the projection of the
virtue of the Sage upon the external and the distant world. The
purpose of his moral philosophy is to establish primarily and
positively, an ideal personality, i.e. a Sage. However, he con¬
siders that a Sage who is morally and politically excellent, should
become a king; and ,in his belief, a Sage-King, establishing detailed
standards of rites and righteousness in order to educate and cultivate
his officials and people practically, will turn a society into an
ideal state or in his term, 'A Society of Ultimate Fairness'. From
this, one may find that the purpose of his theory of politics is to
prescribe the way to realize his ideal state, i.e. the Sage-King is
the only one who can lead the country towards A Society of Ultimate
Fairness. Thus the description of a Sage-King becomes the main
VJ
theme in Hsun-tze's political thought and also becomes the core of
the following discussion. Certain problems arise from his
discussion of a Sage-King.
SECTION 1: THE PROBLEMS WHICH ARISE FROM THE IDEAL OF
A SAGE-KING
To Hsun-tze, the ideal 'cabinet' or the ideal administration
of a state must consist of a Sage-King with his Sage-Officials,
implementing a continuous series of 'virtuous policies'. A Sage-King
thus becomes eminently important in Hsun-tze's political theory. In
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fact nearly one third of his book is devoted to the discussion of
a Sage-King and among the chapters there are ten chapters (from VII
to XVI) which are particularly rich in information about his political
theories. This concentration on political theory is a result of the
chaotic world of his times, Hsun-tze as well as many other contempor¬
ary philosophers, on one hand endeavours to save the world, and on
the other hopes to impress the contemporary kings or feudal princes
with his theory so that he may be employed by one of them. In
theory, this line of thought may be considered to lead to the concrete
realization in society of an Ultimate Mind of a Sage, or the project¬
ion of the Ultimate Mind to the external and the distant world. His
theory of the administration of a Sage-King i s inherited from the
political theory of Confucius. However, this theory, as a whole
must meet the following criticisms.
A: THE PROBLEM OF THE VIRTUE AND POLICY OF A RULER
The main problem of Hsuntze's theory of administration
by a Sage (and in fact one may say the main problem of the traditional
Confucian theory of politics) lies in his confusion of the different
realms of morality and politics. In his ideal, a Sage-King with his
moral and political excellence administers the world and the world
will then attain 'the ultimate success in politics and education'
(chapter XII). This success in politics and education should be,
according to Hsun-tze, attributed to the efforts of the Sage-King.
However, the following two problems immediately emerge:
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(i) The moral and political excellence of the Sage-King
It is obvious that politics cannot be founded only upon
the virtue of one man. Virtue, in a narrow sense, is man's possess¬
ion of a profound knowledge of morality, a sense of responsibility in
morality and a well-cultivated practice in morality. Politics is a
science which basically aims at the organizing of social good, and
historically serves as an analysis of the relationship between the
authority or government or king and the people or the masses.
Morality often involves the ethical and social relations of the
agent to other people, and such relations can be peacefully and
genuinely maintained through a common moral ideal and practice.
Custom and social laws, for example, are a means of maintaining
social morality, and the training and education of man's moral senti¬
ment and moral consciousness are ways of achieving ethical morality.
Politics often involves the struggle of the masses for legal rights
such as public interest, and a guarantee of the rights and freedom
of an individual's life and livelihood under those in political power
and their search for improvement of the livelihood of the individual
and better conditions in society. However, if a country is to
maintain a state in which all men may enjoy these equal legal rights
then firstly objective and concrete lav/s must be established, includ¬
ing laws delegating the right and power of the people to restrict or
abolish those in political authority if ever they should abuse power.
Secondly and more importantly, the men in its realm must be educated
to be highly politically conscious; i.e. on one hand to know their
rights and freedom in the country and to understand the proper use of
them, and on the other to know their duties to their country.
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In Hsun-tze's theory, the best policy is the extension
of the king's excellent virtue. If a king, on one hand possesses
his moral ideal and practises it honestly, and on the other
endeavours to provide his subjects with social benefits and a sure
guarantee of their lives and livelihood, he may then be said to be
morally and politically excellent. However, this is often a case
of good fortune for the kingdom which has come about by chance. In
practice, it seems that more often, in Chinese history, the rulers
and politicians neglected their morality in their policies, not to
mention morality in their private lives. In those cases, how can
the situation be rectified? It is practically wrong to insist
that a morally excellent man must become a king, a ruler, or a
politician, for he may not be prepared to exercise his moral excel¬
lence in politics or even if he is prepared to do so, his moral
excellence may not be successfully transformed into a practical
political excellence. Therefore one may conclude that Hsun-tze's
political theory is based upon the optimistic viewpoint that a Sage-
King will solve all the problems of the country. The main point
here is that he always starts from the assumption that a Sage-King
is the only saviour of all men. In other words, there is, to him,
no other way to save the chaotic world or to put the world in progress
towards arx ideal society of ultimate peace and justice. However,
such an assumption is (1) impractical, because in history the birth
of a Sage-King is not guaranteed; and (2) not thoroughgoing, because
the mass political consciousness and a juristical state are the
primary concern of a theory of politics, while the law-implementating
body or government or professional personality is a secondary concern.
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Hsun-tze does not discuss such problems as the realization of mass
political consciousness, and practical means to attain legal rights
or rights of social benefit and a guarantee of the rights and free¬
dom of people's lives and livelihood. Therefore his theory of the
moral and political excellence of a Sage-King which is not coherently
put forward is not a complete theory of politics.
(ii) Success in politics and education
According to Hsun-tze a Sage, through his continuous
efforts in moral-cultivation, reaches a state of moral perfection,
and with his virtue'helps and educates other people to complete the
process of becoming a Sage. The result of his success in moral
education is that many people thus are encouraged and assisted by
his moral teaching and finally may become Conscientious Men or
Sages. V/hen a Sage becomes a king, it is obvious that he has more
chance to enlarge his circle of education and assistance and the
number of his beneficiaries. In other words, the success in politics
and education of a Sage-King results in his people becoming virtuous,
yet they may not obtain a sure guarantee of rights and freedom in
society. Therefore the success of a Sage-King and the benefit of
his people are more concerned with morality than politics. It is
clear that a Sage-King may be extremely successful in the policy of
moral education, but it is doubtful if a successful policy in moral
education can amount to a complete success in politics. In other
words, though politics may, in some aspects, be involved in some
moral issues such as justice, it does not simply end in morality.
It certainly embraces a larger scope. Thus the sufficiency of the
moral excellence of a Sage-King in his political administration again
is put on crucial trial.
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Hsun-tze admits that there are people whom the Sage-King
fails to educate. In chapter XVIII, he mentions that the fact that Chu
and Hsiang refused to change their Evil Nature is not the fault of Yao
and Shun but the fault of Chu and Hsiang themselves^. However, it is
an undeniable fact that there are numerous specimens of Chu and Hsiang
in the world. How does a Sage-King deal with these trouble-makers
in order to guarantee the rights and interests of millions of honest
citizens? Hsun-tze might say that millions of honest citizens will
complain about the outlaws and accuse them, and the Sage-King will
eliminate or punish them. This suggestion may be applicable in a
small country with a small population, however in a large country with
a large population even a Sage-King with his crowds of Sage-Officials
may not thoroughly observe and understand all the events in the
country if a well-organized government with concise laws is not
established; and thus as regards those who are the enemies of the
public, in what way may the citizens make their complaints about them
or accuse them, or by what means can the Sage-King eliminate or punish
e,
them? It is clear then that the role of laws cannot be reduced to
the moral personality of the Sage-King for the virtue of the Sage-King
often cannot help much in politics. It is acceptable that the best
way to transmit an important piece of information, no matter whether
it be concerned with moral or non-moral issues, to the public is by
means of educating the people, yet laws must be provided if the people
refuse to follow the education. Laws may not necessarily be omni¬
potent, but at least it must be independent from any external power
and possess indivisble sovereignty. Thus besides education in
general, not merely restricted to morality, all kinds of laws, such
1. For reference, please see p.39.
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as laws of the rights of citizens, laws to be obeyed by different
classes of people, including the ruling class, laws of restriction
of the power of authority and fiduciary trust of the masses in their
government, must also be dealt with in the realm of politics.
Although Hsun-tze does mention laws as one of the sources of Artifice
he does not clearly analyse which laws are to be included in his
thinking, nor does he give a detailed discussion, or even an outline,
of the political function of laws rather than its moral role. This
is another insufficiency of his theory of a Sage ruling by virtue and
virtuous policy. In short, Hsun-tze insists that a king must educate
his people up to the level of his own moral excellence. In other
words, Hsun-tze advocates 'the policy of absolute or despotic morality'.
However, in theory and in practice, this policy has its limits. In
fact, in history, other than the legend of Yao and Shun in the
pre-historical period, the success of this policy has never been
heard of.
B: THE FUNCTION OF A RULER IN THE STATE AND AMONG THE MASSES
The subjects of politics are principally twofold: the
state and the masses. The main components in the formation of a
state are the masses; the masses therefore are the substance of the
state. One of the functions of the ruler, whether he is a king of
the old type or a president of modern times, is to lead the state or
the society to a stage of ultimate harmonization. To the state he
is a representative of the masses; to the masses he is a guarantor
of the efficiency of laws which protect the rights and freedom of their
lives and livelihood, and he also is an honest executor of appropriate
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policy. However, all the rights and power he possesses as a ruler
must come theoretically from the state and the masses, and practically
from the laws of the state. To Hsun-tze a Sage-King is the substance
of politics and the saviour of the masses; therefore the term
'polities' simply means, to Hsun-tze, the administration of a Sage-
King. Hsun-tze fails to discuss the function of a ruler in the
state and among the masses, nor does he go further in a discussion of
the relationship between the state and the king. One may say that
Hsun-tze is discussing politics in terms cf morality and he is not
tackling politics on its own terms. In short, his view of the
function of a king with regard to the state as well as to the masses
is not clearly presented. However, it is perhaps because of the
special political situation in his time, when the king is the most
powerful man in politics that Hsun-tze has to design his theories
strategically so that he may recommend his moral philosophy to the
king in a gentle and smooth way. Therefore he would rather not
touch on such issues as the political role of a king, or when he has
vj
to confront such issues, he would put them in an oblique fashion or
in an amiable way. This is perhaps an historical difficulty of most
Chinese thinkers living under an absolute monarchy.
C: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE RULER AND THE MASSES
Hsun-tze considers that the relation of the ruler to the
masses is like that of the parent to his children, or the Heavenly
2
God to his creation . Such an unbalanced position between the ruler
2. For reference, please see p.150.
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and the masses has its historical origin. In the traditional
Confucian theory of politics, the state is like a big family, the
king is like the father, and the masses, the children. What is
important in this family is the virtue of the father, and with his
virtue and influence the whole family will naturally have no problems.
The king is also described as a Heavenly God because his moral excel¬
lence reaches a state of perfection and his political achievements
are great, and to the masses he is as perfect as the Heavenly God.
Since the Confucianists consider that the Sage-King achieves the
highest political success and he should be admired, respected and
adored as the Heavenly God, they deliberately describe the Sage-King
as a god-like figure when they put forward their moral and political
theory to their contemporary kings. However, they fail to reflect
that, as time changes, there are all kinds of complicated problems such as
problems of economics, and sociology, likely to occur in the relationship
between the state and the masses, the problems which the ancient Sage-
King might never encounter and it is doubtful whether with his virtue
only, the ruler may adequately deal with. In short, the Confucian
discussion of the relationship between the king and the masses is
historically an unbalanced one. According to Hsun-tze's theory, the
masses are also described as a crowd of Mean-Spirited Men and the world
is an assembly of these Mean-Spirited masses. Since the masses are
stupid and unenlightened, they commit crimes of all kinds; and thus in
Hsun-tze's thinking, a Sage-King must be born in order to save them, to
educate them and to rule them. To Hsun-tze, the masses are mainly
divided into two groups, namely: (1) the ignorant masses, and (2) the
rioters; the former are those whose Evil Nature is displayed in a
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slight degree while the latter are those who fully display their
Evil Nature. The rebels must, in his theory, be eliminated or
punished by the Sage-King, while the ignorant masses must admire
the Sage-King and they must automatically be submissive to him.
They, the ignorant masses, are like a clump of wild plants which
sways in the wind. If there is a Sage-King in the country, they
will survive just as the wild plants grow in the warm wind of
spring; if there is a tyrant on the throne, they will suffer or
die just like plants in an evil stormy wind. In other words, the
masses are a crowd of poor creatures who are entirely dependent on
the authority of the king. However, whether or not all the masses
are merely either rebels or ignorant is the first disputable point
of Hsun-tze's theory. He could be accused of being too dogmatic in
his groundless belief. In short, the unbalanced relationship
between the ruler and the masses described by Hsun-tze is, for a
modern viewpoint, feudalistic and anachronistic.
D: THE PROBLEM OF THE TRANSFERENCE OF POLITICAL POWER
Supposing that a Sage becomes the king of a country and
that he is capable of shouldering his heavy role then, according to
Hsun-tze, the people of the whole country will follow him, he will
employ Sage-Officials to assist him, and he will educate his people
to become morally good. Thus the whole country will be full of
Sages. When the Sage-King dies or is unable to carry on his work,
a new Sage-King will succeed to his throne. However, in practice,
the following problems must arise:
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(1) How do the people of the country follow their Sage-King?
There must be a political expression by the masses of approval of
the king rather than just a personal loyalty to him. In what way
may the word 'follow' be legally expressed and not be just mere
words in their thought? This is a question Hsun-tze fails to answer.
(2) Supposing that the whole country is now full of sages,
and according to Hsun-tze, the Sage should be the king, therefore
all men in the country are qualified to be the king. In practice,
if the Sage-Kings are many in the country, for the sake of efficiency
of orders and decisions, there must be a Sage-King of all Sage-Kings.
How, then, does this 'Sage-King of all Sage-Kings' come to the throne?
By a public election or a personal approval of the citizens? Since
Hsun-tze has failed to answer the former question it is not surprising
that he fails to discuss the latter one.
(3) According to Hsun-tze, Sage-Officials are directly
employed by the Sage-King. In other words, the employment of Sage-
Officials is entirely dependent upon the wise observation, judgement
and decision of the Sage-King, and the Sage-King is absolutely free
in the choice of the officials he employs. Thus the ordinary people
not only have no right to elect their king, but also have no right
to elect their officials. They only have the duty of following
authority, and they have no legal right and freedom to express their
approval or disapproval of it or to elect, dethrone or dispose of it.
This is another difficulty in Hsun-tze's political theories.
(4) In Hsun-tze's theory a Sage-King is expected to take up
responsibility in the chaotic world in order to eliminate the
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tyrannical and the wicked. However, (a) there is no guarantee
that a Sage will take up such a task. If there is no Sage-King
to save the world what can the masses hope for? According to
Hsun-tze, the masses will be saved only when the Sage-King is
ruling; however, in Chinese history, in a system of hereditory
monarchy, such an occurrence is never guaranteed; what then can
be the guarantee of their lives and livelihood besides the Sage-
King? (b) If the purpose of the one who eliminates the tyrannical
and the wicked is to seize power and kingship rather than to save
the masses from sufferings so that the masses are, as it were, out
of the frying pan and into the fire, then when will they be saved
from this continuous political pressure? Here, if he goes more
deeply into the above question, he may easily bring forward for
further consideration the issues of well-founded legally contracted
political institutions or governmental or social contract such as
the liberal consent or covenant to form a state and to place fiduciary
trust in the authority, or a juristic state of legal omnipotence, or
another form of political theory, and the question of the political
consciousness of the masses. However, Hsun-tze fails to discuss
these questions.
To summarize, the failures of Hsun-tze's political
theory of the administration of a Sage-King are as follows:
(1) Hsun-tze insists that virtue and politics are one
inseparable reality, or that moral and political excellence are
necessary characteristics of a ruler, yet such a strict distinction
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offers little meaning for the practical problems of politics.
Unfortunately he devotes almost the whole of his theory to such a
discussion. Therefore this single-minded development of his
political theory limits his thought, or becomes an obsession in his
thought.
(2) In his theory, the function of a ruler in the state and
among the masses is not clearly and correctly discussed. With
regard to the relationship between the ruler and the masses, it is
a relationship which is politically unbalanced and unguaranteed.
This is a further tailure in his political discussion.
(3) As to the question of the guarantee of the masses' lives
and livelihood in the chaotic world, this is by extension a failure
of his theory.
In ancient philosophy, thinkers tended to include politics
in the discussion of ethics or morality, and to criticize their political
theory with a modern eye is unfair to them. However, to measure a
political theory purely from a theoretical viewpoint with objective
criteria is what has been attempted, although the practical background
which undeniably has greatly influenced the issue and development of
the theory is equally appreciated. The fact that in the long
political history of China there was no establishment of an objective
political contract between the state, the ruler and the masses is a
regrettable state of affairs for which most of the Confucianists
throughout the centuries who greatly influenced the current of
political thought should be responsible.
313
In conclusion, Hsun-tze's theory of the administration
of a Sage-King is a theoretical ideal which, in practice, does not
give any guarantee of success in politics and ignores the legal
rights of the masses. His failure is connected with the political
view of Confucian tradition and ideals, a further discussion of
which will be given in the following chapter.
SECTION 2: A DISCUSSION OF THE CULTIVATION OF A KING
3
In Chinese history, starting from King Ch'i of Hsia
to the times of Hsun-tze, it was an almost two-thousand-year
tradition that the inheritance of kingship followed the ruler of
family heredity, that is to say, when the kind died or resigned
4
normally his eldest son succeeded to the throne. . Hsun-tze well
understands that there may be certain difficulties in implementing
this theory of administration of a Sage-King under this traditional
political institution, he therefore tries to persuade the Kings to
be morally well-educated. In his book, he repeatedly explains the
following two points: (1) If the king keeps to a fair policy and
loves his people, the whole country will follow him loyally and
obediently, and (2) if the king is tyrannical to his people, the
whole country will certainly abandon him. His theories of the
moral and political cultivation of a king are the main theme of his
viewpoint in politics. The following is an examination of them.
3. &L Ch'i, son of Yu. Ch'i succeeded after his father's death
and became the second king of Hsia Dynasty (2183-1752 B.C.)
4. In the early Shang Dynasty, the inheritance of kingship followed
a different principle, i.e. when the king died his younger brother
succeeded to the throne; and if the king had no brother, his eldest
son might become king. However, from the last four generations of
the Shang Dynasty onward, it was only the eldest son who had the right
to the throne.
314
There are numerous illustrations in Hsun-tze's book
to encourage the ruler to be a Sage as well as to warn him not to
be a tyrant. A brief summary is listed as follows:
(i) The 'three essential principles': (1) to keep to a
fair policy and to love the people, (2) to exalt rites and to
respect scholars, and (3) to give high rank to the virtuous and
to employ the capable. When a king is morally educated, he will
know how to practise these 'three principles'. These are discussed
in chapter IX and they may be considered to be an outline of Hsun-
tze's political theory. However, according to him, the purpose of
these 'three principles' is 'to guarantee the king's security on
his throne, honour among his people, and success and fame in the
country'. Thus the result of the policy according to the 'three
principles' has nothing to do with morality. In other words, the
purpose of the king's self-cultivation and moral education is not
the wellbeing of his people or his country, but his own interests
of security, honour, success and fame as a king. This is an obvious
inconsistency caused by either the ambiguity in his thought as to the
king's duty to his people or a conscious or unconscious concession to
contemporary kings in order to attract their interest to his theories.
(ii) The 'four rules of administration': (1) to be good at
nourishing the people, (2) to be good at administering and control¬
ling them, (3) to be good at exalting the capable and virtuous and
arranging high official positions for them, and (4) to be good at
classifying the people and enlightening them. These are discussed
in chapter XII. However, they provide further details of the 'three
principles', and they have the same purpose as discussed above,
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therefore they fall into the same problem when one examines their
purpose.
(iii) The 'five choices of practice' of the king: (1) the
practice of the kingly way, (2) that of the way of the mighty and
hegemonic leader, (3) that of the way of merely obtaining tempor¬
ary peace and survival, (4) that of the way of endangering the
kingdom, and (5) that of the way of extinction and decay. These
are discussed in chapter IX. Hsun-tze insists that a king must
choose and practise the first way, i.e. the kingly way. He believes
that as a result of such a practice, 'the capable and virtuous man
and the wise and sage man will naturally and willingly offer their
services, hostile countries will naturally yield to the virtue of
the Sage-King, and the country will naturally become wealthy'.
However, the word 'naturally' is used in an ambiguous way. Further¬
more, in his theory the practical details of the kingly way are not
clearly discussed. This gives.rise to difficulties when in practice.
(iv) The 'five means' of the king's administration through
his officials: (1) rites and righteousness, (2) reliability and
trust, (3) exaltation of the capable and virtuous, (4) appropriate
bestowal of titles and emoluments to the nobility, and (5) celebration
of success and reward of achievement. These are discussed in
chapters X and XI. The theory is effective as long as the king is
the supreme authority of the state. In other words, Hsun-tze is now
speaking on behalf of a king or from the viewpoint of a king, and the
purpose of this policy of administering the officials is, on one hand
to gain the hearts of the king's inferiors, and on the other hand to
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control them by making use of their desire for fame and profit. If
a king applies this theory incorrectly, it may become his artificial
means or skill in his administration, and even worse, he may become
- and in Chinese history often is - a god-like authority who bestows
kindness, favour or reward in a supreme way. However, if a king
can really keep to the first three means suggested in administering
his officials, he may succeed in influencing and overcoming them by
his moral goodness as expected by Hsun-tze. And perhaps this is
already a great advance in despotic monarchy under the traditional
political situation of his times.
(v) The concrete contents of the king's 'fair policy and
love for his people' are, Hsun-tze says in chapter IX:
'To choose the capable and virtuous, to employ
the sincere and respectful, to promote the dutiful son
and the brotherly man, to accommodate the orphans and
the widowed, and to supply the impoverished and the
poor. ' (V , 2)
The first two statements again raise the problem of the
way of 'choosing' and 'employment'. In Hsun-tze's theory, the fact
that 'choosing' and 'employing' are in the hands of the king and
there are no laws of public election is a crucial difficulty. As
to the promotion of the dutiful son and the brotherly man to politics,
a problem may immediately follow: the possibility of the transition
from ethical morality to political ability. In other words, can a
man, without training and experience in political administration,
shoulder the heavy role of ruling the country and the people with
only his personal moral cultivation? One may agree that it is
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desirable for a ruler also to have moral cultivation, yet one may
not find it makes any sense at all if one insists that a morally
good man must also be good at politics. The last two statements
fall into the category of social work and benefit, and they are
certainly one of the necessary policies of a government. However,
there must be more concrete but appropriate and necessary policies
in a well-functioning government to protect and guarantee the
rights of the life and livelihood of its countrymen as well as to
deal with the problems, external and internal, of the country or
the state. Therefore Hsun-tze's theory of 'fair policy' must be
considered incomplete.
(vi) In the policy of enriching the country, Hsun-tze puts
forward some practical and effective methods. The main points he
suggests are (1) to cut down expenses and to open up more sources
of income, (2) to enrich the people, (3) to make full use of
natural and material sources, (4) to promote efficiency in the
division of labour, and (5) to encourage business and the market.
These are sensible enough, but if he had gone more deeply into the
discussion of such issues as the policy of preventing the emergence
of dominating financial powers which often determine the economic
policy of the country and monopolise its economic structure, he
would have made more of a contribution in this theory. However,
perhaps one cannot expect Hsun-tze to produce a complete system of
economics, since his interest obviously does not lie in this field
and, in fact, one cannot deny that his theory of enriching the
country is outstanding and is still valid today.
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(vii) As to his theory of using the army, he believes that the
army of a Sage-King will not stain itself with the blood of its
enemy. The purpose of having an army is, according to Hsun-tze,
for the sake of protecting the country and the people from the
tyrannical and the wicked. However, without a strong army with
necessary military equipment and supplies, how can it fulfil its
duty? It is understood that Hsun-tze does not consider that milit¬
ary force is important, since the hostile country or enemy should
surrender unconditionally under the influence of the Sage-King's
virtue. However, no matter whether it is an army for the use of
self-defence or an army for eliminating the tyrannical and the
wicked, its organization, including military training and development
of military equipment, is also of essential importance in politics.
Hsun-tze does not give a detailed discussion of this aspect.
(viii) Hsun-tze's suggestion of following the pattern of the
policy of the recent Sage-Kings offers, in political theory, no
significant meaning. A ruler or a government, no matter what poli¬
cies he or it follows, must be able to see the practical needs of
the contemporary situation, including the needs of his or its country¬
men. Thus the pattern of others' policies is of comparatively
secondary consideration.
(ix) As to Hsun-tze's theory of the succession of a ruler, he
suggests that ideally a Sage should succeed to a Sage. However,
there are certain difficulties in this theory which have already been
discussed in the last section.
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In conclusion, his theory of the cultivation of a
king, on one hand is theoretically incomplete because of its
single-minded restriction to morality, and on the other hand is,
in practice, often too idealized to be realizable. Another crucial
failure is the fact that he always speaks for the king rather than '
for the people, which leads hirn to fail to touch upon the basic
topic of political theory, i.e. the rights and duty of a man as a
citizen of a country. The main cause of this failure lies in his
deficiency in the distinction between man's ethical duty and his
civic duty.
SECTION 3: HIS DEFECTIVENESS IN THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
DIFFERENT CONCEPTS OF ETHICAL DUTY AND
CIVIC DUTY
When man reflects that he himself can be the subject of
his observation and reflection, he may also go on to investigate
the meaning of his life, and the relationship between himself and
an external object or objects. When he reflects upon the meaning
of his own life, he may also come to the realization that human
value lies in the need of his moral consciousness to perfect his
moral capacity. There grows up in him a moral ideal and a sense
of moral responsibility. He may conclude that the duty of man is
to practise this moral ideal, and that the complete fulfilment of
such a duty is the complete fulfilment of human life. One may
call such a duty 'moral duty' which obviously emerges from his
moral consciousness. However, man's moral ideal and moral practice
cannot possibly be divorced from the relationship between himself
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and other people. Therefore when he decides that he himself in
human relations should also behave to the state of moral perfection
one may say that his moral ideal of concern with and respect for
all lives around him is also the ideal of ethical morality, his
moral practice is also the practice of ethical morality and his
moral duty is also the duty of ethical morality or, in short,
ethical duty. Moral duty is a self-imposed demand to practise a
moral ideal in order to reach moral perfection. Duty in such a
sense does not necessarily have a correlation with rights or
constraint or compulsion. It is rather a deliberate choice of the
agent who considers that certain actions are morally required by
him, or he feels that he must do such-and-such in order to become
morally perfect. The term 'ethical duty' may serve as a synonym
for moral duty denoting a sense of moral concern with and respect
for all lives. Although the term 'ethical duty' indicates a higher
level of moral ideal and it may also be considered to be an ideal
moral duty, i.e. what ought to be practised in order to become a
morally excellent man or a sage,in ordinary language, there is no
great difference between the two terms. One may take the theory of
Hsun-tze as an example in order to understand this. A man may
demand of himself that he practises the Way of a Sage; this is his
moral ideal, and he therefore urges himself to follow and practise
the way of becoming a Sage and his practice becomes his self-
committed moral duty. However, the processes of becoming a Sage
include the practice of perfection of the duties of human relations
and social institutions, this may also be a practice of ethical
morality and thus may become his duty of ethical morality or his
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ethical duty. Therefore one may conclude that man's moral duty
is identical with his ethical duty. In short, the ethical duty
of human life is to follow and practise the moral ideal of concern
with and respect for all lives, by which on the one hand and
externally, man may enjoy a harmonious life in society, and on the
other and internally he may reach the state of moral perfection.
A man, while living in society which is constituted by
certain institutions, should have certain rights and duties from
and to his society. In other words, there must be,a system of
right and duty in order to make a society possible. Certain
institutional or social practices such as the private collection
of military equipment are illegal in some countries, or murder is
forbidden in civilized society. These delimit one's social duty
or civic duty. It is clear that a man in society may simultan¬
eously practise his ethical duty and civic duty, and in fact,
certain conventional moral duties have been recognized as institut-
ional laws or social laws. Thus it seems that the content of one's
moral duty and civic duty sometimes interpenetrate. However,
society may not require each of its members to become a sage, there¬
fore the social requirement of one's civic duties can be distinguished
from the moral requirement of one's moral duties. In short, moral
duty cannot be reduced to civic duty, yet the latter may be included
in the former by an enlightened moral agent, who may see civic duty
as part of his ethical duty or who practises the established rules
or customs of social morality in the spirit of ethical morality.
The objects of these two duties are also slightly different: the
objects of the ethical duty embrace all men in society, while the
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practice of civic duty is a direct response to social institutions
or laws or to the state as a citizen in order to obtain certain
rights and interest or security which it offers to its citizens.
Therefore these two terms must not be confused and they are two
names with two realities. The terms 'social duty' and 'civic
duty' which may seem to be identical, may be further analyzed
as follows: a man may be responsible for certain practices whatever
society he is in, nevertheless he may not be obliged to follow what
is taken as the civic duties of all countries or states, except his
own. All men should not commit murder, for example, in any society,
for this is a moral duty as well as a social duty, which should be
strictly kept in all times and all societies. A tourist may have to
pay V.A.T. when he is in the United Kingdom, yet he need not respond
to the summons to military service since he is not a British citizen.
In short, one's civic duty can be slightly different from one's social
duty. However, for the present purpose, an understanding of the
difference between one's ethical duty and one's civic duty in order
to establish certain points in the criticism of Hsun-tze's political
theory is more essential. Therefore one's ethical duty is conceived
here as, in practice identical with one's moral duty while one's civic
duty as, in theory no great difference from one's social duty.
One important point about these two concepts is that
although a man practises his ethical duty, he may not obtain a guarantee
of his civic rights. In theory a man in his highest moral state may
practise his social duty and civic duty in a profound spirit of ethical
morality. In practice, however, the result of fulfilment in ethical
morality may not guarantee the acquisition of his civic right. The
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former results in moral perfection in himself and establishes a moral
reputation in society. He may project his internal moral excellence
to other people and he may maintain a harmonious relationship between
himself and other people. The latter secures him certain legal
rights and guarantees under the protection of government which is a
political institution designed for such a function. In short, when
man practises these two duties, he may obtain two different results.
In ancient China a state was actually responsible for
its citizens only under the following circumstances, either (1) be¬
cause of the conscience of the ruler or the ruling class who was
willing to consider (or be considerate of) the interests of his
people; or (2) because of the continuous striving for certain
rights by the masses. In China the political system of absolute
or despotic monarchy enjoyed a long history and people often suffered
much because the ruling king was neither considerate nor benevolent.
During the Pre-Ch'in Period, China was in a state of disunity. The
Chou kingdom was split up into many feudal states, each owning its
territory and army, and wars among them for gaining leading authority
or extending lands seemed never to end. Seeing the people suffering
from wars and tyrannical kings, the Confucian thinkers realized that
only a Sage-King who is considerate and benevolent to his people will
not raise wars and make his people suffer. If all kings behave
morally and all the masses follow the model of their kings, then the
world will be, they believed, in a state of great peace. Therefore
the Confucianists of that time and of later times in Chinese history,
made every effort to educate the kings to be morally cultivated and
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the masses to morally behave. Their efforts certainly are worthy
of respect. In their theory, they often considered that if every
man, no matter whether he is a king or an ordinary man, performs his
moral duty, and if he performs his civic duty in a spirit of ethical
duty, he is a sage. However, their conclusion did not give any
indication of what sorts of legal rights a man ought to have if he
performs his civic duty. It is clear that a man who practises his
ethical duty may not be able to obtain a guarantee of his civic
rights. Therefore the theory ardently suggested by Hsun-tze and
most Confucian thinkers that with the virtuous administration of a
Sage-King or by 'a policy of absolute or despotic morality' the
state may secure peace and justice, may fail to be vindicated by
historical events. An attempt of Hsun-tze, as well as many other
Confucianists, to reduce the theory of politics to that of morality
must be considered to be a theoretical deficiency.
An outline of the Confucian political theory initiated
by Confucius and followed by most of the Confucianists may be helpful
to explain the situation. A Confucianist believes that:
(1) Ethical duty embraces civic duty.
(2) The practice of ethical duty includes the practice of
civic duty.
(3) The result of these practices is to enable man to
become a Sage.
These three summarized theories are themselves descriptive
ones and one cannot and need not argue much to these beliefs. In
practice, however, one may find that the following analyses are also
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of great importance and from them one may see the weakness of the
Confucian political theories:
(1) The purpose of moral practice is to enable the agent to
reach a state of moral perfection, while the purpose of civic
practice is to fulfil the requirement of being a citizen.
(2) The result of moral practice may enable a man to become
a Sage, while the result of civic practice may enable a man to
achieve what is legally right for him as a citizen by certain con¬
tracts mutually agreed by the government and the people. Therefore
the results of both practices can be practically irrelevant to each
other.
(3) The practice of ethical duty cannot guarantee the
agent (i) to obtain legal rights in his country unless there are
institutional laws established to ensure their efficiency, or he,
with his colleagues, will have to strive for them, (ii) to have a
society which is free from the tyrannical pressure of the ruling
king.
It is clear that a state does not originate from the
individual ambition for power nor does it originate from the virtue
of a Sage. It is that a group of men, in return for the assurance
of certain practical guarantees, consent to give certain fiduciary
trust to a government in which they will be citizens. What then
are these guarantees, or what may they claim as citizens? In short,
and in essence, (1) man's right of life and livelihood must be
guaranteed and be protected from irrational infringements of his
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freedom; (2) man ought to have the right of expressing differing
opinions about any governmental policies and presenting his arguments
freely, and more importantly, he ought to have the right to particip¬
ate in legislation and political administration, to elect and to be
elected, and to abolish or reject governmental policies or the
authority of the ruling class. In principle, people must be the
source of a state, and any policies must be "based upon the needs of
the people and the function of a government is to protect and guarantee
the rights and interests of its people: this is one of the practical
themes of politics. As to the problems of international relation¬
ships, these should by no means be given less emphasis; however, one
must see clearly the basic problem of a state before one can go
further to investigate its extended field. In conclusion, it is
clear that the result of man's practising his civic duty is different
from that of practising his ethical duty.
To turn back to Hsun-tze's political theory, viewed from
the standpoint which has just been discussed, one may see the
following problems.
(i) Hsun-tze considers that if a king, with his officials,
practises the Way of a Sage and educates his people to fulfil the
duty of human relations and social institutions, then the whole
state will practise a universal ethical duty and simultaneously fulfil
a universal civic duty. This certainly is a highly ideal theory.
However, this political ideal may be realized only when a Sage-King
is on the throne or it is only when the conscience of the ruler is
so morally awakened that the state is actually responsible for its
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citizens. Since there are actual practical difficulties in the
rule of a Sage-King as discussed in the previous section, such an
ideal may also be difficult to realise.
the country practises morality, the relationship among men, the
state and the ruler should, in theory, be in a state of 'harmonious
moral unity', and they should always come to a universal agreement
upon all kinds of policies. In other words, there should be no
argument or conflict among them. Thus, in this state, there is in
5
fact no room for politics. The term 'Cheng Chih' , or 'politics'
in Chinese means 'a correct way of ruling', and when men, the state
and the ruler are in a state of universal agreement, the need of
'ruling' is indeed unnecessary. Therefore the traditional Confucian
ideal of politics always ends in a state of universal agreement, or
more precisely, in a state of 'harmonious moral unity'. However,
in practice, since the ideal of administration by a Sage-King is not
easily realized, it follows that such an ideal state of universal
agreement in policies is also not easy to achieve.
Hsun-tze's attempt to reduce man's civic duty to ethical
duty leads to his failure in political theory. The reasons for this
may be outlined as follows:
(i) He places excessive insistence upon the importance of
morality in politics which in theory and in practice has its problems
and difficulties, and he fails to see the difference between man's
ethical duty and civic duty.
(ii) If every man including the ruler and the officials in
5 . Cheng Chih.
328
(ii) Hsun-tze always considers that the end of politics lies
in morality and thus politics become a means to morality or, more
precisely, a means to reach the state of 'harmonious moral unity',
or a moral world. He thus tries to 'moralize' or idealize politics
and neglects its practical nature.
(iii) A fatal error also lies in the fact that Hsun-tze often
speaks for the ruler or from the viewpoint of a ruler. He there¬
fore considers that the ruler's practice of morality must be a crucial
point in politics and it is not surprising that in his ideal state
or in his term, 'the Ultimate Fair Society', he does not of ten mention
the laws to protect and guarantee man's rights as a citizen, for he
may think that they are not necessary. However, his neglect of the
voice of the masses, especially their rights as citizens, is a
crucial mistake in his theory.
In the understanding of the two concepts, namely, man's
ethical duty and man's civic duty, Hsuntze may be accused of lacking
accurate distinction and recognition. In nearly three thousand
years from Confucius till modern times, Confucian scholars often
care more about the way the king rules and less about the way politics
should be practised, and this is, more or less, because of the
ambiguity in their thoughts about these concepts. Hsun-tze in
fact is not the only one whose theory can be blamed for this.
Although the historical background might encourage the formation
and development of this theoretical error, what is regrettable is
that with their great sympathy for the suffering of man under political
pressure or chaos and with their great wisdom and their profound
thinking, they still failed to prevent political tragedy in history.
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SECTION 4: AN EXAMINATION OF HIS IDEAL SOCIETY
In his book, Hsun-tze delineates three types of men
according to whether or not they transform their Evil Nature,
accumulate good Artifice and know and practise the Ultimate Principle
of Man or morality. The descriptions and analyses of these three
types of men, namely: the Mean-Spirited Man, the Conscientious Man
and the Sage, occupy most of his book and, in fact, they are also
the essential constituents and basis of his moral philosophy. How¬
ever, his political philosophy also does not depart far from such a
basis. He always insists that the perfection of man's ethical duty,
including civic duty, is the ultimate and final goal of life. He
also emphasizes that man may have different kinds of behaviour, moral
or immoral, and that there therefore exist all kinds of people in
society. If a man is a Mean-Spirited Man, and he is in an inferior
position in society, he will become a wicked member of the masses,
or a bogus or a usurping official of the government; and if he is
in a high official position, he*will become a traitor to the state
or a tyrant. If a man is a Conscientious Man or a Sage, and he is
in an inferior position, he will become a good citizen or a merit¬
orious official; if he is in a high official position, he will
become a Sage minister or a Sage-King. In Hsun-tze's theory, a
Sage citizen should be invited by the King to serve in the government.
If in the state, the king, his officials and his people are all Sages,
then policies will always meet with universal agreement; this is the
ideal society in Hsun-tze's thought. In other words, his ideal
society is a society of Sages. However, he is aware that to reach
such a political (if it may be so called) ideal is not easy, he
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therefore advocates that by means of rites, society may at least
reach a state of Ultimate Fairness, a theory which he puts forward
in chapter IV.
The method of reaching a state of Ultimate Fairness in
society, according to Hsun-tze, is by means of rites which are
established by the kings of the early Chou Dynasty and are recorded
in YI LI or THE BOOK OF ETIQUETTE AND CEREMONIAL. If the king
uses rites to distinguish and classify the noble and the inferior,
the senior and the junior, the wise and the foolish, and the capable
and the incapable; then every man in society will obtain a position
which is most suitable for him, he will devote himself to that
position and be paid according to what he should be paid. It is
only then that a society can be called Ultimately Fair. However,
if such an ideal is to be realized, the following difficulties must
first be overcome:
(i) According to Hsun-tze, rites are the means to achieve
the goal of the social and political ideal of Ultimate Fairness.
However, whether or not rites can be the criterion of distinction
and classification of all societies or official employment and
position must be open to question. In daily life, it is no cfoubt
true that one should use appropriate rites to treat people appropri¬
ately. For example, one should attend to one's parents according
to the rites as a son; one should show respect when being inter¬
viewed by the senior, or one should attend to one's teachers
according to the rites as a pupil. By the suitable practice of
appropriate rites a man thus shows his achievement or perfection in
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moral education or cultivation. Therefore the practice of rites may
be considered to be one of the means to moral cultivation. However,
it is doubtful if by means of rites one can distinguish another's
ability in political administration. Supposing that a government
needs a new leader, the candidate must be chosen according to (1) his
political ability including his knowledge of politics and perhaps
some knowledge of history, sociology, economics, laws, philosophy and
psychology and, more importantly, his theory of politics and policies,
and (2) his past experience and behaviour in political activities.
Then everyone in the country may freely make comments about the
candidate(s); he is free to vote for the one he approves of and to
say no to the one he does not support. When the candidate is
elected to be the leader, then the people should distinguish him
among them with special rites which are appropriate to him. There¬
fore the practice of rites should come after every man in society has
been arranged in an appropriate position. In other words, the quest¬
ion of whether or not a society or a country can reach to a state of
Ultimate Fairness is not answered by the fact that when all men are
in their suitable positions they should then be treated with appropri¬
ate rites, but it has to go more deeply into the problem of how to
arrange suitable positions for people. If every man has legal rights
and freedom in society as well as in politics and he is protected by
laws and governmental institutions, then-the country may be said to
be primarily in the state of fairness, which may further lead to the
state of Ultimate Fairness only when education, including education of
the individual's political consciousness, is universally and success¬
fully practised. However, Hsun-tze's theory that rites can be the
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criterion to distinguish and classify all social and official
positions is doubtful, and it is also wrong to say that rites are a
sufficient means to enable the country to reach the state of Ultimate
Fairness.
(ii) Hsun-tze also considers that to practise politics by
means of rites is the acme of politics. However, in maintaining
social and political order, the power of rites to rule and control
is doubtful. It may be suggested that after social and political
order is well-established, the country may practise rites and right¬
eousness as a higher means of ruling and control, and in this stage
one may call it 'the acme of politics (if it may be so named)'.
However, before social and political order is well-established, laws
must play an important role in the ruling and control of the country.
Therefore successful ruling and control by means of rites may be
considered to be a way of ruling and control in a highly well-established
and well-ordered country. However, there is more to politics than
ruling.
(iii) The term 'Ultimate Fairness' means, according to Hsun-tze,
fairness to man's capability as well as to his salary, and furthermore,
to his position in society. However, only the Sage-King can be the
judge with regard to fairness. It may be therefore neither political
fairness nor social fairness but merely a fairness of judgement and
appointment of a Sage-King. Here Hsun-tze is again speaking from the
standpoint of the Sage-King. Although in his ideal, the country
ruled by a Sage-King is an ideal state or society, this is an ideal
which, in practice, is almost impossible to realise.
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(iv) Supposing that it is a true fact that the whole country
are Sages, it is undeniable that the problems of administration in
the country will be greatly decreased. However, what still remains
are certain problems of organization of the country and problems of
international relations. However, if the whole world are Sages,
what might happen is that, except for some necessary administrative
organization, no more politics is needed. This reminds people of
the picture of the 'Heavenly Kingdom' or 'God's Realm' in certain
religions. However, the human world is still what it is, at least,
it is certainly not the Heavenly Kingdom with only Sages as its
citizens, and the above suppositions are, in fact, not practical in
the human world.
In conclusion, the ideal society in Hsun-tze's theory
is only an impractical ideal which makes no contribution to political
philosophy.
e
The purpose of political philosophy is, in principle, to
study the essence and value of the state, its practical problems such
as its relation to the people, and the organization and realisation
of the ideal state. This may include the clarification of concepts,
an understanding, a criticism and an evaluation of certain forms of
politics or policies. In Hsun-tze's political theory, there is
only discussion of the king's ways of ruling and controlling his
people. He does not establish a theory of politics or form of
governmental contract which is connected with the legal rights and
interests of the people, nor does he make an overall investigation
into the essence of the state, its function and its value. Therefore
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one may say that his political theory is an incomplete one which is
of little importance in its field. It is mainly an extension of
his moral philosophy for he is often speaking of politics in terms
of morality. For a reader, it is another chapter of moral discus¬
sion rather than a chapter of political theory. Hsun-tze, as many
other Confucianists, often does not mention politics in an open and
direct manner, but instead, makes great efforts to explain that a
state of harmonious relationship among all classes in society can
be achieved by means of morality. Therefore it is indeed difficult
to say that all his theories are completely relevant to the theory
of politics. It is perhaps because he lived in an age of absolute
monarchy that he had to strategically design his theories of politics
in an oblique fashion. On the other hand, the political ideal of
'harmonious moral unity' may also reflect his suffering under the
burden of traditional Confucian political thought. This will be
discussed in the next chapter.
EPILOGUE
AN EPILOGUE
In the history of Chinese philosophy, criticism of
Hsun-tze's theory may be divided roughly into two schools.
(1) Most scholars when mentioning Hsun-tze automatically
listed him as an orthodox Confucianist simply because he had
labelled himself as a Confucianist. They also considered him as
a significant Pre-Ch'in Confucianist, after Confucius and Mencius,
simply because he had left his readers a substantial amount of
writing which richly presented his theories and teachings. However,
this school of criticism only shows a casual attitude in admitting
the position of Hsun-tze in the line of Confucianists.
(2) Some considered Hsun-tze a defective Confucianist for
the following reasons:
(a) Since Hsun-tze emphasized that Man's Nature is Evil and
that teachers and laws are important, some accused him of encouraging
the rise of the theory of Fa-ism1.
(b) On the other hand, some considered that Hsun-tze did not
*
understand the meaning of both Confucius' and Mencius' suggestion
2
about human nature and that in his theory, the origin of value of
1. Su-Shih (1036-1101), for example, holds this view. A recent
recurrence of this view may be found in Lao Sse-Kwang's A HISTORY
OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY. However, this viewpoint must be considered
misleading, please see the discussion on p.357.
2. Han Yii ( 768-824) and Ch'eng Hao (1032-1085), for example, hold
this view. However, Confucius in fact seldom talks about human
nature and Mencius gives some indications that human nature is good
with a different viewpoint from that of Hsun-tze.
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morality lies externally in teachers and laws , therefore Hsun-tze
had led, they claimed, the Pre-Ch'in Confucianism astray. They
claimed that the Han Confucianists misdirected their study of Pre-
Ch'in Confucian theories to a study of the theory of the Yin Yang
school, which was greatly away from the spirit of Pre-Ch'in Confucian¬
ism, and that afterward there came the invasion of Buddhism in the
first century A.D. which gradually became a leading current in Chinese
thought for nearly a thousand years, they therefore concluded that the
spirit of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism after Hsun-tze almost came to an end.
The renaissance of Confucianism occurred in the tenth and eleventh
4
centuries led by the Ch'eng brothers and Chu Hsi. It was only
because of their advocacy, they believed, of a study of Li, or the
5
Rational Principle that the spirit of Confucianism survived. In
short, they thought that Hsun-tze's theory was the main cause of the
6
decay of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism .
(c) Some more radical critics also claimed that while the
Chinese cultural spirit of moral-ism originated from the hands of
Confucius and Mencius, Hsun-tze distorted it by, they argued, his
'emphasis' of the importance of teachers and laws and his 'search'
for the external origin of the value of morality. They thus
3. Again this is a misguided criticism which has been discussed
on p.205.
4. Cheng Hao (1032-1085) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107) of the Sung Dynasty
are famous scholars of the study of Li or the Rational Principle.
5. <E£ Li Hsueh, a study of mainly the Mind and human nature as
the ultimate source of the Rational Principle.
6. Please see Lao's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, p.292.
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concluded that it was Hsun-tze who had weakened the cultural spirit
7
of the Pre-Ch'in Period .
In short, this school of critics laid blame on Hsun-tze,
as an offender who caused the destruction of the Confucian theory
and the cultural spirit. They denied that Hsun-tze's philosophy
made a contribution of any value to the history of Chinese thought.
Is Hsun-tze a contributor to or an offender against
Confucianism and Chinese culture? The following chapters are
concerned with this question, where an attempt is made to re-estimate
the proper value and position of Hsun-tze's philosophy in the history
of Chinese thought. The first chapter, aiming at (1) the theoretical
connection between Confucius and Hsun-tze, and (2) Hsun-tze's
philosophical contribution to Confucius' moral theory, may give
sufficient indication that Hsun-tze certainly offers supplementation
to the perfection of Pre-Ch'in Confucianism. And Hsun-tze is not a
defective Confucianist as far as moral philosophy is concerned.
The second chapter is concerned with the differences between the
viewpoints and interests of Hsun-tze and Han Fei Tze, the most
important Fa-ist, who once was the pupil of Hsun-tze. This comparison
shows the irrelevance and invalidity of the critics' attempt to
connect the two thinkers. The last chapter, explaining the content
of and the connection between the Pre-Ch'in philosophical spirit and
7. Please see Lao's A HISTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY, pp.324-325.
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cultural spirit, will give a survey of Hsun-tze's positive
contribution to the two, and attempts to dispel the misleading
argument that Hsun-tze has weakened the Pre-Ch'in cultural spirit.
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CHAPTER IX:
HSUN-TZE AS A CONFUCIANIST
CHAPTER IX:
HSUN-TZE AS A CONFUCIANIST
|.
In his book, Hsun-tze praises and extols Confucius as
g
a 'Ta Ju' (chapter VIII), a Sage (chapter VI) and as great as
such Sages as King Wen, King Wu and Duke Chou (chapter XXI). He
also praises, in chapter VIII for example, the great merits of
Confucianists in politics. In other words, this implies that his
thoughts flow from those of Confucius and in his view, Confucianism
is the only way to save the chaotic world, disorderly countries and
mankind's shortcomings. Almost all later Chinese scholars also
9
listed him as a Confucianist . However, how to prove, in theory,
that Hsun-tze is an orthodox Confucianist is the theme of this•
chapter.
In this chapter, the spirit of the theories of both
Confucius and Hsun-tze will be compared in order to examine their
theoretical connection and Hsun-tze's further development of
Confucius' theories will be discussed in order to evaluate his
philosophical contribution to Confucianism.
A: THE SPIRIT OF CONFUCIUS' THOUGHT
It may be suggested that the spirit of Confucius' thought
is briefly and essentially twofold:
8. A Ta-Ju, the greatest scholar. In Hsun-tze's theory,
this term is no different from the term 'a Sage' which is used
more popularly throughout his book.
9. However, some Ch'ing scholars such as Hsiung Tz'u~Lu (1637-1709)
considered Hsun-tze's philosophy 'a branch of unorthodox theories'
and some modern scholars such as Chang Shih-T'ung considered Hsun-tze
to be an excellent exponent of Fa-ist. (For details, please see
Chang's HSUN-TZE CHIEN CHU, preface.)
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(1) Thought of moral humanism: The main theme of Confucius'
philosophy is man and morality. He puts forward, (a) his theory
of Jen or Human-Mindedness, Yi or righteousness and Li or rites in
order to point out that man's moral behaviour lies in a sense of
righteousness or an inner call from one's conscience; (b) his theory
of the difference between Yi or righteousness and Ming or destiny in
order to reveal that many aspects of human life are out of man's control,
he nevertheless possesses his freedom as a moral being. Confucius
considers Jen to be the ultimate moral ideal, while rites, filial piety,
10
faithfulness, forgiveness, trustworthiness, rectification of names
11
are details of moral practice. His ideal personality is a Jen Man
who, by constant moral practice, reaches the state of moral perfection.
He thus establishes a system of moral humanism.
(2) The ideal of moral education: In his theories, no matter
whether in the problems of politics, social relations or human relations,
he always emphasizes that moral education and the influence of a Jen Man
is the most effective means of instructing and correcting the moral
deficiency of man.
These two points are interrelated; his concern for man,
for morality and for moral education form a significant trinity which
is deeply imprinted in the minds of his later followers, and which
also became a strong current in Chinese thought and culture.
10. Li, ^ Hsiao, 41, Chung, Shu, /jb? Hsin,
Cheng Ming.
11. /p. ^ Jen-Che.
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B: SIMILARITIES IN THE THEORIES OF BOTH THINKERS
In the philosophy of Hsun-tze, it is obvious that he
always consciously follows the spirit of Confucius' thoughts. An
analysis of their similarities is listed below:
(1) In Hsun-tze's theories, he does not show much interest
in such problems as knowledge, nature or a supernatural god. As
far as knowledge of the external world is concerned, he is merely
interested in its practical value to man. In this respect, his
attitude corresponds with that of Confucius, although he has given
more detailed discus-sions to certain subjects of the external world
such as Heaven, than one may find in THE ANALECTS.
(2) Confucius' ideal is to establish a universal moral pattern,
and he thus turns to the problems of the individual and of human
relations. Hsun-tze, cherishing the same ideal, also clearly
advocates the Ultimate Principle of Man or the Way of Man (chapter
VIII) as his moral ideal and as a universal moral pattern for man.
At this point, their thoughts are no different.
(3) In the moral life of an individual, Confucius considers
Jen or Human-Mindedness to be the most important practice, while in
social institutions and human relations, he emphasizes the importance
of observing rites. Hsun-tze advocates the state 'of a Sage as the
ultimate goal of one's moral life, while in daily practice, he also
exalts rites. For example, in chapter II he says:
'Without rites, man cannot live. Without rites,
events may not be completed. Without rites, the country
will not have peace.' (I, 8)
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In chapter XIX, he says:
'Rites as a whole are the acme of the Way of Man.'
(XIII, 5)
There are many more similar statements expressing this idea in his
book. One may say that the spirit of the two thinkers is the same.
As to the connection between their moral ideals, the Jen or Human-
Mindedness of Confucius and the Sheng or Sage of Hsun-tze, a full
discussion will be given later.
(4) Confucius puts forward his theory of rectification of
names by advocating that 'the king should be a king, the official
should be an official, the father should be a father, and the son
12
should be a son ^ . In chapter IX, Hsun-tze extends this idea by
saying:
'The king should be a king, the official
should be an official, the father should be a father,
the son should be a son, the elder brother should be
an elder brother, and the younger should be a younger
brother: they all follow one principle. The farmer
should be a farmer, the scholar should be a scholar,
the worker should be a worker, and the merchant should
be a merchant: they all follow one principle.'
(V, 7)
The one principle suggested by Hsun-tze is the Ultimate
Principle of Man or morality which, in practice, is the practice of
rites and righteousness. Therefore one may say that in the theory
of rectification of names, they both indicate that man should fulfil
the moral requirements of their positions in society and human
relations. In other words, both their theories are concerned with
names and morality.
12. Please see, THE ANALECTS, Chapter XII.
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(5) Confucius repeatedly lays emphasis on moral education
and he considers the acme of moral education to lie in the influence
of the king's virtue upon his people. Hsun-tze reveals a similar
approach. There are many paragraphs in HSUN-TZE describing the
necessary moral cultivation of a king so that he may have a good
influence on his people. In chapter XII entitled 'The Way of a King',
Hsun-tze gives a concrete discussion of 'the acme of politics and
moral education', which may serve as an example of his inheritance
and development of Confucius' idea in this aspect.
C: HIS FURTHER DEVELOPMENT FROM THE THEORY OF CONFUCIUS
These similarities in both men's thinking may not, it may
be argued, prove that Hsun-tze definitely intended to succeed to
Confucius' thought.. However, it is in fact not a difficult task to
prove that he is an orthodox Confucianist. In his book, there are
paragraphs in which he clearly expresses his standpoint as a Confucian¬
ist. In theory, it may be suggested that the following point is the
most evident demonstration that he not only inherits Confucius'
thought, but also tries to develop it to a perfect state. He con¬
siders that the state of a Sage is a further development and a higher
level of the state of a Jen Man which is suggested by Confucius. In
13
Confucius' theory, a Jen Man is different from a Chih Man . He says:
'The Chih Man likes water, while the Jen Man likes
the mountain; for the former is active, while the latter
is calm. The Chih Man is joyful, and the Jen Man enjoys
long life.' (THE ANALECTS, chapter VI)
13. ^ Chih-Che, a wise man.
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He also says:
'The Chih Man is not confused. The Jen Man
does not worry.' (THE ANALECTS, Chapter IX)
However, Confucius implies, without spelling it out,
that a Jen Man is also a Chih Man. Here is the description in
THE ANALECTS:
14
'Once his disciple Tsai-0 asked him, "If
a Jen Man is told that a man has fallen in the well,
will he get into the well to save the man?"
Confucius replied, "Why should he do so? What a
Chiin-tze15 can do is to think up a way to save the man
in the well, yet he himself should not be trapped in
the well.'" (THE ANALECTS, Chapter VI).
In other words, a Jen Man should also be a Wise Man
before he may be called a Chun-tze. Confucius also says:
'How can I dare to call myself a Sage and a
Jen Man?' (THE ANALECTS,_ Chapter VII)
To him, a Sage and a Jen Man are not identical, yet in
what way they are different Confucius does not give further explanation.
In short, Jen or Human-Mindedness and Chih or wisdom are individually
introduced by Confucius while the detailed characteristics of a Sage
and the relationship between the Sage and Jen and Chih are not
mentioned. To Hsun-tze, a Sage is a combination of Jen and Chih.
His further development of Confucius' moral vocabularies of Jen, Chih
and Sheng or the Sage, may be analysed as follows:
14. %A Tsai-O.
15. 2^ Chun-tze, a morally good man. Hsun-tze also employs the
same term to denote the 'Conscientious Man'. Confucius often does
not give clear definitions of his technical moral terms such as the
Jen Man, the Chih Man, the Chun-tze and the Sage, whereas Hsun-tze
introduces his moral concepts in a well-organized way.
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(1) In chapter I, Hsun-tze says:
'If one wants to seek the greatness of the early
kings and to investigate the source of Jen and Yi, then
rites are the important ways.' (I, 5)
In other words, Hsun-tze suggests that rites are the
ways to practice Jen and Yi. Since in Confucius' theory Jen
originates deep in one's mind, which is not easily seen externally,
therefore Hsun-tze tries to put it into the practice of rites and
thus Jen is externalized and revealed.
(2) In Hsun-tze's theory, to practise rites is to practise
the Ultimate Principle of Man or morality, and the one who practises
the Ultimate Principle of Man is a Sage. A Sage therefore possesses
Jen within himself. However, a Sage in his virtue, is more than a
Jen Man.
(3) A Sage is, according to Hsun-tze, a combination of Jen
and Chih, or Human-Mindedness and wisdom. In chapter XII, he says:
'Although he (the Sage) may be in poverty, he
will certainly have reputation; if he achieves
prominence in officialdom, he will certainly contribute
meritorious deeds. His Human-Mindeness is so sub¬
stantially wide that it could cover the universe and
would never be exhausted, while his brightness (or
wisdom) is so intelligent that it is attentive to every
detail in his dealings with the universe and is capable
of administering all changes without delay. His dis¬
position is calm and peaceful, his ambition is great,
and his practice fills the universe with Human-Mindedness
and righteousness. This is the acme of the state of Jen
and Chih. This is what is meant by a Sage.' (VIII, 2-3)
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In the same chapter, Hsun-tze also says:
'One should not be wise (Chih) without
Human-Mindedness (Jen) and one should not be
Human-Minded without wisdom.'
It is thus clear that a Sage must possess not only Jen
but also Chih. This may be suggested to be his contribution to
Confucius' theory: he links up Confucius' moral vocabularies of
Jen, Chih and Sheng so as to allow the Confucian ideal personality
to reach a state of perfection in rational morality. If a moral
man possesses merely Jen without Chih, he may do something foolishly
wrong and in effect, his practice may produce an undesirable result.
16
At one time, Confucius defines Jen as to love man . In the case
of a father, for example, if he lavishes his love upon his son then,
Hsun-tze may argue, his son always gets what he asks for, becomes
idle in every thing and in the long run he is, mentally and physically,
no better than a disabled man. Or in the case of a man who by chance
has to stay with a mentally disordered man; since he should love all
men including this mad man whom he faces, he tries to fulfil every
wish requested by the mad man even when a knife is requested, but
eventually he may be deeply regretful, if the mad man kills himself
with that knife or it may become a great tragedy if he is killed by
the mad man. Therefore Hsun-tze wisely makes significant Chih or
wisdom to make up the logical deficiency and also clarifies the
Confucian concepts of Jen, Chih and Sheng and rearranges them in a
well-ordered way. In other words, his theory of the state of a Sage
16. THE ANALECTS, Chapter XII.
is a thorough extension of Confucius' theory of the state of a Jen
Man in order to allow the Confucian ideal moral state to become
more concise, rational and logical. This is his contribution to
Confucianism, which unfortunately most scholars in the past did
not notice or appreciate.
The Sage, to Hsun-tze, is Human-Minded (Jen) and wise
(Chih). In chapter XVI, Hsun-tze praises Confucius as a Sage who
possesses these qualities, (XV, 4). This may suggest that,
(1) Hsun-tze inherits the concept 'Jen' of Confucius and extends
it in order to develop his own ideal personality of a combination
of Jen and Chih in the state of a Sage; and (2) he holds
Confucius in high esteem as the model of his ideal personality.
In his book, besides the early kings such as Yao, Yu, Shun, the
recent kings, such as King Wen and King Wu, and the historical
figures such as Duke Chou, Confucius is the only one who is close
to Hsun-tze's times to be crowned as a Sage.
It may thus be suggested that Hsun-tze's theory works
as a further extension of and supplement to that of Confucius.
Therefore Hsun-tze is not only an orthodox Confucianist but also a
successful Confucianist in moral philosophy. The accusations that
his Confucianism is defective and that he leads the orthodox
17
Confucian moral theories in the wrong direction are thus mis¬
guided, being caused either by misinterpretation or overlooking the
essence of Hsunt-ze's theories.
17. op.cit., p.264, Lao's, pp.276-77, 292.
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Chapter VIII of his book entitled 'The Merit of a
Confucianist' is also an important demonstration of his inheritance
and development of Confucian theory. The content of this chapter
in general includes a great many miscellaneous subjects as with
other chapters, yet in it, as in other chapters, the main theme
lies in the discussion of the Way to becoming a Sage. He considers
that the ultimate merits of a Confucianist are twofold:
(1) for the agent himself who by following the Confucian practice
or the practice of rites and righteousness with Human-Mindedness
and wisdom, will gradually reach the state of a Sage or that of
moral perfection; and
(2) for the country, as by making use of the Confucian practice,
the agent will successfully rule the country and should, if he is
a king, become a Sage-King.
In other words, in Hsun-tze's ideal, a Confucianist
should be internally a Sage and externally a king or a king-like
figure with virtuous influence over others. This is the original
ideal of Confucius, therefore the meaning of 'Confucianist' in
Hsun-tze's theory also derives directly from Confucius' theory.
In short, Hsun-tze makes a distinctive development of Confucianism.
It is because the spirit of his thought as a whole lies within that
of Confucius' philosophy, therefore in theory and in practice, he
undoubtedly is an orthodox Confucianist.
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D: HIS PRESCRIPTION FOR DEALING WITH THE THEORETICAL
PROBLEMS OF CONFUCIUS' THEORY
Although Hsun-tze is without doubt a Confucianist, it
does not follow that he has successfully solved the theoretical
problems of Confucius. In the Confucian theories, it may be
suggested that the most essential theoretical problems needing to
be amended, supplemented and developed are the following: (1) In
his moral theories, how does Jen or Human-Mindedness originate, or
how can it be demonstrated? (2) In his political theories, what
is the principle of the transference of political power, or how can
a Sage become a king or an official?
Hsun-tze approaches these problems as follows:
(1) In Hsun-tze' theory the first problem is not a real
problem, for he puts Jen into practice, and by practising the Way
of a Sage, the Jen which is within man is externalized and thus
demonstrated. The quality of Jen is, Hsun-tze argues, not origin¬
al
ally and innately in man's Nature, for Man's Nature is innately Evil.
Therefore Jen must originate from the practice of Wei or Artifice;
in other words, it originates from the moral functioning of the Mind
when it is in the state of Great Clearness and Brightness. However,
Hsun-tze does not clearly point out (a) the connection of Jen and
Wei or Artifice, and (b) the relation of Jen to the Mind. He has
clearly indicated that the Sage is a combination of Jen and Chih, in
other words, the Sage is on a higher level than a Jen Man, yet he
fails to tightly link up the progression from Artifice to the issue
of Jen and to the perfection of a Sage, so as to establish a more
concise system of his theory of the Mind.
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(2) To the second problem Hsun-tze does not offer any
solution at all. He puts forward his theory of 'rule by a Sage-
King' and that of the Ultimately Fair Society which, in theory and
in practice, do not alter the deficiency of Confucian political
theory for the better. He does not carefully consider the essence
and value of politics, and he thinks that the way of ruling is a
sufficient way to solve the problems in the country. Therefore
although he advocates moral administration, the moral cultivation
of a king and a state of 'harmonious moral unity' in politics, these
do not, in practice, establish an effective way to the harmonious
and utilitarian state in a country. In short, he honestly follows
the political pattern of Confucius and likewise, his political
theories have the same problems as those of Confucius. The crucial
defects of Confucian political theories as a whole are as follows:
(i) In the general tendency towards emphasis on morality
the Confucianists often speak of politics in terras of morality. In
short, they fail to see that the issues of politics are in many
aspects different from those of morality.
(ii) They often fail to discern the different results of
practice of ethical duty and that of practice of civic duty.
(iii) Although they also consider that people are the source
of a country and the king should be considerate to his people, they
do not thus found a system of democracy because they normally view
the problem from the standpoint of a king or a ruler. Therefore in
Chinese history, their great efforts to find ways to the solution of
political problems were often, unfortunately, taken advantage of by
some emperors in order to fool their people. These emperors
deliberately exalted Confucian thought, especially such theories
18
as faithfulness, forgivingness, filial piety and obedience , which
were useful to their policies, so that their people would be brought
up to be controlled without trouble. However, although the
Confucianists in general are not successful in their political
thought, they diligently give advice to the kings to behave morally
and they also rigidly warn them that if they are tyrannical they will
lose their people and their kingdom. Therefore the disorderly
dynasties and the tyrannical policies in Chinese history were partly
caused either by the real essence of Confucianism not being appreci¬
ated by the emperors, or by the contemporary so-called Confucian
officials or bogus Confucianists not holding firm the spirit of
Confucian policies and to give due advice and warning to their kings.
However, another important problem of Chinese politics lies, it may
be suggested, in the universal ignorance and neglect of democratic
institutions which must be supported by a universal political con¬
sciousness of the masses. Therefore the rise and fall of dynasties
in Chinese history must be the universal responsibility of all
Chinese, and these should not be shouldered merely by Confucianists,
although their political theory in itself certainly has its
deficiencies.
Briefly, Hsun-tze succeeds in developing and supplementing
Confucian moral theory and remedying some of its deficiencies.
18. Chung, "fjg Shu Hsiao, and ^'1 Shun.
352
Nevertheless certain flaws, especially those in political theory,
still make him unsuccessful in the attempt to improve Confucianism
to a state of perfection, theoretically and practically.
In conclusion, the position 'of Hsun-tze's philosophy in
Pre-Ch'in Confucianism may be outlined as follows:
(1) In his moral discussion he follows the path of moral
humanism which was pioneered by Confucius. Nevertheless, his
further development in this aspect makes him the most thorough
advocate of moral humanism. His advocacy became a strong current
of the cultural spirit of his time and encouraged the development of
a healthy and sound cultural life in China. This was a success of
his theories and also a contribution to Confucianism.
(2) His theory of combining Jen and Chih as an ideal state
of moral perfection makes complete and rational the Confucian moral
philosophy.
(3) His theory of the Mind is the most detailed one among
all others in the Pre-Ch'in Period. It also paves the way for
studies of the mind in later Confucianism.
(4) His theories of rites and music are far more thorough
and detailed than those of Confucius. Most later Confucianists
were greatly influenced by him. These theories have been adapted
as basic teaching materials for a Confucianist.
In theoretical system, Hsun-tze's philosophy offers a
better organization than those of Confucius and Mencius. One may
say that Hsun-tze is a great contributor to the theory of the Mind
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and that of moral humanism for Pre-Ch'in Confucianism. In this
period Confucianism was developed and established by Hsun~tze.
Since then its spirit went from rise to fall. There are various




HIS PHILOSOPHY AND FA-ISM
CHAPTER X:
HIS PHILOSOPHY AND FA-ISM
A: A BRIEF SURVEY ON THE SIMILARITIES OF THE THEORIES
OF HSUN-TZE AND HAN FEI
Fa-ism1 was one of the most important schools of
thought in the late period of the Warring States. The leading
2
figure of this period was Han Fei , who was at one time a pupil of
3
Hsun-tze. Ch'in Shih Huang adopted the theories of Fa-ism and
employed Li-Shih, another pupil of Hsun-tze, as prime minister,
and in 221 B.C. he united China under the Ch'in Dynasty. However,
the policies of Fa-ism obviously did not meet the needs of the
masses and his dynasty ended in the third year after he died. Some
later scholars, such as Su-Shih, made the accusation that the severe
laws suggested by the Fa-ists led China to an extremely tyrannical
state and they, directly and indirectly, lay the blame on Hsun-tze,
the teacher of Han Fei who developed the system of Fa-ism, and the
teacher of Li-Shih who implemented the policies of Fa-ism in the
Ch'in Dynasty. Han Fei wrote some chapters on political issues and
he was historically considered to be the most important Fa-ist in
the Pre-Ch'in Period. There was no written work left by Li-Shih
and thus in the history of Chinese thought he did not enjoy the
same attention as that given to Han Fei. In this chapter, Han Fei's
1. op.cit., p.207, Note 12.
2. j||fl fa Han Fei, (d.233 B.C.) the most important thinker of
% Fa-Chia or Fa-ism, or the school of laws. He advocated
absolute government of the king by law and statecraft. There are
fifty-five chapters in his book entitled HAN-FEI-TZE; however, most
recent scholars suspect that there are only a few chapters which
were written by him, the rest were added by other anonymous writers.
jL Ch'in Shih Huang. The first emperor of Ch'in
Dynasty (221-207 B.C.).
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theories are to be taken as the typical exponents of Fa-ism in
order to compare the differences between Hsun-tze's theory and that
of Fa-ism.
The possible theoretical relations of the two thinkers
may be summarized under the following three points:
(1) Han Fei advocates 'laws are the doctrines of the masses
4
and the officials are their instructors' . Some scholars there¬
fore argued that his theory was a development of Hsun-tze's theory
of exaltation of laws and teachers.
(2) Han Fei considers that men swindle and suspect one
g
another and thus implies that man's nature is evil . This was
considered to be an inheritance of his teacher's famous theory that
Man's Nature is Evil.
(3) Han Fei lays great emphasis on the power and authority
of a ruler and suggests that a ruler must ride on his political
influence or authority6, hold firmly to his political art or skilful-
7 8
ness , and establish laws . This was considered to be influenced
by Hsun-tze's emphasis on respect to a king.
4. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapter XLIX.
5. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapter XLIX.
6. ^ Shih. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapters XXVIII, XL.
7. Shu. Please see HAN-FEI-TZE, chapter XLIII.
8. Fa. Please see HAN-TEI-TZE, chapters VIII, L.
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B; THE DIFFERENT IDEALS OF THE TWO THINKERS
Hsun-tze could thus be charged with having a bad
influence on Han Fei, his pupil, but this accusation will only lead
to biased or dogmatic criticism. These charges are, in fact,
disputable.
(1) Han Fei opposes the Confucian theory of the administration
9
of the Sage-King, or in his terms 'rule by the virtuous' . It may¬
be suggested that he tries to rectify, consciously or unconsciously,
this deficiency of Confucian political theory and therefore puts
forward his theory^ of the law-administration of -a king of ordinary
talent. This is a wise breakaway from Confucian political theory,
although his establishment of law-administration, which suggests that
the ruler should have supreme authority and that only the king may
have the freedom of law-making and overall control, leads to another
defect in political theory, i.e. it is viewed merely from the stand¬
point of a ruler and neglects the welfare of the masses. However,
his aim was to found a system of strict rule by the laws of a king
which, he considers, is the only way to save the chaotic world.
As to Hsun-tze's theory of exaltation of laws and teachers, his
intention is to establish the restriction of laws and moral education
of teachers as an external encouragement to good Artifice in order
to assist man on his way to becoming a Sage. Therefore his theory
is couched in terms of a moral discussion and it is initially not a
theory of politics. He also clearly claims that morally good
Artifice itself must originate from the moral functioning of one's
Mind. Therefore his exaltation of laws and teachers is a secondary
9. Hsien-Chih.
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emphasis in his discussion of the origin of moral activity. In
short, for Han Fei, teachers and laws are politically important,
while for Hsun-tze, they are morally influential. The different
viewpoints of the two thinkers are obvious. If one insists that
Han Fei derives his theory from that of Hsun-tze, one must also
bear in mind that they have different intentions.
(2) Han Fei indicates that given the fact that man loves
profits and power, and easily becomes suspicious and jealous, man's
nature therefore is evil. To Hsun-tze, the Evil of Man's Nature
lies in man's lack of the qualities of uprightness, reason, peace-
fulness and order in him and his possession of all kinds of desires
However, Han Fei does not establish a theory of human nature, he
merely tries to warn the ruler that his people have these 'evil'
traits of character, and he must use severe laws and punishments in
order to frighten them and make them obey his orders. Hsun-tze
tries to advise that man must transform his Evil Nature before he
can set off on the way to become a Sage. Therefore even if they
both claim that man's nature is evil, the purpose of making such
claims are different and the developments and directions of their
theories are obviously not the same.
(3) Han Fei tries to establish a political system of the
absolute unity of power and authority of the king. In other words
he advocates absolute or despotic monarchy. He also diametrically
opposes the theory of 'rule by the virtuous' which, he considers,
is not practical and not efficient in a disorderly age. In Hsun-
tze's political theory, a king must be a Sage-King, and a Sage-King
must be respected by all his people for his perfect virtue or moral
excellence, and a Sage-King is the moral teacher of all men in all
times. In other words, Hsun-tze advocates a theory of what Han
Fei calls 'rule by the virtuous', with which Han Fei fundamentally
disagrees and so do the other Fa-ists. Therefore it is not con¬
vincing to insist that at this point Han Fei is influenced by
Hsun-tze.
The critique that the two thinkers share the same
ideals is therefore biased and misguided. To say that two thoughts
are in correspondence with each other means that their essence or
the direction of their ideal is generally the same. However, in
the case of Hsun-tze and Han Fei, although in terminology they may
have used similar names or terms, and in theory they may have
accidental similarities in some minor points (but never the whole
part), the spirits of these two thinkers are almost opposite to
each other. This is why Hsun-tze is considered to be a Confucianist
and not a Fa-ist, and Han Fei a Fa-ist and not a Confucianist. As
to the argument that some parts of Han Fei's theory are encouraged
or influenced by Hsun-tze's thought, it would be unfair to say that
a teacher must be totally responsible for the bad results or defects
of his pupil. In fact, in the conscious digestion of the teacher's
instruction and the conscious establishment of one's own theory, one
should be completely responsible for the consequence of one's own
words and deeds, especially in the case of failure. In the case of
Han Fei, his theory is, in fact, completely divorced from that of his
teacher. According to the record of SHIH CHI or THE RECORDS OF
HISTORY, Han Fei was quite young when he was a pupil of Hsun-tze, and
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when he wrote his book entitled HAN FEI TZE, he had left his teacher
and developed his theories independently. Therefore if one argues
that since some parts of Hsun-tze's theory led to the biased theory
of Fa-ism represented by Han Fei, so that the moral and cultural
spirit of the Pre-Ch'in philosophy was since extinguished, this
10
argument itself is manifestly rootless and erroneous . The decay
of the moral and cultural spirit of Rre-Ch'in philosophy was a fact
caused by various factors, yet there is no evidence that Hsun-tze
should be involved in this connection.
<0
10. op.cit., p. 264. Lao's, pp.322-326.
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CHAPTER XI:
THE VALUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF HSUN-TZE
IN CHINESE CULTURE AND PHILOSOPHY
CHAPTER XI:
THE VALUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF
HSUN-T2E IN CHINESE CULTURE AND
PHILOSOPHY
A: THE SPIRIT OF TRADITIONAL CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
In modern times some western philosophers said
that there was no philosophy in China"1". This is certainly an
arguable statement. First of all one must examine the fact whether
the term 'philosophy' bears the same meaning in the western and
Chinese concepts, and secondly one must examine the different
directions of both thoughts.
(i) The different meanings of the term 'philosophy' in
Chinese and western thought
The term 'philosophy' in Chinese is constituted by the
words Che and Hsueh. The use of these two words as a compound noun
has not had a long history. In fact, they were a translation of a
Japanese expression derived from the English term 'philosophy'. In
a later period of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644-1911), they gradually
came to be used by Chinese scholars. Although during these hundred
years there were people who considered that the term translated was
not appropriate, it gradually became popularly used and commonly
accepted. However, the meaning of the term Che Hsueh, i.e. philosophy,
is in correspondence with the spirit of Chinese traditional thought.
1. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), for example, holds this
opinion. For details, please see Hegel's LECTURES ON THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY (translated from the German by E.S. Haldane and Frances H.
Simson), Introduction, pp.3,99. Oriental Philosophy, pp.117-125.
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2
According to ERH YA , Che is interpreted as 'wisdom', while Hsueh
3
is interpreted, according to Tai Chuan of SHANG SHU by Fu Sheng ,
4
as 'to imitate'; according to PAI HU TUNG by Pan Ku , as 'to be
awakened, to become aware of what one does not know'; and accord-
5
ing to SHUO WEN , as 'to realize'. Thus the term Che Hsueh means,
accordingly, 'the awarenesss and imitation of wisdom'. In other
words, Che Hsueh originates from internal awareness and external
imitation of the individual to wisdom, and it is a process of
combination of knowledge and practice. In the past, though the
Chinese philosophers did not name the content of their thought
Che Hsueh, they used some different terms instead. Chuang-tze
(c.369-286 B.C.), for example, used the term Tao Shu^; the scholars
of the Sung Dynasty (960-1279 A.D.) and Ming Dynasty (1386-1644 A.D.)
7
used the term Li Hsueh .
As to the term 'philosophy' in western thought, it was
the combination of the two Greek words 'philos' and 'sophia' which
means 'love of wisdom'. Because of their love of wisdom, the western
philosophers search for where wisdom is, or where the truth is. What
is different between the west and the Chinese is that, though the
2. /fi£ ERH-YA, an ancient book containing commentaries on
classics and names.
3. ^ & i£) ^ \% Fu-Sheng: SHANG SHU Ta -Chuan, another
name for BOOK OF HISTORY.
Pan Ku. PAI HU T'UNG. (or PO~HU T'UNGr)
5. % ft -K SHUO WEN, title of an etymological dictionary
composed by Hsu Shen of Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 220 A.D.).
6. jjjfj Tao Shu.
7- ^ Li Hsueh.
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Chinese thinkers do not start from the fire of love for wisdom,
they require themselves to have an internal awareness or realization
of wisdom and they also require themselves to practise what they are
aware of or what they are awakened by, while the western philosophers
seem to care more for the knowledge of wisdom and less for the
practice of what they know.
To conclude the above, one may say that the different
explanations of the term 'philosophy' and Che Hsueh given by the
west and the Chinese make the direction of the thoughts of the two
slightly different.
(ii) The different directions of western and Chinese thoughts
In their search for wisdom the western philosophers often
start off by investigating pure knowledge of the objective subjects
in which they are interested, and many of them do not particularly
require themselves to put their knowledge into practice. Thus the
direction of their thought often tends to conceptual investigations.
Some hold that philosophy is a study of linguistic usages. However,
if one considers that the important subjects in western philosophy
are theory of knowledge, metaphysics and ethics, then anyone who has
really studied Chinese philosophy must agree that the Chinese philo¬
sophers also have, more or less, touched upon the same subjects,
although whether or not they are intended to establish a theoretical
system of the subject is another question.
In ancient China, philosophers such as the later followers
of Mo-tze, Kung-Sun Lung, Hui Shih, Chuang-tze and Hsun-tze had
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touched upon the thoughts of formal logic. However, they seldom
intended to research into logic. Hsun-tze, for example, discussed
the theory of names (Ming) and that of the rectification of names
(Cheng Ming), and also mentioned the solution of the three confusions
(Huo) which is considered to be rich in logic, yet his concern was
with the relations of names to morality and not logic in its own
terms. On the other hand, starting from the very beginning, the
Chinese thinkers were skilful in the use of dialectic. The ANALECTS
and MENCIUS, for example, are dialectical dialogues. In Hsun-tze's
book, chapters XXI and XXII for example, are dialectically written.
As to the problems of knowledge, such as its origin, its nature, its
scope, some of the Chinese philosophers also offered a substantial
discussion. Hsun-tze, for example, discussed, though incompletely,
the origin of knowledge in his theory of Epistemological Mind.
Therefore, although the Chinese thinkers do not establish a well-
founded system of theory of knowledge, one cannot say that they have
never said anything about it.
As to the theory of metaphysics, I CHING, or THE BOOK OF
CHANGES, is a book which tries to give an explanation of the funda¬
mental principle of the universe in terms of I or change which
arises out of the interaction of the two cosmic forces of Yin and
8
Yang or the passive and active principles . Also in Mo-tze's theory,
9
his doctrine of 'the will of heaven' and that of 'honour to god and
10
ghosts' are rich in a metaphysical sense. As to the Confucianists,
8. For details, please see I CHING. ^Hsi-Ts'u Chuan.
9. T'ien-Chih. Please see MO-TZE, chapter XXVI.
10. Shang-Kuei. Please see MO-TZE, chapter XXXI.
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Confucius himself suggests Jen as the way of moral practice in order
to enable man to know the order of nature or the goal of man's life11;
Mencius considers that human nature is good and he suggests that by
the practice of 'perfection of the Mind and understanding of one's
12
own nature' one may know the order of the universe; and Hsun-tze
suggests that by a Sage Mind man may know and practice the Ultimate
Principle of Man which is the goal of man's life. They establish
and complete a system of humanistic moral metaphysics. This tend¬
ency in Chinese thought is certainly different from cosmic metaphysics
or theistical moral metaphysics in the western tradition. However,
one must accept that all these inquiries into metaphysics, the
western or the Chinese, are branches of metaphysical thought.
With regard to ethics, it seems that this has been of
special concern in Chinese thought. Confucius considered Jen as
the ultimate source of Li or propriety and Yi or righteousness, and
he advocated the theory that to practice Jen is the free choice of
man. Thus he opened the gate of moral freedom and the theory of
moral humanism was then founded. After him, the theories of either
Mo-ism or Tao-ism or Confucianism tend to be based on this foundation.
13
For example, the 'Sage' in Mo-tze's theory ; the 'real man',
14
'ultimate man' and 'heavenly man' in Chuang-tze's theory; the
15
'Chun-tze' and 'great man' in Mencius; and the 'Sage' and 'Great
11. ^ Chih T'ien.
12. jAti- Chin-Hsin Chih-Hsing.
13 • Sheng-Jen.
14. % ^ Chen-Jen, Chi-Jen, T'ien-Jen.
15. Chun-tze, Ta-Jen.
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Confucianist' in Hsun-tze, are all descriptions of those with ideal
personality. In conclusion, the characteristics of ethical thought
of the traditional Chinese thinkers are mainly twofold: (1) they
emphasize man's absolute freedom in morality, and (2) they believe
that if a man practises according to an objective and universal
moral ideal, he will eventually achieve it within himself. In
short, they reveal a strong sense of moral humanism.
Besides these three subjects, the ancient Chinese
philosophers also gave their opinions on such subjects as politics,
aesthetics, history, laws, economics, education, mathematics, physical
or natural science, medical science and culture. Therefore one may
say that they had produced almost all branches of philosophical
thought. However, historically, the Chinese philosophers tend to
concentrate on what concerns them most, i.e. morality. The general
direction of their efforts has developed the spirit of Chinese
philosophy. What then is the spirit of Chinese philosophy?
In the tradition, Confucian philosophers often tend to
establish a philosophy of a moral ideal. Confucius is the first
philosopher to exude a strong sense of moral humanism. The later
traditional Confucianists also devotedly follow his emphasis on
knowledge and practice of a moral ideal, and this becomes a traditional
spirit of Confucian philosophy. They consider that man's life and
livelihood is a reality, and the ultimate goal of man's life is moral¬
ity. They also consider that the external world is also a reality,
16. Sheng-Jen, Ta-Ju.
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and by means of senses and experience, man may achieve general
knowledge of such a reality. They never question the existence
of external reality, since they believe that it forms the physical
or material world and man's epistemological world. However, they
only care about the practical use of this common-sense reality,
and its relation to man. As to the reality of man's life and
livelihood, they find that only in the pursuit of a moral ideal
may a man enjoy his absolute moral freedom, and he may achieve a
sense of satisfaction through his fulfilment of a moral life. As
regards the extension of morality to society and the country or
state, this may be considered to be a minor detail of their concern.
This is also a common tendency or essential spirit in the thoughts
of Taoists and Moists in the Pre-Ch'in Period. This tendency
extends to modern times. Therefore one may say that their concern
for men and morality actually becomes the traditional spirit of
Chinese philosophy. In short, the spirit of moral humanism is a
consistent direction in Chinese philosophy.
Therefore anyone who says that there is no philosophy
in China or that there is no western style of philosophy in the
Chinese thought is pne who does not have an overall understanding
or comprehension of Chinese thought and who also does not thoroughly
realize the spirit of the Chinese thinkers.
B: THE ROLE OF PHILOSOPHY IN CHINESE CULTURE
Throughout the past three thousand years in Chinese
history although, in politics, there have been over ten changes of
dynasties, its cultural life has never been suspended. Viewed from
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the standpoint of internal or national affairs, although there are
17
five main groups which make up the Chinese nation , in politics
IS
the strongest group rules; and in culture the barbarian group
is influenced and civilized. Viewed from the standpoint of inter¬
national affairs, in politics those who offer tribute to the
sovereign are treated with courtesy and respect, and those who
invade the territory are resisted and fought; while in culture,
no matter whether far or near, many countries are influenced, more
or less, directly or indirectly, by the Chinese. The Chinese
certainly should not, and in fact did not, feel excessively proud
about their long history in culture, but they should reflect upon
the reason for its continuity in order to carry on the heritage so
as to pave the way for its future progress.
The history of Chinese politics, is indeed a succession
of order and disorder, or the rise and fall of dynasties. It is
true that only the emperors or the important officials can enjoy
the freedom of political power and interest. As to the ordinary
masses, they not only do not enjoy such a freedom, but also do not
have a guarantee of their life and livelihood. However, has the
Chinese culture thus ceased to flourish or been held back at a
19
certain stage without further development as some scholars suggest ?
17. Han, Chinese. Man, Manchu. Men, Mongol.
Hui, Mohammedan, and Tsang, Tibetan.
18• *}K i-Ti.
19. G.W.F. Hegel, for example, holds this view. He considers
that a subjective development in Chinese history has been absent
since Han Dynasty. For details of his theory, please see
Hegel's PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY, First Part, chapters I and III.
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The answer must certainly be negative. In fact, one has to separate
the unnecessary entanglement between politics and culture before one
can see clearly what culture is.
In Chinese political thought it is true that the theory
of rule by morality which originates from the ideal of moral achieve¬
ment is, indeed, only a way of ruling but not a system of politics.
Most of the Chinese philosophers do not carefully and thoroughly
ponder upon the actual problems of politics and are merely concerned
with the way of ruling; no matter if they are confined either in
their times or in their tradition, this must be considered to be a
crucial obsession of their thought and serious defect of their theory.
However, such a defect should not, and in fact did not, stop the
continuity and development of Chinese culture and civilization. One
cannot deny that this may have been, directly and indirectly, some¬
what of a hindrance to the development of Chinese culture, yet it
certainly cannot suspend its life. In the following pages an attempt
will be made to clarify the concept of culture and to sort out the
characteristics of Chinese culture. By then, the value of Chinese
philosophy may be established, and a fair criticism of the value of
Hsun-tze's thought in Chinese philosophy and culture may be reached.
(i) Culture and civilization
What, then, is culture?
Culture originates, roughly speaking, in the existence
and livelihood of a nation. In other words, when a nation continues
its existence and livelihood, its culture will certainly live on.
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The levels of culture may be divided into three:
(1) Its lowest level originates from Man's basic needs in
his existence and livelihood to invent material cultural instruments.
One may call this level the 'cultural level of instrumental reality'.
(2) While man's basic needs in his existence and livelihood
have gradually been solved he, the human being as a whole, also
accumulates simultaneously his cultural heritage, including the
technique of producing cultural instruments, language, gesture,
writing system, arts, knowledge, mythology, religion, custom, and
social practice including family and social systems, political
institution and organization. His cultural accumulation gradually
increases and extends: this gradually forms universal cultural
patterns. One may call this level 'cultural level of accumulation'.
In this level what is significant is that there is a gradual tendency
to form, according to the universal ideal and belief of the 'cultural
group', a current of cultural spirit which is separate from its
'level of instrumental reality'. 'Cultural group' means the con¬
stitution of at least the majority of the intellectuals and thinkers
and the majority of the masses. Cultural spirit is the conscious
selective accumulation of 'cultural mentality' or mental patterns.
(3) After their basic needs have been met human beings evolve
their culture by the progress of either (a) improvement in their
standard of living, or (b) response regulated by the traditional
spirit of their culture to external or internal challenges or
stimulations. The mode of their responses may be suggested as
follows:
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(a) by various forms of competition: A culture advances by
responding to challenges by means either of dominating conquest
of other cultures, or of competitive co-existence with other
cultures, or of acculturation of other cultures. This may be
called the positive response, or 'response of dominance'.
(b) by various forms of changes: A culture survives by means
either of borrowing from other cultures in order to supplement its
deficiencies, or of complete adaptation to or imitation of other
cultures, or of transformation in order to avoid a cultural death.
These different changes are in order in a degree in which a culture
loses its determination. This may be called the negative response,
or 'response of gradient'.
(c) by various forms of harmonization: A culture develops by
means either of improvement brought out through cross-fertilization
with the achievement of other cultures, or of improvement as a
result of its own creative resources, or of integration or of con¬
vergence with other cultures in order to smooth the conflict without
losing its self-determination. This may be called the integral
response or 'response of concord'.
One may call this level the 'cultural level of process'.
In every level of process, culture itself is bound to
attain a new level of accumulation, which may form a new accumulated
cultural pattern. Each new accumulated cultural pattern may also
become the base for the next cultural challenge or stimulation.
Therefore one may conclude that culture as a whole is 'a functioning
dynamic system which originates from man's basic needs and evolves
itself to an accumulated base by which its cultural spirit may lead
to a natural improvement or an imperative response to its internal
or external challenge or stimulation'.
is static, while the spirit of culture, or its mental pattern, which
is a continuous universal ideal and value distinctively featured
itself in the constant accumulation of cultural experience in the
nation, is dynamic. One also may see that to be able to deal with
the internal or external challenge or stimulation depends upon the
cultural spirit and not cultural products. The dynamic energy of
culture lies internally in the energy current formed by cultural
consciousness and cultural responsibility of the 'cultural group'.
The term 'civilization' may have various interpretations. If one
20
concentrates on its Chinese term Wen Ming which may mean 'enlight¬
ening or awakening from culture', one may interpret 'civilization'
or Wen Ming as 'the various aspects of consciousness in thoughts and
livelihood of a nation, including principally the consciousness of
morality, the consciousness of humanism, the consciousness of culture,
the consciousness of society, the consciousness of nation and the
consciousness of polities'. However, the term 'civilization' in
modern days is used popularly to indicate material enjoyment and
21
utility rather than mental awakening, a fact which is confusing
It may be suggested that culture is a dynamic evolutionary process
including the cultural products and cultural spirit, while civilization
21. Oswald Spengler, for example, sees the period of civilization as
the period of decline. Please see his work DECLINE OF THE WEST,
Vol.1, pp.31,104.
Thus one may see that the existence of cultural products
20. V.'en-Ming.
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denotes the various kinds of consciousness possessed by the 'cultural
group' in the nation. Civilization originates after culture, and
it is in direct proportion to its cultural spirit. If the cultural
spirit of a nation is of high intelligence, the manifestation of
its civilization is comparatively distinctive. In other words, if
a nation continuously possesses a highly intelligent universal ideal
and value, its people may also cherish various aspect of conscious¬
ness in thoughts and livelihood, and elevate their cultural spirit
to a higher level.
The Chinese possess rich cultural products and a
distinctive cultural spirit, however it has not yet reached the state
of ultimate civilization, i.e. full possession of all kinds of
consciousness of the cultural group. One of the reasons for this
may be suggested to be that although the Chinese thinkers in the
past consciously contemplated issues of morality, of humanism, of
culture and of nature, they still were in need of development in
e
the aspects of social and political consciousness. That is why,
in China, there were unstable dynasties and unjust societies.
Although there were merits in the theory of kingly politics and
ethical social structure, or in the Confucianists' term 'harmonious
moral unity in polities', the Chinese people were not led to a
further progress toward the state of ultimate civilization. How¬
ever, Chinese culture has never been suspended, a fact which is also
undeniable.
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(ii) The characteristics of Chinese culture
The key cause of the existence or decay of a culture
may be suggested to be as follows:
(1) Due to the internal and external challenge or stimulation,
culture itself produces an imperative response. The origin of such
a response must lie, however, in the cultural consciousness of the
'cultural group'. In other words, the cultural consciousness is the
necessary and efficient cause of the cultural dynamic process.
Cultural consciousness means man's understanding and critique of his
past cultural experience, his ability of cultural selection and his
sense of cultural succession, evolution and diffusion. Therefore,
if the cultural consciousness of a nation is significant its cultural
life, in principle, will be be suspended. This may also prove that
although the consciousness of politics and the consciousness of
society in a nation such as China have not yet been manifested or
developed, it does not follow .that its cultural life must then lag
or lapse or fall into decay or suspense.
(2) As to the strength of its energy-current of response, it
is determined by the cultural spirit of the 'cultural group'. The
ideal traits of the cultural spirit may be suggested to be as follows:
(a) Homoeostasis: the ability to constantly stabilize the distinctive
internal cultural traits, or to correct its unbalanced cultural life.
(b) Dynamic equilibrium: the functioning balance of the conflict
between immanent base and external challenge or stimulation.
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(c) Autonomy of culture-selection: the freedom to select the
distinctive foreign culture as a fertilizer for self-improvement,
reconstitution, revolution or convergence.
(d) Intellectual insight into the variable(s) of the
changes and intellectual philosophy of cultural eugenics.
In conclusion, the cultural spirit is determined by the
'cultural group'; the more conscious members it gathers, the stronger
cultural energy-current it aggregates. If the cultural spirit is
sufficiently high, -the durability of this culture will be incomparable,
infinite, inexhaustible and invincible, and it certainly can dispel
challenges and respond to stimulation.
(3) If a culture is able to constantly keep its durability,
in its response to challenge and stimulation, it will also be quali¬
fied for historical continuity and evolutional mobility which are the
reasons for its continuous existence.
Therefore it is clear that the efficient cause of the
continuous existence of a culture lies in the cultural spirit of the
'cultural group'. It is certainly not influenced by one man or a
small group, nor does it follow an external, objective and necessary
22
cultural law . In other words, the zenith or fall of a culture is
determined by the success or failure of the cultural energy-current
of the 'cultural group'. From this one may see that the
mechanistic theory of cultural life, which says that culture has its
destiny similar to human life, i.e. growth, old-age, illness and
22. Oswald Spengler, for example, holds this view in his DECLINE OF
THE WEST.
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death, or that culture is similar to natural seasons, i.e. spring,
23
summer, autumn and winter""' , is dogmatic. The unilinear concept-
24
ion of cultural evolution toward a 'golden age' is not true
either. If one bears in mind that cultural autonomy is in the
hands of the 'cultural group' and that only if a nation possesses
sufficient cultural consciousness and sense of cultural responsi¬
bility may it hold firm its culture-autonomy and durably continue
its life, then one will not fall into those groundless pessimistic
or optimistic beliefs. Although man himself is not the unique
efficient cause of cultural process, and one should not neglect the
fact that culture itself with its accumulation and heritage may
also form one of the determinating causes of its evolution, one
must see clearly that man himself or, more precisely, the 'cultural
group' itself, is the main necessary cause of culture, or the main
necessary origin of cultural energy-current, or the main necessary
structure of cultural dynamics.
After the above conceptions have been established, one
may turn back to the characteristics of Chinese culture or the
Chinese cultural spirit, which made it significantly durably and
23. N. Danilevsky, for example, holds that the period of civilization
of a nation is as short as that of the blooming of flowers. When this
period passes, the culture will lapse. Danilevsky takes the example
of the T'ang Dynasty in Chinese history to illustrate his theory.
However his views on Chinese culture are shallow and dogmatic. For
details of his theory, please see Danilevsky's RUSSIA AND EUROPE
(translated by K. Notzell).
24. The progressively linear theories of the evolution of humanity
advocated by the 17th century western philosophers such as Turgot
(1727-1781), Condorcet (1743-1794) and the Encyclopedists.
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continuously existent and still existing. In the past few
thousand years in the many challenges which it faces, the modes
of its responses are either the response of dominance, or the re-
25
sponse of gradient, or the response of concord . However, what
the Chinese 'cultural group' have expressed are, roughly speaking,
two things: (1) intellectual intuition, and (2) ideal moral
practice or sage practice. These two cultural characteristics
were spread into four interconnected cultural types of thinking:
(1) The emergence of the way of thinking expressed in
the BOOK OF CHANGES26.
27
(2) The continuity of thought in the BOOK OF CHANGES
(3) The moral seriousness and self-strengthening,
self-improvement and self-renewal of thought in
Confucianism26.
(4) The harmony and integration of life aimed at by
Confucianism29.
25. For discussions of the Chinese cultural responses to challenges,
please see for examples: LUN CHUNG-KUO WEN-HUA WEN-T'I by T'ang
Chiin-I and others, and Huang Wen-Shan's WEN-HUA HSUEH T'l-HSI, Vol.2.
26. For example, in I-CHING, the Kua or diagram of
Chi-Chi or 'already completed' is immediately followed by the last
Kua of Wei-Chi or 'not yet completed'. The idea of these
Kua implies that the author tries not to limit the mind to a certain
conclusion but urges one always to start a new direction of thinking.
27. For example, the author often emphasizes the notion of
Sheng-Sheng or 'live and multiply without end' to denote the concept
of Chiu or the long-lasting nature of human life and cultural
life.
28. For example, the Confucianists advocate the practice of
Nei-Sheng Wai-Wang or 'internal sage and external king'. A moral
agent should, they claim, internally be as virtuous as a sage and
externally be as noble in personality as a Sage-King.
29. For example, the notion of _— T'ien-Jen Ho-I or
'the unity of heaven and man' by means of moral practice. The
Confucianists believe that by constant, moral practice, man may
achieve Oneness with the universe and he will then have no worry but
only joy in his life.
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These four classes of thought have accumulated a great
deal of knowledge which cannot be discussed in detail here as it
is not the subject of this thesis. However, these two cultural
characteristics or four cultural classes of thought pave the road
for Chinese culture to evolve with dignity, positively, harmoniously
and in balance. They keep its state of homoeostasis, develop its
dynamic equilibrium and supervise its autonomy of culture-selection,
and they are the reasons for the durable, continuous and dynamical
existence of Chinese culture throughout history.
It is hoped that the above analysis may give a sufficient
understanding of Chinese culture and its spirit of mental patterns.
(iii) The role of philosophy in Chinese culture
The role of Chinese philosophy lies in the formation of
the cultural spirit. The BOOK OF CHANGES provides the skeleton for
Chinese cultural life while Confucianism provides its flesh. The
former advocates a theory of biological evolution of cultural life
while the latter supplements its development by a theory of moral
humanism which significantly flows in the cultural energy-current of
its cultural evolution.
The Confucianists emphasize social and ethical morality
which thus forms a strong tradition of exaltation of rites and
righteousness and respect for moral training or education. This
certainly influences the livelihood of the general masses so that,
they live according to a certain moral standard or pattern. In fact,
most of the local customs in a village are based on certain moral
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codes which, providing that they do not run to extremes, are a
strong moral influence in assisting the stabilization of the people
and society. If the followers of Confucianism are able to reflect
upon the meanings of these moral codes and to understand the teach¬
ing and efforts of earlier sages, they may then realize the meaning
and value of man's life and livelihood. When they reach the state
of a moral personality, the human world and the phsyical world
become only a convenient means of their livelihood, and their mental
life will enjoy a great independence. This is the process of
knowledge and practice of morality described by the Confucianists
as well as many other schools of Chinese thinkers. In short, they
all seek the great independence of man's mind, or its absolute
liberation. They also teach their followers to respect others, and
to take others as an example of learning. This forms a general
attitude of the Chinese thinkers when they face a cultural challenge
or stimulation. Buddhist thought, for example, was introduced to
China around the early years of the first century A.D. However, it
was not until theT'ang Dynasty, over six hundred years later that it
was gradually developed into three significant Chinese Buddhist sects:
30
T'ienT'ai Hua Yuen (Avatamsaka) and Ch' an or Zen . One of the main
reasons that these Buddhist sects were particulary adapted to
Chinese society and flourished and developed there was that the
spirit of the Mahayana or 'Great Vehicle' school was similar to the
spirit of Chinese moral humanism. They therefore converged and
31
integrated, and in later years paved the way for the Li Hsueh school
30. ^ ^.T'ien T'aiTzung
Ch'an Tzung.
Yuen Tzung,
31. 3§t ^ Li Hsueh.
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which flourished particularly in the Sung and Ming Dynasties, and
which became a significant branch of thought in Chinese history. In
other words, the Chinese philosophers in the past on one hand directed
the traditional Chinese cultural spirit into cultural challenges or
stimulations and, on the other, consciously selected aspects of
foreign culture and eased the conflict between traditional cultural
base and external challenge or stimulation. Thus with their
intellectual insight and intellectual intuition they evolved Chinese
culture into a more convergent and integral state. Their common
cultural spirit of moral humanism and their cultural consciousness
therefore worked as an engine and they moved and are still moving
the life of Chinese culture to live on with great durability in
history.
Therefore the role of philosophy in Chinese culture lies
in its enlightening and instructing of the spirit of moral humanism
in the nation and also in its intellectual insight and intellectual
intuition in cultural challenge, stimulation or changes to which it
puts into full play its function of homoeostasis, dynamic equilibrium
and autonomy of culture-selection. Its value must be based on these.
In the above discussion an attempt has been made to
analysize the role of Chinese philosophy in culture which is import¬
ant when the value of Hsun-tze's philosophy in Chinese culture is
estimated.
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C: THE VALUE OF HSUN-TZE'S THOUGHT IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY
AND CULTURE
In Hsun-tze's philosophy there are certain theoretical
defects which affect, directly and indirectly, his academic position
in the history of Chinese thoughts. His theory has few followers,
and he was often critisized as being a defective Confucianist, an
accusation which was unjustifiably made against him. Certain of
his theoretical defects are a theoretical problem, yet the value of
his thought as a whole must not thus be degraded or diminished.
The spirit of his philosophy is important to the development of
Chinese thought. ^s discussed before, Hsun-tze is the most thorough¬
going advocator of 'Man-ism' and 'Moral-ism' in the Pre-Ch'in Period,
and his theories are always in correspondence with the spirit of
moral humanism. His theory of the Way of the Mind reveals his
advocacy of the moral practice of 'internal sage and external king'.
His theory of the Mind as a whole expresses the ideal of the unity
of the Ultimate Principle or Tao and man. His theory always lays
emphasis upon the knowledge and practice of morality, and his ideal
state of moral perfection or the state of a Sage which richly reveals
the spirit of ethical metaphysics encourages a cultural spirit of
self-respect, self-discipline, self-improvement, self-strengthening
and self-renewal. He thus participates in and assists the formation
and development of the cultural energy-current of Chinese culture.
These make his writings a philosophy of carrying on the heritage so
as to pave the way for further generations.
The last paragraph of the last chapter (chapter XXXII)
of HSUN-TZE, which is quoted below, may be found interesting:
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'The commentators argued, "Hsun-tze is not so
great as Confucius". This is not true. Hsun-tze was
pressed by a chaotic world and was compelled by diffi¬
cult circumstances. In his early years, there was no
capable and virtuous king, and in his old age, he lived
into the time of the tyrannical Ch'in king. Thus in
his lifetime, the institutions of rites and righteous¬
ness were not observed, the ideals of moral education
and influence were unfulfilled, the ones who practised
Jen were few, the whole world was immersed in darkness,
those whose moral cultivation were perfect were taunted,
and the fuedal nobles were in great confusion and caused
chaos. At that time, the wise were not given a chance
to make plans (for the country), the capable to admin¬
ister and the virtuous to be employed. Therefore the
kings were deceived and failed to see the truth, while
the capable and the virtuous were rejected and exiled.
Consequently, although Hsun-tze had a great sage mind,
he had to disguise himself with feigned madness in order
to let people .believe him to be stupid. THE BOOK OF
ODES says, "He who is wise and sage-like will protect
his own life". The case of Hsun-tze may serve as an
example of this saying. And this is why he was falsely
accused, his followers were not many and his fame was
not widespread. Nowadays scholars may learn the say¬
ings and teachings which Hsun-tze left behind, which are
sufficiently great to be a pattern and example to be
followed by the world. Those who keep it will be
enriched by it, and those who are under its influence
will be impressed and pervaded by it. If one considers
his moral excellence, one will understand that Confucius
did not surpass him. However, people did not carefully
investigate this and argued that Hsun-tze was not a Sage.
What can one do about this? The world was not well-
governed, and Hsun-tze did not meet a satisfactory
opportunity. His virtue was as excellent as that of
Yao and Yu, but few people knew it. He did not adopt
the popular theories of his contemporaries and he was
thus suspected and slandered. However, his wisdom was
most bright, he followed the Ultimate Principle and his
conduct was in righteousness: all these were sufficiently
excellent to be the standard principle of life to others.
Alas! How capable and virtuous he was! He should have
been a king . . . Now the commentators also do not care¬
fully investigate the truth but easily believe the ill
fame attributed to him. His times were different, (in
such a disorderly world), how could the reputation (of a
sage) be known? He had no opportunity in politics, how
could the success of politics be achieved? However, his
devotedness in morality was perfect and his virtue was
great; who can say that he was not capable and virtuous?'
(XX, 18)
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The contents of the last six or seven chapters are an
assortment of miscellaneous records without a central theme, which
are often irrelevant to the thought of Hsun-tze. Most later scholars
agreed that they were not written by the same author as the previous
chapters, and were counterfeited by other later scholar(s). However,
the paragraph quoted above is extremely interesting and in fact quite
important. It seems that someone, after reading through the whole
book, tried to give his evaluation of Hsun-tze and to come to his
defence against those commentators who attempted to exalt Confucius
and to defame Hsun-tze. This may also give some indication that in
his lifetime, Hsun-tze was not popular and after his death, his
thoughts were also not appreciated. Although in this paragraph,
the writer did not give detailed information of the accusations of
the commentators against Hsun-tze, nor did he himself give a critical
examination of Hsun-tze's thought, it is obvious that the writer was
greatly in favour of Hsun-tze and suggest that Hsun-tze, in his
moral excellence, was as great as Confucius.
The moral excellence of Hsun-tze is, in practice, due to
a lack of documentation, not easy to subject to textual research, and
therefore one may find that the above comments do not help much in
justifying the value of Hsun-tze's philosophy. However, if one con¬
siders that in his theories, his meritorious thoughts that (1) all
men can become a sage which reveals a spirit of moral autonomy,
(2) that knowledge and practice of morality must go hand in hand,
which indicates the importance of moral practice, and (3) that thus
he expresses his ideals and belief in moral humanism and his sense of
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cultural responsibility, which encourages the flow of cultural
energy-current to move forward in later history, one will find the
necessary intrinsic value of his philosophy in Chinese culture.
Hsun-tze is the last great thinker who assists the
movement and development of Confucianism in the Pre-Ch'in Period,
and undoubtedly he is also one of the greatest Confucianists in
Chinese history and philosophy and culture. Hsun-tze, like most
Chinese philosophers, expresses his moral experience in, more or
less, a subjective way. He does not treat moral philosophy as a
subject-matter of conceptual investigation or theoretical analysis.
He often speaks from the viewpoint of an individual judgement and
he often makes statements based on personal experience. Therefore,
he is not a moulder of moral concepts. There are inevitably some
flaws in his theories. However, because of his great concern with
man and his moral destiny, and his profound theory of the way to





A HISTORICAL RECORD OF HIS LIFE
An account of the life of Hsun-tze was written by
Ssu-ma Ch'ien (145-86 B.C.) about 100 B.C., not much more than a
1
hundred years after Hsun-tze!s death . It is as follows:
'Hsun Ch'ing was a native of Chao . It was
not until he was fifty that he first came to widen his
learning in Ch'i®. . . . Those people such as T'ien
P'ien® were all dead. In the time of King Hsiang of
Ch'i7, Hsun Ch'ing became the most important scholar.
At that time, Ch'i was still filling vacancies in the
ranks of the Tai Fu or High Official®, and Hsun Ch'ing
was thrice chosen as Chi Chiu®. Some people of Ch'i
might possibly have slandered Hsun Ch'ing, in consequence
1. %rLt jfc- ^ ^'J Ssu-ma Ch'ien's SHIH CHI;
Meng-IIsun Lieh-Chuan.
2. 3^ Hsun, Surname.
3. fi&p Ch'ing. This is probably a form of title to honour Hsun-tze
who was once the magistrate of Lan-Ling.
4. Chao, a feudal state, arose in the early period of the Warring
States. Chao occupied the northern area of Chin by dividing the
territory of Chin with Hair and Wei, this including the
central and northern parts of present iXi Shansi and southwest of
Hopeh- It existed during 376-229 B.C.
5. Ch'i, a feudal state conferred on the Lu family by
Chou-Kung or the Duke of Chou, brother of Wu Wang or
King Wu, the first ruler of the Chou Dynasty. During the Spring and
Autumn and the Warring States periods, Ch'i became the most powerful
state, however, it was annexed by Ch'in in 221 B.C.
T'ien P'ien, a native of Ch'i. Almost nothing is known
about him. He lived in about 300-200 B.C. He was usually considered
a Taoist.
iang Wang, reigned 283-265 B.C.
8- ^ & Tai Fu. In order to encourage scholars to gather in the
capital, Ch'i offered the honorary title of Tai Fu or High Official.
The title was given without any actual governmental power.
9. Chi Chiu. In ancient sacrificial ceremony, one officer
who was officially named Chi Chiu and who normally was the most promin¬
ent among the High Officials, represented the court to offer wine to
Heaven and Earth.
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of which he went to Ch'u , and was appointed the
magistrate of Lan-Ling11 by Lord Ch 1 un-Shen12 .
When Lord Ch'un-Shen died, Hsun Ch'ing lost his
position, and he made his home at Lan-Ling. Li
Sze12, who afterwards became the prime minister of
Ch'in14, was once his disciple. Hsun Ch'ing
detested the politics of the disordered world of
his time. Declining states were ruled by tyran¬
nical princes who did not follow the great Way or
the Ultimate Principle1®, but turned to sorcery
and incantations, and believed in omens and sought
blessings from gods. Hsun-tze despised those
shallow-minded and low scholars and those fellows
of little learning, such as Chuang Chou16 and
others. He also satirized the chaotic world.
He therefore recommended the practice of the Con¬
fucian and Moist ethics1^ in the hope that the
chaotic situations could be rectified and the
social order restored. He wrote several tens of
thousands of words and died. He was buried in
Lan-Ling.'
Ch'u, a large feudal state in the south of Chou. It
occupied Hupeh, Hunan and part of -pj Honan and
Kiangsu. After having been one of the leading states during
Spring and Autumn and the Warring States periods, it was annexed by
Ch'in in 223 B.C.
11. j||B Pit, Lan-Ling. A place in lJ-1 jft. Shantung.
12. Ch'un-Shen Chun, one of the 'Four Nobles' in the
Warring States. He was the only one among the four having no princely
blood. He was made prime minister and was ennobled as a prince by.
yjj" 5^] 3E. King K'ao-Lieh of Ch'u who reigned from 263-238 B.C.
13. ^ Li Sze.
14. Ch'in was established in 770 B.C. It occupied the western
area of Chou. It gradually expanded during Spring and Autumn and
Warring States periods. In 249 B.C. Ch'in swallowed Chou. In 221 B.C.
it extended its dominance over the whole empire and unified China.
15. 31^ Tao, please see p.24, Note 37. For detailed discussion of
Tao, please see Chapter III of this thesis.
16 • & Ml Chuang Chou, or Chuang-tze.
17. Hsun-tze implemented the Confucian ethics by his theories of the
Ultimate Principle and his advocacy of the practice of the Way of a
Sage. However, Hsun-tze did not agree with Mo-tze's theories and it
is not known why Ssu-ma Ch'ien considered that Hsun-tze had recommended
Moism.
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About half a century later Liu Hsiang (77-6 B.C.) edited
a new version of Hsun-tze's work, and he wrote a preface on the life
of Hsun-tze, which is the only other early account one can find of
this philosopher. Liu's account is as follows:
'Hsun Ch'ing was a native of Chao, his given name
was K'uang1®. In the time of King Hsuan^ and King Wei
of Ch'i20, those capable and virtuous of the empire were
gathered at Chi Hsia21, and were honoured and favoured.
People such as Tsou Yen22, T'ien P'ien, Ch'un Yu-K'un23
and many others were titled as Tai Fu or High Officials,
and all were praised by the world. They all wrote
books to criticize what was happening at that time.
During this time, Hsun Ch'ing possessed scholastic tal¬
ent. When fifty, he first came to widen his knowledge
in Ch'i. He "thought that the types of doctrines of the
contemporary philosophers were all contradictory to those
of the ancient kings. Hsun Ch'ing was good at THE BOOK
OF ODES, RITES, THE BOOK OF CHANGES and THE SPRING AND
AUTUMN2^. At the time of King Hsiang of Ch'i, Hsun
Ch'ing became the most important scholar; Ch'i was still
filling the vacancies of the ranks of Tai Fu or High
Officials, and Hsun Ch'ing was thrice chosen as Chi Chiu.
Some people of Ch'i might possibly have defamed Hsun
Ch'ing, and consequently he went to Ch'u. There he was
made the magistrate of Lan-Ling by Lord Ch'un-Shen, the
prime minister of Ch'u. Someone might have said to Lord
Ch'un-Shen, "T'ang with a piece of land of seventy Li2®
became king; King Wu, with a hundred Li, also became
king. Hsun Ch'ing is a virtuous man, now you offered
him a piece of land of a hundred Li, is he not then danger¬
ous to Ch'u?" Lord Ch'un-Shen dismissed Hsun Ch'ing, and
therefore Hsun Ch'ing left Ch'u and journeyed to Chao.
Later a guest said to Lord Ch'un-Shen, "When I Yin2® left
18. K'uang.
19. ^ 5- Ch'i Hsuan Wang, 342-324 B.C.
20. ^>^5- ch'i Wei Wang, 378-343 B.C.
21. -"jC Chi Hsia, a place in Ch'i.
22. Tsou Yen, a native of Ch'i.
23• % -f 41 Ch 'un Yvi K'un, a native of Ch'i.
24. & SHIH CHING. ft |f LI CHING, A M I CHING,
CH'UN CH'IU.
25. Li, a unit of linear measure in ancient China, a Li is
about one third of a mile.
26. ^ I Yin, a prime minister of Yin Dynasty (c.1384--1I11 B.C.)
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Hsia and served Yin , Yin became the ruler of the world,
and Hsia decayed. When Kuan Chung23 left Lu3^ and
served Ch'i, Lu became weak and Ch'i strong. Hence where
there is a virtuous and capable man, the ruler is honoured
and the state is at peace. Now Hsun Ch'ing is the most
virtuous and capable man in the world, and does it not
worry the state that he is left?" Thus Lord Ch'un-Shen
sent his men to Hsun Ch'ing in the hope of re-employing
him. Hsun Ch'ing refused with a letter criticising Ch'u
to Lord Ch'un-Shen. Because of this letter, Lord Ch'un-
Shen was displeased and decided not to employ him again.
However, Hsun Ch'ing returned and became the magistrate of
Lan-Ling again. When Lord Ch'un-Shen died, Hsun Ch'ing
lost his post, since then he made his home at Lan-Ling.
Li Sze, who afterwards became the prime minister of
Ch'in, was once Hsun Ch'ing's disciple. Han Fei, alias
Han-tze, and Fou Ch'iu-Po3^ were also taught by Hsun Ch'ing,
and all later became famous scholars.
While Hsun Ch'ing was invited to serve the nobles,
he met King Chao of Ch'in31. King Chao at that time took
delight in fighting and conquering, but Hsun Ch'ing tried
to persuade him with the method of the Three Dynasties.
He went also to Ying Hou12, the prime minister of Ch'in;
yet no one was able or willing to employ him. He went to
Chao, and discussed military affairs with Sun Pin33 in front
of King Hsiao Ch'eng of Chao34. Sun Pin held that the army
should be changeable and cunning, whereas Hsun Ch'ing insist¬
ed that "kingly soldiers" should not be so; both did not
approach to an agreement. Consequently Hsun Ch'ing was not
employed by Chao. . .
Hsun Ch'ing died about a hundred years later than
Mencius ... He had never been employed by the rulers of
his time till his death, and spent his old age in Lan-Ling.'
27. Yin, an alternative name for the latter half of the Shang
Dynasty.
28. >|gP ^4* Kuan Chung, a prime minister of Ch'i in the Spring and
Autumn period.
&
29. >•£- Lu, a feudal state in the east of Chou. It occupied
Shantung area, during the Spring and Autumn and the Warring States
periods. In 249 B.C. it was annexed by Ch'u.
30. Fu Ch' iu~Po, not much known about him. He is said
to be a f|I| Hsien-Jen or an immortal by some Han people. However,
Liu might mention this name only according to heresajr.
31. ^ 0$ JE-Ch' in Chao Wang, 306-251 B.C.
32. Ying Hou.
33. •-$- Sun Pin, a native of Ch'u. He is the descendant of
Sun-tze, a strategist noted for his book, pp SUN-TZE PING-FA.
Chao Hsiao Ch'eng Wang, 265-245 B.C.
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According to the statement that 'when fifty, he first
came to widen his knowledge in Ch'i', it is believed by many scholars
that this was about 286-85 B.C., when he was in Ch'i. Thus his date
of birth might be suggested to be as early as 336-5 B.C. Also
according to the statement that 'when Lord Ch'un-Shen died, he lost
his post', Lord Ch'un-Shen was assassinated in 236 B.C., and thus
Hsun-tze's death should not be before 236 B.C. However, since there
is hardly any record with details of his date, one may only suggest





The first edition of HSUN-TZE was compiled by Liu Hsiang
(77-6 B.C.) who arranged the text in 32 chapters. Although it is
doubtful that the last five or six chapters were written by Hsun-tze
or the same author as that of the previous chapters, the text has
been adopted since.
The earliest commentary known is by Yang Liang of the
T ' ang Dynasty, who edited the work and rearranged it into 20 volumes
in 818 A.D., whose edition became an authority on which all later
texts were based.
More work on Hsun-tze was done in theCh'ing Dynasty.
In 1891 Wang Hsien-Ch'ien (1842-1917) edited a collection of
commentaries on all the previous textual studies of Hsun-tze and
this edition also became another basic text for studies of Hsun-tze.
chapters:




















On Honour and Disgrace
Reprimand of Phrenology
Against the Twelve Scholars
Confucius
The Merit of Confucianists

















Chapter XI The King and The Oppressor
Chapter XII The Way of a King
Chapter XIII The Way of Officials
Chapter XIV Obtaining Officials
Chapter XV Discussion of Military Matters
Chapter XVI The Strengthening of the Country
Chapter XVII On Heaven
Chapter XVIII On the Rectification of Errors
Chapter XIX On Rites
Chapter XX On Music
Chapter XXI Dispelling Obsessions (Removal of the
Obsessions of the Mind)
Chapter XXII The Rectification of Names
Chapter XXIII Man's Nature is Evil
Chapter XXIV A Conscientious Man (The Emperor)
Chapter XXV The Perfection of a Prime Minister
Chapter XXVI Poems
Chapter XXVII Scattered Sayings
Chapter XXVIII The Mottoes
Chapter XXIX The Way of a Son
Chapter XXX The Practice of Rules
Chapter XXXI Duke Ai
Chapter XXXII Yao Asked
391
APPENDIX 3:

























































































The works listed are those used in connection with the
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